hina continues balancing its economic ties with the West and its “no-limits friendship” with Russia. Despite occasional threats and harsh anti-Western rhetoric, Beijing does not seem ready to jeopardize its relations with the European Union and the United States and openly side with Moscow against Ukraine. Does that mean that the People’s Republic’s economic interests in the West will prevail over its “Not allies, but better than allies” relationship with the Kremlin?
Despite widespread belief, Russia and China are not allies. Historically, the two countries have often been rivals who even fought several low-scale wars. Geopolitically, the current relationship between Moscow and Beijing can be described as a situational partnership, rather than a “no-limits friendship” or a political and military alliance.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the European Union, openly said the declaration of the People’s Republic "no-limits friendship" with Russia is "nothing but rhetoric.” The very fact that he was not fired following such a statement, clearly indicates that what he stressed represents the official position of China’s Foreign Ministry.
Moreover, at this point Beijing does not even seem interested in developing closer energy cooperation with the Kremlin. Following the recent meeting between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Moscow, China’s leader did not give the green light to the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which means that the Russo-Chinese “friendship” has some very strong limits.
Officially, China never supported Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Despite pursuing a policy of “pro-Russian neutrality,” Beijing indirectly opposed the Kremlin’s plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, close to the former Soviet republic’s border with NATO neighbors Lithuania and Poland. More importantly, China never recognized Russia’s annexation of the Donbass and southern Ukrainian regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. However, from the Western perspective, the People’s Republic’s 12-point peace plan, which calls for a “comprehensive ceasefire,” de facto legitimizes Moscow’s incorporation of four of Ukraine’s regions into the Russian Federation. According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the document “allows Russia to consolidate the gains that it has made in Ukraine.” On the other hand, the 12-point peace plan helped Beijing to portray itself as a peacemaker and improve its position in the global arena ahead of the “historic” China-brokered normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Thus, under the current geopolitical circumstances, the People’s Republic is unlikely to openly side with Russia against Ukraine, since such a move could have a significant impact on its relations with the West. Quite aware of that, the United States and its allies will undoubtedly continue pressuring Beijing not to engage in any military cooperation with Moscow. On 6 April 2023, during her visit to China, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she had warned Xi Jinping that “any arms shipments to Russia would significantly harm the People’s Republic’s relations with the EU.” She also urged the Chinese leader to speak with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. If Xi eventually calls Zelensky,it will likely represent Beijing’s weakness to the eyes of the Western policy makers, since potential talks between the two leaders will come as a result of the Western pressure.
But China seems to have already demonstrated weakness on several occasions. For instance, after U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced her plans to visit Taiwan in August 2022, Beijing warned Washington of “forceful measures” if the American officials visits the self-ruled island. In reality, China’s response was merely symbolic. Its military fired missiles near Taiwan as part of huge military drills. Such an action did not force Pelosi to cancel her trip, just like the Chinese harsh rhetoric did not prevent Taiwan’s leader Tsai Ing-wen from visiting New York City on 30 March 2023.
Given that China appears to be action with restraint, even Ukraine seems to feel confident to “provoke” Beijing. On 8 April 2023, Oleksandr Merezhko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and the Head of the Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation said “Taiwan does not belong to China.” In the past, Merezhko called on the United States to impose additional sanctions on Beijing to stop China from “financing the Russian economy and the Russian military machine by buying Russian oil and gas.” In spite of such anti-Chinese rhetoric, Beijing seems to be hesitant about adopting an anti-Ukrainian stance, quite aware that the Eastern European nation is firmly backed by the United States and the European Union, China’s major trade partners.
The very fact that Tesla plans to open a new Megafactory in Shanghai, and that Airbus signed a contract to open a new assembly line in China’s city of Tianjin, perfectly illustrates that the People’s Republic, at least at this point, is not ready to raise the stakes and engage in an open confrontation with the West, be it over Taiwan or Ukraine.
Thus, even though Russia desperately needs military assistance from China, Beijing is unlikely to start delivering weapons to Moscow anytime soon, if at all. Instead, the Chinese leadership is expected to attempt to additionally strengthen its political and economic ties with the EU, apparently hoping to draw Europe away from America. But if Putin did not manage to divide the West over Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that the EU will turn its back on the United States over Taiwan.
Therefore, in the coming months, it is China that may have to, one way or another, turn its back on Russia in order to continue doing business as usual with Europe.
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Is China Turning its Back on Russia?
