Russia’s renaissance out of the tumultuous years of the 1990s and its emergence as an energy superpower was a salient point in the first decade of the 21st century. Russia’s revival as a great power, its membership in the G8 and BRICs, and its independent foreign policy and a number of vetoes in the UN Security Council all seemed to make Putin out as a bold leader of the Russian nation. But the perception of Putinism has changed since his re-election: Putin has transformed to an authoritarian, unpopular leader. Today’s Putin has become more of a liability than an asset to the Russian people. As Kadri Liik of the European Council on Foreign Relations explained, “During the first decade of the century, Putin’s popularity rested on the notion that he had brought Russia out from the chaos, poverty, and perceived humiliation of the 1990s. The contrast with this period remains Putin’s main claim to legitimacy, but for the population the reference point is shifting: the future, rather than the past is becoming relevant; and that future is clouded by uncertainty.”
During the first decade of the 21st century Putin could successfully use petrodollars to stabilize the economy and provide the population with basic services. But since the world energy geopolitics is drastically changing and not, unfortunately for Putin, in favor of Russia and Gazprom, the social structure of Russia is endangered. As Alexandros Petersen wrote, Gazprom makes up 10 percent of Russian export revenues, so losses leave Putin with fewer resources to spread throughout his patronage network. Russia 's resurgence as a great power after the shame and poverty of the tumultuous 1990s is a major pillar of Putin's popularity, but much of that rebound was based on turning Russia into a petrostate, dependent on Gazprom's profits. As the company falters, the state may not be far behind. The rise of the urban middle class and upcoming possible economic earthquake could break up the very foundations of Putin’s Russia. Both domestic and foreign socio-political currents spark that movement of anti-Putinism: the Arab Spring and the fall of a number of dictatorships in the Middle East, an African democracy boom, as well as the faltering Chavismo in Latin America all signal the powerlessness of authoritarian regimes in the new digital age.
To alleviate these possible scenarios, the once popular Putin is trying to stand out in foreign policy endeavors. But here too flaws are noticeable. As Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center Dmitri Trenin puts it, “The bitter irony is that despite all its efforts and the money spent, Russia's image in the world is currently much worse than the actual situation in the country warrants. In the West, this image is plainly disastrous. This was not always the case. Soviet Russia was once attractive to many Western left-leaning intellectuals, as well as social modernizers from the rest of the world. Post-Communist Russia, by contrast, inspired few admirers. Its 1991 democratic revolution first produced near-chaos, which earned Russia the sobriquet of the "wild East," and was later followed by stabilization along the lines of soft authoritarianism.” This is an excellent explanation of the incompatibility of failed domestic politics with a much vaunted foreign policy. Trenin goes further: "In the Western popular imagination, the Mafiosi of the Yeltsin eras were succeeded by the spooks of Vladimir Putin. Crucially, Russia has failed to develop its economy beyond natural resources, so even when it started to grow, thanks to the surge in energy prices in the 2000s, it was dismissed as 'Nigeria with snow,' hardly a significant improvement over its late-Cold War title of an 'Upper Volta with missiles.'"
To put a halt to that deteriorating image of Putin’s Russia, the Kremlin has tried to initiate an abrupt reversal in its foreign policy strategy, instead applying a “soft power” model. But as IR guru Joseph Nye explains, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft power, strengthening positions of the Russian language." Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the dispute with Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world--and because it has little soft power.". Simply put, an authoritarian regime with a “flourishing resource economy of the 18th century type” can not be attractive to the outside world.
Moreover, as Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Moscow Center notes, because Putin’s foreign policy is all about political survival, it has no modernizing dimension. The covetousness in the search for political longevity of Putinists dominates over prudent economic and socio-political policy. Putin’s Russia is doing all their utmost to postpone the fall of Russia’s Putin.
What seems surprisingly striking, however, is the West’s short-sighted policy vis-à-vis Russia. Instead of engaging the newborn middle class and helping the potentially vibrant civil society with opening up and democratization, western policymakers have opted for confrontation with and alienation from Russia. By such a haphazard agenda they do help Putin and his regime to thumb nose at a population looking for greater political transparency. Instead of making empty remarks on human rights abuses in Russia, the U.S. and EU in particular (as the latter appears to be more attractive to many Russians) should directly engage with large sectors of Russian society. Although the leverage of Russian civil society organizations has diminished to a minimum due to the notorious Russian “Foreign Agents” law covering NGOs, there are other means that the West can reach out, such as visa changes for Russian citizens, more educational programs for Russian students to study abroad in western universities, the elimination of anti-Russian rhetoric from the Western media, and so on--all could be good steps for “Russian awakening.”
Western policymakers must understand one simple truth: Russia is not Putin and his regime; its territory is larger than those of the EU and the U.S. combined, and its population is more than any of an EU member state.
Russia needs a change, a modernization, and creative decision-making. A strong Russia is good not only for Russians but for the world as well. As Dmitri Trenin pointed, “As a lone great power constantly in search of a balance, Russia seeks to diversify its economic and political relationships as widely as possible, in order to gain more options.” Historically Russia had mindset and heartland of a superpower, and that is why its collapse and further long-term diminishing role will no longer be tolerated by the Russian people. They do not need Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia any more--they need a Russians’ Russia.
Vahram Ayvazyan is a 2012 graduate of the Genocide and Human Rights University Program at the International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies in Toronto. He can be found on Twitter @VahramAyvazyan.
