espite having traditionally close relations with Russia, Serbia is strengthening diplomatic, economic, political, and even military ties with Ukraine. The Balkan nation remains one of a handful of European countries that have not imposed sanctions on Moscow. But how will the Kremlin react to the growing cooperation between Belgrade and Kyiv?
Since Russia launched the full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has met with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky several times. Before the war, Vucic held regular summits with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, yet over the past two years he has not held any official meetings with the Russian leader.
Most recently, Vucic and Zelensky met in Albania’s capital, Tirana, where the Serbian president signed the 12–point declaration expressing “unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders as of 1991.” The document also supports Kyiv’s ambitions to join NATO, calling on “the friends of Ukraine” to bring to justice “those individuals responsible for the crime of aggression,” and to cooperate on the return of “unlawfully and illegally deported and forcibly relocated Ukrainian children.”
By signing the Tirana Declaration, Vucic de facto supported the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Putin, who is accused of an “unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.” The Kremlin, however, did not condemn Vucic’s move, which gives the Serbian leader enough room to continue maneuvering, aiming to portray Serbia as an “independent country, and not anyone’s proxy state.”
In reality, however, Serbia seeks to develop close ties with NATO, rather than with Moscow and the Russia–dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). According to the U.S. ambassador to Serbia, Christopher Hill, NATO “works with the Serbian army every day, has exercises, and trainings,” while Belgrade aims to increase its ammunition production capacities, possibly to supply ammunition to Kyiv.
Following the Tirana summit on 28 February 2024, Zelensky said Ukraine is interested in defense co–production with the Balkan countries, including Serbia. Although in December 2007, Serbia declared military neutrality, Vucic did not rule out potential defense cooperation with Kyiv.
“Serbia needs to assess its position regarding joint ammunition production by Western Balkan countries and Ukraine,” he stressed.
Reports suggest that, back in April 2023, Belgrade agreed to sell weapons to the war–torn nation, not directly but through NATO countries allied to Kyiv. A potential joint ammunition deal with Ukraine and other Balkan states could have a positive impact on the Serbian defense industry. But what seems to worry Vucic is how to portray such a move to his voters, given that the vast majority of them are strongly pro–Russian.
In an attempt to change their view on the war in Ukraine, Vucic said he “does not understand the negative attitude towards the Eastern European country,” because Ukraine, as he stressed, “has never done anything against Serbia.”.Indeed, Ukraine, unlike most of its Western allies, has never recognized Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally–declared independence from Serbia. Ukraine’s ambassador to Belgrade, Volodymyr Tolkach, has repeatedly stated that Kyiv would remain consistent in its stance of not recognizing Kosovo. Serbia, on the other hand, supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and provides humanitarian aid to Ukrainians, whom Vucic described as “Serbian Slavic brothers.”
Such rhetoric, as well as various practical steps, indicate that Belgrade seeks to also gradually strengthen economic ties with Kyiv. Serbia reportedly wants to participate in the reconstruction of post–war Ukraine, which is why the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia, the largest business association in the country, signed the Memorandum on Cooperation with the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in late February 2024. The fact that Hill, US ambassador to Serbia, welcomed that move, pointing out that Belgrade is “doing good things for Ukraine,” indicates that the Balkan nation will continue distancing itself from Russia, and strengthening its foreign policy course of pro–Western neutrality.
But Moscow, abandoned by most of its allies, cannot afford to break ties with Belgrade over the growing political and economic contacts between Serbian and Ukrainian officials. The Kremlin even seems to turn a blind eye to the alleged Serbian military cooperation with Ukraine. Instead, Russian leadership likely aims to show to its own population that relations between Belgrade and Moscow can still be characterized as “business as usual.”
For Moscow, isolated by the West, even symbolic events that involve European countries seem to have a big importance. As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the International Federation of Football Associations, FIFA, and the Union of European Football Associations, UEFA, banned Russia’s national team and clubs from all competitions. Since so–called ‘friendly’ games are not part of the ban, Russia decided to host Serbia for a friendly football match in Moscow on 21 March 2024.
It was an ideal opportunity for Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to invite his Serbian counterpart Ivica Dacic to Moscow. The two officials watched the game together, after reportedly discussing the improvement of Serbian–Russian relations.
Dacic’s visit to Moscow, despite the fact that Vucic signed the Tirana Declaration—a move that Russian media and officials widely ignored—signals that Russia is ready to tolerate Belgrade’s cooperation with Kyiv as long as Serbia refuses to officially join anti–Russian sanctions. As a result, the Balkan nation will almost certainly continue developing all forms of cooperation with Ukraine, including military ties, quite aware that it has nothing to lose.
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Serbia’s can’t–lose Ukraine strategy
Belgrade, Serbia. Image by Nikola Cirkovia from Unsplash.
