This report synthesizes a 48-hour crowdsourced brainstorming exercise in which more than 40 analysts from around the world collaboratively explored how the ongoing military/political situation in Mali will evolve over the coming year. Compiled by Pascale Siegel; edited by Steve Keller.
Mali has recently been brought to the forefront of global attention due to the Islamist takeover of country’s northern half. In a bid to reverse that takeover, France–the former colonial power in West Africa–has launched an air and ground operation with the support of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), the primary political and economic bloc in the region.
As international involvement expands, questions have arisen as to what the future holds for Mali. To answer that question, Wikistrat ran a speed-simulation from January 23rd to 25th to examine the future of Mali after the French intervention: Our analysts projected various scenarios for escalation and de-escalation of the conflict.
This report is a summary of their findings.
***
DE-ESCALATION SCENARIOS
Wikistrat analysts believe the drive impetus for de-escalation in Mali will most likely occur if/when neighboring African countries become involved in the conflict in the intervention’s aftermath. The primary reason: Many analysts fear unilateral action by the French will incite anti-colonial sentiment.
Limited clear-and-hold approach works
Relevant scenarios
- Azawad and Bamako: Filling the power vacuum
- France clears, the Malian Government holds
- The West and African countries blunt the threat
The French military intervention is backed by African states (primarily ECOWAS) and by logistical assistance from other Western countries. The military intervention has been successful in pushing back insurgents from their strongholds in the various cities they have occupied since the spring of last year: Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu in the north; Konna, Sevare, and Diabaly in the south. In the face of this intervention, the Islamists choose to cut their losses and flee instead of putting up a fight and starting an urban insurrection.
The Malian population currently supports the intervening force, as Malians have no desire to live under Sharia Law (at least the kind of Sharia proposed by the Islamist groups).
For de-escalation to last, however, the underlying grievances that gave rise to the insurgency will need to be addressed. These scenarios therefore anticipate that, in particular, political, and economic stabilization will be necessary. The community sees two major ways this could come about:
- Military stabilization leads to political stabilization through the establishment of an agreed-upon transitional government (although the elections scheduled for March 2013 are postponed);
- Bilateral and/or multilateral assistance is given to the government of Mali so it can take new initiatives to regain its legitimacy.
Third-party intervention weakens insurgency
Relevant scenarios
- Algeria brokers a peace deal between Malian Government and reconcilable elements
In reaction to the hostage-taking crisis in In-Amenas, Algiers decides that the situation in Mali needs to be resolved very quickly or risk more attacks. As the French Army, backed by ECOWAS, pushes Islamists back from the northern cities of Mali (Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal), Algiers brokers a deal between what it views as reconcilable elements – MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad) and the more moderate Islamist faction of Ansar al-Dine and the Malian transitory government. The deal involves limited autonomy for the Tuaregs, an international border patrol (manned by Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) to curb trans-Saharan trafficking, as well as an alliance with the West (U.K., U.S., France) to monitor and disrupt the activities and operations of irreconcilable elements; these include AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) and the hardline elements of Ansar al-Dine. The region looks slightly more militarized than in the past, but through ECOWAS and bilateral agreements, further (visible) Western intervention is limited.
Divide and (maybe) conquer
Relevant scenarios
- Tuaregs splinter from Islamists
- Short-term success, long-term uncertainty
The military intervention exacerbates already-existing tensions within the insurgency (between Islamists and Secularists as well as between Tuaregs and Arabs) and between the insurgency movements and the population of Mali.
Historically, the secularist group MNLA, which launched the insurrection last year, represented Tuareg grievances but it quickly lost out to a coalition of Islamists that included international jihadists (AQIM), their like-minded brethren (MOJWA), as well as Islamist Tuaregs (Ansar al-Dine). Islamists thus gained control of the cities taken over by the MNLA and instituted a harsh version of Sharia Law, which antagonized many locals. The current French intervention allows for the disgruntled Malian population and MNLA to become actors (not victims or spectators) of the situation again.
The French and ECOWAS alliance successfully forces the Islamists into retreat from the cities–as they prove unable to hold the terrain they conquered. The lack of popular support for their rule and their well-documented brutality has antagonized the local population. The locals turn on the fleeing Islamists and cooperate with the intervening force.
In addition, the conflict of interest between international jihadists (AQIM) and the Tuaregs (more interested in Azawad) comes to a head as the moderate faction of Ansar al-Dine decides to negotiate. It offers the French and the Malian Governments intelligence on AQIM in return for the autonomy of Azawad. The French government, wary of a prolonged conflict such as Afghanistan, accepts.
