or nearly three quarters of a century, NATO has served as a bulwark to prevent first Soviet and now Russian aggression from undermining the sovereignty and stability of Europe and North America. That long-standing adversary to the East has become more belligerent in recent years, using its military to pursue claims related to President Vladimir Putin’s definition of what constitutes Russian territory. In 2023, protecting Europe and North America from Russia, as well as from new and emerging threats, requires meaningful engagement in Africa, Asia, and South America. The question, therefore, is: how can a military alliance, designed to thwart a physical attack within the territory of its member states, operate effectively in regions far afield from that territory with no kinetic activity at play?
Russia’s physical expansion—through invasion and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, invasion and occupation of Crimea in 2014, and invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022—only tells part of the story. Russia has also been expanding in its presence and influence around the world in ways that have nothing to do with President Putin’s efforts to reestablish the boundaries of the Russian imperium. As NATO revisits its role, it must recognize the paradox that, while Russia threatens friends and partners on Europe’s frontier, countering Russia successfully will require NATO engagement in parts of the world where it has not traditionally operated. But how can it do this in a meaningful way?
The answer lies in sharing. NATO has amassed considerable experience and insight since its inception in 1949. Sharing insights and experiences may need to become the new manifestation of NATO expansion. The insights could, if articulated and shared in a transferrable way, be invaluable to governments and militaries now coming to terms with Russian aggression and malign influence. Even beyond Russia, however, other parts of the world could benefit greatly from NATO’s experience and insight on everything from multinational exercising, countering piracy, and identifying hybrid aggression to rethinking strategic communications and advancing cyber security. For example, NATO has infrastructure in the Centers of Excellence, the Defense College, and the Hub, but it needs to become far more creative in recognizing its comparative and competitive edge in countering malevolent security trends around the world.
As the Gulf of Guinea continues to build operational cooperation to counter the scourge of piracy, NATO’s experiences in Operation Ocean Shield could prove valuable. Somali piracy involved attacks far out at sea, taking the vessel and the crew for ransom; while initially, Gulf of Guinea attacks were actually armed robbery at sea, inside the sovereign jurisdictions of states, and focused on theft of oil. The piracy model in Atlantic Africa, however, has changed and now the lessons from the Northwest Indian Ocean are potentially highly valuable to the Gulf of Guinea states especially because the Gulf of Guinea counter-piracy approach is grounded on multinational cooperation and combined operations at sea. As a result, NATO’s operational experience as a multinational force directed at piracy would offer useful insights to the states of West and Central Africa. NATO, therefore, does not need to deploy to the Gulf of Guinea to provide meaningful assistance to it. At a time when Russia—both directly and through proxies—is working to make inroads of influence in Africa, this is the sort of security partnership that could prove valuable in myriad ways. Indeed, the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub is exactly the sort of institution that can foster this relationship.
Similarly, the Pacific Islands and the states of East and Southeast Asia are experiencing a major escalation in the frequency and intensity of hybrid aggression, lawfare, unlawfare and other “grey zone” activities. Some of those activities have actually been directly influenced or inspired by Russia’s own grey zone conduct, and now Russia is engaging much more in the Pacific, as well. NATO has been facing and addressing these issues for years and has established Centers of Excellence in Hybrid Aggression and Strategic Communications, among other things. Leveraging those centers to the benefit of other states facing similar challenges could have material benefit.
By being more generous with its insights, NATO can build relationships that bolster its own resilience as well as that of partners farther afield. But some of that benefit will also come in the very process of preparing to share. When forced to articulate knowledge and distribute it to other parts of the world, NATO will begin to appreciate and more readily recognize its own insights. Institutions like NATO Defense College can play a critical role in this sort of knowledge capture.
While NATO expansion is often viewed as a matter of either adding new members to the alliance or engaging in kinetic activities beyond the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic states, there are a myriad of different approaches that should be considered. NATO’s greatest value may be in sharing what it has learned over generations, including helping states and regions around the world face some of the same challenges that NATO has already overcome. Ironically, this approach may also become a mechanism for NATO to gain new and critically important insights from others. The threats to the Alliance are now global, so NATO must readdress those threats by becoming an Alliance that is willing to engage with and learn from all those who value peace, security, and stability.
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“NATO Expansion” Should Mean Sharing its Experience with the World
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July 11, 2023
NATO will need to engage in parts of the world outside where it has traditionally operated to continue countering threats from Russia and other bad actors. This kind of expansion means sharing NATO's experiences and insights rather than expanded membership, writes I.R. Consilium's Dr. Ian Ralby.
