Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech on October 25th at the annual Valdai Discussion Club made clear that Russia does not view the post-Cold War order as legitimate, but rather as just a system of rules imposed by the West—ones that the U.S. itself does not even follow. There was little new in the speech, but it confirmed that Moscow is in no mood to negotiate, and that there will be no compromise on Ukraine.
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the unequivocally hostile tone Moscow has taken, is a gauntlet being thrown down; the response from Washington, D.C. tells us that the U.S. does not see this as a systemic challenge. The policymaking machine remains in crisis management mode, distracted by the Islamic State in the Middle East. It is difficult to see the sanctions, many of which were only imposed because flight MH17 was shot down, as a purposeful or deliberate response to a long term challenge arising from one of the major powers in the international system. There is no tangible strategy for dealing with Russia.
The title of Valdai’s closing session on October 24th, “New Rules or No Rules,” set an obvious intellectual framework. Putin’s statements confirm what the invasion of Crimea signaled back in February: Moscow believes international rules and norms have become arbitrary Western constraints. Ukraine’s economic development is first and foremost a challenge for the EU, but Russia’s waywardness is something only the U.S. can tackle. The implication in Putin’s speech is that he views the U.S. too weak to impose these rules on Russia any longer. If sanctions are the only tool the West has to back lofty rhetoric about values and “the right side of history”, then he could be right.
Russia has grown impatient with the world as is, hoping this conflict over Ukraine will serve as a catalyst for the often-mentioned transition away from a unipolar world. Putin’s speech was intended more for a domestic audience, but also aimed at other countries disaffected by U.S. policies. He calculates that if Russia is able to absorb the punishment of Western sanctions, it will emerge on the other end of this confrontation in a stronger position on the international arena. Russia hopes to rally others who see the current rules as hypocritical impositions of the U.S. and its allies.
The notion of Russia emerging stronger may seem ridiculous. Surely Russia’s economy will be crippled by sanctions and in time its isolated elites will be consumed by their own angry public. American policymakers are not worried. They think Russia will eventually collapse on itself. After all, Vladimir Putin’s astronomical approval rating has nowhere to go but down. The problem with this strategic perspective is that Russia has a remarkable ability to absorb punishment and a history of tolerating hardship. It survived the last financial crisis when oil prices crashed to $35 per barrel, and it still has large foreign exchange reserves. Russia will find a way to muddle through. It is not a terminal patient, but a tenacious survivor. Russia’s structural weakness is unlikely to prove a recipe for Western success in this confrontation.
American officials continue to work on the basis that Russia is playing well tactically, but strategically holds a weak hand, hence in time this difficult upstart will be easily subdued. The U.S. has vacillated between thinking that Russia does not matter, or that it matters for a few definable interests, but does not require a strategy.
The West has spent years engaging Russia in international institutions, to foster normative behavior, while at the same time making it clear that it will never accept Putin’s vision for the country or the authoritarian political system he established. Expanding a security framework across Europe, but excluding Russia, is another element of a set of policies rife with contradictions. Russia has failed to become a normal power in Europe and it refuses to become irrelevant. There is little future in maintaining this approach.
Time is not a Western ally. Like Putin’s popularity, the incredible power and prominence the U.S. holds in the world also has nowhere to go but down. Though a generalization, it is difficult to describe the past decade of war and interventions abroad as anything other than a colossal expenditure of power with little to show for it. U.S. power has not translated well in achieving desired political ends abroad.
In fact the timing of this break with Russia is quite poor, as the U.S. was entering a strategic reassessment period, sharply cutting defense spending, and hoping that NATO allies will shoulder more of the burden. They have been reluctant to step up, and lack the political will to sacrifice for higher defense budgets. Given Europe’s continued economic weakness, Russia’s annexation of Crimea is unlikely to result in a real change in attitudes towards defense spending—only more colorful speeches.
The rise of China is an exacerbating factor. China is also probing the international system for slack, and steadily seeks to expand its influence. It is increasingly aggressive in territorial disputes in the Asia Pacific region. Undoubtedly Chinese leaders see this confrontation between Russia and the West as buying time for their own challenge to the U.S., which many in Beijing see as inevitable. In China, Russia sees that it is not alone in its opposition to a Western dominated order. China is not Russia’s ally against the U.S., but they are both working independently towards the same goal. The danger of Russia’s challenge is the effect it could have on how other powers perceive the U.S.’ ability to maintain its position in the international order. Russia is in a sprint, China is running a marathon, but both are working towards the demise of a Western dominated system.