However, unless the government of Mali addresses the underlying grievances of the conflict, this respite is only temporary because fleeing Islamists are not defeated. While they move away from the French presence, they still retain operational capabilities.
ESCALATION SCENARIOS
Wikistrat analysts also examined a variety of scenarios that would lead to an escalation and intensification of the conflict between the West and Islamists in the region. Most analysts believe escalation will most likely result from two different but complementary dynamics: 1) a French failure to attain its stated objectives, leading to the necessity to bring reinforcements; and 2) the empowerment of Al-Qaeda elements either in Mali and/or the region as a direct consequence of the intervention. They also anticipate that the conflict escalation will breed further regional destabilization.
France cannot manage alone
Relevant scenarios
- The U.S. steps up in Mali
France’s light-footprint intervention (2,500 ground troops + 3,000 ECOWAS) turns out to be insufficient to deal with the extent of the problem and the Islamists’ strategy of fleeing to the desert and regrouping. As a result, France and its allies are unable to sustain the necessary military presence, and need either to extend their stay or seek reinforcements from outside sources, particularly the U.S. Government (USG) which does not want to see a “failed” state materialize in West Africa. The USG’s approach mimics the early years of the Afghanistan intervention: a build-up of SOF with drone support. There is a now a lethal persistent American presence in the region, and Mali becomes a new Yemen.
Disjointed effort leads to intervention failure and emboldened enemy
Relevant scenarios
- Every pro-Malian outpost a Fort Apache
- The gangs of Timbuktu
- The French clear but no one holds
- Arms and militants diffuse throughout northwest Africa
France is able to take on the introductory phase of the anti-Islamist intervention by itself, but cannot muster the strength to put together the wide coalition necessary to resolve the problem. As a result, early tactical successes do not amount to a strategic win–au contraire. Many unfavorable dynamics hamper the intervention’s success and embolden the insurgency, sometimes up to the point where the West feels forced to escalate in return. The community identified the following unfavorable dynamics:
- Foreign intervention triggers anti-colonial sentiment;
- Military “errors” infuriates a public initially satisfied with the intervention;
- Malian government’s presence reinvigorates the Tuareg nationalist movement;
- Lean French forces can’t clear and hold;
- Political and economic initiatives are stalled;
- Human security is discarded because means to provide it are unavailable.
In this scenario, French forces have two choices. They can either give up entirely or retreat from the north to concentrate on holding the line through central Mali to turn away further Jihadist encroachments.
Al-Qaeda survives, adapts, and strives
Relevant scenarios
- AQ makes a stand
- AQIM Salafists and Boko Haram align to establish Islamist force in West Africa
- Back to historical jihad roots
- Islamist terrorism and the international response leads to destabilization
- Mali sparks religious violence in religiously divided countries
Many analysts posited that the French intervention might, in fact, embolden Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali and beyond as its ambitions and capabilities are bolstered as a result of France’s “interference” in the country.
Several trends, if they came to pass, would be instrumental to this emboldening.
- 1. The French intervention is able to displace the Islamists from cities, but they are able to regroup in the desert. 2. Some of the actions of the intervening force turn Mali into a cause célèbre for jihadists. 3. AQIM is able to take advantage of the geographical situation–vast terrain, loose borders, abundant cross-border trafficking, low security environment, flush cash flow–to evade surveillance, regroup, and plot new attacks.
An emboldened AQIM with more support would undoubtedly become a more prominent threat to the West and its interests and its allies in Africa, as AQIM could/would:
- Expand or strengthen its geographical reach throughout the Sahel; this could include (but is not limited to) a presence in Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad;
- Increase the frequency of its attacks in Mali and the region, both against civilians and French and ECOWAS soldiers;
- Deepen cooperation with Al-Qaeda Central, which mobilizes to assist AQIM by sending in money, advisors, and fighters;
- Expand its target list to include energy infrastructure, bars, hotels, places of worship, and Western companies;
- Ignite a religious-based conflict in countries where Muslims and Christians peacefully co-exist (such as Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sudan) by provoking religious-based violence.
AQIM’s escalating tactics has devastating consequences for the region. In this case, AQ’s agenda (dar al-Islam versus dar al-harb) again dominates the agenda, hampering African-Western dialogue. Already-strained societies experience further fragmentation and division. The insecurity generated by AQIM’s attacks has a negative impact on the economy (particularly energy and tourism) in countries in dire need of economic growth. The West gets further pulled into a prolonged, complex and multi-layer conflict.