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or nearly three quarters of a century, NATO has served as a bulwark to prevent first Soviet and now Russian aggression from undermining the sovereignty and stability of Europe and North America. That long-standing adversary to the East has become more belligerent in recent years, using its military to pursue claims related to President Vladimir Putin’s definition of what constitutes Russian territory. In 2023, protecting Europe and North America from Russia, as well as from new and emerging threats, requires meaningful engagement in Africa, Asia, and South America. The question, therefore, is: how can a military alliance, designed to thwart a physical attack within the territory of its member states, operate effectively in regions far afield from that territory with no kinetic activity at play?
Russia’s physical expansion—through invasion and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, invasion and occupation of Crimea in 2014, and invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022—only tells part of the story. Russia has also been expanding in its presence and influence around the world in ways that have nothing to do with President Putin’s efforts to reestablish the boundaries of the Russian imperium. As NATO revisits its role, it must recognize the paradox that, while Russia threatens friends and partners on Europe’s frontier, countering Russia successfully will require NATO engagement in parts of the world where it has not traditionally operated. But how can it do this in a meaningful way?
The answer lies in sharing. NATO has amassed considerable experience and insight since its inception in 1949. Sharing insights and experiences may need to become the new manifestation of NATO expansion. The insights could, if articulated and shared in a transferrable way, be invaluable to governments and militaries now coming to terms with Russian aggression and malign influence. Even beyond Russia, however, other parts of the world could benefit greatly from NATO’s experience and insight on everything from multinational exercising, countering piracy, and identifying hybrid aggression to rethinking strategic communications and advancing cyber security. For example, NATO has infrastructure in the Centers of Excellence, the Defense College, and the Hub, but it needs to become far more creative in recognizing its comparative and competitive edge in countering malevolent security trends around the world.
As the Gulf of Guinea continues to build operational cooperation to counter the scourge of piracy, NATO’s experiences in Operation Ocean Shield could prove valuable. Somali piracy involved attacks far out at sea, taking the vessel and the crew for ransom; while initially, Gulf of Guinea attacks were actually armed robbery at sea, inside the sovereign jurisdictions of states, and focused on theft of oil. The piracy model in Atlantic Africa, however, has changed and now the lessons from the Northwest Indian Ocean are potentially highly valuable to the Gulf of Guinea states especially because the Gulf of Guinea counter-piracy approach is grounded on multinational cooperation and combined operations at sea. As a result, NATO’s operational experience as a multinational force directed at piracy would offer useful insights to the states of West and Central Africa. NATO, therefore, does not need to deploy to the Gulf of Guinea to provide meaningful assistance to it. At a time when Russia—both directly and through proxies—is working to make inroads of influence in Africa, this is the sort of security partnership that could prove valuable in myriad ways. Indeed, the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub is exactly the sort of institution that can foster this relationship.
Similarly, the Pacific Islands and the states of East and Southeast Asia are experiencing a major escalation in the frequency and intensity of hybrid aggression, lawfare, unlawfare and other “grey zone” activities. Some of those activities have actually been directly influenced or inspired by Russia’s own grey zone conduct, and now Russia is engaging much more in the Pacific, as well. NATO has been facing and addressing these issues for years and has established Centers of Excellence in Hybrid Aggression and Strategic Communications, among other things. Leveraging those centers to the benefit of other states facing similar challenges could have material benefit.
By being more generous with its insights, NATO can build relationships that bolster its own resilience as well as that of partners farther afield. But some of that benefit will also come in the very process of preparing to share. When forced to articulate knowledge and distribute it to other parts of the world, NATO will begin to appreciate and more readily recognize its own insights. Institutions like NATO Defense College can play a critical role in this sort of knowledge capture.
While NATO expansion is often viewed as a matter of either adding new members to the alliance or engaging in kinetic activities beyond the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic states, there are a myriad of different approaches that should be considered. NATO’s greatest value may be in sharing what it has learned over generations, including helping states and regions around the world face some of the same challenges that NATO has already overcome. Ironically, this approach may also become a mechanism for NATO to gain new and critically important insights from others. The threats to the Alliance are now global, so NATO must readdress those threats by becoming an Alliance that is willing to engage with and learn from all those who value peace, security, and stability.
