As the only city in the world to ‘naturally’ span two continents, Istanbul has long been considered a major connecting point between Europe and Asia, and vital to trade between the two continents. It also boasts a unique cultural blend as Istanbul’s rich Islamic culture, history, and architecture have merged with more modern, western, and secular influences. More recently, however, the Western and Islamic elements of the city have become increasingly polarized. Without a leader or a philosophy which can unite these two elements, their peaceful co-existence and Turkey’s economic advancement risk being reversed as a ‘great divide’ emerges in Turkish society.
Istanbul’s Potential
Geographical proximity to large and growing trade routes provides Istanbul with the opportunity to cement itself as a regional, if not global, trade hub. Already roughly 4 percent of the world’s oil consumption travels through the Turkish Straits and Turkish pipelines every day. As trade between Asia and Europe increases, similar levels could be reached for other key commodities.
In recent years, the policies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have also laid the groundwork for growth in Turkey’s domestic economy, most notably in Istanbul. Over their 11 years in power, Turkey’s GSP has risen rapidly; GDP per capita has moved from $3,576 to $10,666; and the number of billionaires living in Istanbul (37) now lags only Moscow, New York, London, and Hong Kong.
Moreover, Turkey’s political influence in the Arab world has grown substantially under the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan, even as Turkey’s ambitions to accede to the EU have remained on hold.
All of these factors point to a potentially bright future for Turkey and its largest and most influential city.
At the Forefront of National Problems
Despite these positive developments, however, many of the AKP’s domestic policies have created a strong division between the modern and Islamic elements of society, with the former viewing the government as increasingly authoritarian and intent on rolling back Ataturk’s vision of a secular Turkey.
In 2008, the Erdoğan government passed an amendment to the Turkish constitution which would lift the longstanding ban on hardscarves in public institutions. While the amendment was later struck down by Turkey’s constitutional court, mass protests occurred in response to what was seen as an attempt to undermine Turkey’s secularity. It was only in late September 2013 that Erdoğan relented on this issue, lifting the ban on headscarves as part of a “democracy package” set of reforms. More recently, legislation passed by the AKP will ban the sale of alcohol between 10pm and 6am, with a 500,000 Lira ($270,000) fine for violation. Given Turkey’s already low levels of alcohol consumption, this has raised concerns as to Erdogan’s motives, which many suspect to be the creeping Islamization of Turkish society.
Perhaps most concerning, however, is the mass jailing of senior army officers, journalists, academics, and businessmen in August of this year. Most if not all of which were of a political nature, as Erdoğan sought to undermine the power of a Turkish military establishment which has long served as the ultimate guardian of Ataturk’s vision for Turkey.
And Then There Was Gezi
In this context, it is not hard to see why the AKP’s intervention in the decision to install a shopping mall in Gezi Park caused such outrage among residents of Istanbul. (Imagine President Obama intervening in a decision on whether to build a shopping mall in New York’s Central Park).
Nor is it hard to see why the government’s response was condemned by the international community, as rubber bullets, water cannons, and tear gas were used to disperse a non-violent demonstration—killing 10 people and injuring over 8,000 more in the process.
While the protests have largely subsided in recent months, this may be explained by the absence of university students and football supporters groups in Istanbul during the summer break—groups that played a key role in organizing the protests. As they return and regroup, it is highly likely that the protests will resurface.
Undeterred, the government used the delay in protests to jail many journalists and military leaders, as well as to conduct a “random” tax inspection on Koç Holdings—a Fortune 500 company which accounts for 10 percent of Turkey’s GDP. Their suspected crime? Being owners of a hotel which provided “refuge” for Gezi Park protesters.
Finding a New Vision for Turkey
In the midst of the Gezi protests, Erdoğan reminded his critics that 50 percent of the country voted for him in 2011 “and we can barely keep them at home.” This strikes at the heart of Turkey’s problem: how can it bridge the divide between two very large and very different constituent groups?
While an enduring solution may not be evident, the need certainly is. Without it, it is likely that the country’s cultural divide will negatively impact:
1. Foreign Direct Investment: Turkey’s Borsa Index still sits around 20 percent below its pre-Gezi levels despite a halt in protests. This has slowed economic growth and put a lot of pressure on Turkish banks, which have relied heavily on the influx of foreign capital in recent years.
2. Turkey’s International Reputation: The government’s response to the Gezi Park protests and mass incarceration of journalists (of whom Turkey has more in jail than any other country in the world) has drawn widespread international condemnation and strained relations with its Western allies.
3. Turkey’s Trade Relations with the West: As the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership looks set to establish a U.S.-EU free trade zone, Turkey is nervous about what its own involvement will be. The best case scenario: an agreement which provides it with open access to U.S. markets—a goal which becomes more difficult to achieve with human rights abuses hanging over its head.
An Enduring Divide?
All indications are that things will get worse before they get better in Istanbul. Almost a century after Ataturk proposed a vision which united the Turkish people, this vision is looking increasingly incapable of uniting Turkey’s increasingly broad cultural spectrum.
Whether or not Erdogan is the man to provide this vision—and he is likely not—without it, Istanbul’s great potential looks set to be thwarted by Turkey’s ‘great divide’.
Alexander Botting works for a Washington, D.C.-based international government affairs firm, where he provides political and business consultancy services to clients from the Europe and Eurasia regions. Mr. Botting received his B.A. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, specializing in Political Communication, U.S. Politics, and International Security; and is studying for a Master’s in Political Management at George Washington University, where he has been awarded an Academic Fellowship.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2013 print edition.
