.
Reports indicate that another round of violence has broken out between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, this time in the southern Maungdaw Township of the Rakhine state in Myanmar.
According to the Arakan Project, a Rohingya rights group with a network of on-the-ground sources in Maungdaw, the violence began on Monday, January 13th, when police entered a displaced Rohingya camp “to confiscate mobile phones and check family lists. As police entered houses, angry Rohingya villagers gathered and the mob attacked and beat the police.”
Early the next morning police returned, this time with soldiers and Rakhine Buddhist villagers, to search for a policeman that they claim had gone missing the previous night: “The joint forces and [Rakhine] villagers looted many houses in the village. Women and children were brutally killed (as many men had already fled) and some were allegedly raped…”
The deaths were mostly by stabbing, suggesting that Rakhine villagers, rather than officers, did the actual killing; law enforcement reportedly observed the conflict and “did nothing to stop it.”
Local government officials have denied the killings, but said that police have begun an investigation. “We have had no information about the killings that have been reported in the media. Those reports might be a cover-up, because of the policeman going missing,” said Deputy Information Minister Ye Htut.
The Arakan Project mentioned that the violence follows a recent visit of Buddhist monk Wirathu, the leader of the extremist nationalist 969 movement.
Myanmar’s latest round of ethnic tension began in 2012 when mobs of rioters torched the homes of both Rakhine and Rohingya by the hundreds, although the bulk of the violence appears to have been directed towards the Rohingya. Security forces and a government-imposed emergency curfew were unable to calm the situation. Two days later, the federal government of Myanmar declared a state of emergency in Rakhine, which allowed military stationed in the region to assume control. By the end of the month, 80 people had died and an estimated 52,000 had been displaced by the violence. The President of the Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK) disputed the official numbers, claiming that as many as 650 Rohingyas lost their lives, 1,200 were missing, and more than 80,000 had been displaced.
Between 1962 and 2011, a military junta that suppressed all forms of dissent ruled Burma. The military was known for its persecution of most minorities—forced labor, state-sanctioned terror, and mass displacement were common. Still, some Rohingya Muslims lived well. Many well-to-do Rohingya lived in the Rohingya quarter of Sittwe, one of the largest cities in the Rakhine state, where they owned property, managed their own businesses, shared primary schools with Buddhist families, and went to college. This quarter no longer exists; it was first burned down by mobs and then bulldozed by the government in June 2012.
A gradual shift towards democracy that began in 2010 and 2011 has exacerbated Rakhine -Rohingya tensions. Greater freedom of speech has allowed extremist Buddhist factions to spread propaganda about Rohingya Muslims and sow hate towards the religion’s followers throughout the country. In some instances, extremist Buddhists have pressured moderate Buddhists to either participate in anti-Rohingya demonstrations, or be portrayed as unpatriotic, Muslim sympathizers. Some Rakhine communities that refused to protest experienced an influx of protestors shipped in from Sittwe.
The most prominent extremist Buddhist faction, 969, is led by a monk named Wirathu who claims that Muslims are “waging a jihad war on the Rakhine”, “doping young children with drugs to make them fight”, and “disguising themselves as women to get involved in fights”. Wirathu calls himself the “Burmese Bin Laden”. His followers shop only at stores bearing the 969 movement’s emblem in an effort to retain wealth amongst the Buddhist majority and impoverish Muslims; support a law that would ban Buddhist women from marrying outside their religion; and travel around the country, particularly in Rakhine, in an attempt to incite and ignite anti-Muslim sentiment in moderate areas. They describe the Rohingya as “a most dangerous and fearful poison that is severe enough to eradicate all civilization.” The prominence of 969 and other extremist groups has forced more moderate Buddhists into silence—moderate politicians stay silent or join in the anti-Muslim chatter rather than risk the fall-out from defending the Rohingyas’ basic rights.
The popular belief that Rohingya are a “poison” to be exterminated has led to animosity towards humanitarian aid workers; in February 2014, the national government banned Doctors Without Borders, the main health care provider for about 140,000 Rohingya living in internally displaced persons camps. Kang Kyung-wha, the deputy emergency relief coordinator for the United Nations, described the desperate situation in the camps: “In Rakhine, I witnessed a level of human suffering in [displacement] camps that I have personally never seen before, with men, women, and children living in appalling conditions with severe restrictions on their freedom of movement, both in camps and isolated villages.” The Rakhine political party has argued that crimes against humanity, such as those committed in the Holocaust, are justified “in defense of national sovereignty” and “survival of race”.
