ince April 2023, Sudan has plunged into a civil war fought between the Sudanese regular army under the rule of Prime Minister Fattah al–Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a parallel army commanded by Vice President Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. After almost a year of hostilities, the humanitarian situation in Sudan is on the verge of collapse, with Sudan quickly on its way to becoming a failed state. Regional powers with interests in the Sudanese economy and politics, particularly Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have entered the conflict—supporting one side or the other. Currently, there are three scenarios in which the war can evolve: a prolonged civil war, a proxy war between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and a ceasefire backed by external powers.
Sudan has been roughly split into two parts: the regular army controls the east, while the RSF controls the west and most of the capital, Khartoum. The military clashes caused a big–scale humanitarian catastrophe, which—according to the United Nations estimates—amounted to 12,000 people dead and 8 million displaced. This is an increase of 3 million displaced people in about ten months (an average of 300,000 people per month) since the outbreak of the war in May 2023. Also, UNICEF reported that 700,000 children are likely to suffer from life–threatening malnutrition.
The Crisis Group, a U.S. nonprofit committed to resolving deadly conflict, reported that the paramilitaries have succeeded in the first phase of the war by dividing Sudan into two zones of control. Now, having entered the second phase, it is necessary to understand whether hostilities will stop before Sudan suffers an epochal failure.
As for now, all the diplomatic peace efforts have resulted in significant failures. In July last year, Egypt tried to lead a peace initiative that did not reach a final agreement. It was followed by November's Jeddah talks in Saudi Arabia, which had a similar outcome despite the presence of the United States, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the African Union (AU).
Diplomatic Maneuvering by Regional Powers
Some regional powers are involved in the Sudanese civil war. On one side, the UAE has allegedly supported the RSF because it aimed to exploit the local gold mines. According to the New York Times, this help has materialized as direct funding for logistics and military equipment using a secret air base in Chad. UAE officials have denied these claims. The Moscow–backed Wagner group has been allegedly linked to the Rapid Support Forces for similar reasons. The U.S. Treasury Department has reported the group has provided surface–to–air missiles to the RSF.
On the other side, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia supported the Sudanese regular army. Egypt, for example, shares a border with Sudan, and some experts have already suggested the al–Sisi government could be forced to establish a buffer zone to avoid further dangers, especially in a period of multiple threats coming from neighboring Libya, the Gaza Strips, and the Red Sea.
Iran has also made significant steps to normalize ties with Sudan, which entered into a crisis after Iran protesters stormed into the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran in 2016. Last year's Riyadh–Tehran normalization agreement has unlocked new chances for cooperation and alliances. Sudan Islamists, which have significant leverage over the army, have maintained cordial relations with the Islamic Republic and see with favor a Khartoum–Tehran rapprochement.
In early February, the Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Al Sadiq traveled to Tehran to meet with his Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. During the visit, Al Sadiq condemned the Israel war on Gaza and defined the Netanyahu government as a Zionist regime. These statements are remarkable because Sudan announced it would begin normalizing relations with Israel in 2021.
Looking Ahead
At this point, there are some possible outcomes for the conflict's future. The most likely scenario is that the civil war continues, leading to a further humanitarian disaster in Sudan and neighboring countries. Chad, for example, has already hosted 610,000 Sudanese refugees, which will probably increase in the coming months. In the long run, this scenario could lead to the collapse of Sudan's state and economy.
The second potential scenario—an even worse version of the previous one—is the civil war evolving into a proxy war between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Both countries see considerable opportunities to increase their influence in Sudan, a rich–resources country with a strategic location between Africa and the Middle East. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are formally allies but, in the last few years, have started a competition to lead the Gulf and the Arab world by increasing their footprint in politics, economy, energy, sport, and science.
In the last, least likely scenario, the sides reach a ceasefire, facilitating the humanitarian aid and opening up new opportunities for diplomatic talks. This scenario would improve the Sudanese people's living conditions by curbing inflation and sustaining the local economy with international financial support. Nevertheless, it remains remote until domestic and external actors maintain incentives to prolong the conflict.
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Evolving diplomacy in Sudan: Escalation, proxy, or ceasefire?
Aerial view of the Nile as it runs through Sudan. Photo by Abdulaziz Mohammed on Unsplash.
