France and Russia have recently undertaken extensive and exhaustive diplomatic efforts, but the impetus for their actions are profoundly different. Russia’s plan is Euro-Centric while France has been courting India.
Developing non Euro-Centric economic partnerships is nothing new for France, in the post-colonial world; France continues to maintain strong international alliances. Much as President Obama faces low approval ratings, so does French President Sarkozy. The two leaders have approached these numbers in similar fashion, turning attention to international issues. This has worked for Sarkozy in the past and appears to be working for him again, unlike Obama who continually is criticized for not focusing on domestic issues. Sarkozy has reached out to non-traditional French partners, India and Brazil with great logic. The two countries are developing regional powers boasting expansive populations and trade markets.
France is one of the world’s leaders in atomic energy use and production, India is one of the world’s most determined developers of atomic energy production; therefore, a partnership between these two countries is nothing short of logical. In 2006, the United States and India signed a nuclear pact that focused on weapons grade nuclear production. France has taken a different approach; President Sarkozy’s delegation focused on civilian nuclear development. What makes this deal more intriguing is that President Obama was visiting India days before, but was not able to secure nuclear agreements or prevent this French arrangement. For years, India has expressed friendship toward the United States, but has also been looking to step out from the shadow cast by the United States. France’s successful agreement with India on nuclear cooperation is a demonstration by India to step away from the United States’ shadow and by default France will receive $20 billion of aviation, military and atomic energy contracts.
The United States has also faltered on the Brazilian front. Since the Reagan presidency, the United States has lessened its focus on Latin America; this is especially true since September 11th as evidenced by the increasing number of left leaning government. Similarly to India, Brazil wishes to push the bounds of traditional diplomatic relations by finding ways to push the bounds of American influence. Brazil is seeking to re-arm the national air force; the government is picking between three bidders; one company is American, one is Swedish and the last is French. After Sarkozy’s recent visit, the French company appears to be the favorite. Sarkozy’s diplomatic efforts convinced Brazil to choose the French company and ensured an additional $45 billion for French companies, money and manufacturing jobs.
France’s diplomatic efforts illustrate a lack of confidence in the economic stability of the EU. The European Union has repeatedly bailed out member states and there is no reason to doubt that more bailouts are to follow. France understands that the economic viability and strength of the EU is under great amounts of stress and with more bailouts on the horizon, France may be looking for routes to escape an economic doomsday.
While France is taking an economic and non Euro-centric approach Russia is undertaking a vastly different game plan. Just as France recognizes the EU’s continued downward economic spiral, so has Russia. Russia is attempting to position itself as a viable strategic and economic alternative to the traditional European players and stabilize interests in Europe.
President Medvedev—and at times Prime Minister Putin—has met with leaders in Poland and Brussels and invited Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi to Russia. The diplomatic efforts with Poland appear to be the most critical because Poland is taking over the Presidency of the EU in mid-2011. As the leading political entity of the EU, Poland will play a crucial role in either allowing or hindering Russia’s relations with the EU-Russia borderland. Since early 2010, Russia and Poland have worked to develop lucrative natural gas and pipeline contracts. The pipelines that traverse Russian territory supplying much of the EU run through Poland, by developing business and investment relationships, Russia is looking ahead to the next heated diplomatic battle with Europe, but with Poland now holding a vested interest in the continual flow of fuel, the future Presidency of the EU may be more cordial to Russia’s threats or less amiable to Europe’s complaints.
Similarly to Russia, Poland is attempting to raise capital and reduce the budget. Part of Poland’s plan to reduce budget deficits is to privatize numerous government owned assets. This approach to budget balancing is similar to Russia’s plan, but conservatives in Russia have outwardly expressed their dissatisfaction with this plan. Russian leadership is in the process of reassessing the economic plan, but the recent meetings with Poland hint at a different approach to resolving differences—sell off Russian owned assets, but purchase critical Polish assets. While this does not necessarily balance Russia’s budget, it would provide an alternative method of maintaining ownership over regional critical assets.
