ow a war starts is as important as how it ends. One hundred years after the opening salvo of World War I, how that world-changing conflict began is still subject to debate and vividly highlights the difference between received wisdom and factual nuance. In the case of the former, many would tell you it was the assassination of a relatively unimportant member of Austrian nobility that led to the shattering of European peace. For the latter, the complexities of intertwined alliances, domestic pressures and nationalism, a sense of closing windows of opportunities, and other deeply connected reasons brought forth the “war to end all wars.”
Today, popular and received wisdom about the war in Ukraine is that this conflict was caused by a single man’s erroneous understanding of history—Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. While a necessary factor, it is not sufficient, and such a narrow and inaccurate analysis ascribes too much to Putin and too little to other, concurrent and competing variables. It also leads to wrongheaded conclusions about how the war will or could end. Perhaps most ironically, ascribing the conflict to one man removes any agency for the Ukrainians themselves, something journalist Anna Arutunyan successfully corrects in her new book “Hybrid Warriors” (a copy of which was kindly lent by the author while a review copy was somewhere in the postal ether).
Arutunyan’s book is truly one of the most insightful books released this year. Through exceptional field reporting and superb, in-depth research, Arutunyan offers a sharply incisive look at the true origins of present crisis in Ukraine, one that strips away the hyperbole by looking at how 2014’s annexation of Crimea and outbreak of violence in Donbas actually happened, and how it presaged the February 2022 expanded invasion. “The prevailing view of Russia’s war in Ukraine over the last eight years…was that the Kremlin has been behind everything that happened from the very beginning… In a general sense, this is largely accurate,” Arutunyan writes. She continues: “However, it misses an important and widely contested dimension: the extent to which local Ukrainian separatists and Russian non-state fights and activists…shaped the insurgency and the war it sparked.”
Much like “Navalny” by Ben Noble, Jan Matti Dollbaum, and Morvan Lallouet, Arutunyan’s “Hybrid Warriors” presents its core story exceedingly well—in Noble’s case an ostensible biography of the opposition figure Alexei Navalny; in Arutunyan’s the genesis of the crisis in Ukraine—but uses that narrative as a stalking horse to provide far greater nuance and perspective about governance in contemporary Russia. As Arutunyan shows, the genesis of the separatist movement was not wholly or even predominantly a top-down affair, as is so often assumed to be the case in matters related to Putin’s Russia. There were innumerable entrepreneurs, enthusiastic amateurs, mercenaries, genuine true believers, and simple opportunists that drove events in Donbas. These figures, both Russian and Ukrainian, created a narrative on-the-ground, hoping to copy the success in Crimea that forced Moscow into a position that it otherwise may not have initially desired.
A theme to which Arutunyan returns throughout the book, and which is also noted by others such as Mark Galeotti, is that Putin is less a master strategist than a master ditherer, someone who avoids making difficult choices (and in so doing actually makes a choice) until the last possible moment. What is assumed or seen to be strategic acumen—clearly, he must be waiting to act—is often more tactical idleness until such time as avoidance is no longer practical. This is indeed the case in Donbas in 2014. The collision of political entrepreneurs, religious zealots, neo-imperialists, members of the government’s eco-system, and genuine separatists generated momentum over which the Kremlin had little, if any control. It could only assert grip after the fact, lest it lose control over the situation entirely and be outpaced by events.
This reflects less a coherent power vertical and mass orchestration of the levers of national power from the Kremlin, and more the reality of the fragmented, competitive, complex, and inefficient Russian political system. Confluences of events, interests—personal and business—historical grievances, and the broader geopolitical context in which all of these dynamics took place drove developments from the bottom-up—a far different perspective than many assume about politics in Russia. In this latter narrative, it is Putin sitting in the Kremlin that orchestrates events across the country, placing “little green men” behind every tree. It is a rather trite and simplistic perspective, and reflects a limited understanding of politics in contemporary Russia.
Shockingly for many in the West, as Arutunyan writes, it’s neither all about Putin nor is it all about the West—or at least it didn’t start out as about the West. As Arutunyan writes, “Putin seemed caught by the country’s two-headed eagle…both eagles were looking at Putin, stuck in the middle. One yammered at him about the need to modernize and reform, while the other hissed about the West’s betrayal.” This is a much-needed point of nuance.
Russia’s “hybrid war” is not exclusively an organic development within the country’s military intelligentsia, but is equally a reaction to what Moscow understood the West to be waging globally. By using non-state and non-military means, the West, in Russia’s view, was able to destabilize regimes (the color revolutions and Arab Spring). “They believed that they were playing catch up against the political war the West was already waging,” writes Arutunyan. The Kremlin’s fear that tactics it saw at work in former Soviet states, such as Ukraine, could be turned against it were manifested in reality in anti-Putin protests and developments in Kyiv. There the government was turning more toward the European Union and NATO, and away from Russia’s sphere of influence. Ukraine, for Russia, became a contest of wills and intentions; for the Kremlin it mattered less what Kyiv or even those in Donbas thought, and more of how it understood developments in the region to be playing out.