April 5, 2024
Serbia’s strengthening diplomatic, economic, political, and even military ties with Ukraine—bringing up the question of how the Kremlin will react to this cooperation. Serbian president Vucic's signing of the Tirana Declaration signifies Serbian as an independent country, writes Nikola Mikovic.
D
espite having traditionally close relations with Russia, Serbia is strengthening diplomatic, economic, political, and even military ties with Ukraine. The Balkan nation remains one of a handful of European countries that have not imposed sanctions on Moscow. But how will the Kremlin react to the growing cooperation between Belgrade and Kyiv?
Since Russia launched the full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has met with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky several times. Before the war, Vucic held regular summits with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, yet over the past two years he has not held any official meetings with the Russian leader.
Most recently, Vucic and Zelensky met in Albania’s capital, Tirana, where the Serbian president signed the 12–point declaration expressing “unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders as of 1991.” The document also supports Kyiv’s ambitions to join NATO, calling on “the friends of Ukraine” to bring to justice “those individuals responsible for the crime of aggression,” and to cooperate on the return of “unlawfully and illegally deported and forcibly relocated Ukrainian children.”
By signing the Tirana Declaration, Vucic de facto supported the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Putin, who is accused of an “unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.” The Kremlin, however, did not condemn Vucic’s move, which gives the Serbian leader enough room to continue maneuvering, aiming to portray Serbia as an “independent country, and not anyone’s proxy state.”
In reality, however, Serbia seeks to develop close ties with NATO, rather than with Moscow and the Russia–dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). According to the U.S. ambassador to Serbia, Christopher Hill, NATO “works with the Serbian army every day, has exercises, and trainings,” while Belgrade aims to increase its ammunition production capacities, possibly to supply ammunition to Kyiv.
Following the Tirana summit on 28 February 2024, Zelensky said Ukraine is interested in defense co–production with the Balkan countries, including Serbia. Although in December 2007, Serbia declared military neutrality, Vucic did not rule out potential defense cooperation with Kyiv.
“Serbia needs to assess its position regarding joint ammunition production by Western Balkan countries and Ukraine,” he stressed.
Reports suggest that, back in April 2023, Belgrade agreed to sell weapons to the war–torn nation, not directly but through NATO countries allied to Kyiv. A potential joint ammunition deal with Ukraine and other Balkan states could have a positive impact on the Serbian defense industry. But what seems to worry Vucic is how to portray such a move to his voters, given that the vast majority of them are strongly pro–Russian.
In an attempt to change their view on the war in Ukraine, Vucic said he “does not understand the negative attitude towards the Eastern European country,” because Ukraine, as he stressed, “has never done anything against Serbia.”.Indeed, Ukraine, unlike most of its Western allies, has never recognized Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally–declared independence from Serbia. Ukraine’s ambassador to Belgrade, Volodymyr Tolkach, has repeatedly stated that Kyiv would remain consistent in its stance of not recognizing Kosovo. Serbia, on the other hand, supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and provides humanitarian aid to Ukrainians, whom Vucic described as “Serbian Slavic brothers.”
Such rhetoric, as well as various practical steps, indicate that Belgrade seeks to also gradually strengthen economic ties with Kyiv. Serbia reportedly wants to participate in the reconstruction of post–war Ukraine, which is why the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia, the largest business association in the country, signed the Memorandum on Cooperation with the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in late February 2024. The fact that Hill, US ambassador to Serbia, welcomed that move, pointing out that Belgrade is “doing good things for Ukraine,” indicates that the Balkan nation will continue distancing itself from Russia, and strengthening its foreign policy course of pro–Western neutrality.
But Moscow, abandoned by most of its allies, cannot afford to break ties with Belgrade over the growing political and economic contacts between Serbian and Ukrainian officials. The Kremlin even seems to turn a blind eye to the alleged Serbian military cooperation with Ukraine. Instead, Russian leadership likely aims to show to its own population that relations between Belgrade and Moscow can still be characterized as “business as usual.”
For Moscow, isolated by the West, even symbolic events that involve European countries seem to have a big importance. As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the International Federation of Football Associations, FIFA, and the Union of European Football Associations, UEFA, banned Russia’s national team and clubs from all competitions. Since so–called ‘friendly’ games are not part of the ban, Russia decided to host Serbia for a friendly football match in Moscow on 21 March 2024.
It was an ideal opportunity for Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to invite his Serbian counterpart Ivica Dacic to Moscow. The two officials watched the game together, after reportedly discussing the improvement of Serbian–Russian relations.
Dacic’s visit to Moscow, despite the fact that Vucic signed the Tirana Declaration—a move that Russian media and officials widely ignored—signals that Russia is ready to tolerate Belgrade’s cooperation with Kyiv as long as Serbia refuses to officially join anti–Russian sanctions. As a result, the Balkan nation will almost certainly continue developing all forms of cooperation with Ukraine, including military ties, quite aware that it has nothing to lose.
