zerbaijan aims to restore full sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region that has been under Armenian forces’ control for the past three decades. Baku, strongly backed by its ally Turkey, seems to have a unique opportunity to use Armenia’s and Russia’s weak positions in the global arena and resolve the Karabakh issue in its favor. But what will be the fate of the local Armenian population?
After Armenia Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on 18 April 2023 that his country “fully recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,” it became obvious that Yerevan has given up its ambitions to preserve de facto control over Nagorno-Karabakh, where ethnic Armenians make up the majority of the population. Previously, on 23 March, the Armenian leader stressed that “there will be a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and it will be based on the joint official statements adopted at the highest level.”
Some Armenian opposition figures see such Pashinyan’s approach as Yerevan’s capitulation to Baku. Indeed, Armenia has demonstrated that it cannot prevent Azerbaijani military from “encircling” Nagorno-Karabakh. After months of blockade of the Lachin corridor—the only land link between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave—on 24 April 2023 the Azerbaijani army set up a checkpoint on the road, effectively cutting off Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, if another round of hostilities eventually breaks out, Armenia will have no way to supply weapons to the Armenian forces in the region.
In 2020, during the 44-day war Azerbaijan and Armenia fought over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani military managed to recapture significant portions of the mountainous region, as well as surrounding areas. As a result of the Russia-brokered ceasefire deal, around 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops have been deployed to Karabakh. One of their major tasks was to ensure the safety of the Lachin corridor. But now that Azerbaijan controls the road, the very presence of the Russian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh seems to have become redundant. More importantly, by establishing a checkpoint on the Lachin Corridor, the existence of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh (Artsakh being the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) has also come into question.
During the war, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev said that Karabakh Armenians could have cultural autonomy within the energy-rich nation. But now that Baku is so close to establishing full control over the region, it is not very probable that Aliyev’s offer will remain open. He has recently stated that ethnic Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh “have to either take up Azerbaijani citizenship or seek another place of residence”. Even though the Azerbaijani president pointed out that the Karabakh Armenians’ status “must be resolved on the basis of human rights,” that does not necessarily mean that they will get any special privileges.
Since the Russian peacekeepers have clearly shown they cannot prevent Azerbaijan from blocking the Lachin corridor and protecting the Karabakh Armenians, Yerevan has started distancing itself from Moscow and looking for ways to replace the Russian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh with international forces.
"If it becomes clear that, due to objective or subjective reasons, Russia is unable to fulfill its commitments, it should ask the UN Security Council to either grant an international mandate to the Russian military contingent or send a new multinational peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh," Pashinyan said on 10 January 2023.
But given that the region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, it is Baku, rather than Yerevan or the United Nations, that will have the last say over the matter. Under the current circumstances—when Azerbaijan is firmly backed by neighboring Turkey, and the European Union aims to develop energy cooperation with Baku to ensure flawless gas supplies from the Caspian Sea—the South Caucasus nation is unlikely to be under pressure to allow the presence of foreign troops on its soil once the Russian peacekeepers mandate expires in 2025.
Meanwhile, Armenia will likely attempt to establish closer ties with the West, hoping that such a strategy will help Yerevan improve its position vis-à-vis Baku. However, such an approach could have an impact on Armenia’s relations with its nominal ally Russia. In January, the former Soviet socialist republic refused to host military drills by the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), frustrated by Moscow’s failure to secure free transit along the Lachin corridor. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, seems to have benefited from the Russian peacekeepers’ impotence.
In the coming months Baku will undoubtedly continue gradually restoring its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, quite aware that the Russian military presence in the region cannot prevent Azerbaijani military from creating checkpoints and recapturing more territory. Although a new round of military confrontation should not be ruled out, at this point it is more probable that Baku will seek to peacefully achieve its political goals in the region. Given that Yerevan is not in a position to help the Karabakh Armenians, sooner or later their leaders will have to negotiate directly with Azerbaijani officials, and accept most of Baku’s conditions.
Once the Karabakh issue is over, the energy-rich Caucasus nation will likely seek to resolve the Nakhchivan corridor (also known as Zangezur corridor) matter by pressuring Yerevan to build its section of the railroad along the country’s border with Iran, and allow mainland Azerbaijan to have a land connection with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory. Baku insists on no Armenian presence on the corridor, even passport or customs checks. For Yerevan, such a proposal is unacceptable. But given that Azerbaijan has a significant leverage over Armenia, it is entirely possible that Pashinyan will eventually have to make yet another painful concession to the neighboring state.
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Nagorno-Karabakh’s Uncertain Future Within Azerbaijan
Photo by İltun Huseynli on Unsplash
May 5, 2023
Armenia has functionally set aside its claim over the Nagorno-Karabakh region despite occupying it militarily for the past three decades, ceding sovereignty to Azerbaijan. The move leaves the future fate of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population at question, writes Nikola Mikovic.