Although Rohingya Muslims have lived in Burma for generations and may even be native to the country, the dominant belief amongst the Burmese is that the Rohingya are ‘Bengalis’, or illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh. As ‘Bengalis’, the Rohingya are considered foreign, and are therefore not allowed to vote. In the 2010 elections, the central government allowed the Rohingya to vote by granting them “white cards”, or temporary identification cards. On February 10, the Burmese Parliament passed legislation that would allow white cardholders, or those technically in the process of applying for citizenship, to vote in an upcoming constitutional referendum and this year’s national election. Parliament initially opposed the measure, but reversed its decision after an appeal from President Thein Sein, who likely foresaw the intensity of international criticism were the measure not to pass.
The next day, hundreds of Buddhist protestors—including about 70 monks—took to the streets of Yangon to protest the passage of the new law. Protestors carried signs voicing their anger towards the decision: “Anyone who allows foreigners to vote is our enemy”, “Never accept white card”, and “Red card for inefficient ‘White Card’ parliament!”. According to one monk who joined the protest, Shin Thumana; “White card holders are not citizens and those who are non-citizens don’t have the right to vote in other countries. This is just a ploy by politicians to win votes.”
Hours later, President Thein Sein released a statement retracting the legality of white cards as of March 31st. White card holders will have two months from the expiration date to surrender their cards to authorities, who will then independently assess each cardholder’s citizenship status under Myanmar’s citizenship laws. The President’s statement also pledged to establish an advisory commission to address the question of white cards. But these same cards that would allow minorities to vote in the constitutional referendum in May, as well as in the national election in the fall, also enable their holders to receive health and education services. Without clearer guidelines as to the method and speed with which the citizenship process will take place, it seems unlikely that cardholders will relinquish their only means of identification.
Analysts warn and recent conflict suggests that the Rohingya camps are a powder keg. Muslim children and teenagers, who are denied educations and economic opportunities, are growing up full of anger and resentment toward the Rakhine, never getting the opportunity to meet Buddhists who could disprove the inevitable “Buddhists are all violent attackers” stereotype. Such a childhood breeds extremism, and is in stark contrast to the childhoods of many older Rohingya who grew up near Buddhists and went to school with Buddhists just a few years ago. Revoking white cards—which are seen as a potential means to an end of their suffering, as well as their way to engage in politics and extract themselves from their situation—could prove too much for these strained communities. As a report by the Brussels-based think tank Crisis Group argues, “It would be hard for [Rohingya] to avoid the conclusion that politics had failed them, which would prompt civil disobedience or even organized violence.”
Photo Source. Photo Source
Photo Source. Photo SourceThe views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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Prevalence of Anti-Muslim Attitudes in Myanmar Threaten Path to Democracy
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June 2, 2015
Reports indicate that another round of violence has broken out between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, this time in the southern Maungdaw Township of the Rakhine state in Myanmar.
According to the Arakan Project, a Rohingya rights group with a network of on-the-ground sources in Maungdaw, the violence began on Monday, January 13th, when police entered a displaced Rohingya camp “to confiscate mobile phones and check family lists. As police entered houses, angry Rohingya villagers gathered and the mob attacked and beat the police.”
Early the next morning police returned, this time with soldiers and Rakhine Buddhist villagers, to search for a policeman that they claim had gone missing the previous night: “The joint forces and [Rakhine] villagers looted many houses in the village. Women and children were brutally killed (as many men had already fled) and some were allegedly raped…”
The deaths were mostly by stabbing, suggesting that Rakhine villagers, rather than officers, did the actual killing; law enforcement reportedly observed the conflict and “did nothing to stop it.”
Local government officials have denied the killings, but said that police have begun an investigation. “We have had no information about the killings that have been reported in the media. Those reports might be a cover-up, because of the policeman going missing,” said Deputy Information Minister Ye Htut.
The Arakan Project mentioned that the violence follows a recent visit of Buddhist monk Wirathu, the leader of the extremist nationalist 969 movement.
Myanmar’s latest round of ethnic tension began in 2012 when mobs of rioters torched the homes of both Rakhine and Rohingya by the hundreds, although the bulk of the violence appears to have been directed towards the Rohingya. Security forces and a government-imposed emergency curfew were unable to calm the situation. Two days later, the federal government of Myanmar declared a state of emergency in Rakhine, which allowed military stationed in the region to assume control. By the end of the month, 80 people had died and an estimated 52,000 had been displaced by the violence. The President of the Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK) disputed the official numbers, claiming that as many as 650 Rohingyas lost their lives, 1,200 were missing, and more than 80,000 had been displaced.
Between 1962 and 2011, a military junta that suppressed all forms of dissent ruled Burma. The military was known for its persecution of most minorities—forced labor, state-sanctioned terror, and mass displacement were common. Still, some Rohingya Muslims lived well. Many well-to-do Rohingya lived in the Rohingya quarter of Sittwe, one of the largest cities in the Rakhine state, where they owned property, managed their own businesses, shared primary schools with Buddhist families, and went to college. This quarter no longer exists; it was first burned down by mobs and then bulldozed by the government in June 2012.