The West, in particular, assumed that because Russia was very much the lead driver behind events in Crimea, seizing upon local grievances to advance a narrow political interest through the focused application of the titular “hybrid warriors,” it was therefore the same in Ukraine’s Donbas. Yet, even in Crimea, as Arutunyan shows, there were as many amateurs as there were professional Russian intelligence officers (albeit lacking insignia). Both in Crimea and Donbas, as Arutunyan shows, there were true, organic separatist movements well before the events of 2014—indeed, she returns agency back to the Ukrainians themselves. As is the case with many separatist movements, there was no coherent agenda or plan, or even platform of belief. Some wanted to be part of Russia, others wanted total independence, others still pined for a return to the Soviet days. The grievances were many and, for those holding them, very real and very legitimate. Many Ukrainians in the Donbas did not see themselves as represented or supported by Kyiv. Their affinity was less to Kyiv and not much more to Moscow. They wished to chart their own path.
While we may never fully know what drove Putin to decide to invade, it is clear that the efforts of this collection of amateurs and their erstwhile government backers collided with Kremlin action and inaction in 2014, all against the backdrop of the complexities of geopolitics, laying the foundation for the events of 24 February 2022—Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine.
One wonders whether Arutunyan’s critical signal will be heard in the noise. This is due to no fault of the author, and simply reflects the volume of received wisdom of the moment. Indeed, the explanation she presents may well make some readers uncomfortable, only because its ground-truth challenges the received wisdom that seems to “inform” (dominate) the discourse on Ukraine. The actual complexities and nuance of the origin of the crisis appear to matter far less than the simple answer most people assume to be true; indeed, how it actually started matters less than how it ends. This is especially true as Ukrainian forces make impressive advances against Russian forces, which as of the writing of this review were withdrawing from Kherson, across the Dnipro River. Yet, understanding how it started is critical to informing the success of its end.
“Hybrid Warriors” easily joins this year’s best books of the 2022 list. It is sharp, incisive, insightful, and presents a much-needed complex and nuanced look at what is assumed to be a well-known story. Through compelling on-the-ground reporting and thorough research, Arutunyan provides a deeper look at politics in contemporary Russia through the crisis in Donbas—something that is very much needed if the West is to resolve this current crisis and make smarter policy towards Russia in the longer-term, whether Putin is in office or not.
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Ground Truth About the Origin of War in Ukraine
Photo via Pixabay.
November 19, 2022
In his latest review, Joshua Huminski explores Anna Arutunyan’s “Hybrid Warriors,” which examines the origins of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Arutunyan looks beyond the Kremlin to the complexities and nuance that led to the current crisis.
H
ow a war starts is as important as how it ends. One hundred years after the opening salvo of World War I, how that world-changing conflict began is still subject to debate and vividly highlights the difference between received wisdom and factual nuance. In the case of the former, many would tell you it was the assassination of a relatively unimportant member of Austrian nobility that led to the shattering of European peace. For the latter, the complexities of intertwined alliances, domestic pressures and nationalism, a sense of closing windows of opportunities, and other deeply connected reasons brought forth the “war to end all wars.”
Today, popular and received wisdom about the war in Ukraine is that this conflict was caused by a single man’s erroneous understanding of history—Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. While a necessary factor, it is not sufficient, and such a narrow and inaccurate analysis ascribes too much to Putin and too little to other, concurrent and competing variables. It also leads to wrongheaded conclusions about how the war will or could end. Perhaps most ironically, ascribing the conflict to one man removes any agency for the Ukrainians themselves, something journalist Anna Arutunyan successfully corrects in her new book “Hybrid Warriors” (a copy of which was kindly lent by the author while a review copy was somewhere in the postal ether).
Arutunyan’s book is truly one of the most insightful books released this year. Through exceptional field reporting and superb, in-depth research, Arutunyan offers a sharply incisive look at the true origins of present crisis in Ukraine, one that strips away the hyperbole by looking at how 2014’s annexation of Crimea and outbreak of violence in Donbas actually happened, and how it presaged the February 2022 expanded invasion. “The prevailing view of Russia’s war in Ukraine over the last eight years…was that the Kremlin has been behind everything that happened from the very beginning… In a general sense, this is largely accurate,” Arutunyan writes. She continues: “However, it misses an important and widely contested dimension: the extent to which local Ukrainian separatists and Russian non-state fights and activists…shaped the insurgency and the war it sparked.”
Much like “Navalny” by Ben Noble, Jan Matti Dollbaum, and Morvan Lallouet, Arutunyan’s “Hybrid Warriors” presents its core story exceedingly well—in Noble’s case an ostensible biography of the opposition figure Alexei Navalny; in Arutunyan’s the genesis of the crisis in Ukraine—but uses that narrative as a stalking horse to provide far greater nuance and perspective about governance in contemporary Russia. As Arutunyan shows, the genesis of the separatist movement was not wholly or even predominantly a top-down affair, as is so often assumed to be the case in matters related to Putin’s Russia. There were innumerable entrepreneurs, enthusiastic amateurs, mercenaries, genuine true believers, and simple opportunists that drove events in Donbas. These figures, both Russian and Ukrainian, created a narrative on-the-ground, hoping to copy the success in Crimea that forced Moscow into a position that it otherwise may not have initially desired.
