As India becomes a more powerful player in the global hierarchy and strengthens ties with the United States—despite occasional setbacks—China construes that it is in its best interest to turn towards Pakistan to fend off the Indo-U.S. alliance in South and East Asia.
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani traveled to China in May 2011 to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Described as “higher than mountains and deeper than oceans”, these bilateral relations are crucial to both Beijing and Islamabad. At a time when Central and South Asia, particularly Pakistan, are under intense scrutiny for their contribution to the fight against extremism and terrorism, the great powers have been keeping a close eye on evolving Pakistani-Chinese relations.
After Bin Laden’s assassination, China was perhaps the only powerful country that openly expressed its support for Pakistan for having its territorial integrity violated. During his visit to Pakistan in December 2010, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (2003-2013) stated,“Pakistan has made huge sacrifices and an important contribution to the international fight against terrorism, that its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be respected, and that the international community should understand and support Pakistan’s efforts to maintain domestic stability and to realize economic and social development.” Wen added that China wishes to be an “all-weather strategic partner” and is “ready to assist Pakistan and its population to weather their political and economic troubles.’”
China moved quickly from mere rhetoric to action by immediately delivering 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-functional fighter jets and a promise to provide Pakistan with combat aircrafts with stealth technology. In addition, the state-owned Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea west of Karachi, in which the Chinese have invested heavily in recent years, is now operated by China and serves to enhance China’s naval projection capabilities in South Asia. In Pakistan-China talks, Islamabad has offered Beijing to convert the Gwadar port into a naval base for Chinese use. Beijing’s response, however, came quickly. Fearful of antagonizing Washington and New Delhi, it rejected the offer of formally establishing a military base in Pakistan.
Why this relationship?
Pakistan’s relationship with China can be characterized as deep and multi-faceted, buttressed by mutual trust and confidence. Islamabad’s priority has been to maintain close ties with China. In return it benefited from China’s extensive provision of economic, military and technical aid over the years. Moreover, Pakistan was instrumental in China’s cultivation of relations with the U.S.—and the West more generally—in the early 1970s. It acted as a behind-the-scene mediator prior to the secret trip of then-U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to China in July 1971 and enabled China to develop closer ties the larger Muslim world.
For a number of years now, China has proved to be Pakistan’s largest weapons supplier. The two countries are engaged large joint projects to produce, among other armaments, fighter jets and guided-missile frigates. China is a reliable supplier of military hardware to the corrupt-stricken Pakistani army. It has actively shared in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure and helped Pakistan acquire equipments and technology at a time when protectionism was on the rise in Western countries.
In this sense, the Pakistani nuclear weapons program is highly dependent on the Chinese one. China is possibly the first country which broke the pledge to the 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by declared nuclear states (including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, and more recently India and Pakistan) not to export to non-nuclear states either weapons-grade fissile material or nuclear weapons components or technologies.
On the economic front, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan amounted to $12 billion in 2012. Pakistan appreciates China’s economic aid more than what it receives from the U.S., since the latter always attaches “strings” to its assistance programs. Calls are being heard in Pakistan to make China, not the U.S., the strongest ally in its foreign policy, especially in the context of intense U.S. pressure on the civilian government of President Mamnoon Hussain to increase efforts in fighting local and international terrorism.
Two factors have helped these calls gain traction and become popular: 1) China’s recent ascendance to the stratus of a leading global economic power; and 2) the increased cooperation between India and the U.S. Many Pakistani observers accuse Washington of using Pakistan to defend its selfish interests and achieve its larger strategic agenda. China, on the contrary, is viewed as a dependable ally that has rarely hesitated to offer help to Pakistan when India showed signs of aggressiveness or toughness. That explains Pakistan’s readiness to give China ‘carte blanche’ in India-Pakistani peace talks or in the negotiation over the status of Kashmir.
As India makes quick strides in the global political hierarchy and strengthens its ties with the U.S., the role of Pakistan in China’s foreign policy is likely to grow. An emerging India enhances Pakistan’s importance in China’s strategy towards the subcontinent. No one is expecting a change in the China-Pakistan partnership, as it serves the interests of both countries. In particular, India is confronted with the prospect of a two-front war should a breakdown in its relations with either China or Pakistan occur. Beijing’s good chemistry with Islamabad reached its zenith in the wake of Bin Laden's death and the uproar in Washington to deal firmly with Pakistan.
For China, Pakistan is an increasingly important country in addressing the challenge posed by the U.S. and India. South Asia is being transformed into an essential new front in the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, as well as between China and India, and the region’s weigh in global politics is likely to increase in coming years.
Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the American University of Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. His research, teaching and consulting interests include Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics, international political economy and globalization.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's May/June 2014 print edition.
Photo: Reuters.
