or Russia, a potential formal recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government is a sensitive political issue. Although Moscow still sees the radical group as a terrorist organization, that does not prevent the Kremlin from developing close economic ties with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities.
During the Soviet era, “the graveyard of empires” as Afghanistan is often known, was in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit. But following the Soviet military intervention in the country (1979–1989), and its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the Kremlin effectively lost its influence in Kabul. Ever since, the United States has been struggling to achieve its geostrategic goals in Afghanistan.
The American withdrawal from the landlocked Asian nation in 2021 gave Russia another opportunity to “return” to the war–torn country. This time, however, Moscow’s primary goals seem to be closely related to economy and security. But that does not mean the Kremlin aims to establish a Russian military presence in Afghanistan.
Given Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, as well as the recent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno–Karabakh, Russia is unlikely to have the ability to deploy forces to Afghanistan. Still, in order to protect its ally Tajikistan from Islamic militants operating in the war–torn nation, the Kremlin will have to develop close political ties with the Taliban.
The fact that the Taliban (despite being on Moscow’s terror list) has been invited to participate in the Russia–Islamic World Forum—an event scheduled to take place in May 2024 in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, where Muslims make up the majority of the population—clearly illustrates that Moscow sees the Afghan group as a potential partner in the international arena.
But Russia’s 2003 decision to recognize the Taliban movement as a terrorist organization over its alleged ties with separatist forces in Chechnya limits the Kremlin’s room for cooperation with the Afghan rulers. From the legal perspective, the Kremlin plans to host “terrorists” in Tatarstan’s capital, Kazan. Paradoxically enough, according to Zamir Kabulov, Russian special envoy for Afghanistan, Russia continues its “counter–terrorist cooperation” with the Taliban (a terrorist organization, from Moscow’s perspective).
At the same time, Moscow seeks to indirectly upgrade diplomatic cooperation with the Afghan group. As Kabulov reportedly told Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s deputy prime minister for political affairs, the Kremlin supports granting Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations to a Taliban representative. That could be the first step in the long process of taking the Taliban off Russia’s list of terrorist organizations.
If the group gets a seat at the UN, it will be a signal that the international community no longer sees the Taliban as a terrorist movement. Moscow could then use the Taliban presence at the United Nations as a pretext for further normalization of ties with Kabul.
But that does not mean that Russia will unconditionally recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. Western diplomats have repeatedly stated the group needs to change its course on human rights, particularly those of women. Although Moscow seems to have taken a more pragmatic approach regarding the Taliban, it also insists on these human rights issues.
According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russia will not recognize the Taliban until human rights, especially women's rights, are respected and an inclusive government is formed. But for Moscow, “an inclusive Afghan government” seems to be a priority over women's rights. Lavrov insists on a government that will not only include only ethnic Pashtuns, but also other groups living in Afghanistan.
From the Taliban perspective, its government is already inclusive because some ministers are ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks. Afghanistan’s ethnic landscape consists of Pashtuns (42%), Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbeks (9%), Aimak (4%), Turks (3%), and Baloch (2%). Although Lavrov admits that the Pashtun–dominated government includes other ethnic groups, he sees all of them as “political Taliban.” Does that mean Moscow expects the Taliban to form a politically diverse government?
For the radical group, such a Russian demand is unacceptable. As the Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid stressed on 20 January 2024, “the internal issues of Afghanistan are a matter for the Afghan people to address.” In his view, other countries should cooperate with Afghanistan and its people but should also “refrain from interfering in the Afghan internal affairs.”
Moscow, therefore, seems to have a hard time reaching a common ground with the Taliban, at least when it comes to political issues. The Afghan movement never supported Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor did it recognize Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as four other Ukrainian regions. Even if the Kremlin eventually removes the radical group from its list of terrorist organizations, the Taliban–led Afghan government is unlikely to take a pro–Russian stance, as such a move could jeopardize its relations with other potential partners in the global arena.
Quite aware of that, at this point Moscow seems to give priority to economic, rather than political, relations with Kabul. Back in 2022, Russia and the Taliban made an arrangement in the field of energy. The Russian Federation began supplying the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with gasoline, diesel, gas, and grain. Reports suggest that Russia even offered the Taliban administration a discount to average global commodity prices, a move that could have helped the Afghan group ease the international isolation that cut it off from the global banking system.
On 24 April 2024, following a meeting between Kabir and Kabulov, the Russian official emphasized that Russian companies are “keen on investing in Afghanistan.” Although the Taliban reportedly increased oil imports from Russia, as long as their country remains one of the top–ranked fragile states across the globe, Russian energy–giants such as Gazprom, Lukoil, and Rosneft, are unlikely to launch any big projects in Afghanistan.
All this complicates Russian political and economic efforts in Afghanistan. That is why the Kremlin does not seem to have much choice but to continue negotiating with “terrorists,” aiming to gradually increase its influence in the “graveyard of empires.”
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Russia’s troubling Taliban paradox
Sunset in Kabul, Afghanistan. Photo by nasim dadfar on Unsplash
April 30, 2024
Russia may formally recognize the Taliban—despite listing them as a terrorist organization—as it seeks to bolster security for its Central Asian allies. Yet a political agreement between the Kremlin and Taliban will be difficult to reach, writes Nikola Mikovic.
