urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not manage to persuade Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin to extend Moscow’s participation in the Black Sea Initiative, also known as the grain deal. That, however, does not mean that Moscow and Ankara will end their “situational partnership” anytime soon.
It is not a secret that Turkey was one of the major beneficiaries of the grain deal—an agreement, initially established in July 2022, that allowed Ukraine to freely export its grains through the Back Sea to Turkish ports. Ankara, as the main mediator in the Black Sea Initiative, reportedly sought to purchase grain from Ukraine at a discount of more than 25%. Turkey also aimed to become a regional grain hub, which is one of the reasons why Erdogan repeatedly pressured Putin to extend the grain deal.
The Russian president made several “goodwill gestures” that undoubtedly helped his “dear friend” Erdogan to achieve significant diplomatic victories. Putin indirectly supported the Turkish leader on 17 May 2023, which is when Russia extended the grain deal for the last time. Such a move was very important for Erdogan, given he was preparing for the second round of “historic” presidential elections. In other words, Russia’s extension of the grain deal helped Erdoganportray himself as a leader who has great diplomatic skills.
In the past, he even agreed with Putin that Russian grains sent under the Black Sea export deal should go to poor African countries for free. Coincidently or not, the Kremlin agreed to send free grains to Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia—nations where Turkey has been trying to increase its influence. Following his successful negotiations with Putin, Erdogan likely thought that he could make another deal with the Kremlin. But on 17 July 2023, Russia suspended its participation in the Black Sea Initiative, claiming that it was being prevented from adequately exporting its own foodstuffs. More importantly, Moscow is indirectly warning Ankara that it will have to start purchasing Russian grains at “normal, world prices.”
Turkey now has at least two options. It can stop importing grains from Ukraine, given that the Kremlin no longer guarantees the safety in the Black Sea, and increase the import of the Russian grains, hoping that Moscow will agree to offer a significant discount. Alternatively, Ukraine and Turkey could continue implementing the grain deal without Russia’s participation. Such an option would undoubtedly represent another humiliation for Moscow, given that Russia would unlikely dare to sink Ukrainian civilian ships carrying grains, as Turkey could respond by deploying its navy ships to Ukraine’s ports of Odesa and Mykolaiv to “ensure safety” of the grain deal. Thus, the Kremlin would likely rather turn a blind eye to potential Turkish-Ukrainian arrangements, than to risk an open Turkey’s involvement in the Ukraine war. More importantly, Russian potential attacks on Ukrainian ships could result in retaliation by Ukraine, which would clearly show that Russia cannot protect its military and civilian infrastructure.
Erdogan, for his part, could use another trump card and pressure Putin to eventually sign a “new grain deal” with Turkey. The two leaders will likely discuss that issue in August, which is when Russia’s president is expected to visit Turkey. Meanwhile, Ankara will undoubtedly continue openly supporting Ukraine, knowing that the Kremlin does not seem willing to seriously retaliate to Turkish actions.
The fact that the Turkish defense company Baykar has started constructing a factory in Ukraine to produce Bayraktar drones clearly suggests that Ankara has significant leverage over Moscow. Since Russia, despite numerous threats, never bombed any “decision-making centers” in Kyiv, it is extremely improbable that it would ever dare to strike a Turkish-owned factory in Ukraine. Moreover, when Erdogan recently allowed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to bring five Azov Regiment commanders—captured by Russia in May 2022, and “evacuated” to Turkey where they were supposed to stay until the end of the war—back home, the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said such a Turkish move would not have an impact on Moscow’s relations with Ankara. He even stressed that Russia is not giving up on its plans to turn Turkey into a regional gas hub.
Thus, Turkish policy makers seem to be quite aware that they can continue feely developing military cooperation with Ukraine, and openly arming the Eastern European country, given that the Kremlin aims to preserve “friendly” relations with Turkey almost at any cost. It was, therefore, not surprising that on 18 July 2023, Moscow—despite the fact that Ankara supplies Kyiv with weapons—sent two amphibious aircraft to Turkey to help the authorities there extinguish wildfires. Indeed, Russia’s moves perfectly show that Erdogan has an upper hand over Putin, and that the Kremlin seeks to avoid any political conflicts with its Turkish partners.
As a result, Turkey will almost certainly continue strengthening its influence not only in Ukraine, but also in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, aiming to crowd Moscow out of the regions that were traditionally in Russia’s sphere of influence. The Kremlin, bogged down in Ukraine, does not seem to have a choice but to continue turning a blind eye to Turkish actions.
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Russia, Turkey, and the Potential for a ‘New Grain Deal’
July 25, 2023
Turkey failed to persuade the Kremlin to extend the Black Sea Initiative grain deal despite enjoying close ties. Yet Turkey appears to have leverage over Moscow that should allow it to continue building relations with Ukraine, including the import of Ukrainian grain, safely, writes Nikola Mikovic.
