esults from the parliamentary and local elections in Belarus, scheduled for 25 February 2024, should theoretically be easy to predict. Given that, over the past four years, pro–Western and nationalist opposition leaders have either been arrested or exiled, chances that the upcoming vote will bring crucial changes to the country’s foreign policy course are rather minimal. So why might these Belarusian elections be different?
For the exiled opposition, the upcoming vote is illegitimate. Svetlkana Tikhanovskaya, who ran against President Alexander Lukashenko in 2020 and was forced to leave the country afterward, called on Belarusian citizens to boycott the parliamentary and local elections, claiming that there is no point to participate in what she described as “deception and imitation.”
Although other opposition leaders share her view that the vote in Belarus is neither free nor democratic, some groups have a slightly different approach when it comes to the election day. For instance, the “Honest People” non–government organization suggests opposition supporters go to polling stations on 25 February and vote “against everyone” on the ballot. But since in Belarus “those who count the vote decide everything”—which is what the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin reportedly once said—neither boycotting nor voting “against everyone” will have a significant impact on the outcome of the elections, as they represent merely an administrative formality.
That, however, does not mean the vote will not bring any changes in the country’s political life. Presently, Belarus is the only nation in Europe where political parties play an insignificant role. As a presidential republic, the Eastern European country has been ruled by Lukashenko since 1994 in what he proudly describes as an authoritarian way. But the 70–year-old Belarusian strongman now seeks to strengthen the role of the All–Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA), a move that could lead to a gradual transformation of the country’s political system. As a result, the ABPA leadership committee could soon start playing a primary role in Belarusian politics, although Lukashenko would almost certainly continue to pull the strings behind the scenes.
His recent decision to sign a new law granting him lifelong immunity from criminal prosecution and preventing opposition leaders living in exile from running in future presidential elections, indicates that the Belarusian leader is preparing the ground for his political retirement. Such a transition-of-power model was already implemented in Kazakhstan, after the Central Asian nation’s former leader Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down in 2019 yet retained enormous influence as head of both the ruling Nur–Otan party and the country’s national security council. That, however, did not prevent new authorities from prosecuting his relatives, and launching a process of de–Nazarbayevification of Kazakhstan.
Quite aware of that, Lukashenko, as an experienced leader, likely aims to find a way to avoid suffering Nazarbayev’s fate. He could, theoretically, appoint one of his sons as his successor, although Belarus does not have a history of such a power transition. Thus, it is not improbable that he will once again run for president in 2025.
Meanwhile, he will seek to preserve stability in the country that remains heavily dependent on its ally, Russia. Lukashenko recently met with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, where the two leaders discussed their countries’ integration into the Russia–Belarus Union State—a federal–type state entity formed in 1999 that, to this day, exists only on paper.
Although Putin claims that Moscow and Minsk have “created conditions for a unified monetary policy,” it remains highly uncertain if Lukashenko will agree to adopt a single currency, as such a move would have a serious impact on Belarus’ financial monetary sovereignty. More importantly, Russia and Belarus have still not created common markets for gas, oil, and petroleum products, even though Dmitry Fyodorovich Mezentsev, the state secretary of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, claims Moscow and Minsk have moved significantly closer to implementing the “two countries, one economy” model. In reality, however, the two nations have still not fully implemented the 2021 28–point road map for closer integration into the Russia Belarus Union State, and are far from being “one economy.”
Their visa policy also remains unharmonized. While all European Union citizens must obtain a visa to enter the Russian Federation, Belarus has introduced a visa–free regime for Lithuanian, Latvian and Polish passport holders (all three countries being NATO members), even though Belarusian pro–government media constantly spread anti–Western narratives. Such a Belarusian policy could indicate that Lukashenko, despite being dependent on the Kremlin, aims to create room to improve relations with the West.
On the other hand, he demonstrated loyalty to Moscow by agreeing to create joint Russian–Belarusian history textbooks for schools and universities, as well as a joint media company that will include four operating media outlets: two weekly newspapers, a weekly magazine, and a TV channel. Still, it is entirely possible that Lukashenko will not hurry with the actual implementation of these deals, as he aims to preserve at least some form of autonomy vis–à–vis Russia.
One thing is for sure: Belarusian leader’s political fate will depend on the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as on Moscow’s political will to continue funding Belarus. Parliamentary elections, for their part, will have no direct impact on his reign, although they could pave the way for a potential transition of power.
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Lukashenko’s strongman retirement plan
March of Justice, Minsk, Belarus, 20 September 2020. Photo by Andrew Keymaster on Unsplash.