March 6, 2024
Sudan is nearing the one–year anniversary of a civil war, and the humanitarian situation is on the verge of collapse. Now, neighbors have become involved, supporting one side or the other and looking for a diplomatic solution, but thus far these efforts have failed, writes Elia Preto Martini.
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ince April 2023, Sudan has plunged into a civil war fought between the Sudanese regular army under the rule of Prime Minister Fattah al–Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a parallel army commanded by Vice President Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. After almost a year of hostilities, the humanitarian situation in Sudan is on the verge of collapse, with Sudan quickly on its way to becoming a failed state. Regional powers with interests in the Sudanese economy and politics, particularly Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have entered the conflict—supporting one side or the other. Currently, there are three scenarios in which the war can evolve: a prolonged civil war, a proxy war between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and a ceasefire backed by external powers.
Sudan has been roughly split into two parts: the regular army controls the east, while the RSF controls the west and most of the capital, Khartoum. The military clashes caused a big–scale humanitarian catastrophe, which—according to the United Nations estimates—amounted to 12,000 people dead and 8 million displaced. This is an increase of 3 million displaced people in about ten months (an average of 300,000 people per month) since the outbreak of the war in May 2023. Also, UNICEF reported that 700,000 children are likely to suffer from life–threatening malnutrition.
The Crisis Group, a U.S. nonprofit committed to resolving deadly conflict, reported that the paramilitaries have succeeded in the first phase of the war by dividing Sudan into two zones of control. Now, having entered the second phase, it is necessary to understand whether hostilities will stop before Sudan suffers an epochal failure.
As for now, all the diplomatic peace efforts have resulted in significant failures. In July last year, Egypt tried to lead a peace initiative that did not reach a final agreement. It was followed by November's Jeddah talks in Saudi Arabia, which had a similar outcome despite the presence of the United States, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the African Union (AU).
Diplomatic Maneuvering by Regional Powers
Some regional powers are involved in the Sudanese civil war. On one side, the UAE has allegedly supported the RSF because it aimed to exploit the local gold mines. According to the New York Times, this help has materialized as direct funding for logistics and military equipment using a secret air base in Chad. UAE officials have denied these claims. The Moscow–backed Wagner group has been allegedly linked to the Rapid Support Forces for similar reasons. The U.S. Treasury Department has reported the group has provided surface–to–air missiles to the RSF.
On the other side, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia supported the Sudanese regular army. Egypt, for example, shares a border with Sudan, and some experts have already suggested the al–Sisi government could be forced to establish a buffer zone to avoid further dangers, especially in a period of multiple threats coming from neighboring Libya, the Gaza Strips, and the Red Sea.
Iran has also made significant steps to normalize ties with Sudan, which entered into a crisis after Iran protesters stormed into the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran in 2016. Last year's Riyadh–Tehran normalization agreement has unlocked new chances for cooperation and alliances. Sudan Islamists, which have significant leverage over the army, have maintained cordial relations with the Islamic Republic and see with favor a Khartoum–Tehran rapprochement.
In early February, the Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Al Sadiq traveled to Tehran to meet with his Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. During the visit, Al Sadiq condemned the Israel war on Gaza and defined the Netanyahu government as a Zionist regime. These statements are remarkable because Sudan announced it would begin normalizing relations with Israel in 2021.
Looking Ahead
At this point, there are some possible outcomes for the conflict's future. The most likely scenario is that the civil war continues, leading to a further humanitarian disaster in Sudan and neighboring countries. Chad, for example, has already hosted 610,000 Sudanese refugees, which will probably increase in the coming months. In the long run, this scenario could lead to the collapse of Sudan's state and economy.
The second potential scenario—an even worse version of the previous one—is the civil war evolving into a proxy war between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Both countries see considerable opportunities to increase their influence in Sudan, a rich–resources country with a strategic location between Africa and the Middle East. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are formally allies but, in the last few years, have started a competition to lead the Gulf and the Arab world by increasing their footprint in politics, economy, energy, sport, and science.
In the last, least likely scenario, the sides reach a ceasefire, facilitating the humanitarian aid and opening up new opportunities for diplomatic talks. This scenario would improve the Sudanese people's living conditions by curbing inflation and sustaining the local economy with international financial support. Nevertheless, it remains remote until domestic and external actors maintain incentives to prolong the conflict.