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Istanbul: Great Potential or ‘Great Divide’
December 17, 2013
As the only city in the world to ‘naturally’ span two continents, Istanbul has long been considered a major connecting point between Europe and Asia, and vital to trade between the two continents. It also boasts a unique cultural blend as Istanbul’s rich Islamic culture, history, and architecture have merged with more modern, western, and secular influences. More recently, however, the Western and Islamic elements of the city have become increasingly polarized. Without a leader or a philosophy which can unite these two elements, their peaceful co-existence and Turkey’s economic advancement risk being reversed as a ‘great divide’ emerges in Turkish society.
Istanbul’s Potential
Geographical proximity to large and growing trade routes provides Istanbul with the opportunity to cement itself as a regional, if not global, trade hub. Already roughly 4 percent of the world’s oil consumption travels through the Turkish Straits and Turkish pipelines every day. As trade between Asia and Europe increases, similar levels could be reached for other key commodities.
In recent years, the policies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have also laid the groundwork for growth in Turkey’s domestic economy, most notably in Istanbul. Over their 11 years in power, Turkey’s GSP has risen rapidly; GDP per capita has moved from $3,576 to $10,666; and the number of billionaires living in Istanbul (37) now lags only Moscow, New York, London, and Hong Kong.
Moreover, Turkey’s political influence in the Arab world has grown substantially under the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan, even as Turkey’s ambitions to accede to the EU have remained on hold.
All of these factors point to a potentially bright future for Turkey and its largest and most influential city.
At the Forefront of National Problems
Despite these positive developments, however, many of the AKP’s domestic policies have created a strong division between the modern and Islamic elements of society, with the former viewing the government as increasingly authoritarian and intent on rolling back Ataturk’s vision of a secular Turkey.
In 2008, the Erdoğan government passed an amendment to the Turkish constitution which would lift the longstanding ban on hardscarves in public institutions. While the amendment was later struck down by Turkey’s constitutional court, mass protests occurred in response to what was seen as an attempt to undermine Turkey’s secularity. It was only in late September 2013 that Erdoğan relented on this issue, lifting the ban on headscarves as part of a “democracy package” set of reforms. More recently, legislation passed by the AKP will ban the sale of alcohol between 10pm and 6am, with a 500,000 Lira ($270,000) fine for violation. Given Turkey’s already low levels of alcohol consumption, this has raised concerns as to Erdogan’s motives, which many suspect to be the creeping Islamization of Turkish society.
Perhaps most concerning, however, is the mass jailing of senior army officers, journalists, academics, and businessmen in August of this year. Most if not all of which were of a political nature, as Erdoğan sought to undermine the power of a Turkish military establishment which has long served as the ultimate guardian of Ataturk’s vision for Turkey.
And Then There Was Gezi
In this context, it is not hard to see why the AKP’s intervention in the decision to install a shopping mall in Gezi Park caused such outrage among residents of Istanbul. (Imagine President Obama intervening in a decision on whether to build a shopping mall in New York’s Central Park).
Nor is it hard to see why the government’s response was condemned by the international community, as rubber bullets, water cannons, and tear gas were used to disperse a non-violent demonstration—killing 10 people and injuring over 8,000 more in the process.
While the protests have largely subsided in recent months, this may be explained by the absence of university students and football supporters groups in Istanbul during the summer break—groups that played a key role in organizing the protests. As they return and regroup, it is highly likely that the protests will resurface.
Undeterred, the government used the delay in protests to jail many journalists and military leaders, as well as to conduct a “random” tax inspection on Koç Holdings—a Fortune 500 company which accounts for 10 percent of Turkey’s GDP. Their suspected crime? Being owners of a hotel which provided “refuge” for Gezi Park protesters.
Finding a New Vision for Turkey
In the midst of the Gezi protests, Erdoğan reminded his critics that 50 percent of the country voted for him in 2011 “and we can barely keep them at home.” This strikes at the heart of Turkey’s problem: how can it bridge the divide between two very large and very different constituent groups?
While an enduring solution may not be evident, the need certainly is. Without it, it is likely that the country’s cultural divide will negatively impact:
1. Foreign Direct Investment: Turkey’s Borsa Index still sits around 20 percent below its pre-Gezi levels despite a halt in protests. This has slowed economic growth and put a lot of pressure on Turkish banks, which have relied heavily on the influx of foreign capital in recent years.
2. Turkey’s International Reputation: The government’s response to the Gezi Park protests and mass incarceration of journalists (of whom Turkey has more in jail than any other country in the world) has drawn widespread international condemnation and strained relations with its Western allies.
3. Turkey’s Trade Relations with the West: As the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership looks set to establish a U.S.-EU free trade zone, Turkey is nervous about what its own involvement will be. The best case scenario: an agreement which provides it with open access to U.S. markets—a goal which becomes more difficult to achieve with human rights abuses hanging over its head.
An Enduring Divide?
All indications are that things will get worse before they get better in Istanbul. Almost a century after Ataturk proposed a vision which united the Turkish people, this vision is looking increasingly incapable of uniting Turkey’s increasingly broad cultural spectrum.
Whether or not Erdogan is the man to provide this vision—and he is likely not—without it, Istanbul’s great potential looks set to be thwarted by Turkey’s ‘great divide’.
Alexander Botting works for a Washington, D.C.-based international government affairs firm, where he provides political and business consultancy services to clients from the Europe and Eurasia regions. Mr. Botting received his B.A. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, specializing in Political Communication, U.S. Politics, and International Security; and is studying for a Master’s in Political Management at George Washington University, where he has been awarded an Academic Fellowship.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2013 print edition.
