ccording to the United Nations, by the middle of 2023 India will surpass China and become the world’s most populous country. The UN’s Population Fund forecasts that India’s population will climb to 1.4286 billion against China’s 1.4257 billion—2.9 million fewer. The United States, with its population of just over 330 million, is a distant third, but would be fourth if the European Union were counted as one bloc. The Brussels-based supranational entity would have nearly 450 million people across its 27 member states.
By 2050, four political entities will represent 40% of the world’s population—China, the European Union, India, and the United States. Blending elements of empires and nation-states, these four entities constitute “superstates” according to Alasdair Roberts, a professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. In his book of the same title, Roberts finds that each polity will face its own challenges in managing domestic interests, but Roberts asks what commonalities will be shared across these case studies. At its core, “Superstates” is an interesting intellectual exercise, but one whose theoretical structure is surpassed by the challenges it uncovers.
Having defined the “superstate” concept, Roberts briefly explores the history of empires to identify what affected the ability of empires to manage both the territory and citizens under its dominion. Here, Roberts sees control, leadership, and the creation and maintenance of national creeds as defining the challenges empires faced and, which in turn, superstates will face. Surveying the four case studies, Roberts explores how each became superstates and the challenges each individually will face and looks to the responses to the COVID-19 crisis as illustrative of these challenges in practice.
Looking for such similarities across four distinct entities is a risky prospect. The reductionist trend in comparative politics often sees the creation of such broad categories that the nuances and variability is lost—in searching for a broad enough forest, the trees simply become a green backdrop. Indeed, authoritarian capitalist China, democratic India and the United States, and supranational European Union all sit alongside one another as equals. Each system has significant differences and substantial internal and external challenges. Creating a framework that captures all four accurately necessitates a rather broad definition, hence Roberts' “superstates.”
China’s authoritarian capitalist system will find the Chinese Communist Party’s control under increasing pressure. An aging population will strain the Party’s ability to deliver social care amidst a dwindling economic support base—the four-two-one problem where four grandparents, two parents, all rely on one child for support. Years of environmental degradation will lead to poor air and water quality, increasing desertification, and reduce the availability of arable land. Beijing’s domestic financial profligacy and support of inefficient state-owned enterprises risks undermining the sustained growth on which its social contract is based. This is to say nothing of the risk of conflict with the United States over Taiwan. Beijing will, however, have the advantage of unparalleled technologically-enabled social control, which sees the Party on the path towards creating a true panopticon.
The democratic supranational bloc of the European Union appears to have much going for it, with its common market and the free flow of goods, services, and people across its borders. Yet it too faces its own challenges. While Brexit may have been an aberration (and certainly one Brussels is keen to ensure never happens again), the EU is seeing pressure from countries such as Hungary and Poland pursuing their own policies in contravention of Brussels’ centralized efforts. Brussels’ limited centralized powers means it is unable to affect widespread change, but it may prove more adaptable than the other case studies. Ultimately, there is no real “European” creed; at best there is a European identity, which will certainly be superseded by national identities if stressed. The EU is a successful political and economic bloc, but one that will perpetually face the challenge of balancing macro-level interests with those of its constituent members.
India continues to struggle to meet the needs of its growing population yet does enjoy pockets of considerable success and growth. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strain of Hindu nationalism has provided a centralizing creed for a significant segment of the country, but anger and populism are only mobilizing to a point. It is insufficient to marshal the economic and financial resources of the country and could serve as a deterrent to foreign investment if it leads to increased instability. Moreover, alienating a not insignificant element of the population risks creating fragmentary pressures and inciting internecine violence. What succeeds Modi remains to be seen as does whether his Hindu nationalism will outlast him.
The United States, for its part, is struggling to reconcile its federal system of government with increasing regional pressures and rising populism from both the left and right. The tension between the power and control of the federal government with the constitutional tradition of states’ reservation of powers and authorities is leading to increased political sclerosis, and an increasingly bifurcated country. At the same time, given America’s republican system of two- and four-year elections, the ability of Washington to affect sustained change across administrations is markedly limited. Political incentives for populism and extremism both drive and reward politicians who exploit emotions at the expense of practical solutions. While there has always been an underlying trend of extremism within American politics, it is only in recent years that it has been so rewarded or normalized. It is worth cautioning that the more breathless claims of a looming civil war are most certainly overblown—wonderful for cable television and talk radio but ignorant of the flexibility and adaptability of American democracy.
