ndia and China are leading the Global South with divergent tactics and objectives. Their differing strategies are on display at the recent BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit in South Africa and the G-20 Summit in India. India focused its G-20 presidency to reorient the forum to champion Global South interests and welcome its newest member: the African Union. At the BRICS Summit, China led the effort—over a reluctant India—to expand the repositioning of the group and act as a counterweight to the G7 by adding Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The India-China rivalry will reverberate across continents and inform American outreach to the Global South.
While India strives to work within the existing institutions in giving voice to the Global South and enhancing its own standing in the process, China wants to recruit the Global South in establishing alternative structures to those established after WWII by the U.S. and Europe. China, through aggressive lending under its Belt & Road Initiative has rapidly become the largest sovereign debt holder across the Global South. These divergent strategies are informed by their respective national narratives and polities—Indian federal democracy and Chinese communist authoritarianism.
For example, Chinese leaders often refer to China’s century of humiliation by foreign colonial powers. The Chinese worldview and diplomacy emanate from their determination to right a historical wrong—fuelled by their response to past indignity. Unsurprisingly, China is devoted to reshaping the global order to be supportive of the Chinese Communist Party’s totalitarian rule at home and interests overseas. India, under British colonial rule, saw its share of global GDP fall from over 20% to about 2%. However, antipathy to Britain’s colonial rule is conspicuous by its absence in the Indian narrative.
The contrasting predispositions of India and China inform how they approach territorial sovereignty and economic interdependence. China’s new national map, released a week before the G-20, includes territories within the national borders of India, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc. China’s navy—the world’s largest—constantly bullies its neighbors’ ships in the South China Sea, as currently being exhibited in the Philippines. Chinese leaders readily direct economic coercion to advance the Party’s interests at home and abroad. India has demonstrated neither the appetite nor the aptitude to associate its national honor or standing to reclaim disputed territories under the control of China and Pakistan. Indian polity lacks power to direct its industry to advance its political and military interests.
The growing rivalry and divergent strategies of India and China may hold three probable consequences for world affairs. First, the Global South fora may be increasingly occupied with India-China jousting rather than aspiring to be a united front vying for greater leverage vis-à-vis the perceived Global North. This rivalry also speaks to the ideological and strategic choice facing the Global South (i.e. whether its interests are better served by operating through, with periodic updates, the established global rules and institutions or by creating alternative ones).
Second, it may hasten the end of post-Cold War multilateralism. Russia under Putin will remain a pariah for the foreseeable future and absent from the world stage. Xi, since the COVID-19 pandemic and the slowing economy, has been a reluctant traveller with an aversion to attending forums not dominated by China. Xi is abstaining from the G20 and is unlikely to attend the upcoming APEC gathering in the United States. The new era of multilateralism will be defined by varying cliques and factions. The perspectives on multilateralism among the U.S., G7, and India may find greater convergence as China attempts to create more China-dominated forums.
Third, as the rivalry intensifies, India must decide if aligning with the U.S., G7, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)—U.S. , Japan, India, and Australia—enhances its strategic autonomy, global reach, and advocacy for Global South issues or if preserving its nostalgic neutrality is more beneficial. India lacks the military and economic heft to equal China. The realists in India are aware that soft power on its own is a discounted commodity. Soft power is of highest import when tethered with hard power and deployed in preference of it. Conversely, the U.S., Europe, and Japan may have to assess whether their efforts to forge stronger ties with the Global South are more effective with India inside the proverbial tent than outside of it.
For the Global South, the growing India–China rivalry compounds the prevailing U.S.-China competition. The emerging nations will have to evaluate whether their national interests are better served in a world governed by laws or an alternative beholden to a powerful autocrat. This offers an opportunity for the U.S.—with the G7 and India—to include Global South priorities and representation across international institutions. Adding the African Union to the G20 is a start. More is needed.
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India-China Rivalry’s Impact on World Affairs and the Global South
Anunachal Pradesh, India. Image by Jagrat Bordolai from Pixabay
October 12, 2023
For the Global South, the growing India–China rivalry compounds the prevailing U.S.-China competition. There is evidence that India will grow closer to the West and a rules-based international order even as China creates distance from that order, writes Kaush Arha.
