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ontenegro President Milo Djukanovic lost a re-election bid on 2 April 2023, after spending 32 years in power. He leaves behind a society deeply divided over ethnic and religious matters, amid the nation’s ambition to join the European Union by 2025. But how will a post-Djukanovic Montenegro look, and how will his defeat impact the country’s foreign policy?

Over the past three decades, Milo Djukanovic has been ruling the tiny Balkan nation, be it as a president or as a prime minister. In the late 1990s, following his split with then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Djukanovic began opting for Montenegro’s exit from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose only members were Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, Montenegro invoked its right to secede from the federation and, following a referendum, declared itself an independent nation on 3 June 2006.

Two years later, after Podgorica recognized Kosovo’s  declaration of independence from Serbia, relations between the Montenegrin authorities and Belgrade started to deteriorate. In spite of that, Serbia remains Montenegro’s major trade partner, and cultural ties between the two neighboring states remain strong. Politically, both Belgrade and Podgorica seek to join the European Union, although Montenegro joined NATO in 2017, while Serbia continues pursuing its policy of military neutrality.

Jakov Milatovic, the president-elect of Montenegro, a former banker and the deputy leader of the Europe Now Movement, was only 5 years old when Djukanovic first became prime minister. Given that Milatovic studied in the West and had very close ties with Western financial institutions, he is expected to preserve Montenegro’s current pro-Western foreign policy course. However, given that he was supported by pro-Serbian political parties, he will likely attempt to improve ties with Belgrade, although Montenegro’s accession to the European Union will undoubtedly be his top priority.

But the problem is that, at least at this point, there are no indications suggesting that the EU is ready to continue its enlargement process in the near future. After French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a new political organization in May 2022 to bring together countries on the continent that share European Union values but are not part of the bloc, the fate of former Yugoslav republics that remain outside the EU became rather uncertain. Macron emphasized that “joining the new organization would not guarantee future EU membership,” which means that Montenegro, as well as other Balkan countries, may not join the bloc anytime soon, if at all.

Even though Milatovic is expected to continue pursuing pro-EU policy, Montenegro under his leadership may eventually join the Open Balkan Initiative (OBI), a regional integration process whose members are Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia. Unlike Milatovic, who seems to have adopted a pragmatic approach regarding the Open Balkan Initiative, Djukanovic saw it as an “existential threat” for Montenegro’s statehood. He even said the country’s membership in this organization would be “equal to high treason.” But according to opinion polls, 41% of Montenegro’s population supports the Adriatic nation’s membership in the regional integration initiative, while United States officials repeatedly stated that all countries in the western Balkans should join the Open Balkan Initiative. 

Therefore, unless other regional actors pressure Montenegro to stay out of the OBI, sooner or later Podgorica may join Belgrade, Tirana, and Skopje in an attempt to deepen regional integration. At the same time, Montenegro is expected to continue supporting Ukraine, which is not surprising given that Podgorica has already joined anti-Russian sanctions the West has imposed on Moscow following Russia’s invasion of the Eastern European country. The former Yugoslav republic of around 600,000 people has also provided military assistance to Ukraine, which clearly suggests that, from the Western perspective, Montenegro remains a reliable ally despite its internal divisions.

Indeed, ethnic Serbs make up some 30%of the country’s population, and the Serbian Orthodox Church seems to be very influential in the Adriatic nation. The Serbian Orthodox Church played an important role in a protest movement that eventually resulted in the removal of Djukanovic’s nationalist Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS) from power following the 2020 parliamentary election. Milatovic, although an ethnic Montenegrin, openly said that he is a Serbian Orthodox Church believer, which indicates that his policy might represent a delicate balance between the pro-Serbian Democratic Front and the DPS. But after early parliamentary elections, scheduled for 11 June 2023, the two parties will likely be the largest opposition groups in Montenegro’s parliament, while Milatovic’s Europe Now Movement is expected to win most seats.

But until a new Montenegrin government is formed—which is unlikely to happen before the fall—the current country’s authorities are not expected to make any important decisions that could have an impact on Montenegro’s domestic and foreign policies. In other words, the nation’s potential membership in the Open Balkan Initiative is unlikely to be on the agenda in the near future.

Meanwhile, Milatovic will have enough time to fulfill his election promise and develop good ties not only with Serbia, but also with other western Balkan nations. Serbia’s President Alexander Vucic, for his part, hopes that the new Montenegrin leader's first foreign trip will be to Belgrade. Although such a move would undoubtedly have a positive impact on relations between the two neighboring states, Milatovic, as a pro-EU politician, is more likely to visit Brussels first and symbolically show that Montenegro still hopes to join the bloc by 2025, despite a new geopolitical reality that came about as a result of the war in Ukraine.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Montenegro is Entering a New Political Era

The Millenium Bridge in Podgorički, Montenegro. Photo by Denis Ismailaj on Unsplash


April 10, 2023

For the first time in 32 years, Montenegro has a new president-elect. The shift comes at a time of societal divide and uncertain relations with other Balkan states and the EU, writes Nikola Mikovic.

