arly elections in Serbia seem to have become a norm. After a multi-party system was reintroduced in 1990, following the fall of communism, the southeastern European country held 10 snap elections. Will the upcoming vote, scheduled for 17 December 2023, have an impact on Serbia’s foreign policy, and who is expected to win?
Since the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power in 2012, the Balkan nation has held three early elections. Its former leader, Aleksandar Vucic, who is the current president of Serbia, claims that “there will be no other elections until 2027,” and that the voters will “determine the country’s fate on 17 December.” While Vucic formally stepped down as the president of the SNS in May 2023, he is still seen as the party’s de facto leader. The SNS is a major player in the Serbia Must Not Stop “big tent” coalition, which includes a number of small parties, and recent opinion polls [Serbian-language link] suggest that it might win 39% of the vote. That would certainly not be enough to form a new government. However, if its traditional partner—the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)—wins around 9% of the vote, and national minorities’ parties join them, the SNS and the SPS could continue governing the country.
The problem for the SNS, however, is the fact that the party’s support is significantly below its 2022 election results, when the SNS-led coalition won 44% of the vote. Previously, in 2022—when the opposition boycotted the elections —it got 63% of the vote, which clearly indicates it is losing popularity. But that does not necessarily mean the ruling parties will not be able to form a new government after the 17 December vote.
In Serbia, there is no unified opposition, and Vucic seems to be tacitly backed by all major foreign powers operating in the Balkans—the United States, the European Union, Russia, and even China. The major opposition “big tent” coalition, Serbia Against Violence, may get 25-30% of the seats in the Serbian parliament, which will be interpreted as a huge success. But in order to form a government, it would need to create a post-election alliance with several small nationalist political parties, as well as with the SPS. However, while it is not very probable the Socialists would turn their back on the SNS, it is entirely possible that certain opposition parties might join the SPS and the SNS and participate in a new government.
On the other hand, the opposition hopes to win local elections in big cities, including the capital Belgrade. But because Serbia has been chosen to host the renowned world's fair Expo 2027, which will take place in Belgrade, the SNS is unlikely to easily give up its control over the Serbian capital. The party’s leadership is quite aware that huge infrastructure projects in the next four years could bring significant profit to companies affiliated with the SNS. Thus, the “battle” for Belgrade could be the most interesting segment of the upcoming elections.
Still, the Kosovo issue remains one of the most dominant topics in Serbian domestic politics. Whoever wins the vote will almost certainly have to implement the European Union’s proposal on normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Vucic has already agreed to put into effect the deal, despite the fact that it represents Serbia’s implicit recognition of Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally declared independence, although he did not hurry with the actual implementation, as such a move would have had a serious impact on the SNS election results.
On the other hand, Borko Stefanovic, one of the leaders of the allegedly pro-Western Serbia Against Violence coalition, insists [Serbian-language link] that Vucic’s deals with the West and the authorities in Pristina “do not oblige the opposition in any sense”, which suggests that, if it comes to power, Serbia Against Violence may not implement the EU-brokered plan. Unless Stefanovic’s rhetoric is an empty promise, his coalition cannot count on Western support.
From the Western perspective, Vucic has so far been very cooperative, especially when it comes to Kosovo. Under his rule, Serbia has signed and implemented almost all aspects of the Brussels Agreement, as well as the Washington Agreement. As a result, Belgrade lost de facto control over Northern Kosovo, where ethnic Serbs make up the majority of the population. Thus, “better the devil you know, than the devil you don’t” seems to be the Western approach regarding the Serbian parliamentary elections.
Finally, regardless of the outcome of the vote, the Balkan nation—surrounded by NATO and EU members, and with extremely strong economic ties with the European Union—has little choice but to continue implementing its strategy of “pro-Western neutrality,” with or without the Serbian Progressive Party in power.
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Why the Serbian Elections Matter
Belgrade, Serbia. Photo by Ivan Aleksic on Unsplash
December 13, 2023
The outcome of Serbia’s 17 December election is difficult to predict, given the lack of a unified opposition and given the falling popularity of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party. Regardless of the outcome, Serbia’s foreign policy will likely remain largely unchanged, writes Nikola Mikovic.