T
urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not manage to persuade Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin to extend Moscow’s participation in the Black Sea Initiative, also known as the grain deal. That, however, does not mean that Moscow and Ankara will end their “situational partnership” anytime soon.
It is not a secret that Turkey was one of the major beneficiaries of the grain deal—an agreement, initially established in July 2022, that allowed Ukraine to freely export its grains through the Back Sea to Turkish ports. Ankara, as the main mediator in the Black Sea Initiative, reportedly sought to purchase grain from Ukraine at a discount of more than 25%. Turkey also aimed to become a regional grain hub, which is one of the reasons why Erdogan repeatedly pressured Putin to extend the grain deal.
The Russian president made several “goodwill gestures” that undoubtedly helped his “dear friend” Erdogan to achieve significant diplomatic victories. Putin indirectly supported the Turkish leader on 17 May 2023, which is when Russia extended the grain deal for the last time. Such a move was very important for Erdogan, given he was preparing for the second round of “historic” presidential elections. In other words, Russia’s extension of the grain deal helped Erdoganportray himself as a leader who has great diplomatic skills.
In the past, he even agreed with Putin that Russian grains sent under the Black Sea export deal should go to poor African countries for free. Coincidently or not, the Kremlin agreed to send free grains to Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia—nations where Turkey has been trying to increase its influence. Following his successful negotiations with Putin, Erdogan likely thought that he could make another deal with the Kremlin. But on 17 July 2023, Russia suspended its participation in the Black Sea Initiative, claiming that it was being prevented from adequately exporting its own foodstuffs. More importantly, Moscow is indirectly warning Ankara that it will have to start purchasing Russian grains at “normal, world prices.”
Turkey now has at least two options. It can stop importing grains from Ukraine, given that the Kremlin no longer guarantees the safety in the Black Sea, and increase the import of the Russian grains, hoping that Moscow will agree to offer a significant discount. Alternatively, Ukraine and Turkey could continue implementing the grain deal without Russia’s participation. Such an option would undoubtedly represent another humiliation for Moscow, given that Russia would unlikely dare to sink Ukrainian civilian ships carrying grains, as Turkey could respond by deploying its navy ships to Ukraine’s ports of Odesa and Mykolaiv to “ensure safety” of the grain deal. Thus, the Kremlin would likely rather turn a blind eye to potential Turkish-Ukrainian arrangements, than to risk an open Turkey’s involvement in the Ukraine war. More importantly, Russian potential attacks on Ukrainian ships could result in retaliation by Ukraine, which would clearly show that Russia cannot protect its military and civilian infrastructure.
Erdogan, for his part, could use another trump card and pressure Putin to eventually sign a “new grain deal” with Turkey. The two leaders will likely discuss that issue in August, which is when Russia’s president is expected to visit Turkey. Meanwhile, Ankara will undoubtedly continue openly supporting Ukraine, knowing that the Kremlin does not seem willing to seriously retaliate to Turkish actions.
The fact that the Turkish defense company Baykar has started constructing a factory in Ukraine to produce Bayraktar drones clearly suggests that Ankara has significant leverage over Moscow. Since Russia, despite numerous threats, never bombed any “decision-making centers” in Kyiv, it is extremely improbable that it would ever dare to strike a Turkish-owned factory in Ukraine. Moreover, when Erdogan recently allowed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to bring five Azov Regiment commanders—captured by Russia in May 2022, and “evacuated” to Turkey where they were supposed to stay until the end of the war—back home, the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said such a Turkish move would not have an impact on Moscow’s relations with Ankara. He even stressed that Russia is not giving up on its plans to turn Turkey into a regional gas hub.
Thus, Turkish policy makers seem to be quite aware that they can continue feely developing military cooperation with Ukraine, and openly arming the Eastern European country, given that the Kremlin aims to preserve “friendly” relations with Turkey almost at any cost. It was, therefore, not surprising that on 18 July 2023, Moscow—despite the fact that Ankara supplies Kyiv with weapons—sent two amphibious aircraft to Turkey to help the authorities there extinguish wildfires. Indeed, Russia’s moves perfectly show that Erdogan has an upper hand over Putin, and that the Kremlin seeks to avoid any political conflicts with its Turkish partners.
As a result, Turkey will almost certainly continue strengthening its influence not only in Ukraine, but also in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, aiming to crowd Moscow out of the regions that were traditionally in Russia’s sphere of influence. The Kremlin, bogged down in Ukraine, does not seem to have a choice but to continue turning a blind eye to Turkish actions.