A theme to which Arutunyan returns throughout the book, and which is also noted by others such as Mark Galeotti, is that Putin is less a master strategist than a master ditherer, someone who avoids making difficult choices (and in so doing actually makes a choice) until the last possible moment. What is assumed or seen to be strategic acumen—clearly, he must be waiting to act—is often more tactical idleness until such time as avoidance is no longer practical. This is indeed the case in Donbas in 2014. The collision of political entrepreneurs, religious zealots, neo-imperialists, members of the government’s eco-system, and genuine separatists generated momentum over which the Kremlin had little, if any control. It could only assert grip after the fact, lest it lose control over the situation entirely and be outpaced by events.
This reflects less a coherent power vertical and mass orchestration of the levers of national power from the Kremlin, and more the reality of the fragmented, competitive, complex, and inefficient Russian political system. Confluences of events, interests—personal and business—historical grievances, and the broader geopolitical context in which all of these dynamics took place drove developments from the bottom-up—a far different perspective than many assume about politics in Russia. In this latter narrative, it is Putin sitting in the Kremlin that orchestrates events across the country, placing “little green men” behind every tree. It is a rather trite and simplistic perspective, and reflects a limited understanding of politics in contemporary Russia.
Shockingly for many in the West, as Arutunyan writes, it’s neither all about Putin nor is it all about the West—or at least it didn’t start out as about the West. As Arutunyan writes, “Putin seemed caught by the country’s two-headed eagle…both eagles were looking at Putin, stuck in the middle. One yammered at him about the need to modernize and reform, while the other hissed about the West’s betrayal.” This is a much-needed point of nuance.
Russia’s “hybrid war” is not exclusively an organic development within the country’s military intelligentsia, but is equally a reaction to what Moscow understood the West to be waging globally. By using non-state and non-military means, the West, in Russia’s view, was able to destabilize regimes (the color revolutions and Arab Spring). “They believed that they were playing catch up against the political war the West was already waging,” writes Arutunyan. The Kremlin’s fear that tactics it saw at work in former Soviet states, such as Ukraine, could be turned against it were manifested in reality in anti-Putin protests and developments in Kyiv. There the government was turning more toward the European Union and NATO, and away from Russia’s sphere of influence. Ukraine, for Russia, became a contest of wills and intentions; for the Kremlin it mattered less what Kyiv or even those in Donbas thought, and more of how it understood developments in the region to be playing out.
The West, in particular, assumed that because Russia was very much the lead driver behind events in Crimea, seizing upon local grievances to advance a narrow political interest through the focused application of the titular “hybrid warriors,” it was therefore the same in Ukraine’s Donbas. Yet, even in Crimea, as Arutunyan shows, there were as many amateurs as there were professional Russian intelligence officers (albeit lacking insignia). Both in Crimea and Donbas, as Arutunyan shows, there were true, organic separatist movements well before the events of 2014—indeed, she returns agency back to the Ukrainians themselves. As is the case with many separatist movements, there was no coherent agenda or plan, or even platform of belief. Some wanted to be part of Russia, others wanted total independence, others still pined for a return to the Soviet days. The grievances were many and, for those holding them, very real and very legitimate. Many Ukrainians in the Donbas did not see themselves as represented or supported by Kyiv. Their affinity was less to Kyiv and not much more to Moscow. They wished to chart their own path.
While we may never fully know what drove Putin to decide to invade, it is clear that the efforts of this collection of amateurs and their erstwhile government backers collided with Kremlin action and inaction in 2014, all against the backdrop of the complexities of geopolitics, laying the foundation for the events of 24 February 2022—Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine.
One wonders whether Arutunyan’s critical signal will be heard in the noise. This is due to no fault of the author, and simply reflects the volume of received wisdom of the moment. Indeed, the explanation she presents may well make some readers uncomfortable, only because its ground-truth challenges the received wisdom that seems to “inform” (dominate) the discourse on Ukraine. The actual complexities and nuance of the origin of the crisis appear to matter far less than the simple answer most people assume to be true; indeed, how it actually started matters less than how it ends. This is especially true as Ukrainian forces make impressive advances against Russian forces, which as of the writing of this review were withdrawing from Kherson, across the Dnipro River. Yet, understanding how it started is critical to informing the success of its end.
“Hybrid Warriors” easily joins this year’s best books of the 2022 list. It is sharp, incisive, insightful, and presents a much-needed complex and nuanced look at what is assumed to be a well-known story. Through compelling on-the-ground reporting and thorough research, Arutunyan provides a deeper look at politics in contemporary Russia through the crisis in Donbas—something that is very much needed if the West is to resolve this current crisis and make smarter policy towards Russia in the longer-term, whether Putin is in office or not.
