he journey from the Nausori Airport to Suva—Fiji’s capital city in the South Pacific—would have cost $4 Fijian dollars in fuel in February 2026. Just a few months later, cab drivers say it now costs $10. While the whole world is feeling the economic squeeze caused by the major spike in energy costs following the Israeli and American decision to start attacking Iran on 28 February 2026, developing states feel it in disproportionate ways. The knock–on costs of everything—food, transportation, heating and cooling, technology, and basic goods—are increasing due to higher energy costs. Yet one area affected but not discussed is security. The last few years have been replete with reminders of how much the maritime domain contributes to life on land. Roughly 90% of world trade happens by sea, roughly 20% of dietary protein intake comes from fish, and roughly 99% of all telephonic and internet communication goes through submarine cables. That means that, at any given time, a substantial amount of the world’s wealth is out at sea. Yet with crippling fuel prices, states everywhere are struggling to afford the maritime operations necessary to ensure the security of that wealth.
In the US, fuel prices have risen by about 50% since the start of the war. In places like Fiji, that increase is well over 100%, making the economic challenge far more extreme. And while the United States has the resources to absorb some of those costs and maintain its own Coast Guard and naval operations, places like Fiji, which is still far wealthier than many other states worldwide, cannot. The United States Navy spends about $4 billion on fuel each year, and supplemental funding can alleviate the pain of rising costs. In Fiji, however, the Navy's entire budget is less than $20 million, and even before the war in Iran, foreign assistance was needed to cover some of the Navy’s fuel costs for operations. As a practical matter, the increased costs mean fewer patrols and more time spent nearshore rather than offshore. And Fiji is much better off than dozens of other states in Oceania, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean.
That dynamic is a gift to criminals of all sorts. Whether illegal fishers—including state–sponsored operations like the Chinese Distant Water Fishing Fleet—who steal the sovereign resources of states, or traffickers of drugs, arms, humans, or contraband, or smugglers of migrants, resources, or, ironically, fuel, the current decrease in maritime security operations around the world is a fantastic opportunity to gain illicit profits at sea. And once established, some of these illicit operations become far more difficult to counter.
With bad actors taking greater advantage of the maritime space, this is a problem not just for the security of smaller states but for the security of the world as a whole. The systematic operation of the so–called “shadow fleet” seeks opportunities to avoid interdiction, and fewer patrols mean greater invisibility. So much of the world’s maritime domain is becoming safer for criminals and sanctioned actors, thanks to the inability to afford fuel. That is precipitating a shift in the global economy away from the regulated, dollar–centered legitimate economy toward a more flexible, affordable approach that is unconcerned with issues like the rule of law and human rights.
But there is also another concern. Everyone around the world needs fuel, and when the prices spike, as they have, fuel theft, smuggling, and adulteration spike as well. In the maritime domain, this means carrying fuel on vessels not designed to do so, and operations like the shadow fleet, which are already moving lower–cost energy supplies under sanctions, tend to flourish. The decrease in maritime security presence and patrolling means that some of these operations can proceed with impunity. But it also means a heightened risk for accidents and spills. And in a painful twist of irony, the national response mechanisms of countries around the world may not be able to afford the fuel to respond to an oil spill. That lack of response can lead to intergenerational harm to the marine environment and, with it, to the economies of nearby states.
Over the last several decades, as the United States has enjoyed the position of the world’s preeminent superpower, even amid growing competition, a major focus of its defense and security policy has been to support partner nations' capacity and capability to secure their own territory. In the process of pursuing its interests in Iran, the current U.S. administration has created an operational context that diminishes the ability of America’s friends, allies, and partners to protect themselves, and at the same time, has opened the door to adversarial competitors like China and Russia to advance their own interests in the resulting security blackout. Granted, this situation may be temporary. That said, the end of the war has been imminent according to the White House since late March, and a detailed pathway to resolution remains elusive. Yet even a short–term advance by both state and non–state nefarious actors, in the absence of the developing world’s ability to maintain security operations, may spell long–term trouble.
This situation points to three key mitigation measures. The first is cooperation—states everywhere need a diverse array of friends and partners, and finding new ways to support one another may be a key approach to reducing the impact of this situation. The second is maximizing efficiency and effectiveness of resources. States can do more with less, and while that should not be the default approach, it can help catalyze efforts to do as much as possible with what is available. For example, states can work to find more novel ways, legally and operationally, to leverage laws, technology, and interagency cooperation to target and effectively penalize offenses that occur at sea but are interdicted portside, thereby saving fuel and other costs. And finally, states need to consider longer–term resiliency measures to safeguard against this sort of situation in the future. Alternative energy sources, shorter emergency supply chains, and other emergency measures can all help alleviate the pain of such price spikes. While this present circumstance may be temporary, volatility is becoming more commonplace, and every state—regardless of size—needs to consider how to secure, govern, and develop its maritime domain amid the reality of this undesirable backdrop.
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The Iran war’s hidden cost at sea
Donovan Kelly via Pexels.