I
ndia and China are leading the Global South with divergent tactics and objectives. Their differing strategies are on display at the recent BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit in South Africa and the G-20 Summit in India. India focused its G-20 presidency to reorient the forum to champion Global South interests and welcome its newest member: the African Union. At the BRICS Summit, China led the effort—over a reluctant India—to expand the repositioning of the group and act as a counterweight to the G7 by adding Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The India-China rivalry will reverberate across continents and inform American outreach to the Global South.
While India strives to work within the existing institutions in giving voice to the Global South and enhancing its own standing in the process, China wants to recruit the Global South in establishing alternative structures to those established after WWII by the U.S. and Europe. China, through aggressive lending under its Belt & Road Initiative has rapidly become the largest sovereign debt holder across the Global South. These divergent strategies are informed by their respective national narratives and polities—Indian federal democracy and Chinese communist authoritarianism.
For example, Chinese leaders often refer to China’s century of humiliation by foreign colonial powers. The Chinese worldview and diplomacy emanate from their determination to right a historical wrong—fuelled by their response to past indignity. Unsurprisingly, China is devoted to reshaping the global order to be supportive of the Chinese Communist Party’s totalitarian rule at home and interests overseas. India, under British colonial rule, saw its share of global GDP fall from over 20% to about 2%. However, antipathy to Britain’s colonial rule is conspicuous by its absence in the Indian narrative.
The contrasting predispositions of India and China inform how they approach territorial sovereignty and economic interdependence. China’s new national map, released a week before the G-20, includes territories within the national borders of India, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc. China’s navy—the world’s largest—constantly bullies its neighbors’ ships in the South China Sea, as currently being exhibited in the Philippines. Chinese leaders readily direct economic coercion to advance the Party’s interests at home and abroad. India has demonstrated neither the appetite nor the aptitude to associate its national honor or standing to reclaim disputed territories under the control of China and Pakistan. Indian polity lacks power to direct its industry to advance its political and military interests.
The growing rivalry and divergent strategies of India and China may hold three probable consequences for world affairs. First, the Global South fora may be increasingly occupied with India-China jousting rather than aspiring to be a united front vying for greater leverage vis-à-vis the perceived Global North. This rivalry also speaks to the ideological and strategic choice facing the Global South (i.e. whether its interests are better served by operating through, with periodic updates, the established global rules and institutions or by creating alternative ones).
Second, it may hasten the end of post-Cold War multilateralism. Russia under Putin will remain a pariah for the foreseeable future and absent from the world stage. Xi, since the COVID-19 pandemic and the slowing economy, has been a reluctant traveller with an aversion to attending forums not dominated by China. Xi is abstaining from the G20 and is unlikely to attend the upcoming APEC gathering in the United States. The new era of multilateralism will be defined by varying cliques and factions. The perspectives on multilateralism among the U.S., G7, and India may find greater convergence as China attempts to create more China-dominated forums.
Third, as the rivalry intensifies, India must decide if aligning with the U.S., G7, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)—U.S. , Japan, India, and Australia—enhances its strategic autonomy, global reach, and advocacy for Global South issues or if preserving its nostalgic neutrality is more beneficial. India lacks the military and economic heft to equal China. The realists in India are aware that soft power on its own is a discounted commodity. Soft power is of highest import when tethered with hard power and deployed in preference of it. Conversely, the U.S., Europe, and Japan may have to assess whether their efforts to forge stronger ties with the Global South are more effective with India inside the proverbial tent than outside of it.
For the Global South, the growing India–China rivalry compounds the prevailing U.S.-China competition. The emerging nations will have to evaluate whether their national interests are better served in a world governed by laws or an alternative beholden to a powerful autocrat. This offers an opportunity for the U.S.—with the G7 and India—to include Global South priorities and representation across international institutions. Adding the African Union to the G20 is a start. More is needed.
