Despite the optimism with which Tajikistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization was met amongst Tajik government officials, a more realistic assessment of the country’s potential economic prospects is not so promising.
Tajikistan is a remittance-dependent country with strong political affinity to Russia, a country whose own membership in the World Trade Organization has been described as a bumpy ride—both trends unlikely to change. Given the numerous disagreements involving the imports of U.S. meat and the effects of the Magnitsky Law on U.S.-Russian relations, Russia is posed to render its membership in the WTO ineffective. Equally, Tajikistan’s membership in the WTO is not expected to alleviate the country’s dependence on Russia. Tajikistan will continue to struggle to bypass Russia’s interests and will have to constantly work to avoid conflicts of interests with Russia on major agreements with other countries. When presidents of Russia and Tajikistan, Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon signed a series of memorandums in October 2012 reaffirming the longstanding bilateral military and economic cooperation, they clearly sent a warning signal to the western policy makers and ideologues searching for an opportunity to extend U.S. presence in Central Asia beyond Afghanistan.
While these memorandums were focused on military cooperation, migration policy, and energy supply issues, the main purpose of Putin’s visit to Tajikistan was the extension of the Russian 201st military base agreement. According to a new agreement, Russian troops are not expected to leave the Central Asian country until at least 2042. In contrast to Kyrgyzstan, whose opportunistic foreign policy has granted the U.S. Air Force the right to lease a portion of Manas International Airport for its operations in Afghanistan since December 2001, Tajikistan has always been viewed as a primary outpost of Russian strategic interests in Central Asia. The presence of the Russian-made Indian war planes at the Farkhor Air Base exemplifies Russia’s loyalty toward its South Asian partner. Not only did India have Russia’s acquiescence in acquiring the right to lease the air base, but Russia was instrumental in initiating India’s commitment to its own sphere of influence. Russia does not in any way see India’s air force base in Tajikistan as somehow eroding their dominance, which is primarily driven by economic and military assistance to Tajikistan. As the saying goes, one that pays orders the music.
In this case, however, paying more means dictating a Tajik foreign policy. Russia’s participation in Tajikistan’s economy is larger than that of their participation in all other countries combined. Millions of Tajik households depend on a steady supply of remittances and oil from Russia, which add up to billions of dollars each year. President Rakhmon's government, in turn, relies on a supply of modern equipment to maintain the country’s military, which is crucial for sustaining political hegemony within the country and deterring any military action by a neighboring Uzbekistan, whose relations with Tajikistan have been strained for the past decade.
Presently, Russia views India’s presence in Tajikistan as a cornerstone of the “multipolar triangle” needed to repel U.S. encroachments on Eurasian space. Seemingly, what could be more of a morale boost for Russia than the presence of the Indian air force at the border with Afghanistan? Yet it would also be an overestimation to view India as Russia’s close strategic partner, especially when it comes to a collision of neo-imperial interests at the nexus of Central Asia, and the rise of China and India. Thus, China’s and India’s own political ambitions cannot be underestimated.
Paradoxically, given Tajikistan’s high economic dependence on Russia, it is Russia that is primarily interested in the prolongation of close bilateral ties, despite the opinions voiced in both countries in favor of alleviating the co-dependence. Propositions have been made in both Russia and Tajikistan to introduce a visa regime between the countries. For Tajikistan, this means finding alternative routes to meet the demands of its labor intensive economy. For Russia, it means filling an empty space that is currently occupied by Tajik migrant workers, who fill a specific niche in the construction sector of Russia’s economy. Similarly, attempts to find alternative hosting countries have hardly proved successful for Tajikistan in the years past. Thus, Russia remains Tajikistan’s major economic partner and sponsor, despite China and Iran’s growing involvement in Tajikistan’s economy and their increasing investments in major development projects. Likewise, Tajikistan is Russia’s main supplier of gross labor force and the extension of its neo-imperial interests—an actor difficult to substitute.
The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2014 offers an opportunity for American policymakers to continue the installation of democratic and pro-Western regimes in Central Asia, particularly in areas where Russian influence continues to be strong thanks to the authoritarian puppet regimes sponsored by the Kremlin. Yet, Tajikistan will become the staging arena for political change or interplay of global powers only when and if Russia’s interest in the republic wanes, or the U.S. backs a so-called “color revolution” in Tajikistan; both are doubtful scenarios given Putin’s stated objective to prioritize a “near-abroad” in Russian foreign policy and the U.S.’s visible satisfaction with the regime of President Emomali Rakhmon. While Russian interest in Tajikistan serves as a deterrent to the extension of U.S. influence from Afghanistan to the north, U.S. leadership also seems to be satisfied with the current Tajik regime given the lack of a viable alternative political force in the country and, perhaps, their interest in maintaining stability in the region. By contributing significantly to the consolidation of state power institutions, both Russia and the U.S. indicate their anxiety about the prospect of another cycle of warfare in Tajikistan. Neither party is interested in the rise of fundamentalism in Tajikistan.
Russian-Tajik relations are a dependence-driven, symbiotic alliance wherein one country’s political and strategic imperatives are met by another country’s economic needs—a dependence hard to escape without some miraculous event such as the discovery of major hydrocarbon or gas deposits, or the construction of a gargantuan hydro-power plant, which the leaders in Tajikistan see as the only remedy for this dependence.
Shavkat Kasymov is a Moscow-based analyst and writer. He holds a master's degree in political science from the University of Notre Dame.
Photo: Xinhua/Wang Siwei.