July 1, 2026
Soaring fuel costs from the Iran war are eroding maritime security in developing states and opening the seas to criminals, writes Dr. Ian Ralby.
T
he journey from the Nausori Airport to Suva—Fiji’s capital city in the South Pacific—would have cost $4 Fijian dollars in fuel in February 2026. Just a few months later, cab drivers say it now costs $10. While the whole world is feeling the economic squeeze caused by the major spike in energy costs following the Israeli and American decision to start attacking Iran on 28 February 2026, developing states feel it in disproportionate ways. The knock–on costs of everything—food, transportation, heating and cooling, technology, and basic goods—are increasing due to higher energy costs. Yet one area affected but not discussed is security. The last few years have been replete with reminders of how much the maritime domain contributes to life on land. Roughly 90% of world trade happens by sea, roughly 20% of dietary protein intake comes from fish, and roughly 99% of all telephonic and internet communication goes through submarine cables. That means that, at any given time, a substantial amount of the world’s wealth is out at sea. Yet with crippling fuel prices, states everywhere are struggling to afford the maritime operations necessary to ensure the security of that wealth.
In the US, fuel prices have risen by about 50% since the start of the war. In places like Fiji, that increase is well over 100%, making the economic challenge far more extreme. And while the United States has the resources to absorb some of those costs and maintain its own Coast Guard and naval operations, places like Fiji, which is still far wealthier than many other states worldwide, cannot. The United States Navy spends about $4 billion on fuel each year, and supplemental funding can alleviate the pain of rising costs. In Fiji, however, the Navy's entire budget is less than $20 million, and even before the war in Iran, foreign assistance was needed to cover some of the Navy’s fuel costs for operations. As a practical matter, the increased costs mean fewer patrols and more time spent nearshore rather than offshore. And Fiji is much better off than dozens of other states in Oceania, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean.
That dynamic is a gift to criminals of all sorts. Whether illegal fishers—including state–sponsored operations like the Chinese Distant Water Fishing Fleet—who steal the sovereign resources of states, or traffickers of drugs, arms, humans, or contraband, or smugglers of migrants, resources, or, ironically, fuel, the current decrease in maritime security operations around the world is a fantastic opportunity to gain illicit profits at sea. And once established, some of these illicit operations become far more difficult to counter.
With bad actors taking greater advantage of the maritime space, this is a problem not just for the security of smaller states but for the security of the world as a whole. The systematic operation of the so–called “shadow fleet” seeks opportunities to avoid interdiction, and fewer patrols mean greater invisibility. So much of the world’s maritime domain is becoming safer for criminals and sanctioned actors, thanks to the inability to afford fuel. That is precipitating a shift in the global economy away from the regulated, dollar–centered legitimate economy toward a more flexible, affordable approach that is unconcerned with issues like the rule of law and human rights.
But there is also another concern. Everyone around the world needs fuel, and when the prices spike, as they have, fuel theft, smuggling, and adulteration spike as well. In the maritime domain, this means carrying fuel on vessels not designed to do so, and operations like the shadow fleet, which are already moving lower–cost energy supplies under sanctions, tend to flourish. The decrease in maritime security presence and patrolling means that some of these operations can proceed with impunity. But it also means a heightened risk for accidents and spills. And in a painful twist of irony, the national response mechanisms of countries around the world may not be able to afford the fuel to respond to an oil spill. That lack of response can lead to intergenerational harm to the marine environment and, with it, to the economies of nearby states.
Over the last several decades, as the United States has enjoyed the position of the world’s preeminent superpower, even amid growing competition, a major focus of its defense and security policy has been to support partner nations' capacity and capability to secure their own territory. In the process of pursuing its interests in Iran, the current U.S. administration has created an operational context that diminishes the ability of America’s friends, allies, and partners to protect themselves, and at the same time, has opened the door to adversarial competitors like China and Russia to advance their own interests in the resulting security blackout. Granted, this situation may be temporary. That said, the end of the war has been imminent according to the White House since late March, and a detailed pathway to resolution remains elusive. Yet even a short–term advance by both state and non–state nefarious actors, in the absence of the developing world’s ability to maintain security operations, may spell long–term trouble.
This situation points to three key mitigation measures. The first is cooperation—states everywhere need a diverse array of friends and partners, and finding new ways to support one another may be a key approach to reducing the impact of this situation. The second is maximizing efficiency and effectiveness of resources. States can do more with less, and while that should not be the default approach, it can help catalyze efforts to do as much as possible with what is available. For example, states can work to find more novel ways, legally and operationally, to leverage laws, technology, and interagency cooperation to target and effectively penalize offenses that occur at sea but are interdicted portside, thereby saving fuel and other costs. And finally, states need to consider longer–term resiliency measures to safeguard against this sort of situation in the future. Alternative energy sources, shorter emergency supply chains, and other emergency measures can all help alleviate the pain of such price spikes. While this present circumstance may be temporary, volatility is becoming more commonplace, and every state—regardless of size—needs to consider how to secure, govern, and develop its maritime domain amid the reality of this undesirable backdrop.
