When India tested its nuclear weapons, one of its primary objectives was to develop a nuclear triad for the nation. A nuclear triad includes land based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and SSBNs (fitted with Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). In the Indian context, the Indian Air Force’s Mirage 2000H which was initially meant only for air defence, but was later chosen for nuclear strikes. The Jaguar-IM was also capable of delivering nuclear bombs. The MiG-27ML and Mirage 2000Ns were also considered to be a choice to deliver nuclear weapons.
At present, India’s missile arsenal includes Prithvi variants and the Agni category missiles which can carry nuclear warheads. However, the triad was incomplete for a long time, as India lagged behind in its SSBN capability. This changed in 2009, when India completed its nuclear triad when through the launch of nuclear powered submarine, Arihant (meaning destroyer of enemies) under the Advanced Technology Vessel Project.
On the 9th of August 2013, India activated its nuclear reactor on the INS Arihant. This means that operational deployment of the SSBN will take place soon.
Until now, nuclear deterrence relied on the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. However, it now may rely on the Indian Navy too. India had already declared a ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons in its nuclear strategy. As the old school of thought suggests, nuclear submarines (SSBNs, that is) are the best mode of survivability of the nuclear arsenals and thereby strengthens counter strike or second strike capability.
Since India’s Agni variant is expected to be the counter strike weapon of choice, the INS Arihant could prevail as the preferred second strike weapon. To properly analyze this possibility, it is imperative to understand the difference in the two terminologies of counter strike and second strike. Counter strike refers to the reaction which India would make after having been struck first with a nuclear weapon by an adversary, whereas the second strike is an action that India would make after it having launched its counter strike, and subsequently having absorbed the enemy’s second strike.
Naturally, Agni would not be saved for so long even though they are road and rail mobile. Therefore, Arihant could launch second strike counter force targeting weapons to destroy the enemy’s counter force capabilities and hence strengthen nuclear deterrence. Making Sagarika a counter force weapon would deter Pakistan from irrationally using Nasr for battlefield purposes since it would know some survivable counter force targeting weapon from the Indian side could result cataclysmic destruction. However, for an assured strike capability, the SSBN should be reliable and robust in order to deter an enemy attack. For this, there would be a need for an effective chain of command, control and communication. With enemy states developing Anti Submarine Warfare technologies, SSBNs could become vulnerable too.
It has been reported that the INS Arihant is expected to be fitted with Sagarika category submarine launched ballistic missiles with a range of 700km. In fact, earlier this year in February, India also tested its K-15 SLBM. With such range, the missile is unlikely to be a deterrent against China, however, could deter Pakistan. If the missile has to be a deterrent against China, either the range of the missile has to be increased or the SSBN would have to be stationed close to the Chinese shores. The latter option could be dangerous as SSBNs should be kept as far as possible away from the enemy shores. There could be a possibility of MIRV-ing the missile in order to reduce the number of missiles required to be launched and also collateral damage.
At present, Pakistan does not have any nuclear powered submarines. Hence, parity can be maintained if Pakistan acquires SSBN either indigenously or with the help of China (with the latter being more likely likely). This would enable both India and Pakistan to possess nuclear triad, and therefore balance the stability/instability paradox. However, it must be noted that since Pakistan is aware that even with a nuclear first strike on India, that some of the Indian nuclear arsenal would survive to retaliate it could indulge more into low intensity conflicts.
China, which also has a no first use policy (against states which China does not consider to be a part of its territory) is also trying to make progress with its SSBN program. At present, China has the Xia class SSBN and the Jin class SLBM, both of which are fitted with Julang class SLBM. However, China’s Xia class SSBN probably have never completed a single patrol while there is also a delay in the operational deployment of the Jin class submarine.
Debalina Ghoshal is an Associate Fellow for the Centre For Air Power Studies in New Delhi.
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India's Airhant Reactor Provides Alternative Nuclear Deterrence Options
October 2, 2013
When India tested its nuclear weapons, one of its primary objectives was to develop a nuclear triad for the nation. A nuclear triad includes land based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and SSBNs (fitted with Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). In the Indian context, the Indian Air Force’s Mirage 2000H which was initially meant only for air defence, but was later chosen for nuclear strikes. The Jaguar-IM was also capable of delivering nuclear bombs. The MiG-27ML and Mirage 2000Ns were also considered to be a choice to deliver nuclear weapons.
At present, India’s missile arsenal includes Prithvi variants and the Agni category missiles which can carry nuclear warheads. However, the triad was incomplete for a long time, as India lagged behind in its SSBN capability. This changed in 2009, when India completed its nuclear triad when through the launch of nuclear powered submarine, Arihant (meaning destroyer of enemies) under the Advanced Technology Vessel Project.
On the 9th of August 2013, India activated its nuclear reactor on the INS Arihant. This means that operational deployment of the SSBN will take place soon.
Until now, nuclear deterrence relied on the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. However, it now may rely on the Indian Navy too. India had already declared a ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons in its nuclear strategy. As the old school of thought suggests, nuclear submarines (SSBNs, that is) are the best mode of survivability of the nuclear arsenals and thereby strengthens counter strike or second strike capability.
Since India’s Agni variant is expected to be the counter strike weapon of choice, the INS Arihant could prevail as the preferred second strike weapon. To properly analyze this possibility, it is imperative to understand the difference in the two terminologies of counter strike and second strike. Counter strike refers to the reaction which India would make after having been struck first with a nuclear weapon by an adversary, whereas the second strike is an action that India would make after it having launched its counter strike, and subsequently having absorbed the enemy’s second strike.
Naturally, Agni would not be saved for so long even though they are road and rail mobile. Therefore, Arihant could launch second strike counter force targeting weapons to destroy the enemy’s counter force capabilities and hence strengthen nuclear deterrence. Making Sagarika a counter force weapon would deter Pakistan from irrationally using Nasr for battlefield purposes since it would know some survivable counter force targeting weapon from the Indian side could result cataclysmic destruction. However, for an assured strike capability, the SSBN should be reliable and robust in order to deter an enemy attack. For this, there would be a need for an effective chain of command, control and communication. With enemy states developing Anti Submarine Warfare technologies, SSBNs could become vulnerable too.
It has been reported that the INS Arihant is expected to be fitted with Sagarika category submarine launched ballistic missiles with a range of 700km. In fact, earlier this year in February, India also tested its K-15 SLBM. With such range, the missile is unlikely to be a deterrent against China, however, could deter Pakistan. If the missile has to be a deterrent against China, either the range of the missile has to be increased or the SSBN would have to be stationed close to the Chinese shores. The latter option could be dangerous as SSBNs should be kept as far as possible away from the enemy shores. There could be a possibility of MIRV-ing the missile in order to reduce the number of missiles required to be launched and also collateral damage.
At present, Pakistan does not have any nuclear powered submarines. Hence, parity can be maintained if Pakistan acquires SSBN either indigenously or with the help of China (with the latter being more likely likely). This would enable both India and Pakistan to possess nuclear triad, and therefore balance the stability/instability paradox. However, it must be noted that since Pakistan is aware that even with a nuclear first strike on India, that some of the Indian nuclear arsenal would survive to retaliate it could indulge more into low intensity conflicts.
China, which also has a no first use policy (against states which China does not consider to be a part of its territory) is also trying to make progress with its SSBN program. At present, China has the Xia class SSBN and the Jin class SLBM, both of which are fitted with Julang class SLBM. However, China’s Xia class SSBN probably have never completed a single patrol while there is also a delay in the operational deployment of the Jin class submarine.
Debalina Ghoshal is an Associate Fellow for the Centre For Air Power Studies in New Delhi.
