.
J

ust two days before he announced he plans to run for another term in next year’s presidential election, Russian leader Vladimir Putin made a surprise trip to the United States’ key partners in the Middle East—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Sanctioned by the West over his actions in Ukraine, Putin continues demonstrating that he is not really isolated in the international arena. But is his rare visit outside of former Soviet Union states (and China) just part of his election campaign, or does it symbolize significant changes in the current global order?

Upon Putin’s arrival in Abu Dhabi on 07 December 2023, the fighter jets that escorted him painted the skies over Dubai with the colors of the Russian flag, while UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan described his Russian counterpart as a "dear friend." Although it is believed that the UAE has become a safe haven for Russian oligarchs, such a warm welcome in the Arab country also clearly shows that while the Russian leader might be isolated from the West, he is not so isolated in what is widely perceived as the Global South.  

On the other hand, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier was made to wait for half an hour at the gate of his aircraft after reaching Qatar's capital Doha on 01 December 2023, a move that Russian media portrayed as “humiliation” [Russian-language link] for the German delegation. But even though Putin received warm embraces during his visit to the Middle East, that does not necessarily mean Moscow will easily achieve its ambitious geostrategic goals in this part of the world.

It is no secret that the Kremlin seeks to develop the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to connect India, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and other countries via railways and sea. The INSTC consists of 7,200 kilometers (4,474 miles) of sea routes, rail links and roads that connect Mumbai to St. Petersburg. The route runs from northern Russia across the Caspian Sea to southern Iran for shipment through the Strait of Hormuz and into the Arabian Sea, or Indian Ocean. Moscow now wants to include Saudi Arabia in this project. 

According to reports, a transit freight train from Russia with 36 containers has passed through the Iranian transport corridor, and has arrived in Saudi Arabia on 27 August 2023. It is, therefore, not surprising that the prospects of the North-South corridor was on the agenda of the meeting between Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al Saud. 

Indeed, from the Kremlin’s perspective, a potential Saudi participation in the INSTC would represent a significant Russian geopolitical victory over the United States, given that Washington reportedly expects the Kingdom to take part in the construction of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The U.S.-backed corridor aims to establish a rail and shipping network linking the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Israeli port of Haifa on the Mediterranean Sea, as well as Europe. The transportation route would allow goods to be shipped to Europe bypassing the Suez Canal. However, there are fears that the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas could have an impact on the project, which is exactly what Moscow seems to hope for.

Just a day after his trip to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Putin hosted in Moscow his Iranian counterpart Ebrahim Raisi, who said that both Russia and Iran are “striving to implement the North-South corridor project.” Putin, for his part, stressed that the two countries have “come to the practical construction of the North-South railway,” which suggests that the project is one of the Kremlin’s top priorities in the Middle East, although it might take years before the actual realization of the INSTC.

Moreover, Putin and Raisi agreed to sign an agreement on the creation of a free-trade zone between the Islamic Republic and the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which could be the first step in Tehran’s potential accession to the EAEU. Meanwhile, the two countries are expected to continue their growing military cooperation. The U.S. has warned that Iran seeks to purchase sophisticated attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles from Russia, while Moscow continues building a plant that will mass produce Iranian-designed kamikaze drones the Russian military uses against Ukraine.

Thus, despite Putin’s rhetoric about the Kremlin’s alleged readiness to hold talks with Kyiv, in reality Russia is preparing for a long war in Ukraine, while Iran undoubtedly represents Moscow’s de facto ally, even though Tehran publicly denies the Islamic Republic is sending drones and other weapons to the Russian Federation. 

Finally, the Kremlin will almost certainly use Putin’s trip to the Middle East, as well as his meeting with Raisi, as evidence that—despite the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for the Russian leader over alleged war crimes in Ukraine—he can freely travel to far-abroad countries.

If the Russian presidential election were “a real democracy, rather than costly bureaucracy”—which is how the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reportedly once characterized the election system in Russia—Putin’s visit to the UAE and Saudi Arabia would have played an important role in the ongoing election campaign. But since the result of the vote is already known, the Russian president’s meeting with the Arab leaders will have a very small impact on the Russian domestic political activities, although it might, at least to a certain extent, help the Kremlin improve its positions in the global arena.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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In Middle East, Russia Fights Battle for Corridors

Abu Dhabi. The UAE worked hard to make Russian president Vladimir Putin feel welcome during his 07 December visit.