The current plan to redress Russia’s behavior with punitive sanctions is impractical as policy and ill conceived as a coercive tool to shape Russian behavior. It is impractical because Russia is not an oversized Iran, and cannot be contained in similar fashion. It is a much larger economy with numerous trading partners outside the West, none of which are likely to cooperate in a sanctions regime. Furthermore Russia does not fear Iran’s fate, because it does not see Iran as a Western policy success. That too may seem strange. Years of crippling sanctions may have ruined Iran’s economy, but it remains a technologically and culturally vibrant state, and is still the dominant power in the region. Putin thinks that if the worst the U.S. can do is try to turn Russia into Iran, then this is a manageable fate, and he does not believe Europe has the political fortitude to make this policy remotely successful.
If he is wrong, and sanctions could work over time, the strategy seems little better. Let’s assume it is feasible to completely deny technical cooperation or investment for energy extraction, and thus steadily suffocate the Russian economy. The U.S. has taken the first steps towards such a policy, but has not yet consciously embarked on it. It can prove successful, eventually, but a strategy to choke Russia comes with significant risks.
This approach could ultimately weaken Russia to the point of instability, and uncontrollable centrifugal forces will take effect, destabilizing the country. As a consequence, Russia may become ungovernable or an even more autocratic leadership could take root. The second is that strangling Russia’s economy will ruin the primary market and source of revenue for the Russian periphery. This means it will destabilize former Soviet countries first, which are highly dependent on Russia for remittances, as a transit route for goods, and a market for products. Given the existing problems of managing Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the risk of a cascade wave of economic instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus seems a costly bill to pay.
There is no easy answer to Russia; this is a wicked problem. A realist approach would be to strike a Faustian bargain with Putin, accepting the partition of Ukraine, and sacrificing Western liberal values on the altar of pragmatism. Russia is clearly a far more important country for U.S. interests than Ukraine. However, that line of reasoning is too morally compromising and unbecoming the U.S. as a liberal democracy. The U.S. already has enough ethical compromises to make in stabilizing the Middle East, without having to make them in Europe.
A hawkish policy to stare Putin down is more tempting, but it ignores the realities of Russian power and influence on its periphery, and the costs Ukraine would pay in a genuine proxy war. It would sacrifice Ukraine’s future on the altar of Western ideals, the way other nations were sacrificed in proxy conflicts during the Cold War. The idealistic answer is thinking that the West can negotiate a way out with Russia. The time for thoughtful negotiation to avoid this scenario was in 2013, when Russia, the EU, and Ukraine spent the year steadily climbing towards this crisis.
The way forward means a mix of realist pragmatism and steadfast commitment in Ukraine. Russia is not done taking Ukrainian territory, and there is almost nothing the West can do about it. Escalating rhetoric is only a recipe for embarrassment. The U.S. is not about to entertain war with Russia over Ukraine’s territorial integrity. There is no prospect for negotiation with Moscow until it is visibly done using force. Russia’s economic woes will eventually force it to start making compromises, but the interim period remains unstable and highly unfavorable to Ukraine.
If no compromise is to be had, then the goal should be to manage bad impulses. Militarizing Ukraine, without any intent to support them in a fight, or committing to their security, is one of them. That is tantamount to sleepwalking into a proxy war with Russia, at a time when Ukraine is destined to lose it. Instead the West should demonstrate the political will to see Ukraine through with billions of dollars in aid, as opposed to rhetoric, which is largely what the U.S. has committed thus far. This will dissuade Moscow from thinking it can simply wait out Western efforts in Ukraine, and motivate towards compromising in the long term. Ukraine will undergo a massive GDP contraction this year, perhaps over 15 percent. That damage bill will prove a bigger immediate challenge to Western commitment than Russia’s aggression.
Looking past the conflict in Ukraine, Moscow should be disabused of the notion that America’s decline is approaching, but in the same vein, it must see a way forward in its relationship with the West. The U.S. should create a policy box, with a floor for antagonism and a ceiling for cooperation, and then see where Vladimir Putin wishes to take Russia. Neither side can afford to sustain a relationship that is this confrontational, because it is unstable; however, a return to business as it was pre-2014 is equally impossible given what Putin’s Russia has become.
Russia’s broader challenge to the U.S. in the international system is not rooted in its strength, but in the perception of American weakness and incompetence. It can only be answered by effective leadership abroad, engaged diplomacy, and demonstrating to others that the U.S. remains a powerful force abroad for stability and prosperity. The U.S. must show that it is a competent and effective force for good, and not take it for granted that Putin’s Valdai speech will fall on deaf ears.
Michael Kofman is currently serving as a Public Policy Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center. His research focuses on security issues in Russia and Eastern Europe. Previously he served at National Defense University as a Program Manager and subject matter expert, advising senior military and government officials on issues in Russia/Eurasia and Pakistan.