Each of these four polities is decidedly different. While some will certainly quibble with the creation of such a broad definition, the taxonomy matters less than what it enables Roberts to do: identify commonalities across all four entities. Carrying the challenges that affected empires forward—control, leadership, and creed—Roberts' framework comes into its own and offers an interesting lens to view the superstates’ future viability.
Central to all four is the question of control and the ability of the governing bodies in question to affect change across their territories and population. Here, transnational pressures of the globalization of economics, disease, politics, trade, and more both erode the ability of central governments to affect change, but also conversely, demand greater centralization of authority. At the same time, governments are finding the tools to affect policy change are largely without its purview. Technology is both a fragmentary development, but also a tool for increasing centralized authority. In the former, social media is fueling the erosion of traditional sources of power and control, leading to the rise, and spread of disinformation. In the case of the latter, and in particular in China, technology is a tool for increasing control, managing dissent, and manufacturing consensus.
Leadership is a far more fluid consideration for each and reflects the unique structure of each institution. The ability of these figures in turn are constrained by the legal frameworks in which they exist and operate. President Xi Jinping in China has far more authority and power than President Joe Biden in the United States, who is limited by constitutional election cycles. Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission president of the European Union, and her successors, enjoy decidedly fewer powers and authorities than Modi in India.
While national creeds do indeed matter, these are far more fluid concepts and much more difficult to maintain overtime and across states the size and scale of Roberts’ superstates. It is often the case that a creed is less about what someone is and more about what they are not. America’s national unity was perhaps never stronger than in the Cold War against Soviet Russia. In the wake of the September 11 attacks the country did rally, for a time, but the threat of terrorism was insufficient to mobilize sustained national unity. The European Union too has its own concept of “European-ness,” but national identity will almost always trump a continental creed. China’s national creed is, perhaps, its own version of exceptionalism, seeking to recapture what Beijing views as its rightful place in the world. Such hyper-nationalism risks unleashing forces outside of the Party’s control.
Perhaps the most significant challenge, one shared by all four “superstates,” blends the three areas Roberts identifies—the ability and willingness of governments to maintain or create new social contracts with their citizens. Indeed, this is a core threat identified by the U.S. National Intelligence Council in its most recent Global Trends report. Rising expectations from national populations and the decreasing ability of governments to meet these demands will likely yield greater strains on each of the political institutions in question. Will these four superstates be forced to establish new social contracts in the face of an inability to meet these rising demands? It is an open question and one that could well result in increased domestic and fragmentary pressures.
Indeed, as Roberts notes, these four polities all have elements of inherent fragility and rising demands for the devolution of authority. Will each have the staying power to outlast their imperial predecessors? The auguries are not good. The fragmentary pressures, limited powers, rising demands and insufficient supply, to say nothing of global challenges may well see each of the four “superstates” relegated to the ash heap of history. Democracies may well fare better than authoritarian China, but the outcome of this contest is not one anyone really wants to see.
How these “superstates” are viewed from the rest of the world is worth further exploration. The geopolitics of the interactions of “superstates” and the rest remains to be seen. It is certainly the case that the minnows of the global ocean could well be swept aside by the whales, but it is almost certainly these same minnows that will undoubtedly create waves of both challenges and opportunities.
“Superstates” finds a nice balance between academic curiosity and practical utility and overcomes the limitations of comparative political definitions to identify real challenges shared across four distinct political structures. While there may be a desire to fight the definition, accepting Roberts’ argument and allowing it to flow naturally offers up interesting insights into shared challenges across entities that will represent 40% of the world’s population. While the responses will certainly be different to these challenges, it is a useful framework for looking at what will be a very dynamic period of both domestic and international politics.
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Governance on a Grand Scale
Image by Thanasis Papazacharias from Pixabay
June 3, 2023
The world's four largest political entities—China, the EU, India, and the U.S.—comprise 40% of the world population. In his new book Alasdair Roberts identifies commonalities across the four "superstates" to gain insights into the future viability of each, writes Joshua Huminski.