December 16, 2023

The UAE’s extravagant welcome for Russian president Vladimir Putin illustrated that Putin is not as isolated as many had perceived. Russia is capitalizing on good relationships with the Middle East to push forward on its planned International North-South Transport Corridor, writes Nikola Mikovic.

J

ust two days before he announced he plans to run for another term in next year’s presidential election, Russian leader Vladimir Putin made a surprise trip to the United States’ key partners in the Middle East—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Sanctioned by the West over his actions in Ukraine, Putin continues demonstrating that he is not really isolated in the international arena. But is his rare visit outside of former Soviet Union states (and China) just part of his election campaign, or does it symbolize significant changes in the current global order?

Upon Putin’s arrival in Abu Dhabi on 07 December 2023, the fighter jets that escorted him painted the skies over Dubai with the colors of the Russian flag, while UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan described his Russian counterpart as a "dear friend." Although it is believed that the UAE has become a safe haven for Russian oligarchs, such a warm welcome in the Arab country also clearly shows that while the Russian leader might be isolated from the West, he is not so isolated in what is widely perceived as the Global South.  

On the other hand, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier was made to wait for half an hour at the gate of his aircraft after reaching Qatar's capital Doha on 01 December 2023, a move that Russian media portrayed as “humiliation” [Russian-language link] for the German delegation. But even though Putin received warm embraces during his visit to the Middle East, that does not necessarily mean Moscow will easily achieve its ambitious geostrategic goals in this part of the world.

It is no secret that the Kremlin seeks to develop the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to connect India, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and other countries via railways and sea. The INSTC consists of 7,200 kilometers (4,474 miles) of sea routes, rail links and roads that connect Mumbai to St. Petersburg. The route runs from northern Russia across the Caspian Sea to southern Iran for shipment through the Strait of Hormuz and into the Arabian Sea, or Indian Ocean. Moscow now wants to include Saudi Arabia in this project. 

According to reports, a transit freight train from Russia with 36 containers has passed through the Iranian transport corridor, and has arrived in Saudi Arabia on 27 August 2023. It is, therefore, not surprising that the prospects of the North-South corridor was on the agenda of the meeting between Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al Saud. 

Indeed, from the Kremlin’s perspective, a potential Saudi participation in the INSTC would represent a significant Russian geopolitical victory over the United States, given that Washington reportedly expects the Kingdom to take part in the construction of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The U.S.-backed corridor aims to establish a rail and shipping network linking the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Israeli port of Haifa on the Mediterranean Sea, as well as Europe. The transportation route would allow goods to be shipped to Europe bypassing the Suez Canal. However, there are fears that the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas could have an impact on the project, which is exactly what Moscow seems to hope for.

Just a day after his trip to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Putin hosted in Moscow his Iranian counterpart Ebrahim Raisi, who said that both Russia and Iran are “striving to implement the North-South corridor project.” Putin, for his part, stressed that the two countries have “come to the practical construction of the North-South railway,” which suggests that the project is one of the Kremlin’s top priorities in the Middle East, although it might take years before the actual realization of the INSTC.

Moreover, Putin and Raisi agreed to sign an agreement on the creation of a free-trade zone between the Islamic Republic and the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which could be the first step in Tehran’s potential accession to the EAEU. Meanwhile, the two countries are expected to continue their growing military cooperation. The U.S. has warned that Iran seeks to purchase sophisticated attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles from Russia, while Moscow continues building a plant that will mass produce Iranian-designed kamikaze drones the Russian military uses against Ukraine.

Thus, despite Putin’s rhetoric about the Kremlin’s alleged readiness to hold talks with Kyiv, in reality Russia is preparing for a long war in Ukraine, while Iran undoubtedly represents Moscow’s de facto ally, even though Tehran publicly denies the Islamic Republic is sending drones and other weapons to the Russian Federation. 

Finally, the Kremlin will almost certainly use Putin’s trip to the Middle East, as well as his meeting with Raisi, as evidence that—despite the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for the Russian leader over alleged war crimes in Ukraine—he can freely travel to far-abroad countries.

If the Russian presidential election were “a real democracy, rather than costly bureaucracy”—which is how the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reportedly once characterized the election system in Russia—Putin’s visit to the UAE and Saudi Arabia would have played an important role in the ongoing election campaign. But since the result of the vote is already known, the Russian president’s meeting with the Arab leaders will have a very small impact on the Russian domestic political activities, although it might, at least to a certain extent, help the Kremlin improve its positions in the global arena.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.