n late 2022, Cristiano Ronaldo's move to Saudi Arabian club Al-Nassr shocked the soccer community. This fact gathered a lot of attention as one of the most famous players worldwide decided to play in a minor league with a small local fan base and limited international appeal.
At that time, no one suspected that Cristiano Ronaldo's decision was the first in a long series that would have disrupted the 2023 soccer market. This summer, stars like Karim Benzema and N'Golo Kanté left Europe to join Saudi club Al-Ittihād, and many others are following.
There is mainly an economic reason behind these moves, as players are sometimes offered three to four times higher salaries than those they might earn in Europe.
Gulf Arab countries are also attempting to acquire some prestigious soccer teams in Europe, as happened with Newcastle—now owned by the Saudi Arabian Private Investment Fund (PIF)—or the Qatari-owned Paris Saint-Germain.
Saudi Arabia's interest in global sports extends beyond soccer. The country was reported to have discussed a potential deal with the ATP, the association of male professional tennis players. On the table is the proposal of hosting the Next Gen Finals in Riyadh—an event taking place every November for the most talented young players.
Some famous tennis players endorsed this proposal. Australia's Nick Kyrgios welcomed potential Saudi investment in tennis by tweeting, "Sign me up." More cautious was Novak Djokovic, a multiple Grand Slam champion, who said "integrity and tradition" are two essential pillars of tennis.
In recent years, Saudi Arabia succeeded in other sports. First, the country signed a 15-year, $900 million deal with F1 to host the Jeddah Grand Prix. Second, this year Saudi-backed LIV Golf merged with the renowned American PGA Tour, the organizer of golf tours in the United States.
Three main reasons are at the heart of the Saudi interest in global sport. First, the local leadership has prioritized socioeconomic development with its Vision 2030 strategy, which aims to channel additional resources towards sectors with high technological and social value.
Second, Saudi Arabia aims to increase its regional and international soft power—a concept that refers to "the use of a country's cultural and economic influence to persuade other countries to do something, rather than the use of military power."
Third, Riyadh's sportswashing aims to divert attention away from systemic human rights abuse. For example, the country's leadership's brutal killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 has drawn criticism and attention from the international community, particularly the U.S.
Saudi's ambitions should be understood in light of recent Middle Eastern events. In 2017, the so-called Qatar diplomatic crisis pitted Doha, supported by Teheran, against other Gulf countries. The tiny Arab country was accused of adopting an "independent" foreign policy, which meant "too close to Iran."
The Saudi-led coalition also accused Doha of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, a political-terrorist organization banned in most Gulf countries. In response, Doha highlighted the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi through its newspaper Al Jazeera, which has millions of readers in the Middle East and worldwide.
This diplomatic crisis officially ended in early 2021 after 43 months of air, land, and sea blockade of Qatar. Nowadays, Saudi-Iran relations are experiencing a moment of détente with the reopening of embassies in Tehran and Riyadh and the signing of a normalization agreement brokered by China.
Even if the direct competition with Qatar ended, soft power competition remains a priority in the Gulf, especially after Doha hosted the soccer World Cup in November last year. This fact irritated Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with the latter having already hosted major international sports events over the years.
The Saudi strategy is nothing new to sports fans. In fact, during the last decade, China adopted a similar national soccer strategy to attract international stars like Brazilian player Oscar and strengthen the national team.
In 2011, two years before becoming president of China, Xi Jinping set three soccer goals for the nation: qualify for another World Cup, host a World Cup, and win a World Cup by 2050. Xi's unstated purpose was to grow Chinese soft power at the expense of the West and other Asian countries.
More than 10 years later, these goals seem far from being achieved, and most foreign footballers decided to leave the league after the government tightened players' salaries. The COVID-19 pandemic and the global recession following the Russian invasion of Ukraine have accelerated this process.
Investments from authoritarian governments towards specific sectors can be increased—or decreased—for political purposes. Thus, soccer dreams could quickly falter without a market economy, a well-established fan base, and positive corporate balance sheets to support them.
To avoid what happened in China, Saudi Arabia's soccer ambitions need structural adjustments, such as privatizing the clubs (now state-owned), improving competition among them, and building infrastructure to generate long-term value.
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Saudi Arabia’s Sports Superpower Dreams
King Fahd International Stadium, the largest stadium in Saudi Arabia. Image by على المزارقه, CC BY-SA 3.0 , via Wikimedia Commons
August 7, 2023
Saudi Arabia has a growing interest in making a splash in global sports—from football to F1 racing. The reasoning for this interest is three-fold: socio-economic development, increased soft power, and diverting attention from human rights abuses, writes DC Correspondent Elia Preto Martini.