E
arly elections in Serbia seem to have become a norm. After a multi-party system was reintroduced in 1990, following the fall of communism, the southeastern European country held 10 snap elections. Will the upcoming vote, scheduled for 17 December 2023, have an impact on Serbia’s foreign policy, and who is expected to win?
Since the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power in 2012, the Balkan nation has held three early elections. Its former leader, Aleksandar Vucic, who is the current president of Serbia, claims that “there will be no other elections until 2027,” and that the voters will “determine the country’s fate on 17 December.” While Vucic formally stepped down as the president of the SNS in May 2023, he is still seen as the party’s de facto leader. The SNS is a major player in the Serbia Must Not Stop “big tent” coalition, which includes a number of small parties, and recent opinion polls [Serbian-language link] suggest that it might win 39% of the vote. That would certainly not be enough to form a new government. However, if its traditional partner—the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)—wins around 9% of the vote, and national minorities’ parties join them, the SNS and the SPS could continue governing the country.
The problem for the SNS, however, is the fact that the party’s support is significantly below its 2022 election results, when the SNS-led coalition won 44% of the vote. Previously, in 2022—when the opposition boycotted the elections —it got 63% of the vote, which clearly indicates it is losing popularity. But that does not necessarily mean the ruling parties will not be able to form a new government after the 17 December vote.
In Serbia, there is no unified opposition, and Vucic seems to be tacitly backed by all major foreign powers operating in the Balkans—the United States, the European Union, Russia, and even China. The major opposition “big tent” coalition, Serbia Against Violence, may get 25-30% of the seats in the Serbian parliament, which will be interpreted as a huge success. But in order to form a government, it would need to create a post-election alliance with several small nationalist political parties, as well as with the SPS. However, while it is not very probable the Socialists would turn their back on the SNS, it is entirely possible that certain opposition parties might join the SPS and the SNS and participate in a new government.
On the other hand, the opposition hopes to win local elections in big cities, including the capital Belgrade. But because Serbia has been chosen to host the renowned world's fair Expo 2027, which will take place in Belgrade, the SNS is unlikely to easily give up its control over the Serbian capital. The party’s leadership is quite aware that huge infrastructure projects in the next four years could bring significant profit to companies affiliated with the SNS. Thus, the “battle” for Belgrade could be the most interesting segment of the upcoming elections.
Still, the Kosovo issue remains one of the most dominant topics in Serbian domestic politics. Whoever wins the vote will almost certainly have to implement the European Union’s proposal on normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Vucic has already agreed to put into effect the deal, despite the fact that it represents Serbia’s implicit recognition of Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally declared independence, although he did not hurry with the actual implementation, as such a move would have had a serious impact on the SNS election results.
On the other hand, Borko Stefanovic, one of the leaders of the allegedly pro-Western Serbia Against Violence coalition, insists [Serbian-language link] that Vucic’s deals with the West and the authorities in Pristina “do not oblige the opposition in any sense”, which suggests that, if it comes to power, Serbia Against Violence may not implement the EU-brokered plan. Unless Stefanovic’s rhetoric is an empty promise, his coalition cannot count on Western support.
From the Western perspective, Vucic has so far been very cooperative, especially when it comes to Kosovo. Under his rule, Serbia has signed and implemented almost all aspects of the Brussels Agreement, as well as the Washington Agreement. As a result, Belgrade lost de facto control over Northern Kosovo, where ethnic Serbs make up the majority of the population. Thus, “better the devil you know, than the devil you don’t” seems to be the Western approach regarding the Serbian parliamentary elections.
Finally, regardless of the outcome of the vote, the Balkan nation—surrounded by NATO and EU members, and with extremely strong economic ties with the European Union—has little choice but to continue implementing its strategy of “pro-Western neutrality,” with or without the Serbian Progressive Party in power.