A
ccording to the United Nations, by the middle of 2023 India will surpass China and become the world’s most populous country. The UN’s Population Fund forecasts that India’s population will climb to 1.4286 billion against China’s 1.4257 billion—2.9 million fewer. The United States, with its population of just over 330 million, is a distant third, but would be fourth if the European Union were counted as one bloc. The Brussels-based supranational entity would have nearly 450 million people across its 27 member states.
By 2050, four political entities will represent 40% of the world’s population—China, the European Union, India, and the United States. Blending elements of empires and nation-states, these four entities constitute “superstates” according to Alasdair Roberts, a professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. In his book of the same title, Roberts finds that each polity will face its own challenges in managing domestic interests, but Roberts asks what commonalities will be shared across these case studies. At its core, “Superstates” is an interesting intellectual exercise, but one whose theoretical structure is surpassed by the challenges it uncovers.
Having defined the “superstate” concept, Roberts briefly explores the history of empires to identify what affected the ability of empires to manage both the territory and citizens under its dominion. Here, Roberts sees control, leadership, and the creation and maintenance of national creeds as defining the challenges empires faced and, which in turn, superstates will face. Surveying the four case studies, Roberts explores how each became superstates and the challenges each individually will face and looks to the responses to the COVID-19 crisis as illustrative of these challenges in practice.
Looking for such similarities across four distinct entities is a risky prospect. The reductionist trend in comparative politics often sees the creation of such broad categories that the nuances and variability is lost—in searching for a broad enough forest, the trees simply become a green backdrop. Indeed, authoritarian capitalist China, democratic India and the United States, and supranational European Union all sit alongside one another as equals. Each system has significant differences and substantial internal and external challenges. Creating a framework that captures all four accurately necessitates a rather broad definition, hence Roberts' “superstates.”
China’s authoritarian capitalist system will find the Chinese Communist Party’s control under increasing pressure. An aging population will strain the Party’s ability to deliver social care amidst a dwindling economic support base—the four-two-one problem where four grandparents, two parents, all rely on one child for support. Years of environmental degradation will lead to poor air and water quality, increasing desertification, and reduce the availability of arable land. Beijing’s domestic financial profligacy and support of inefficient state-owned enterprises risks undermining the sustained growth on which its social contract is based. This is to say nothing of the risk of conflict with the United States over Taiwan. Beijing will, however, have the advantage of unparalleled technologically-enabled social control, which sees the Party on the path towards creating a true panopticon.
The democratic supranational bloc of the European Union appears to have much going for it, with its common market and the free flow of goods, services, and people across its borders. Yet it too faces its own challenges. While Brexit may have been an aberration (and certainly one Brussels is keen to ensure never happens again), the EU is seeing pressure from countries such as Hungary and Poland pursuing their own policies in contravention of Brussels’ centralized efforts. Brussels’ limited centralized powers means it is unable to affect widespread change, but it may prove more adaptable than the other case studies. Ultimately, there is no real “European” creed; at best there is a European identity, which will certainly be superseded by national identities if stressed. The EU is a successful political and economic bloc, but one that will perpetually face the challenge of balancing macro-level interests with those of its constituent members.
India continues to struggle to meet the needs of its growing population yet does enjoy pockets of considerable success and growth. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strain of Hindu nationalism has provided a centralizing creed for a significant segment of the country, but anger and populism are only mobilizing to a point. It is insufficient to marshal the economic and financial resources of the country and could serve as a deterrent to foreign investment if it leads to increased instability. Moreover, alienating a not insignificant element of the population risks creating fragmentary pressures and inciting internecine violence. What succeeds Modi remains to be seen as does whether his Hindu nationalism will outlast him.