A gradual shift towards democracy that began in 2010 and 2011 has exacerbated Rakhine -Rohingya tensions. Greater freedom of speech has allowed extremist Buddhist factions to spread propaganda about Rohingya Muslims and sow hate towards the religion’s followers throughout the country. In some instances, extremist Buddhists have pressured moderate Buddhists to either participate in anti-Rohingya demonstrations, or be portrayed as unpatriotic, Muslim sympathizers. Some Rakhine communities that refused to protest experienced an influx of protestors shipped in from Sittwe.
The most prominent extremist Buddhist faction, 969, is led by a monk named Wirathu who claims that Muslims are “waging a jihad war on the Rakhine”, “doping young children with drugs to make them fight”, and “disguising themselves as women to get involved in fights”. Wirathu calls himself the “Burmese Bin Laden”. His followers shop only at stores bearing the 969 movement’s emblem in an effort to retain wealth amongst the Buddhist majority and impoverish Muslims; support a law that would ban Buddhist women from marrying outside their religion; and travel around the country, particularly in Rakhine, in an attempt to incite and ignite anti-Muslim sentiment in moderate areas. They describe the Rohingya as “a most dangerous and fearful poison that is severe enough to eradicate all civilization.” The prominence of 969 and other extremist groups has forced more moderate Buddhists into silence—moderate politicians stay silent or join in the anti-Muslim chatter rather than risk the fall-out from defending the Rohingyas’ basic rights.
The popular belief that Rohingya are a “poison” to be exterminated has led to animosity towards humanitarian aid workers; in February 2014, the national government banned Doctors Without Borders, the main health care provider for about 140,000 Rohingya living in internally displaced persons camps. Kang Kyung-wha, the deputy emergency relief coordinator for the United Nations, described the desperate situation in the camps: “In Rakhine, I witnessed a level of human suffering in [displacement] camps that I have personally never seen before, with men, women, and children living in appalling conditions with severe restrictions on their freedom of movement, both in camps and isolated villages.” The Rakhine political party has argued that crimes against humanity, such as those committed in the Holocaust, are justified “in defense of national sovereignty” and “survival of race”.
Although Rohingya Muslims have lived in Burma for generations and may even be native to the country, the dominant belief amongst the Burmese is that the Rohingya are ‘Bengalis’, or illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh. As ‘Bengalis’, the Rohingya are considered foreign, and are therefore not allowed to vote. In the 2010 elections, the central government allowed the Rohingya to vote by granting them “white cards”, or temporary identification cards. On February 10, the Burmese Parliament passed legislation that would allow white cardholders, or those technically in the process of applying for citizenship, to vote in an upcoming constitutional referendum and this year’s national election. Parliament initially opposed the measure, but reversed its decision after an appeal from President Thein Sein, who likely foresaw the intensity of international criticism were the measure not to pass.
The next day, hundreds of Buddhist protestors—including about 70 monks—took to the streets of Yangon to protest the passage of the new law. Protestors carried signs voicing their anger towards the decision: “Anyone who allows foreigners to vote is our enemy”, “Never accept white card”, and “Red card for inefficient ‘White Card’ parliament!”. According to one monk who joined the protest, Shin Thumana; “White card holders are not citizens and those who are non-citizens don’t have the right to vote in other countries. This is just a ploy by politicians to win votes.”
Hours later, President Thein Sein released a statement retracting the legality of white cards as of March 31st. White card holders will have two months from the expiration date to surrender their cards to authorities, who will then independently assess each cardholder’s citizenship status under Myanmar’s citizenship laws. The President’s statement also pledged to establish an advisory commission to address the question of white cards. But these same cards that would allow minorities to vote in the constitutional referendum in May, as well as in the national election in the fall, also enable their holders to receive health and education services. Without clearer guidelines as to the method and speed with which the citizenship process will take place, it seems unlikely that cardholders will relinquish their only means of identification.
Analysts warn and recent conflict suggests that the Rohingya camps are a powder keg. Muslim children and teenagers, who are denied educations and economic opportunities, are growing up full of anger and resentment toward the Rakhine, never getting the opportunity to meet Buddhists who could disprove the inevitable “Buddhists are all violent attackers” stereotype. Such a childhood breeds extremism, and is in stark contrast to the childhoods of many older Rohingya who grew up near Buddhists and went to school with Buddhists just a few years ago. Revoking white cards—which are seen as a potential means to an end of their suffering, as well as their way to engage in politics and extract themselves from their situation—could prove too much for these strained communities. As a report by the Brussels-based think tank Crisis Group argues, “It would be hard for [Rohingya] to avoid the conclusion that politics had failed them, which would prompt civil disobedience or even organized violence.”
Photo Source. Photo Source
Photo Source. Photo SourceThe views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