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Russian-Tajik Relations: A Dependence-Driven Alliance
April 19, 2013
Despite the optimism with which Tajikistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization was met amongst Tajik government officials, a more realistic assessment of the country’s potential economic prospects is not so promising.
Tajikistan is a remittance-dependent country with strong political affinity to Russia, a country whose own membership in the World Trade Organization has been described as a bumpy ride—both trends unlikely to change. Given the numerous disagreements involving the imports of U.S. meat and the effects of the Magnitsky Law on U.S.-Russian relations, Russia is posed to render its membership in the WTO ineffective. Equally, Tajikistan’s membership in the WTO is not expected to alleviate the country’s dependence on Russia. Tajikistan will continue to struggle to bypass Russia’s interests and will have to constantly work to avoid conflicts of interests with Russia on major agreements with other countries. When presidents of Russia and Tajikistan, Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon signed a series of memorandums in October 2012 reaffirming the longstanding bilateral military and economic cooperation, they clearly sent a warning signal to the western policy makers and ideologues searching for an opportunity to extend U.S. presence in Central Asia beyond Afghanistan.
While these memorandums were focused on military cooperation, migration policy, and energy supply issues, the main purpose of Putin’s visit to Tajikistan was the extension of the Russian 201st military base agreement. According to a new agreement, Russian troops are not expected to leave the Central Asian country until at least 2042. In contrast to Kyrgyzstan, whose opportunistic foreign policy has granted the U.S. Air Force the right to lease a portion of Manas International Airport for its operations in Afghanistan since December 2001, Tajikistan has always been viewed as a primary outpost of Russian strategic interests in Central Asia. The presence of the Russian-made Indian war planes at the Farkhor Air Base exemplifies Russia’s loyalty toward its South Asian partner. Not only did India have Russia’s acquiescence in acquiring the right to lease the air base, but Russia was instrumental in initiating India’s commitment to its own sphere of influence. Russia does not in any way see India’s air force base in Tajikistan as somehow eroding their dominance, which is primarily driven by economic and military assistance to Tajikistan. As the saying goes, one that pays orders the music.
In this case, however, paying more means dictating a Tajik foreign policy. Russia’s participation in Tajikistan’s economy is larger than that of their participation in all other countries combined. Millions of Tajik households depend on a steady supply of remittances and oil from Russia, which add up to billions of dollars each year. President Rakhmon's government, in turn, relies on a supply of modern equipment to maintain the country’s military, which is crucial for sustaining political hegemony within the country and deterring any military action by a neighboring Uzbekistan, whose relations with Tajikistan have been strained for the past decade.
Presently, Russia views India’s presence in Tajikistan as a cornerstone of the “multipolar triangle” needed to repel U.S. encroachments on Eurasian space. Seemingly, what could be more of a morale boost for Russia than the presence of the Indian air force at the border with Afghanistan? Yet it would also be an overestimation to view India as Russia’s close strategic partner, especially when it comes to a collision of neo-imperial interests at the nexus of Central Asia, and the rise of China and India. Thus, China’s and India’s own political ambitions cannot be underestimated.
Paradoxically, given Tajikistan’s high economic dependence on Russia, it is Russia that is primarily interested in the prolongation of close bilateral ties, despite the opinions voiced in both countries in favor of alleviating the co-dependence. Propositions have been made in both Russia and Tajikistan to introduce a visa regime between the countries. For Tajikistan, this means finding alternative routes to meet the demands of its labor intensive economy. For Russia, it means filling an empty space that is currently occupied by Tajik migrant workers, who fill a specific niche in the construction sector of Russia’s economy. Similarly, attempts to find alternative hosting countries have hardly proved successful for Tajikistan in the years past. Thus, Russia remains Tajikistan’s major economic partner and sponsor, despite China and Iran’s growing involvement in Tajikistan’s economy and their increasing investments in major development projects. Likewise, Tajikistan is Russia’s main supplier of gross labor force and the extension of its neo-imperial interests—an actor difficult to substitute.
The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2014 offers an opportunity for American policymakers to continue the installation of democratic and pro-Western regimes in Central Asia, particularly in areas where Russian influence continues to be strong thanks to the authoritarian puppet regimes sponsored by the Kremlin. Yet, Tajikistan will become the staging arena for political change or interplay of global powers only when and if Russia’s interest in the republic wanes, or the U.S. backs a so-called “color revolution” in Tajikistan; both are doubtful scenarios given Putin’s stated objective to prioritize a “near-abroad” in Russian foreign policy and the U.S.’s visible satisfaction with the regime of President Emomali Rakhmon. While Russian interest in Tajikistan serves as a deterrent to the extension of U.S. influence from Afghanistan to the north, U.S. leadership also seems to be satisfied with the current Tajik regime given the lack of a viable alternative political force in the country and, perhaps, their interest in maintaining stability in the region. By contributing significantly to the consolidation of state power institutions, both Russia and the U.S. indicate their anxiety about the prospect of another cycle of warfare in Tajikistan. Neither party is interested in the rise of fundamentalism in Tajikistan.
Russian-Tajik relations are a dependence-driven, symbiotic alliance wherein one country’s political and strategic imperatives are met by another country’s economic needs—a dependence hard to escape without some miraculous event such as the discovery of major hydrocarbon or gas deposits, or the construction of a gargantuan hydro-power plant, which the leaders in Tajikistan see as the only remedy for this dependence.
Shavkat Kasymov is a Moscow-based analyst and writer. He holds a master's degree in political science from the University of Notre Dame.
Photo: Xinhua/Wang Siwei.