The United States, for its part, is struggling to reconcile its federal system of government with increasing regional pressures and rising populism from both the left and right. The tension between the power and control of the federal government with the constitutional tradition of states’ reservation of powers and authorities is leading to increased political sclerosis, and an increasingly bifurcated country. At the same time, given America’s republican system of two- and four-year elections, the ability of Washington to affect sustained change across administrations is markedly limited. Political incentives for populism and extremism both drive and reward politicians who exploit emotions at the expense of practical solutions. While there has always been an underlying trend of extremism within American politics, it is only in recent years that it has been so rewarded or normalized. It is worth cautioning that the more breathless claims of a looming civil war are most certainly overblown—wonderful for cable television and talk radio but ignorant of the flexibility and adaptability of American democracy.
Each of these four polities is decidedly different. While some will certainly quibble with the creation of such a broad definition, the taxonomy matters less than what it enables Roberts to do: identify commonalities across all four entities. Carrying the challenges that affected empires forward—control, leadership, and creed—Roberts' framework comes into its own and offers an interesting lens to view the superstates’ future viability.
Central to all four is the question of control and the ability of the governing bodies in question to affect change across their territories and population. Here, transnational pressures of the globalization of economics, disease, politics, trade, and more both erode the ability of central governments to affect change, but also conversely, demand greater centralization of authority. At the same time, governments are finding the tools to affect policy change are largely without its purview. Technology is both a fragmentary development, but also a tool for increasing centralized authority. In the former, social media is fueling the erosion of traditional sources of power and control, leading to the rise, and spread of disinformation. In the case of the latter, and in particular in China, technology is a tool for increasing control, managing dissent, and manufacturing consensus.
Leadership is a far more fluid consideration for each and reflects the unique structure of each institution. The ability of these figures in turn are constrained by the legal frameworks in which they exist and operate. President Xi Jinping in China has far more authority and power than President Joe Biden in the United States, who is limited by constitutional election cycles. Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission president of the European Union, and her successors, enjoy decidedly fewer powers and authorities than Modi in India.
While national creeds do indeed matter, these are far more fluid concepts and much more difficult to maintain overtime and across states the size and scale of Roberts’ superstates. It is often the case that a creed is less about what someone is and more about what they are not. America’s national unity was perhaps never stronger than in the Cold War against Soviet Russia. In the wake of the September 11 attacks the country did rally, for a time, but the threat of terrorism was insufficient to mobilize sustained national unity. The European Union too has its own concept of “European-ness,” but national identity will almost always trump a continental creed. China’s national creed is, perhaps, its own version of exceptionalism, seeking to recapture what Beijing views as its rightful place in the world. Such hyper-nationalism risks unleashing forces outside of the Party’s control.
Perhaps the most significant challenge, one shared by all four “superstates,” blends the three areas Roberts identifies—the ability and willingness of governments to maintain or create new social contracts with their citizens. Indeed, this is a core threat identified by the U.S. National Intelligence Council in its most recent Global Trends report. Rising expectations from national populations and the decreasing ability of governments to meet these demands will likely yield greater strains on each of the political institutions in question. Will these four superstates be forced to establish new social contracts in the face of an inability to meet these rising demands? It is an open question and one that could well result in increased domestic and fragmentary pressures.
Indeed, as Roberts notes, these four polities all have elements of inherent fragility and rising demands for the devolution of authority. Will each have the staying power to outlast their imperial predecessors? The auguries are not good. The fragmentary pressures, limited powers, rising demands and insufficient supply, to say nothing of global challenges may well see each of the four “superstates” relegated to the ash heap of history. Democracies may well fare better than authoritarian China, but the outcome of this contest is not one anyone really wants to see.
How these “superstates” are viewed from the rest of the world is worth further exploration. The geopolitics of the interactions of “superstates” and the rest remains to be seen. It is certainly the case that the minnows of the global ocean could well be swept aside by the whales, but it is almost certainly these same minnows that will undoubtedly create waves of both challenges and opportunities.
“Superstates” finds a nice balance between academic curiosity and practical utility and overcomes the limitations of comparative political definitions to identify real challenges shared across four distinct political structures. While there may be a desire to fight the definition, accepting Roberts’ argument and allowing it to flow naturally offers up interesting insights into shared challenges across entities that will represent 40% of the world’s population. While the responses will certainly be different to these challenges, it is a useful framework for looking at what will be a very dynamic period of both domestic and international politics.
