fter over 25 years of rule by Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas Maduro, Venezuelans took to the polls on 28 July 2024. While the opposition has sought to oust the Chavista presidents for decades, this time was different—discontent with the status quo had grown substantially and the opposition held primaries to ensure that it was not fragmented. Although there is evidence that the opposition won the election in a landslide, Maduro declared victory. While many leaders have called on Maduro to release evidence of election results, the first effort to pass a joint resolution to conduct an impartial investigation and demand Maduro release results from the Organization of American States failed to gain sufficient support on 31 July 2024. A second attempt secured the necessary votes on 16 August 2024. As the regional community seeks to respond to yet another democratic crisis in the Americas, it is past time it looks for ways to address democratic decline before nations reach the point of crisis.
On 11 September 2001, representatives from OAS member states met in Lima, Peru, to recognize a landmark mechanism in protecting democracy in the region—the Inter–American Democratic Charter. While democracy promotion has been at the core of the mission of the OAS since its inception, the Democratic Charter provided specific tools to allow member states to collectively respond to coups and address democratic crises in the region. The Democratic Charter has served as an important mechanism in addressing democratic crises in the region—particularly in addressing military coups, which have become far rarer in the region. Indeed, the Inter–American Democratic Charter was soon tested in Venezuela during the 2002 coup against Hugo Chavez and the OAS quickly condemned these actions.
However, since its ratification, challenges to the implementation of the Inter–American Democratic Charter have crystalized and threats to democracy have evolved. Just in recent years, OAS responses to democratic crises have highlighted some of the limitations of the Inter–American
Recent challenges
Earlier this year, the OAS was praised for its role in ensuring the presidential transition of power occurred in Guatemala. While the OAS was instrumental in ensuring that Bernardo Arevalo—the duly elected president of Guatemala—was able to become the president despite efforts to prevent the presidential transition, the wrong lessons were learned from the experience. In the leadup to the 2023 Guatemalan elections, the government banned opposition candidates and assaulted the media—all with the goal of fixing the electoral results. Although the OAS members expressed concerns surrounding these actions, invocation of the Democratic Charter was limited due to these actions not reaching the threshold to be considered as an “unconstitutional alteration of power.” However, this threshold forces the OAS to respond to democratic crises rather than preventing these crises from occurring in the first place.
Indeed, Guatemala is not the only case in recent history where the OAS has had to act as a crisis unfolded rather than in preemptively addressing democratic backsliding in a country. Days before the 2019 Bolivian election, when asked about what the OAS could do to address democratic backsliding and concerns about the election in the country at a public event that I attended at Florida International University, OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro noted it was his job as secretary general to resolve crises not to create them. This came despite concerns about former President Evo Morales ignoring term limits and a referendum that he could not run for re–election, crackdowns on the media, and concerns over executive overreach—actions that led some pundits to refer to the country undergoing a ”slow–motion coup.” When the OAS raised concerns surrounding the fairness of the vote during the vote count, the military removed Morales from power. Morales’ supporters called the OAS a tool for U.S. imperialist ambitions—including some U.S. politicians who viewed the crisis through the lens of a traditional left–right political divide. While the fallout varnished the OAS’s reputation and ability to respond to future democratic crises, the underlying challenges of addressing democratic crises before democratic erosion results in a crisis.
Another threat to democracy that has emerged in recent years are incumbents challenging the veracity of the election count and encouraging their supporters to take actions into their own hands. Maduro’s refusal to release the formal vote counts through the government controlled National Electoral Council parallel calls in their own countries from former U.S. President Donald Trump and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. In both of these cases, despite elections being deemed fair, the incumbent presidents questioned the results and encouraged their supporters to take action—leading to strikingly similar images of their supporters on 6 January 2021 and 8 January 2023 in Washington and Brasilia.
Addressing weaknesses
These recent cases highlight some of the OAS’s challenges in addressing democratic crises in the region, including the politicization of democratic crises along partisan lines and how democratic erosion can lead to crisis. One key action that can be taken to help address both of these issues is the development of a reporting and response mechanism within the OAS. An internal but autonomous body—similar to the Inter–American Commission on Human Rights—could be responsible for producing reports on the state of democracy in all member states along with concrete recommendations for member states to take as well as for collective response.
By understanding how threats to democracy are occurring within countries and developing a shared understanding of best practices to address these crises, the OAS can better serve its mandate of defending and supporting democracy in the Americas. Additionally, in reporting on democratic crises occurring in all member states—both those run by left–wing and right–wing politicians—the OAS can bolster its impartiality on these issues in an effort to reduce the ideological responses to democratic crises. While there are other challenges that the OAS must address to strengthen the Inter–American defense of democracy regime, without addressing these underlying issues, collectively addressing threats to democracy will remain a pipedream.
Efforts to reinvigorate the Inter–American Democratic Charter are underway, with a working group devoted to strengthening the Charter established in 2023. As the crisis in Venezuela unfolds and nations across the region try to respond, the importance of the regional defense of democracy framework has never been clearer. Threats to democracy have come from both the left and the right of the political spectrum and must be confronted regardless of political ideology. Finding ways to address the crisis in Venezuela are not just about this one country, but about finding mechanisms to defend and preserve democracy across the Americas.
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Moving from ‘firefighting’ to defending democracy
Photo by Skitterphoto via Pexels.