Diplomatic efforts geared toward Italy have a similar goal as the diplomatic meetings with Poland. Italy is one of the leading EU economies and has a history of cooperating with Moscow. Relations with Italy are founded upon similar energy concerns. Pipeline deals have been discussed that would develop new Russian pipelines destined for Italy. More importantly, Italy is the leading importer of Libyan natural gas. Continuing to build a positive relationship with Italy is important for that reason. As Libya continues to develop natural gas fields and exporting capability, Russia’s threats to withhold fuel from Europe become less intimidating. Russia must ensure that Rome is on the same page because threats to withhold fuel would become extra poignant.
As the NATO alliance decreases in prestige, as evidenced by the lackluster 2010 meeting in Portugal, and the EU continues to experience economic turmoil, the integration of Russia into the European system becomes more appealing—especially for Eastern European nations. Russia recognizes these developments and has held high level diplomatic meetings in Brussels in order to advance Russia’s political, strategic and political interests in Europe. One of the major foci of Medvedev’s meeting in Brussels was obtaining EU visa waivers for Russian nationals—an important domestic and economic issue.
As NATO absorbed more countries, the military practicality has been called into question. This was especially evidenced in the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. Since then, France has sold military equipment to Russia, Italy has agreed to participate in war games with Russia, and Germany has pushed for Russia’s ascension into NATO. Russia’s growing military and strategic relationships with individual EU and NATO members has pushed Russia to the point of desiring integration into Euro-centric politics and to be able to voice a strong and respected argument in handling multinational and bilateral relationships in the Russian sphere of influence.
Although France and Russia have different plans and goals for their recent flurry of diplomatic endeavors, there are two major underlying similarities—their focus on competing with United States’ interests and the United States’ continued interests in the Middle East. America’s interests in the Middle East left the door open for France to solidify contracts with a traditional America ally and a growing power in America’s sphere of influence and for Russia to re-establish itself as a regional power in the declining NATO sphere of influence. While the two countries build international partnerships in different fashions, it is clear that both countries are challenging United States’ interests through diplomacy.
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France Looks to the East, Russia Looks to the West
December 19, 2010
France and Russia have recently undertaken extensive and exhaustive diplomatic efforts, but the impetus for their actions are profoundly different. Russia’s plan is Euro-Centric while France has been courting India.
Developing non Euro-Centric economic partnerships is nothing new for France, in the post-colonial world; France continues to maintain strong international alliances. Much as President Obama faces low approval ratings, so does French President Sarkozy. The two leaders have approached these numbers in similar fashion, turning attention to international issues. This has worked for Sarkozy in the past and appears to be working for him again, unlike Obama who continually is criticized for not focusing on domestic issues. Sarkozy has reached out to non-traditional French partners, India and Brazil with great logic. The two countries are developing regional powers boasting expansive populations and trade markets.
France is one of the world’s leaders in atomic energy use and production, India is one of the world’s most determined developers of atomic energy production; therefore, a partnership between these two countries is nothing short of logical. In 2006, the United States and India signed a nuclear pact that focused on weapons grade nuclear production. France has taken a different approach; President Sarkozy’s delegation focused on civilian nuclear development. What makes this deal more intriguing is that President Obama was visiting India days before, but was not able to secure nuclear agreements or prevent this French arrangement. For years, India has expressed friendship toward the United States, but has also been looking to step out from the shadow cast by the United States. France’s successful agreement with India on nuclear cooperation is a demonstration by India to step away from the United States’ shadow and by default France will receive $20 billion of aviation, military and atomic energy contracts.
The United States has also faltered on the Brazilian front. Since the Reagan presidency, the United States has lessened its focus on Latin America; this is especially true since September 11th as evidenced by the increasing number of left leaning government. Similarly to India, Brazil wishes to push the bounds of traditional diplomatic relations by finding ways to push the bounds of American influence. Brazil is seeking to re-arm the national air force; the government is picking between three bidders; one company is American, one is Swedish and the last is French. After Sarkozy’s recent visit, the French company appears to be the favorite. Sarkozy’s diplomatic efforts convinced Brazil to choose the French company and ensured an additional $45 billion for French companies, money and manufacturing jobs.