Photo: Monika Flueckiger/World Economic Forum (cc).
a global affairs media network
Russia Rejects Global Governance Norms, and the U.S. is Running Out of Options
November 7, 2014
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech on October 25th at the annual Valdai Discussion Club made clear that Russia does not view the post-Cold War order as legitimate, but rather as just a system of rules imposed by the West—ones that the U.S. itself does not even follow. There was little new in the speech, but it confirmed that Moscow is in no mood to negotiate, and that there will be no compromise on Ukraine.
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the unequivocally hostile tone Moscow has taken, is a gauntlet being thrown down; the response from Washington, D.C. tells us that the U.S. does not see this as a systemic challenge. The policymaking machine remains in crisis management mode, distracted by the Islamic State in the Middle East. It is difficult to see the sanctions, many of which were only imposed because flight MH17 was shot down, as a purposeful or deliberate response to a long term challenge arising from one of the major powers in the international system. There is no tangible strategy for dealing with Russia.
The title of Valdai’s closing session on October 24th, “New Rules or No Rules,” set an obvious intellectual framework. Putin’s statements confirm what the invasion of Crimea signaled back in February: Moscow believes international rules and norms have become arbitrary Western constraints. Ukraine’s economic development is first and foremost a challenge for the EU, but Russia’s waywardness is something only the U.S. can tackle. The implication in Putin’s speech is that he views the U.S. too weak to impose these rules on Russia any longer. If sanctions are the only tool the West has to back lofty rhetoric about values and “the right side of history”, then he could be right.
Russia has grown impatient with the world as is, hoping this conflict over Ukraine will serve as a catalyst for the often-mentioned transition away from a unipolar world. Putin’s speech was intended more for a domestic audience, but also aimed at other countries disaffected by U.S. policies. He calculates that if Russia is able to absorb the punishment of Western sanctions, it will emerge on the other end of this confrontation in a stronger position on the international arena. Russia hopes to rally others who see the current rules as hypocritical impositions of the U.S. and its allies.
The notion of Russia emerging stronger may seem ridiculous. Surely Russia’s economy will be crippled by sanctions and in time its isolated elites will be consumed by their own angry public. American policymakers are not worried. They think Russia will eventually collapse on itself. After all, Vladimir Putin’s astronomical approval rating has nowhere to go but down. The problem with this strategic perspective is that Russia has a remarkable ability to absorb punishment and a history of tolerating hardship. It survived the last financial crisis when oil prices crashed to $35 per barrel, and it still has large foreign exchange reserves. Russia will find a way to muddle through. It is not a terminal patient, but a tenacious survivor. Russia’s structural weakness is unlikely to prove a recipe for Western success in this confrontation.
American officials continue to work on the basis that Russia is playing well tactically, but strategically holds a weak hand, hence in time this difficult upstart will be easily subdued. The U.S. has vacillated between thinking that Russia does not matter, or that it matters for a few definable interests, but does not require a strategy.
The West has spent years engaging Russia in international institutions, to foster normative behavior, while at the same time making it clear that it will never accept Putin’s vision for the country or the authoritarian political system he established. Expanding a security framework across Europe, but excluding Russia, is another element of a set of policies rife with contradictions. Russia has failed to become a normal power in Europe and it refuses to become irrelevant. There is little future in maintaining this approach.
Time is not a Western ally. Like Putin’s popularity, the incredible power and prominence the U.S. holds in the world also has nowhere to go but down. Though a generalization, it is difficult to describe the past decade of war and interventions abroad as anything other than a colossal expenditure of power with little to show for it. U.S. power has not translated well in achieving desired political ends abroad.
In fact the timing of this break with Russia is quite poor, as the U.S. was entering a strategic reassessment period, sharply cutting defense spending, and hoping that NATO allies will shoulder more of the burden. They have been reluctant to step up, and lack the political will to sacrifice for higher defense budgets. Given Europe’s continued economic weakness, Russia’s annexation of Crimea is unlikely to result in a real change in attitudes towards defense spending—only more colorful speeches.
The rise of China is an exacerbating factor. China is also probing the international system for slack, and steadily seeks to expand its influence. It is increasingly aggressive in territorial disputes in the Asia Pacific region. Undoubtedly Chinese leaders see this confrontation between Russia and the West as buying time for their own challenge to the U.S., which many in Beijing see as inevitable. In China, Russia sees that it is not alone in its opposition to a Western dominated order. China is not Russia’s ally against the U.S., but they are both working independently towards the same goal. The danger of Russia’s challenge is the effect it could have on how other powers perceive the U.S.’ ability to maintain its position in the international order. Russia is in a sprint, China is running a marathon, but both are working towards the demise of a Western dominated system.
