ver the years, Kazakhstan has been relatively successfully navigating its foreign policy in a world of growing polarity—attempting to portray itself as a bridge connecting the East and the West. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced the Central Asian nation to start gradually distancing itself from Moscow.
On June 17, at the plenary session of the 25th Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev openly confronted his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, stating that Nur-Sultan would not recognize the Moscow-backed and self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic. “We do not recognize either Taiwan, or Kosovo, or South Ossetia, or Abkhazia. Such a principle will also be applied to quasi-state territories, which, in our opinion, are Lugansk and Donetsk,” Tokayev stressed.
Although this was not the first time that the Kazakh President spoke in favor of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Tokayev’s statements in Saint Petersburg had a powerful symbolic meaning. In the past, Tokayev, as well as other Kazakhstan’s officials, had claimed that the Central Asian nation wound never recognize the Donbass republic, but this time the Kazakh leader told it to Putin directly—in front of TV cameras.
Indeed, from the Russian perspective, such a move humiliates Moscow, particularly given that Kazakhstan is a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In this moment, it became crystal clear that the Kremlin cannot force its nominal ally to harmonize their foreign policy with the one of the Russian Federation.
That, however, does not necessarily mean that Nur-Sultan will burn all bridges with Moscow any time soon. The energy-rich Central Asian nation remains economically dependent on Russia, especially when it comes to oil exports. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Kremlin started using energy as a weapon against its nominal ally.
On July 5, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium—which takes oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea via one of the world's largest pipelines—was ordered by a Russian court to suspend activity for 30 days. The pipeline carries over 80% of Kazakhstan's total oil exports, meaning that Russia’s move will significantly damage the Kazakh economy. Given that on July 4, Tokayev pledged to assist the European Union in stabilizing the global energy market, it is entirely possible that the Russian court’s decision was Moscow’s response.
Although Europe is one of the most import export destinations for Kazakh oil—the country’s main export commodity—the problem for Nur-Sultan is that its major pipelines cross through Russia. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, Kazakhstan has little choice but to balance between its ties with the West and its alliance with Moscow.
Nur-Sultan has not joined the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but instead decided to adhere to all the rules established by the West regarding economic cooperation with the Russian Federation. In fact, as early as March 29, Timur Suleimenov, the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, stated that Kazakhstan “will not be a tool to circumvent the sanctions that the European Union has imposed on Russia.”
Recent economic statistics show that the trade balance between the Central Asian nation and Russia had not changed drastically in January to May of this year relative to 2021. Imports from Russia increased by 7.3%, while Kazakhstan's exports to Russia increased by only 2.8%. Such data indicate that Nur-Sultan has not participated in the re-export of goods that cannot be imported into Russia due to Western sanctions.
More importantly, Nur-Sultan seeks to diversify export routes in order to bypass Russia. The country reportedly plans to start using the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route to deliver goods via the Caspian Sea to Baku, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Recently, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a declaration on transport cooperation, while Tokayev and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed the importance of the corridor during a recent visit to Ankara. Additionally, the Kazakh leader visited Tehran on June 20, where he inaugurated a railway network running from Kazakhstan, via Turkmenistan and Iran into Turkey. This railway further facilitates Kazakh exports to Europe while bypassing Russian territory. Quite aware that Russia has become a de facto pariah state, Nur-Sultan is seeking to gradually reduce its economic dependence with Russia—with whom Kazakhstan shares a 4,253-mile border.
At the same time, the Central Asian nation is working on a new stage in its relations with the United States as it aims to continue its policy of multi-vector diplomacy. Such a geopolitical stance was initially created by the country’s first President Nursultan Nazarbayev, but violent protests in Kazakhstan in January marked the end of the Nazarbayev era. Although the January riots ended after Russia and its CSTO allies, following Tokayev’s request, deployed troops to the energy-rich nation, Kazakhstan’s leader now intends to minimize the Kremlin’s role during the Kazakh unrest.
“Some people in Russia misinterpret the whole situation by claiming that Moscow ‘saved’ Kazakhstan and now Nur-Sultan must forever ‘serve and bow at the feet’ of Russia,” Tokayev said, calling such a reasoning “far from reality.”
While Kazakhstan may maintain relations with Russia, Tokayev is making it perfectly clear that the nation does not owe anything to the Kremlin nor can Moscow count on Nur-Sultan’s support in the Ukraine. In the long-term, Kazakh foreign policy will likely continue to cool toward the Russian Federation.
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Kazakhstan is slowly turning its back to Russia
Photo via Pixabay.
