ussia’s invasion of Ukraine spawned a legion of insta-pundits and social media experts, all of whom speculated about Moscow’s intentions, President Vladimir Putin’s mental health, how Ukraine would fare, and every subject in between. Watching the news and commentary unfold, it was striking to see many of the tired old clichés about Russia and Putin re-emerged: Russia and Putin are merely tactical actors. It’s all about Putin. Moscow doesn’t have a strategy, it’s purely reactive. The Gerasimov doctrine (which doesn’t exist) dictates everything. This is a new “Cold War”. Russia is merely a gas station with nuclear weapons. The list could go on and on.
One would be forgiven for thinking that they were watching Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, its involvement in Syria since 2015, Moscow’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, its cyber assault on Estonia in 2007, or even the first and second Chechen wars. It is as if the field of Russia analysis had not progressed from the end of the Cold War (indeed experts struggled to come up with a new name for the situation in which the West found itself vis-à-vis Moscow).
At its core, this boils down to intellectual laziness and strategic arrogance. Were it purely a matter of academic interest, it could be ignored, but the tangible consequences of this on the world stage are legion. Every administration has sought to “get” Russia right be it by intimate eye gazing, burger diplomacy and “over-charging” resets, or unrequited “bromances.”
Breaking through this intellectual idleness at the policymaking level is critical if the West is to make smart, long-term policy toward Moscow. Dr. Andrew Monaghan, a Kennan Institute Fellow, assembled an impressive group of diverse authors to unpack Russia’s approach to the world and, ultimately, its grand strategy in the aptly titled “Russian Grand Strategy in an Era of Global Power Competition”. This is an exceedingly timely book (a copy of which was kindly provided by Manchester University Press), even more so in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
That invasion in no way diminishes the utility or value of this book. In fact, it better helps to frame the war within a broad context of Russian strategy and worldviews, its “mental maps” and understanding of its geopolitical place and policy goals. From literal map-making to Arctic policy, strategically important economic sectors, and the understanding of Russia’s “next generation war” concept, the authors clearly present a much more nuanced, complex, and ultimately invaluable, picture of Russia. This complexity is something to be relished. In grossly oversimplified terms, Bond villains are interesting, to be sure, but the political intrigues, subterfuge, deception, and complexity of Game of Thrones (the books, not the series, about which we will not speak), is vastly more engaging and enjoyable. Monaghan and other real Russia experts take the one-dimensional Russia we see on cable news and make a much more vivid and fascinating three-dimensional structure.
Readers diving into “Russian Grand Strategy” will be faced with two key realities. The first is just how little President Vladimir Putin figures into the discussion. This brings into stark contrast how much Western media puts Putin at the center of everything with the reality of how he is only one part of a dynamic ecosystem of leadership. In the case of the former, the West’s tendency is to personalize politics and fixate on one figure. It is far easier to pin politics to one figure rather than engage with an eco-system of leaders, parties, factions, and differing centers of gravity. Yet, to do so masks the complexity, nuance, and dynamism of foreign political systems, preventing real understanding of how a country works. Putin may sit astride a personalist autocratic system, but he is absolutely not an unquestioned dictator whose every diktat is carried out to the letter.
Assuming that everything is about Putin suggests that his departure from the Kremlin—literally or metaphorically—would mean that Russia’s interests or behaviors would somehow fundamentally change. This is manifestly wrong as the authors show. Russia’s grand strategy is not about Putin, but about, shockingly, Russia. This doesn’t mean that Russia’s grand strategy is straightforward. It is based on Moscow’s understanding of the world and its future, and Russia’s desired place within that future. Neither Russia’s security fears of encirclement nor its desire to corner certain strategic industries will suddenly disappear when Putin leaves office.
The second reality is that Russia does, indeed, have a grand strategy and does not operate in some ad hoc, opportunistic or tactical fashion alone. Russia – and Putin specifically – is often portrayed as a tactical actor, responding to events as they happen. Here, Putin and Russia act without a plan, acting in an ad hoc fashion. This is demonstrably not the case. Every chapter in “Russian Grand Strategy” notes the number and diversity of plans, documents, and strategic guidance issued from Moscow on everything from mapping to military doctrine, from Arctic policy to strategic economic industries. Of course, having plans and documents does not mean that the implementation is guaranteed or a smooth process. Russia may be a personalist autocracy, but that does not mean that the Kremlin’s edicts are followed unquestioningly or smoothly.