February 10, 2024
Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko's recent decisions indicate he is preparing the ground for his political retirement, making for a very interesting election this month, writes Nikola Mikovic.
R
esults from the parliamentary and local elections in Belarus, scheduled for 25 February 2024, should theoretically be easy to predict. Given that, over the past four years, pro–Western and nationalist opposition leaders have either been arrested or exiled, chances that the upcoming vote will bring crucial changes to the country’s foreign policy course are rather minimal. So why might these Belarusian elections be different?
For the exiled opposition, the upcoming vote is illegitimate. Svetlkana Tikhanovskaya, who ran against President Alexander Lukashenko in 2020 and was forced to leave the country afterward, called on Belarusian citizens to boycott the parliamentary and local elections, claiming that there is no point to participate in what she described as “deception and imitation.”
Although other opposition leaders share her view that the vote in Belarus is neither free nor democratic, some groups have a slightly different approach when it comes to the election day. For instance, the “Honest People” non–government organization suggests opposition supporters go to polling stations on 25 February and vote “against everyone” on the ballot. But since in Belarus “those who count the vote decide everything”—which is what the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin reportedly once said—neither boycotting nor voting “against everyone” will have a significant impact on the outcome of the elections, as they represent merely an administrative formality.
That, however, does not mean the vote will not bring any changes in the country’s political life. Presently, Belarus is the only nation in Europe where political parties play an insignificant role. As a presidential republic, the Eastern European country has been ruled by Lukashenko since 1994 in what he proudly describes as an authoritarian way. But the 70–year-old Belarusian strongman now seeks to strengthen the role of the All–Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA), a move that could lead to a gradual transformation of the country’s political system. As a result, the ABPA leadership committee could soon start playing a primary role in Belarusian politics, although Lukashenko would almost certainly continue to pull the strings behind the scenes.
His recent decision to sign a new law granting him lifelong immunity from criminal prosecution and preventing opposition leaders living in exile from running in future presidential elections, indicates that the Belarusian leader is preparing the ground for his political retirement. Such a transition-of-power model was already implemented in Kazakhstan, after the Central Asian nation’s former leader Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down in 2019 yet retained enormous influence as head of both the ruling Nur–Otan party and the country’s national security council. That, however, did not prevent new authorities from prosecuting his relatives, and launching a process of de–Nazarbayevification of Kazakhstan.
Quite aware of that, Lukashenko, as an experienced leader, likely aims to find a way to avoid suffering Nazarbayev’s fate. He could, theoretically, appoint one of his sons as his successor, although Belarus does not have a history of such a power transition. Thus, it is not improbable that he will once again run for president in 2025.
Meanwhile, he will seek to preserve stability in the country that remains heavily dependent on its ally, Russia. Lukashenko recently met with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, where the two leaders discussed their countries’ integration into the Russia–Belarus Union State—a federal–type state entity formed in 1999 that, to this day, exists only on paper.
Although Putin claims that Moscow and Minsk have “created conditions for a unified monetary policy,” it remains highly uncertain if Lukashenko will agree to adopt a single currency, as such a move would have a serious impact on Belarus’ financial monetary sovereignty. More importantly, Russia and Belarus have still not created common markets for gas, oil, and petroleum products, even though Dmitry Fyodorovich Mezentsev, the state secretary of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, claims Moscow and Minsk have moved significantly closer to implementing the “two countries, one economy” model. In reality, however, the two nations have still not fully implemented the 2021 28–point road map for closer integration into the Russia Belarus Union State, and are far from being “one economy.”
Their visa policy also remains unharmonized. While all European Union citizens must obtain a visa to enter the Russian Federation, Belarus has introduced a visa–free regime for Lithuanian, Latvian and Polish passport holders (all three countries being NATO members), even though Belarusian pro–government media constantly spread anti–Western narratives. Such a Belarusian policy could indicate that Lukashenko, despite being dependent on the Kremlin, aims to create room to improve relations with the West.
On the other hand, he demonstrated loyalty to Moscow by agreeing to create joint Russian–Belarusian history textbooks for schools and universities, as well as a joint media company that will include four operating media outlets: two weekly newspapers, a weekly magazine, and a TV channel. Still, it is entirely possible that Lukashenko will not hurry with the actual implementation of these deals, as he aims to preserve at least some form of autonomy vis–à–vis Russia.
One thing is for sure: Belarusian leader’s political fate will depend on the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as on Moscow’s political will to continue funding Belarus. Parliamentary elections, for their part, will have no direct impact on his reign, although they could pave the way for a potential transition of power.