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April 18, 2023
China's rhetoric during the Ukraine crisis has led many to assume that China and Russia are bona fide allies. Yet they are at best in a situational partnership, and both history and pragmatic considerations suggest that China won't strengthen these ties any further, writes Nikola Mikovic.
C
hina continues balancing its economic ties with the West and its “no-limits friendship” with Russia. Despite occasional threats and harsh anti-Western rhetoric, Beijing does not seem ready to jeopardize its relations with the European Union and the United States and openly side with Moscow against Ukraine. Does that mean that the People’s Republic’s economic interests in the West will prevail over its “Not allies, but better than allies” relationship with the Kremlin?
Despite widespread belief, Russia and China are not allies. Historically, the two countries have often been rivals who even fought several low-scale wars. Geopolitically, the current relationship between Moscow and Beijing can be described as a situational partnership, rather than a “no-limits friendship” or a political and military alliance.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the European Union, openly said the declaration of the People’s Republic "no-limits friendship" with Russia is "nothing but rhetoric.” The very fact that he was not fired following such a statement, clearly indicates that what he stressed represents the official position of China’s Foreign Ministry.
Moreover, at this point Beijing does not even seem interested in developing closer energy cooperation with the Kremlin. Following the recent meeting between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Moscow, China’s leader did not give the green light to the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which means that the Russo-Chinese “friendship” has some very strong limits.
Officially, China never supported Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Despite pursuing a policy of “pro-Russian neutrality,” Beijing indirectly opposed the Kremlin’s plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, close to the former Soviet republic’s border with NATO neighbors Lithuania and Poland. More importantly, China never recognized Russia’s annexation of the Donbass and southern Ukrainian regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. However, from the Western perspective, the People’s Republic’s 12-point peace plan, which calls for a “comprehensive ceasefire,” de facto legitimizes Moscow’s incorporation of four of Ukraine’s regions into the Russian Federation. According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the document “allows Russia to consolidate the gains that it has made in Ukraine.” On the other hand, the 12-point peace plan helped Beijing to portray itself as a peacemaker and improve its position in the global arena ahead of the “historic” China-brokered normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Thus, under the current geopolitical circumstances, the People’s Republic is unlikely to openly side with Russia against Ukraine, since such a move could have a significant impact on its relations with the West. Quite aware of that, the United States and its allies will undoubtedly continue pressuring Beijing not to engage in any military cooperation with Moscow. On 6 April 2023, during her visit to China, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she had warned Xi Jinping that “any arms shipments to Russia would significantly harm the People’s Republic’s relations with the EU.” She also urged the Chinese leader to speak with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. If Xi eventually calls Zelensky,it will likely represent Beijing’s weakness to the eyes of the Western policy makers, since potential talks between the two leaders will come as a result of the Western pressure.
But China seems to have already demonstrated weakness on several occasions. For instance, after U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced her plans to visit Taiwan in August 2022, Beijing warned Washington of “forceful measures” if the American officials visits the self-ruled island. In reality, China’s response was merely symbolic. Its military fired missiles near Taiwan as part of huge military drills. Such an action did not force Pelosi to cancel her trip, just like the Chinese harsh rhetoric did not prevent Taiwan’s leader Tsai Ing-wen from visiting New York City on 30 March 2023.
Given that China appears to be action with restraint, even Ukraine seems to feel confident to “provoke” Beijing. On 8 April 2023, Oleksandr Merezhko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and the Head of the Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation said “Taiwan does not belong to China.” In the past, Merezhko called on the United States to impose additional sanctions on Beijing to stop China from “financing the Russian economy and the Russian military machine by buying Russian oil and gas.” In spite of such anti-Chinese rhetoric, Beijing seems to be hesitant about adopting an anti-Ukrainian stance, quite aware that the Eastern European nation is firmly backed by the United States and the European Union, China’s major trade partners.
The very fact that Tesla plans to open a new Megafactory in Shanghai, and that Airbus signed a contract to open a new assembly line in China’s city of Tianjin, perfectly illustrates that the People’s Republic, at least at this point, is not ready to raise the stakes and engage in an open confrontation with the West, be it over Taiwan or Ukraine.
Thus, even though Russia desperately needs military assistance from China, Beijing is unlikely to start delivering weapons to Moscow anytime soon, if at all. Instead, the Chinese leadership is expected to attempt to additionally strengthen its political and economic ties with the EU, apparently hoping to draw Europe away from America. But if Putin did not manage to divide the West over Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that the EU will turn its back on the United States over Taiwan.
Therefore, in the coming months, it is China that may have to, one way or another, turn its back on Russia in order to continue doing business as usual with Europe.