The Kremlin’s leadership is much like a lighthouse, when the light is shining directly on an issue or policy, much gets done. But as that light rotates onto other areas it gets dimmer and dimmer, creating more room for bureaucratic inertia to step in, parochial interests to coopt budgets, or simple idleness to set in.
There is an alarming trend in American politics that conflates empathy with sympathy. If you understand something, you in turn must support that thing. Understanding does not equate to acceptance, but that is how it appears to be in today’s discourse. Yet, understanding something, like how Russia views the world and creates policy accordingly, is critical if smart policy is to be crafted. Unfortunately, too often it seems if one has strategic empathy for an adversary—that is, understanding the world from their point of view—one is of dubious moral quality and clearly supports said adversary. Is it any wonder then that we repeatedly end up with such bad policy?
There is an unfortunate weakness in “Russian Grand Strategy” that’s due to no fault of Monaghan or the assembled authors. The authors patiently and thoroughly present a necessary nuanced picture of Russia’s grand strategy. They clearly demonstrate that it’s not all about Putin and that Russia actually has a long-term plan. They achieve all they set out to do and then some.
This book is, however, likely to appeal to those already interested in Russia and who already possess such a nuanced perspective. They will learn something nonetheless and should absolutely read it, but they are not the people that should be reading this book. Rather, penetrating the commentariat or the policy community above, perhaps, the professional staff member level, is the key challenge. This is especially true when mass market publications tend toward repackaging tired clichés (“Putin the mastermind” sells a lot better than “Putin the first among equals in a competing system of overlapping interest groups, power bases, bureaucracies, and centers of gravity.”)
The inability to breakthrough to the level of the principals (an issue not limited to Russia policy) is likely a consequence of the nature of managing up to principals, full stop—distilling complex issues into bullet points or perhaps a one-pager. Yet, unless nuance and complexity are introduced at that level, the same shortcuts will lead to the same policy shortcomings.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly sparked renewed interest in understanding the country and its politics. If, however, the understanding only recycles the same clichés and tropes, we shouldn’t be surprised if we end up with the same policy outcomes, and that is something that we cannot afford.
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Russia’s Grand Strategy in Moscow’s Own Words
Moscow, Russia. Photo via Pixabay.
April 23, 2022
In his latest book review, Joshua Huminski discusses "Russian Grand Strategy," edited by Andrew Monaghan. The book delivers some powerful lessons, upsetting Western assumptions about the Kremlin's decision making while subtly showing how intellectually lazy Western policy has become.
R
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine spawned a legion of insta-pundits and social media experts, all of whom speculated about Moscow’s intentions, President Vladimir Putin’s mental health, how Ukraine would fare, and every subject in between. Watching the news and commentary unfold, it was striking to see many of the tired old clichés about Russia and Putin re-emerged: Russia and Putin are merely tactical actors. It’s all about Putin. Moscow doesn’t have a strategy, it’s purely reactive. The Gerasimov doctrine (which doesn’t exist) dictates everything. This is a new “Cold War”. Russia is merely a gas station with nuclear weapons. The list could go on and on.
One would be forgiven for thinking that they were watching Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, its involvement in Syria since 2015, Moscow’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, its cyber assault on Estonia in 2007, or even the first and second Chechen wars. It is as if the field of Russia analysis had not progressed from the end of the Cold War (indeed experts struggled to come up with a new name for the situation in which the West found itself vis-à-vis Moscow).
At its core, this boils down to intellectual laziness and strategic arrogance. Were it purely a matter of academic interest, it could be ignored, but the tangible consequences of this on the world stage are legion. Every administration has sought to “get” Russia right be it by intimate eye gazing, burger diplomacy and “over-charging” resets, or unrequited “bromances.”
Breaking through this intellectual idleness at the policymaking level is critical if the West is to make smart, long-term policy toward Moscow. Dr. Andrew Monaghan, a Kennan Institute Fellow, assembled an impressive group of diverse authors to unpack Russia’s approach to the world and, ultimately, its grand strategy in the aptly titled “Russian Grand Strategy in an Era of Global Power Competition”. This is an exceedingly timely book (a copy of which was kindly provided by Manchester University Press), even more so in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
That invasion in no way diminishes the utility or value of this book. In fact, it better helps to frame the war within a broad context of Russian strategy and worldviews, its “mental maps” and understanding of its geopolitical place and policy goals. From literal map-making to Arctic policy, strategically important economic sectors, and the understanding of Russia’s “next generation war” concept, the authors clearly present a much more nuanced, complex, and ultimately invaluable, picture of Russia. This complexity is something to be relished. In grossly oversimplified terms, Bond villains are interesting, to be sure, but the political intrigues, subterfuge, deception, and complexity of Game of Thrones (the books, not the series, about which we will not speak), is vastly more engaging and enjoyable. Monaghan and other real Russia experts take the one-dimensional Russia we see on cable news and make a much more vivid and fascinating three-dimensional structure.