Photo: Magharebia (cc)
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Mali: In the Crossfire
February 13, 2013
This report synthesizes a 48-hour crowdsourced brainstorming exercise in which more than 40 analysts from around the world collaboratively explored how the ongoing military/political situation in Mali will evolve over the coming year. Compiled by Pascale Siegel; edited by Steve Keller.
Mali has recently been brought to the forefront of global attention due to the Islamist takeover of country’s northern half. In a bid to reverse that takeover, France–the former colonial power in West Africa–has launched an air and ground operation with the support of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), the primary political and economic bloc in the region.
As international involvement expands, questions have arisen as to what the future holds for Mali. To answer that question, Wikistrat ran a speed-simulation from January 23rd to 25th to examine the future of Mali after the French intervention: Our analysts projected various scenarios for escalation and de-escalation of the conflict.
This report is a summary of their findings.
***
DE-ESCALATION SCENARIOS
Wikistrat analysts believe the drive impetus for de-escalation in Mali will most likely occur if/when neighboring African countries become involved in the conflict in the intervention’s aftermath. The primary reason: Many analysts fear unilateral action by the French will incite anti-colonial sentiment.
Limited clear-and-hold approach works
Relevant scenarios
- Azawad and Bamako: Filling the power vacuum
- France clears, the Malian Government holds
- The West and African countries blunt the threat
The French military intervention is backed by African states (primarily ECOWAS) and by logistical assistance from other Western countries. The military intervention has been successful in pushing back insurgents from their strongholds in the various cities they have occupied since the spring of last year: Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu in the north; Konna, Sevare, and Diabaly in the south. In the face of this intervention, the Islamists choose to cut their losses and flee instead of putting up a fight and starting an urban insurrection.
The Malian population currently supports the intervening force, as Malians have no desire to live under Sharia Law (at least the kind of Sharia proposed by the Islamist groups).
For de-escalation to last, however, the underlying grievances that gave rise to the insurgency will need to be addressed. These scenarios therefore anticipate that, in particular, political, and economic stabilization will be necessary. The community sees two major ways this could come about:
- Military stabilization leads to political stabilization through the establishment of an agreed-upon transitional government (although the elections scheduled for March 2013 are postponed);
- Bilateral and/or multilateral assistance is given to the government of Mali so it can take new initiatives to regain its legitimacy.
Third-party intervention weakens insurgency
Relevant scenarios
- Algeria brokers a peace deal between Malian Government and reconcilable elements
In reaction to the hostage-taking crisis in In-Amenas, Algiers decides that the situation in Mali needs to be resolved very quickly or risk more attacks. As the French Army, backed by ECOWAS, pushes Islamists back from the northern cities of Mali (Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal), Algiers brokers a deal between what it views as reconcilable elements – MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad) and the more moderate Islamist faction of Ansar al-Dine and the Malian transitory government. The deal involves limited autonomy for the Tuaregs, an international border patrol (manned by Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) to curb trans-Saharan trafficking, as well as an alliance with the West (U.K., U.S., France) to monitor and disrupt the activities and operations of irreconcilable elements; these include AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) and the hardline elements of Ansar al-Dine. The region looks slightly more militarized than in the past, but through ECOWAS and bilateral agreements, further (visible) Western intervention is limited.
Divide and (maybe) conquer
Relevant scenarios
- Tuaregs splinter from Islamists
- Short-term success, long-term uncertainty
The military intervention exacerbates already-existing tensions within the insurgency (between Islamists and Secularists as well as between Tuaregs and Arabs) and between the insurgency movements and the population of Mali.
Historically, the secularist group MNLA, which launched the insurrection last year, represented Tuareg grievances but it quickly lost out to a coalition of Islamists that included international jihadists (AQIM), their like-minded brethren (MOJWA), as well as Islamist Tuaregs (Ansar al-Dine). Islamists thus gained control of the cities taken over by the MNLA and instituted a harsh version of Sharia Law, which antagonized many locals. The current French intervention allows for the disgruntled Malian population and MNLA to become actors (not victims or spectators) of the situation again.
The French and ECOWAS alliance successfully forces the Islamists into retreat from the cities–as they prove unable to hold the terrain they conquered. The lack of popular support for their rule and their well-documented brutality has antagonized the local population. The locals turn on the fleeing Islamists and cooperate with the intervening force.
In addition, the conflict of interest between international jihadists (AQIM) and the Tuaregs (more interested in Azawad) comes to a head as the moderate faction of Ansar al-Dine decides to negotiate. It offers the French and the Malian Governments intelligence on AQIM in return for the autonomy of Azawad. The French government, wary of a prolonged conflict such as Afghanistan, accepts.