August 20, 2024
As the regional community seeks to respond to yet another democratic crisis in the Americas, it is past time it looks for ways to address democratic decline before nations reach the point of crisis, writes Adam Ratzlaff.
A
fter over 25 years of rule by Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas Maduro, Venezuelans took to the polls on 28 July 2024. While the opposition has sought to oust the Chavista presidents for decades, this time was different—discontent with the status quo had grown substantially and the opposition held primaries to ensure that it was not fragmented. Although there is evidence that the opposition won the election in a landslide, Maduro declared victory. While many leaders have called on Maduro to release evidence of election results, the first effort to pass a joint resolution to conduct an impartial investigation and demand Maduro release results from the Organization of American States failed to gain sufficient support on 31 July 2024. A second attempt secured the necessary votes on 16 August 2024. As the regional community seeks to respond to yet another democratic crisis in the Americas, it is past time it looks for ways to address democratic decline before nations reach the point of crisis.
On 11 September 2001, representatives from OAS member states met in Lima, Peru, to recognize a landmark mechanism in protecting democracy in the region—the Inter–American Democratic Charter. While democracy promotion has been at the core of the mission of the OAS since its inception, the Democratic Charter provided specific tools to allow member states to collectively respond to coups and address democratic crises in the region. The Democratic Charter has served as an important mechanism in addressing democratic crises in the region—particularly in addressing military coups, which have become far rarer in the region. Indeed, the Inter–American Democratic Charter was soon tested in Venezuela during the 2002 coup against Hugo Chavez and the OAS quickly condemned these actions.
However, since its ratification, challenges to the implementation of the Inter–American Democratic Charter have crystalized and threats to democracy have evolved. Just in recent years, OAS responses to democratic crises have highlighted some of the limitations of the Inter–American
Recent challenges
Earlier this year, the OAS was praised for its role in ensuring the presidential transition of power occurred in Guatemala. While the OAS was instrumental in ensuring that Bernardo Arevalo—the duly elected president of Guatemala—was able to become the president despite efforts to prevent the presidential transition, the wrong lessons were learned from the experience. In the leadup to the 2023 Guatemalan elections, the government banned opposition candidates and assaulted the media—all with the goal of fixing the electoral results. Although the OAS members expressed concerns surrounding these actions, invocation of the Democratic Charter was limited due to these actions not reaching the threshold to be considered as an “unconstitutional alteration of power.” However, this threshold forces the OAS to respond to democratic crises rather than preventing these crises from occurring in the first place.
Indeed, Guatemala is not the only case in recent history where the OAS has had to act as a crisis unfolded rather than in preemptively addressing democratic backsliding in a country. Days before the 2019 Bolivian election, when asked about what the OAS could do to address democratic backsliding and concerns about the election in the country at a public event that I attended at Florida International University, OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro noted it was his job as secretary general to resolve crises not to create them. This came despite concerns about former President Evo Morales ignoring term limits and a referendum that he could not run for re–election, crackdowns on the media, and concerns over executive overreach—actions that led some pundits to refer to the country undergoing a ”slow–motion coup.” When the OAS raised concerns surrounding the fairness of the vote during the vote count, the military removed Morales from power. Morales’ supporters called the OAS a tool for U.S. imperialist ambitions—including some U.S. politicians who viewed the crisis through the lens of a traditional left–right political divide. While the fallout varnished the OAS’s reputation and ability to respond to future democratic crises, the underlying challenges of addressing democratic crises before democratic erosion results in a crisis.
Another threat to democracy that has emerged in recent years are incumbents challenging the veracity of the election count and encouraging their supporters to take actions into their own hands. Maduro’s refusal to release the formal vote counts through the government controlled National Electoral Council parallel calls in their own countries from former U.S. President Donald Trump and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. In both of these cases, despite elections being deemed fair, the incumbent presidents questioned the results and encouraged their supporters to take action—leading to strikingly similar images of their supporters on 6 January 2021 and 8 January 2023 in Washington and Brasilia.
Addressing weaknesses
These recent cases highlight some of the OAS’s challenges in addressing democratic crises in the region, including the politicization of democratic crises along partisan lines and how democratic erosion can lead to crisis. One key action that can be taken to help address both of these issues is the development of a reporting and response mechanism within the OAS. An internal but autonomous body—similar to the Inter–American Commission on Human Rights—could be responsible for producing reports on the state of democracy in all member states along with concrete recommendations for member states to take as well as for collective response.
By understanding how threats to democracy are occurring within countries and developing a shared understanding of best practices to address these crises, the OAS can better serve its mandate of defending and supporting democracy in the Americas. Additionally, in reporting on democratic crises occurring in all member states—both those run by left–wing and right–wing politicians—the OAS can bolster its impartiality on these issues in an effort to reduce the ideological responses to democratic crises. While there are other challenges that the OAS must address to strengthen the Inter–American defense of democracy regime, without addressing these underlying issues, collectively addressing threats to democracy will remain a pipedream.
Efforts to reinvigorate the Inter–American Democratic Charter are underway, with a working group devoted to strengthening the Charter established in 2023. As the crisis in Venezuela unfolds and nations across the region try to respond, the importance of the regional defense of democracy framework has never been clearer. Threats to democracy have come from both the left and the right of the political spectrum and must be confronted regardless of political ideology. Finding ways to address the crisis in Venezuela are not just about this one country, but about finding mechanisms to defend and preserve democracy across the Americas.