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ontenegro President Milo Djukanovic lost a re-election bid on 2 April 2023, after spending 32 years in power. He leaves behind a society deeply divided over ethnic and religious matters, amid the nation’s ambition to join the European Union by 2025. But how will a post-Djukanovic Montenegro look, and how will his defeat impact the country’s foreign policy?

Over the past three decades, Milo Djukanovic has been ruling the tiny Balkan nation, be it as a president or as a prime minister. In the late 1990s, following his split with then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Djukanovic began opting for Montenegro’s exit from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose only members were Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, Montenegro invoked its right to secede from the federation and, following a referendum, declared itself an independent nation on 3 June 2006.

Two years later, after Podgorica recognized Kosovo’s  declaration of independence from Serbia, relations between the Montenegrin authorities and Belgrade started to deteriorate. In spite of that, Serbia remains Montenegro’s major trade partner, and cultural ties between the two neighboring states remain strong. Politically, both Belgrade and Podgorica seek to join the European Union, although Montenegro joined NATO in 2017, while Serbia continues pursuing its policy of military neutrality.

Jakov Milatovic, the president-elect of Montenegro, a former banker and the deputy leader of the Europe Now Movement, was only 5 years old when Djukanovic first became prime minister. Given that Milatovic studied in the West and had very close ties with Western financial institutions, he is expected to preserve Montenegro’s current pro-Western foreign policy course. However, given that he was supported by pro-Serbian political parties, he will likely attempt to improve ties with Belgrade, although Montenegro’s accession to the European Union will undoubtedly be his top priority.

But the problem is that, at least at this point, there are no indications suggesting that the EU is ready to continue its enlargement process in the near future. After French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a new political organization in May 2022 to bring together countries on the continent that share European Union values but are not part of the bloc, the fate of former Yugoslav republics that remain outside the EU became rather uncertain. Macron emphasized that “joining the new organization would not guarantee future EU membership,” which means that Montenegro, as well as other Balkan countries, may not join the bloc anytime soon, if at all.

Even though Milatovic is expected to continue pursuing pro-EU policy, Montenegro under his leadership may eventually join the Open Balkan Initiative (OBI), a regional integration process whose members are Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia. Unlike Milatovic, who seems to have adopted a pragmatic approach regarding the Open Balkan Initiative, Djukanovic saw it as an “existential threat” for Montenegro’s statehood. He even said the country’s membership in this organization would be “equal to high treason.” But according to opinion polls, 41% of Montenegro’s population supports the Adriatic nation’s membership in the regional integration initiative, while United States officials repeatedly stated that all countries in the western Balkans should join the Open Balkan Initiative. 

Therefore, unless other regional actors pressure Montenegro to stay out of the OBI, sooner or later Podgorica may join Belgrade, Tirana, and Skopje in an attempt to deepen regional integration. At the same time, Montenegro is expected to continue supporting Ukraine, which is not surprising given that Podgorica has already joined anti-Russian sanctions the West has imposed on Moscow following Russia’s invasion of the Eastern European country. The former Yugoslav republic of around 600,000 people has also provided military assistance to Ukraine, which clearly suggests that, from the Western perspective, Montenegro remains a reliable ally despite its internal divisions.

Indeed, ethnic Serbs make up some 30%of the country’s population, and the Serbian Orthodox Church seems to be very influential in the Adriatic nation. The Serbian Orthodox Church played an important role in a protest movement that eventually resulted in the removal of Djukanovic’s nationalist Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS) from power following the 2020 parliamentary election. Milatovic, although an ethnic Montenegrin, openly said that he is a Serbian Orthodox Church believer, which indicates that his policy might represent a delicate balance between the pro-Serbian Democratic Front and the DPS. But after early parliamentary elections, scheduled for 11 June 2023, the two parties will likely be the largest opposition groups in Montenegro’s parliament, while Milatovic’s Europe Now Movement is expected to win most seats.

But until a new Montenegrin government is formed—which is unlikely to happen before the fall—the current country’s authorities are not expected to make any important decisions that could have an impact on Montenegro’s domestic and foreign policies. In other words, the nation’s potential membership in the Open Balkan Initiative is unlikely to be on the agenda in the near future.

Meanwhile, Milatovic will have enough time to fulfill his election promise and develop good ties not only with Serbia, but also with other western Balkan nations. Serbia’s President Alexander Vucic, for his part, hopes that the new Montenegrin leader's first foreign trip will be to Belgrade. Although such a move would undoubtedly have a positive impact on relations between the two neighboring states, Milatovic, as a pro-EU politician, is more likely to visit Brussels first and symbolically show that Montenegro still hopes to join the bloc by 2025, despite a new geopolitical reality that came about as a result of the war in Ukraine.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.