However, unless the government of Mali addresses the underlying grievances of the conflict, this respite is only temporary because fleeing Islamists are not defeated. While they move away from the French presence, they still retain operational capabilities.
ESCALATION SCENARIOS
Wikistrat analysts also examined a variety of scenarios that would lead to an escalation and intensification of the conflict between the West and Islamists in the region. Most analysts believe escalation will most likely result from two different but complementary dynamics: 1) a French failure to attain its stated objectives, leading to the necessity to bring reinforcements; and 2) the empowerment of Al-Qaeda elements either in Mali and/or the region as a direct consequence of the intervention. They also anticipate that the conflict escalation will breed further regional destabilization.
France cannot manage alone
Relevant scenarios
- The U.S. steps up in Mali
France’s light-footprint intervention (2,500 ground troops + 3,000 ECOWAS) turns out to be insufficient to deal with the extent of the problem and the Islamists’ strategy of fleeing to the desert and regrouping. As a result, France and its allies are unable to sustain the necessary military presence, and need either to extend their stay or seek reinforcements from outside sources, particularly the U.S. Government (USG) which does not want to see a “failed” state materialize in West Africa. The USG’s approach mimics the early years of the Afghanistan intervention: a build-up of SOF with drone support. There is a now a lethal persistent American presence in the region, and Mali becomes a new Yemen.
Disjointed effort leads to intervention failure and emboldened enemy
Relevant scenarios
- Every pro-Malian outpost a Fort Apache
- The gangs of Timbuktu
- The French clear but no one holds
- Arms and militants diffuse throughout northwest Africa
France is able to take on the introductory phase of the anti-Islamist intervention by itself, but cannot muster the strength to put together the wide coalition necessary to resolve the problem. As a result, early tactical successes do not amount to a strategic win–au contraire. Many unfavorable dynamics hamper the intervention’s success and embolden the insurgency, sometimes up to the point where the West feels forced to escalate in return. The community identified the following unfavorable dynamics:
- Foreign intervention triggers anti-colonial sentiment;
- Military “errors” infuriates a public initially satisfied with the intervention;
- Malian government’s presence reinvigorates the Tuareg nationalist movement;
- Lean French forces can’t clear and hold;
- Political and economic initiatives are stalled;
- Human security is discarded because means to provide it are unavailable.
In this scenario, French forces have two choices. They can either give up entirely or retreat from the north to concentrate on holding the line through central Mali to turn away further Jihadist encroachments.
Al-Qaeda survives, adapts, and strives
Relevant scenarios
- AQ makes a stand
- AQIM Salafists and Boko Haram align to establish Islamist force in West Africa
- Back to historical jihad roots
- Islamist terrorism and the international response leads to destabilization
- Mali sparks religious violence in religiously divided countries
Many analysts posited that the French intervention might, in fact, embolden Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali and beyond as its ambitions and capabilities are bolstered as a result of France’s “interference” in the country.
Several trends, if they came to pass, would be instrumental to this emboldening.
- 1. The French intervention is able to displace the Islamists from cities, but they are able to regroup in the desert. 2. Some of the actions of the intervening force turn Mali into a cause célèbre for jihadists. 3. AQIM is able to take advantage of the geographical situation–vast terrain, loose borders, abundant cross-border trafficking, low security environment, flush cash flow–to evade surveillance, regroup, and plot new attacks.
An emboldened AQIM with more support would undoubtedly become a more prominent threat to the West and its interests and its allies in Africa, as AQIM could/would:
- Expand or strengthen its geographical reach throughout the Sahel; this could include (but is not limited to) a presence in Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad;
- Increase the frequency of its attacks in Mali and the region, both against civilians and French and ECOWAS soldiers;
- Deepen cooperation with Al-Qaeda Central, which mobilizes to assist AQIM by sending in money, advisors, and fighters;
- Expand its target list to include energy infrastructure, bars, hotels, places of worship, and Western companies;
- Ignite a religious-based conflict in countries where Muslims and Christians peacefully co-exist (such as Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sudan) by provoking religious-based violence.
AQIM’s escalating tactics has devastating consequences for the region. In this case, AQ’s agenda (dar al-Islam versus dar al-harb) again dominates the agenda, hampering African-Western dialogue. Already-strained societies experience further fragmentation and division. The insecurity generated by AQIM’s attacks has a negative impact on the economy (particularly energy and tourism) in countries in dire need of economic growth. The West gets further pulled into a prolonged, complex and multi-layer conflict.
Photo: Magharebia (cc)
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