France’s diplomatic efforts illustrate a lack of confidence in the economic stability of the EU. The European Union has repeatedly bailed out member states and there is no reason to doubt that more bailouts are to follow. France understands that the economic viability and strength of the EU is under great amounts of stress and with more bailouts on the horizon, France may be looking for routes to escape an economic doomsday.
While France is taking an economic and non Euro-centric approach Russia is undertaking a vastly different game plan. Just as France recognizes the EU’s continued downward economic spiral, so has Russia. Russia is attempting to position itself as a viable strategic and economic alternative to the traditional European players and stabilize interests in Europe.
President Medvedev—and at times Prime Minister Putin—has met with leaders in Poland and Brussels and invited Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi to Russia. The diplomatic efforts with Poland appear to be the most critical because Poland is taking over the Presidency of the EU in mid-2011. As the leading political entity of the EU, Poland will play a crucial role in either allowing or hindering Russia’s relations with the EU-Russia borderland. Since early 2010, Russia and Poland have worked to develop lucrative natural gas and pipeline contracts. The pipelines that traverse Russian territory supplying much of the EU run through Poland, by developing business and investment relationships, Russia is looking ahead to the next heated diplomatic battle with Europe, but with Poland now holding a vested interest in the continual flow of fuel, the future Presidency of the EU may be more cordial to Russia’s threats or less amiable to Europe’s complaints.
Similarly to Russia, Poland is attempting to raise capital and reduce the budget. Part of Poland’s plan to reduce budget deficits is to privatize numerous government owned assets. This approach to budget balancing is similar to Russia’s plan, but conservatives in Russia have outwardly expressed their dissatisfaction with this plan. Russian leadership is in the process of reassessing the economic plan, but the recent meetings with Poland hint at a different approach to resolving differences—sell off Russian owned assets, but purchase critical Polish assets. While this does not necessarily balance Russia’s budget, it would provide an alternative method of maintaining ownership over regional critical assets.
Diplomatic efforts geared toward Italy have a similar goal as the diplomatic meetings with Poland. Italy is one of the leading EU economies and has a history of cooperating with Moscow. Relations with Italy are founded upon similar energy concerns. Pipeline deals have been discussed that would develop new Russian pipelines destined for Italy. More importantly, Italy is the leading importer of Libyan natural gas. Continuing to build a positive relationship with Italy is important for that reason. As Libya continues to develop natural gas fields and exporting capability, Russia’s threats to withhold fuel from Europe become less intimidating. Russia must ensure that Rome is on the same page because threats to withhold fuel would become extra poignant.
As the NATO alliance decreases in prestige, as evidenced by the lackluster 2010 meeting in Portugal, and the EU continues to experience economic turmoil, the integration of Russia into the European system becomes more appealing—especially for Eastern European nations. Russia recognizes these developments and has held high level diplomatic meetings in Brussels in order to advance Russia’s political, strategic and political interests in Europe. One of the major foci of Medvedev’s meeting in Brussels was obtaining EU visa waivers for Russian nationals—an important domestic and economic issue.
As NATO absorbed more countries, the military practicality has been called into question. This was especially evidenced in the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. Since then, France has sold military equipment to Russia, Italy has agreed to participate in war games with Russia, and Germany has pushed for Russia’s ascension into NATO. Russia’s growing military and strategic relationships with individual EU and NATO members has pushed Russia to the point of desiring integration into Euro-centric politics and to be able to voice a strong and respected argument in handling multinational and bilateral relationships in the Russian sphere of influence.
Although France and Russia have different plans and goals for their recent flurry of diplomatic endeavors, there are two major underlying similarities—their focus on competing with United States’ interests and the United States’ continued interests in the Middle East. America’s interests in the Middle East left the door open for France to solidify contracts with a traditional America ally and a growing power in America’s sphere of influence and for Russia to re-establish itself as a regional power in the declining NATO sphere of influence. While the two countries build international partnerships in different fashions, it is clear that both countries are challenging United States’ interests through diplomacy.