Readers diving into “Russian Grand Strategy” will be faced with two key realities. The first is just how little President Vladimir Putin figures into the discussion. This brings into stark contrast how much Western media puts Putin at the center of everything with the reality of how he is only one part of a dynamic ecosystem of leadership. In the case of the former, the West’s tendency is to personalize politics and fixate on one figure. It is far easier to pin politics to one figure rather than engage with an eco-system of leaders, parties, factions, and differing centers of gravity. Yet, to do so masks the complexity, nuance, and dynamism of foreign political systems, preventing real understanding of how a country works. Putin may sit astride a personalist autocratic system, but he is absolutely not an unquestioned dictator whose every diktat is carried out to the letter.
Assuming that everything is about Putin suggests that his departure from the Kremlin—literally or metaphorically—would mean that Russia’s interests or behaviors would somehow fundamentally change. This is manifestly wrong as the authors show. Russia’s grand strategy is not about Putin, but about, shockingly, Russia. This doesn’t mean that Russia’s grand strategy is straightforward. It is based on Moscow’s understanding of the world and its future, and Russia’s desired place within that future. Neither Russia’s security fears of encirclement nor its desire to corner certain strategic industries will suddenly disappear when Putin leaves office.
The second reality is that Russia does, indeed, have a grand strategy and does not operate in some ad hoc, opportunistic or tactical fashion alone. Russia – and Putin specifically – is often portrayed as a tactical actor, responding to events as they happen. Here, Putin and Russia act without a plan, acting in an ad hoc fashion. This is demonstrably not the case. Every chapter in “Russian Grand Strategy” notes the number and diversity of plans, documents, and strategic guidance issued from Moscow on everything from mapping to military doctrine, from Arctic policy to strategic economic industries. Of course, having plans and documents does not mean that the implementation is guaranteed or a smooth process. Russia may be a personalist autocracy, but that does not mean that the Kremlin’s edicts are followed unquestioningly or smoothly.
The Kremlin’s leadership is much like a lighthouse, when the light is shining directly on an issue or policy, much gets done. But as that light rotates onto other areas it gets dimmer and dimmer, creating more room for bureaucratic inertia to step in, parochial interests to coopt budgets, or simple idleness to set in.
There is an alarming trend in American politics that conflates empathy with sympathy. If you understand something, you in turn must support that thing. Understanding does not equate to acceptance, but that is how it appears to be in today’s discourse. Yet, understanding something, like how Russia views the world and creates policy accordingly, is critical if smart policy is to be crafted. Unfortunately, too often it seems if one has strategic empathy for an adversary—that is, understanding the world from their point of view—one is of dubious moral quality and clearly supports said adversary. Is it any wonder then that we repeatedly end up with such bad policy?
There is an unfortunate weakness in “Russian Grand Strategy” that’s due to no fault of Monaghan or the assembled authors. The authors patiently and thoroughly present a necessary nuanced picture of Russia’s grand strategy. They clearly demonstrate that it’s not all about Putin and that Russia actually has a long-term plan. They achieve all they set out to do and then some.
This book is, however, likely to appeal to those already interested in Russia and who already possess such a nuanced perspective. They will learn something nonetheless and should absolutely read it, but they are not the people that should be reading this book. Rather, penetrating the commentariat or the policy community above, perhaps, the professional staff member level, is the key challenge. This is especially true when mass market publications tend toward repackaging tired clichés (“Putin the mastermind” sells a lot better than “Putin the first among equals in a competing system of overlapping interest groups, power bases, bureaucracies, and centers of gravity.”)
The inability to breakthrough to the level of the principals (an issue not limited to Russia policy) is likely a consequence of the nature of managing up to principals, full stop—distilling complex issues into bullet points or perhaps a one-pager. Yet, unless nuance and complexity are introduced at that level, the same shortcuts will lead to the same policy shortcomings.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly sparked renewed interest in understanding the country and its politics. If, however, the understanding only recycles the same clichés and tropes, we shouldn’t be surprised if we end up with the same policy outcomes, and that is something that we cannot afford.