The current plan to redress Russia’s behavior with punitive sanctions is impractical as policy and ill conceived as a coercive tool to shape Russian behavior. It is impractical because Russia is not an oversized Iran, and cannot be contained in similar fashion. It is a much larger economy with numerous trading partners outside the West, none of which are likely to cooperate in a sanctions regime. Furthermore Russia does not fear Iran’s fate, because it does not see Iran as a Western policy success. That too may seem strange. Years of crippling sanctions may have ruined Iran’s economy, but it remains a technologically and culturally vibrant state, and is still the dominant power in the region. Putin thinks that if the worst the U.S. can do is try to turn Russia into Iran, then this is a manageable fate, and he does not believe Europe has the political fortitude to make this policy remotely successful.
If he is wrong, and sanctions could work over time, the strategy seems little better. Let’s assume it is feasible to completely deny technical cooperation or investment for energy extraction, and thus steadily suffocate the Russian economy. The U.S. has taken the first steps towards such a policy, but has not yet consciously embarked on it. It can prove successful, eventually, but a strategy to choke Russia comes with significant risks.
This approach could ultimately weaken Russia to the point of instability, and uncontrollable centrifugal forces will take effect, destabilizing the country. As a consequence, Russia may become ungovernable or an even more autocratic leadership could take root. The second is that strangling Russia’s economy will ruin the primary market and source of revenue for the Russian periphery. This means it will destabilize former Soviet countries first, which are highly dependent on Russia for remittances, as a transit route for goods, and a market for products. Given the existing problems of managing Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the risk of a cascade wave of economic instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus seems a costly bill to pay.
There is no easy answer to Russia; this is a wicked problem. A realist approach would be to strike a Faustian bargain with Putin, accepting the partition of Ukraine, and sacrificing Western liberal values on the altar of pragmatism. Russia is clearly a far more important country for U.S. interests than Ukraine. However, that line of reasoning is too morally compromising and unbecoming the U.S. as a liberal democracy. The U.S. already has enough ethical compromises to make in stabilizing the Middle East, without having to make them in Europe.
A hawkish policy to stare Putin down is more tempting, but it ignores the realities of Russian power and influence on its periphery, and the costs Ukraine would pay in a genuine proxy war. It would sacrifice Ukraine’s future on the altar of Western ideals, the way other nations were sacrificed in proxy conflicts during the Cold War. The idealistic answer is thinking that the West can negotiate a way out with Russia. The time for thoughtful negotiation to avoid this scenario was in 2013, when Russia, the EU, and Ukraine spent the year steadily climbing towards this crisis.
The way forward means a mix of realist pragmatism and steadfast commitment in Ukraine. Russia is not done taking Ukrainian territory, and there is almost nothing the West can do about it. Escalating rhetoric is only a recipe for embarrassment. The U.S. is not about to entertain war with Russia over Ukraine’s territorial integrity. There is no prospect for negotiation with Moscow until it is visibly done using force. Russia’s economic woes will eventually force it to start making compromises, but the interim period remains unstable and highly unfavorable to Ukraine.
If no compromise is to be had, then the goal should be to manage bad impulses. Militarizing Ukraine, without any intent to support them in a fight, or committing to their security, is one of them. That is tantamount to sleepwalking into a proxy war with Russia, at a time when Ukraine is destined to lose it. Instead the West should demonstrate the political will to see Ukraine through with billions of dollars in aid, as opposed to rhetoric, which is largely what the U.S. has committed thus far. This will dissuade Moscow from thinking it can simply wait out Western efforts in Ukraine, and motivate towards compromising in the long term. Ukraine will undergo a massive GDP contraction this year, perhaps over 15 percent. That damage bill will prove a bigger immediate challenge to Western commitment than Russia’s aggression.
Looking past the conflict in Ukraine, Moscow should be disabused of the notion that America’s decline is approaching, but in the same vein, it must see a way forward in its relationship with the West. The U.S. should create a policy box, with a floor for antagonism and a ceiling for cooperation, and then see where Vladimir Putin wishes to take Russia. Neither side can afford to sustain a relationship that is this confrontational, because it is unstable; however, a return to business as it was pre-2014 is equally impossible given what Putin’s Russia has become.
Russia’s broader challenge to the U.S. in the international system is not rooted in its strength, but in the perception of American weakness and incompetence. It can only be answered by effective leadership abroad, engaged diplomacy, and demonstrating to others that the U.S. remains a powerful force abroad for stability and prosperity. The U.S. must show that it is a competent and effective force for good, and not take it for granted that Putin’s Valdai speech will fall on deaf ears.
Michael Kofman is currently serving as a Public Policy Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center. His research focuses on security issues in Russia and Eastern Europe. Previously he served at National Defense University as a Program Manager and subject matter expert, advising senior military and government officials on issues in Russia/Eurasia and Pakistan.
Photo: Monika Flueckiger/World Economic Forum (cc).