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zerbaijan aims to restore full sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region that has been under Armenian forces’ control for the past three decades. Baku, strongly backed by its ally Turkey, seems to have a unique opportunity to use Armenia’s and Russia’s weak positions in the global arena and resolve the Karabakh issue in its favor. But what will be the fate of the local Armenian population?
After Armenia Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on 18 April 2023 that his country “fully recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,” it became obvious that Yerevan has given up its ambitions to preserve de facto control over Nagorno-Karabakh, where ethnic Armenians make up the majority of the population. Previously, on 23 March, the Armenian leader stressed that “there will be a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and it will be based on the joint official statements adopted at the highest level.”
Some Armenian opposition figures see such Pashinyan’s approach as Yerevan’s capitulation to Baku. Indeed, Armenia has demonstrated that it cannot prevent Azerbaijani military from “encircling” Nagorno-Karabakh. After months of blockade of the Lachin corridor—the only land link between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave—on 24 April 2023 the Azerbaijani army set up a checkpoint on the road, effectively cutting off Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, if another round of hostilities eventually breaks out, Armenia will have no way to supply weapons to the Armenian forces in the region.
In 2020, during the 44-day war Azerbaijan and Armenia fought over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani military managed to recapture significant portions of the mountainous region, as well as surrounding areas. As a result of the Russia-brokered ceasefire deal, around 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops have been deployed to Karabakh. One of their major tasks was to ensure the safety of the Lachin corridor. But now that Azerbaijan controls the road, the very presence of the Russian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh seems to have become redundant. More importantly, by establishing a checkpoint on the Lachin Corridor, the existence of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh (Artsakh being the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) has also come into question.
During the war, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev said that Karabakh Armenians could have cultural autonomy within the energy-rich nation. But now that Baku is so close to establishing full control over the region, it is not very probable that Aliyev’s offer will remain open. He has recently stated that ethnic Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh “have to either take up Azerbaijani citizenship or seek another place of residence”. Even though the Azerbaijani president pointed out that the Karabakh Armenians’ status “must be resolved on the basis of human rights,” that does not necessarily mean that they will get any special privileges.
Since the Russian peacekeepers have clearly shown they cannot prevent Azerbaijan from blocking the Lachin corridor and protecting the Karabakh Armenians, Yerevan has started distancing itself from Moscow and looking for ways to replace the Russian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh with international forces.
"If it becomes clear that, due to objective or subjective reasons, Russia is unable to fulfill its commitments, it should ask the UN Security Council to either grant an international mandate to the Russian military contingent or send a new multinational peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh," Pashinyan said on 10 January 2023.
But given that the region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, it is Baku, rather than Yerevan or the United Nations, that will have the last say over the matter. Under the current circumstances—when Azerbaijan is firmly backed by neighboring Turkey, and the European Union aims to develop energy cooperation with Baku to ensure flawless gas supplies from the Caspian Sea—the South Caucasus nation is unlikely to be under pressure to allow the presence of foreign troops on its soil once the Russian peacekeepers mandate expires in 2025.
Meanwhile, Armenia will likely attempt to establish closer ties with the West, hoping that such a strategy will help Yerevan improve its position vis-à-vis Baku. However, such an approach could have an impact on Armenia’s relations with its nominal ally Russia. In January, the former Soviet socialist republic refused to host military drills by the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), frustrated by Moscow’s failure to secure free transit along the Lachin corridor. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, seems to have benefited from the Russian peacekeepers’ impotence.
In the coming months Baku will undoubtedly continue gradually restoring its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, quite aware that the Russian military presence in the region cannot prevent Azerbaijani military from creating checkpoints and recapturing more territory. Although a new round of military confrontation should not be ruled out, at this point it is more probable that Baku will seek to peacefully achieve its political goals in the region. Given that Yerevan is not in a position to help the Karabakh Armenians, sooner or later their leaders will have to negotiate directly with Azerbaijani officials, and accept most of Baku’s conditions.
Once the Karabakh issue is over, the energy-rich Caucasus nation will likely seek to resolve the Nakhchivan corridor (also known as Zangezur corridor) matter by pressuring Yerevan to build its section of the railroad along the country’s border with Iran, and allow mainland Azerbaijan to have a land connection with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory. Baku insists on no Armenian presence on the corridor, even passport or customs checks. For Yerevan, such a proposal is unacceptable. But given that Azerbaijan has a significant leverage over Armenia, it is entirely possible that Pashinyan will eventually have to make yet another painful concession to the neighboring state.