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How China and Pakistan Shift the Balance of Power in South Asia
May 14, 2014
As India becomes a more powerful player in the global hierarchy and strengthens ties with the United States—despite occasional setbacks—China construes that it is in its best interest to turn towards Pakistan to fend off the Indo-U.S. alliance in South and East Asia.
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani traveled to China in May 2011 to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Described as “higher than mountains and deeper than oceans”, these bilateral relations are crucial to both Beijing and Islamabad. At a time when Central and South Asia, particularly Pakistan, are under intense scrutiny for their contribution to the fight against extremism and terrorism, the great powers have been keeping a close eye on evolving Pakistani-Chinese relations.
After Bin Laden’s assassination, China was perhaps the only powerful country that openly expressed its support for Pakistan for having its territorial integrity violated. During his visit to Pakistan in December 2010, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (2003-2013) stated,“Pakistan has made huge sacrifices and an important contribution to the international fight against terrorism, that its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be respected, and that the international community should understand and support Pakistan’s efforts to maintain domestic stability and to realize economic and social development.” Wen added that China wishes to be an “all-weather strategic partner” and is “ready to assist Pakistan and its population to weather their political and economic troubles.’”
China moved quickly from mere rhetoric to action by immediately delivering 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-functional fighter jets and a promise to provide Pakistan with combat aircrafts with stealth technology. In addition, the state-owned Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea west of Karachi, in which the Chinese have invested heavily in recent years, is now operated by China and serves to enhance China’s naval projection capabilities in South Asia. In Pakistan-China talks, Islamabad has offered Beijing to convert the Gwadar port into a naval base for Chinese use. Beijing’s response, however, came quickly. Fearful of antagonizing Washington and New Delhi, it rejected the offer of formally establishing a military base in Pakistan.
Why this relationship?
Pakistan’s relationship with China can be characterized as deep and multi-faceted, buttressed by mutual trust and confidence. Islamabad’s priority has been to maintain close ties with China. In return it benefited from China’s extensive provision of economic, military and technical aid over the years. Moreover, Pakistan was instrumental in China’s cultivation of relations with the U.S.—and the West more generally—in the early 1970s. It acted as a behind-the-scene mediator prior to the secret trip of then-U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to China in July 1971 and enabled China to develop closer ties the larger Muslim world.
For a number of years now, China has proved to be Pakistan’s largest weapons supplier. The two countries are engaged large joint projects to produce, among other armaments, fighter jets and guided-missile frigates. China is a reliable supplier of military hardware to the corrupt-stricken Pakistani army. It has actively shared in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure and helped Pakistan acquire equipments and technology at a time when protectionism was on the rise in Western countries.
In this sense, the Pakistani nuclear weapons program is highly dependent on the Chinese one. China is possibly the first country which broke the pledge to the 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by declared nuclear states (including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, and more recently India and Pakistan) not to export to non-nuclear states either weapons-grade fissile material or nuclear weapons components or technologies.
On the economic front, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan amounted to $12 billion in 2012. Pakistan appreciates China’s economic aid more than what it receives from the U.S., since the latter always attaches “strings” to its assistance programs. Calls are being heard in Pakistan to make China, not the U.S., the strongest ally in its foreign policy, especially in the context of intense U.S. pressure on the civilian government of President Mamnoon Hussain to increase efforts in fighting local and international terrorism.
Two factors have helped these calls gain traction and become popular: 1) China’s recent ascendance to the stratus of a leading global economic power; and 2) the increased cooperation between India and the U.S. Many Pakistani observers accuse Washington of using Pakistan to defend its selfish interests and achieve its larger strategic agenda. China, on the contrary, is viewed as a dependable ally that has rarely hesitated to offer help to Pakistan when India showed signs of aggressiveness or toughness. That explains Pakistan’s readiness to give China ‘carte blanche’ in India-Pakistani peace talks or in the negotiation over the status of Kashmir.
As India makes quick strides in the global political hierarchy and strengthens its ties with the U.S., the role of Pakistan in China’s foreign policy is likely to grow. An emerging India enhances Pakistan’s importance in China’s strategy towards the subcontinent. No one is expecting a change in the China-Pakistan partnership, as it serves the interests of both countries. In particular, India is confronted with the prospect of a two-front war should a breakdown in its relations with either China or Pakistan occur. Beijing’s good chemistry with Islamabad reached its zenith in the wake of Bin Laden's death and the uproar in Washington to deal firmly with Pakistan.
For China, Pakistan is an increasingly important country in addressing the challenge posed by the U.S. and India. South Asia is being transformed into an essential new front in the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, as well as between China and India, and the region’s weigh in global politics is likely to increase in coming years.
Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the American University of Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. His research, teaching and consulting interests include Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics, international political economy and globalization.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's May/June 2014 print edition.
Photo: Reuters.