I
n late 2022, Cristiano Ronaldo's move to Saudi Arabian club Al-Nassr shocked the soccer community. This fact gathered a lot of attention as one of the most famous players worldwide decided to play in a minor league with a small local fan base and limited international appeal.
At that time, no one suspected that Cristiano Ronaldo's decision was the first in a long series that would have disrupted the 2023 soccer market. This summer, stars like Karim Benzema and N'Golo Kanté left Europe to join Saudi club Al-Ittihād, and many others are following.
There is mainly an economic reason behind these moves, as players are sometimes offered three to four times higher salaries than those they might earn in Europe.
Gulf Arab countries are also attempting to acquire some prestigious soccer teams in Europe, as happened with Newcastle—now owned by the Saudi Arabian Private Investment Fund (PIF)—or the Qatari-owned Paris Saint-Germain.
Saudi Arabia's interest in global sports extends beyond soccer. The country was reported to have discussed a potential deal with the ATP, the association of male professional tennis players. On the table is the proposal of hosting the Next Gen Finals in Riyadh—an event taking place every November for the most talented young players.
Some famous tennis players endorsed this proposal. Australia's Nick Kyrgios welcomed potential Saudi investment in tennis by tweeting, "Sign me up." More cautious was Novak Djokovic, a multiple Grand Slam champion, who said "integrity and tradition" are two essential pillars of tennis.
In recent years, Saudi Arabia succeeded in other sports. First, the country signed a 15-year, $900 million deal with F1 to host the Jeddah Grand Prix. Second, this year Saudi-backed LIV Golf merged with the renowned American PGA Tour, the organizer of golf tours in the United States.
Three main reasons are at the heart of the Saudi interest in global sport. First, the local leadership has prioritized socioeconomic development with its Vision 2030 strategy, which aims to channel additional resources towards sectors with high technological and social value.
Second, Saudi Arabia aims to increase its regional and international soft power—a concept that refers to "the use of a country's cultural and economic influence to persuade other countries to do something, rather than the use of military power."
Third, Riyadh's sportswashing aims to divert attention away from systemic human rights abuse. For example, the country's leadership's brutal killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 has drawn criticism and attention from the international community, particularly the U.S.
Saudi's ambitions should be understood in light of recent Middle Eastern events. In 2017, the so-called Qatar diplomatic crisis pitted Doha, supported by Teheran, against other Gulf countries. The tiny Arab country was accused of adopting an "independent" foreign policy, which meant "too close to Iran."
The Saudi-led coalition also accused Doha of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, a political-terrorist organization banned in most Gulf countries. In response, Doha highlighted the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi through its newspaper Al Jazeera, which has millions of readers in the Middle East and worldwide.
This diplomatic crisis officially ended in early 2021 after 43 months of air, land, and sea blockade of Qatar. Nowadays, Saudi-Iran relations are experiencing a moment of détente with the reopening of embassies in Tehran and Riyadh and the signing of a normalization agreement brokered by China.
Even if the direct competition with Qatar ended, soft power competition remains a priority in the Gulf, especially after Doha hosted the soccer World Cup in November last year. This fact irritated Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with the latter having already hosted major international sports events over the years.
The Saudi strategy is nothing new to sports fans. In fact, during the last decade, China adopted a similar national soccer strategy to attract international stars like Brazilian player Oscar and strengthen the national team.
In 2011, two years before becoming president of China, Xi Jinping set three soccer goals for the nation: qualify for another World Cup, host a World Cup, and win a World Cup by 2050. Xi's unstated purpose was to grow Chinese soft power at the expense of the West and other Asian countries.
More than 10 years later, these goals seem far from being achieved, and most foreign footballers decided to leave the league after the government tightened players' salaries. The COVID-19 pandemic and the global recession following the Russian invasion of Ukraine have accelerated this process.
Investments from authoritarian governments towards specific sectors can be increased—or decreased—for political purposes. Thus, soccer dreams could quickly falter without a market economy, a well-established fan base, and positive corporate balance sheets to support them.
To avoid what happened in China, Saudi Arabia's soccer ambitions need structural adjustments, such as privatizing the clubs (now state-owned), improving competition among them, and building infrastructure to generate long-term value.