July 13, 2022
In a world of growing polarity, Kazakhstan has been attempting to portray itself as a bridge connecting the East and the West. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced the Central Asian nation to start gradually distancing itself from Moscow, writes DC’s Nikola Mikovic.
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ver the years, Kazakhstan has been relatively successfully navigating its foreign policy in a world of growing polarity—attempting to portray itself as a bridge connecting the East and the West. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced the Central Asian nation to start gradually distancing itself from Moscow.
On June 17, at the plenary session of the 25th Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev openly confronted his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, stating that Nur-Sultan would not recognize the Moscow-backed and self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic. “We do not recognize either Taiwan, or Kosovo, or South Ossetia, or Abkhazia. Such a principle will also be applied to quasi-state territories, which, in our opinion, are Lugansk and Donetsk,” Tokayev stressed.
Although this was not the first time that the Kazakh President spoke in favor of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Tokayev’s statements in Saint Petersburg had a powerful symbolic meaning. In the past, Tokayev, as well as other Kazakhstan’s officials, had claimed that the Central Asian nation wound never recognize the Donbass republic, but this time the Kazakh leader told it to Putin directly—in front of TV cameras.
Indeed, from the Russian perspective, such a move humiliates Moscow, particularly given that Kazakhstan is a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In this moment, it became crystal clear that the Kremlin cannot force its nominal ally to harmonize their foreign policy with the one of the Russian Federation.
That, however, does not necessarily mean that Nur-Sultan will burn all bridges with Moscow any time soon. The energy-rich Central Asian nation remains economically dependent on Russia, especially when it comes to oil exports. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Kremlin started using energy as a weapon against its nominal ally.
On July 5, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium—which takes oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea via one of the world's largest pipelines—was ordered by a Russian court to suspend activity for 30 days. The pipeline carries over 80% of Kazakhstan's total oil exports, meaning that Russia’s move will significantly damage the Kazakh economy. Given that on July 4, Tokayev pledged to assist the European Union in stabilizing the global energy market, it is entirely possible that the Russian court’s decision was Moscow’s response.
Although Europe is one of the most import export destinations for Kazakh oil—the country’s main export commodity—the problem for Nur-Sultan is that its major pipelines cross through Russia. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, Kazakhstan has little choice but to balance between its ties with the West and its alliance with Moscow.
Nur-Sultan has not joined the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but instead decided to adhere to all the rules established by the West regarding economic cooperation with the Russian Federation. In fact, as early as March 29, Timur Suleimenov, the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, stated that Kazakhstan “will not be a tool to circumvent the sanctions that the European Union has imposed on Russia.”
Recent economic statistics show that the trade balance between the Central Asian nation and Russia had not changed drastically in January to May of this year relative to 2021. Imports from Russia increased by 7.3%, while Kazakhstan's exports to Russia increased by only 2.8%. Such data indicate that Nur-Sultan has not participated in the re-export of goods that cannot be imported into Russia due to Western sanctions.
More importantly, Nur-Sultan seeks to diversify export routes in order to bypass Russia. The country reportedly plans to start using the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route to deliver goods via the Caspian Sea to Baku, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Recently, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a declaration on transport cooperation, while Tokayev and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed the importance of the corridor during a recent visit to Ankara. Additionally, the Kazakh leader visited Tehran on June 20, where he inaugurated a railway network running from Kazakhstan, via Turkmenistan and Iran into Turkey. This railway further facilitates Kazakh exports to Europe while bypassing Russian territory. Quite aware that Russia has become a de facto pariah state, Nur-Sultan is seeking to gradually reduce its economic dependence with Russia—with whom Kazakhstan shares a 4,253-mile border.
At the same time, the Central Asian nation is working on a new stage in its relations with the United States as it aims to continue its policy of multi-vector diplomacy. Such a geopolitical stance was initially created by the country’s first President Nursultan Nazarbayev, but violent protests in Kazakhstan in January marked the end of the Nazarbayev era. Although the January riots ended after Russia and its CSTO allies, following Tokayev’s request, deployed troops to the energy-rich nation, Kazakhstan’s leader now intends to minimize the Kremlin’s role during the Kazakh unrest.
“Some people in Russia misinterpret the whole situation by claiming that Moscow ‘saved’ Kazakhstan and now Nur-Sultan must forever ‘serve and bow at the feet’ of Russia,” Tokayev said, calling such a reasoning “far from reality.”
While Kazakhstan may maintain relations with Russia, Tokayev is making it perfectly clear that the nation does not owe anything to the Kremlin nor can Moscow count on Nur-Sultan’s support in the Ukraine. In the long-term, Kazakh foreign policy will likely continue to cool toward the Russian Federation.