F
or Russia, a potential formal recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government is a sensitive political issue. Although Moscow still sees the radical group as a terrorist organization, that does not prevent the Kremlin from developing close economic ties with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities.
During the Soviet era, “the graveyard of empires” as Afghanistan is often known, was in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit. But following the Soviet military intervention in the country (1979–1989), and its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the Kremlin effectively lost its influence in Kabul. Ever since, the United States has been struggling to achieve its geostrategic goals in Afghanistan.
The American withdrawal from the landlocked Asian nation in 2021 gave Russia another opportunity to “return” to the war–torn country. This time, however, Moscow’s primary goals seem to be closely related to economy and security. But that does not mean the Kremlin aims to establish a Russian military presence in Afghanistan.
Given Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, as well as the recent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno–Karabakh, Russia is unlikely to have the ability to deploy forces to Afghanistan. Still, in order to protect its ally Tajikistan from Islamic militants operating in the war–torn nation, the Kremlin will have to develop close political ties with the Taliban.
The fact that the Taliban (despite being on Moscow’s terror list) has been invited to participate in the Russia–Islamic World Forum—an event scheduled to take place in May 2024 in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, where Muslims make up the majority of the population—clearly illustrates that Moscow sees the Afghan group as a potential partner in the international arena.
But Russia’s 2003 decision to recognize the Taliban movement as a terrorist organization over its alleged ties with separatist forces in Chechnya limits the Kremlin’s room for cooperation with the Afghan rulers. From the legal perspective, the Kremlin plans to host “terrorists” in Tatarstan’s capital, Kazan. Paradoxically enough, according to Zamir Kabulov, Russian special envoy for Afghanistan, Russia continues its “counter–terrorist cooperation” with the Taliban (a terrorist organization, from Moscow’s perspective).
At the same time, Moscow seeks to indirectly upgrade diplomatic cooperation with the Afghan group. As Kabulov reportedly told Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s deputy prime minister for political affairs, the Kremlin supports granting Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations to a Taliban representative. That could be the first step in the long process of taking the Taliban off Russia’s list of terrorist organizations.
If the group gets a seat at the UN, it will be a signal that the international community no longer sees the Taliban as a terrorist movement. Moscow could then use the Taliban presence at the United Nations as a pretext for further normalization of ties with Kabul.
But that does not mean that Russia will unconditionally recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. Western diplomats have repeatedly stated the group needs to change its course on human rights, particularly those of women. Although Moscow seems to have taken a more pragmatic approach regarding the Taliban, it also insists on these human rights issues.
According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russia will not recognize the Taliban until human rights, especially women's rights, are respected and an inclusive government is formed. But for Moscow, “an inclusive Afghan government” seems to be a priority over women's rights. Lavrov insists on a government that will not only include only ethnic Pashtuns, but also other groups living in Afghanistan.
From the Taliban perspective, its government is already inclusive because some ministers are ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks. Afghanistan’s ethnic landscape consists of Pashtuns (42%), Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbeks (9%), Aimak (4%), Turks (3%), and Baloch (2%). Although Lavrov admits that the Pashtun–dominated government includes other ethnic groups, he sees all of them as “political Taliban.” Does that mean Moscow expects the Taliban to form a politically diverse government?
For the radical group, such a Russian demand is unacceptable. As the Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid stressed on 20 January 2024, “the internal issues of Afghanistan are a matter for the Afghan people to address.” In his view, other countries should cooperate with Afghanistan and its people but should also “refrain from interfering in the Afghan internal affairs.”
Moscow, therefore, seems to have a hard time reaching a common ground with the Taliban, at least when it comes to political issues. The Afghan movement never supported Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor did it recognize Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as four other Ukrainian regions. Even if the Kremlin eventually removes the radical group from its list of terrorist organizations, the Taliban–led Afghan government is unlikely to take a pro–Russian stance, as such a move could jeopardize its relations with other potential partners in the global arena.
Quite aware of that, at this point Moscow seems to give priority to economic, rather than political, relations with Kabul. Back in 2022, Russia and the Taliban made an arrangement in the field of energy. The Russian Federation began supplying the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with gasoline, diesel, gas, and grain. Reports suggest that Russia even offered the Taliban administration a discount to average global commodity prices, a move that could have helped the Afghan group ease the international isolation that cut it off from the global banking system.
On 24 April 2024, following a meeting between Kabir and Kabulov, the Russian official emphasized that Russian companies are “keen on investing in Afghanistan.” Although the Taliban reportedly increased oil imports from Russia, as long as their country remains one of the top–ranked fragile states across the globe, Russian energy–giants such as Gazprom, Lukoil, and Rosneft, are unlikely to launch any big projects in Afghanistan.
All this complicates Russian political and economic efforts in Afghanistan. That is why the Kremlin does not seem to have much choice but to continue negotiating with “terrorists,” aiming to gradually increase its influence in the “graveyard of empires.”