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Putin’s Russia vs. a Russians’ Russia
June 15, 2013
Russia’s renaissance out of the tumultuous years of the 1990s and its emergence as an energy superpower was a salient point in the first decade of the 21st century. Russia’s revival as a great power, its membership in the G8 and BRICs, and its independent foreign policy and a number of vetoes in the UN Security Council all seemed to make Putin out as a bold leader of the Russian nation. But the perception of Putinism has changed since his re-election: Putin has transformed to an authoritarian, unpopular leader. Today’s Putin has become more of a liability than an asset to the Russian people. As Kadri Liik of the European Council on Foreign Relations explained, “During the first decade of the century, Putin’s popularity rested on the notion that he had brought Russia out from the chaos, poverty, and perceived humiliation of the 1990s. The contrast with this period remains Putin’s main claim to legitimacy, but for the population the reference point is shifting: the future, rather than the past is becoming relevant; and that future is clouded by uncertainty.”
During the first decade of the 21st century Putin could successfully use petrodollars to stabilize the economy and provide the population with basic services. But since the world energy geopolitics is drastically changing and not, unfortunately for Putin, in favor of Russia and Gazprom, the social structure of Russia is endangered. As Alexandros Petersen wrote, Gazprom makes up 10 percent of Russian export revenues, so losses leave Putin with fewer resources to spread throughout his patronage network. Russia 's resurgence as a great power after the shame and poverty of the tumultuous 1990s is a major pillar of Putin's popularity, but much of that rebound was based on turning Russia into a petrostate, dependent on Gazprom's profits. As the company falters, the state may not be far behind. The rise of the urban middle class and upcoming possible economic earthquake could break up the very foundations of Putin’s Russia. Both domestic and foreign socio-political currents spark that movement of anti-Putinism: the Arab Spring and the fall of a number of dictatorships in the Middle East, an African democracy boom, as well as the faltering Chavismo in Latin America all signal the powerlessness of authoritarian regimes in the new digital age.
To alleviate these possible scenarios, the once popular Putin is trying to stand out in foreign policy endeavors. But here too flaws are noticeable. As Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center Dmitri Trenin puts it, “The bitter irony is that despite all its efforts and the money spent, Russia's image in the world is currently much worse than the actual situation in the country warrants. In the West, this image is plainly disastrous. This was not always the case. Soviet Russia was once attractive to many Western left-leaning intellectuals, as well as social modernizers from the rest of the world. Post-Communist Russia, by contrast, inspired few admirers. Its 1991 democratic revolution first produced near-chaos, which earned Russia the sobriquet of the "wild East," and was later followed by stabilization along the lines of soft authoritarianism.” This is an excellent explanation of the incompatibility of failed domestic politics with a much vaunted foreign policy. Trenin goes further: "In the Western popular imagination, the Mafiosi of the Yeltsin eras were succeeded by the spooks of Vladimir Putin. Crucially, Russia has failed to develop its economy beyond natural resources, so even when it started to grow, thanks to the surge in energy prices in the 2000s, it was dismissed as 'Nigeria with snow,' hardly a significant improvement over its late-Cold War title of an 'Upper Volta with missiles.'"
To put a halt to that deteriorating image of Putin’s Russia, the Kremlin has tried to initiate an abrupt reversal in its foreign policy strategy, instead applying a “soft power” model. But as IR guru Joseph Nye explains, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft power, strengthening positions of the Russian language." Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the dispute with Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world--and because it has little soft power.". Simply put, an authoritarian regime with a “flourishing resource economy of the 18th century type” can not be attractive to the outside world.
Moreover, as Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Moscow Center notes, because Putin’s foreign policy is all about political survival, it has no modernizing dimension. The covetousness in the search for political longevity of Putinists dominates over prudent economic and socio-political policy. Putin’s Russia is doing all their utmost to postpone the fall of Russia’s Putin.
What seems surprisingly striking, however, is the West’s short-sighted policy vis-à-vis Russia. Instead of engaging the newborn middle class and helping the potentially vibrant civil society with opening up and democratization, western policymakers have opted for confrontation with and alienation from Russia. By such a haphazard agenda they do help Putin and his regime to thumb nose at a population looking for greater political transparency. Instead of making empty remarks on human rights abuses in Russia, the U.S. and EU in particular (as the latter appears to be more attractive to many Russians) should directly engage with large sectors of Russian society. Although the leverage of Russian civil society organizations has diminished to a minimum due to the notorious Russian “Foreign Agents” law covering NGOs, there are other means that the West can reach out, such as visa changes for Russian citizens, more educational programs for Russian students to study abroad in western universities, the elimination of anti-Russian rhetoric from the Western media, and so on--all could be good steps for “Russian awakening.”
Western policymakers must understand one simple truth: Russia is not Putin and his regime; its territory is larger than those of the EU and the U.S. combined, and its population is more than any of an EU member state.
Russia needs a change, a modernization, and creative decision-making. A strong Russia is good not only for Russians but for the world as well. As Dmitri Trenin pointed, “As a lone great power constantly in search of a balance, Russia seeks to diversify its economic and political relationships as widely as possible, in order to gain more options.” Historically Russia had mindset and heartland of a superpower, and that is why its collapse and further long-term diminishing role will no longer be tolerated by the Russian people. They do not need Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia any more--they need a Russians’ Russia.
Vahram Ayvazyan is a 2012 graduate of the Genocide and Human Rights University Program at the International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies in Toronto. He can be found on Twitter @VahramAyvazyan.
