n February 2024, the Iraqi Supreme Court ruled that the 11 seats reserved for religious and ethnic minorities in the Kurdistan Region Parliament are unconstitutional. In response, the Kurdistan president and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Nechirvan Barzani, decided to postpone the elections scheduled for June 2024. His decision was criticized by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the second–largest party in the Kurdistan region, resulting in increased tensions between KDP and PUK.
The Court's ruling flared latent tensions in Iraqi politics. Mainly since 2022, the Iraqi Supreme Court has issued rulings on legal and economic matters, slowly eroding the Kurdistan Region's autonomy. The current electoral impasse between KDP and other parties weakens the legitimacy of the Kurdistan government in this already troubled relations with Baghdad.
The clashes between KDP and KUP over elections
The Kurdistan Region is an autonomous region within the federal state of Iraq. It has its own Parliament and independence in managing its natural resources, particularly oil. In the last few years, tensions have increased between the Iraqi federal and regional governments due to attempts to erode Kurdistan's autonomy. In a contested 2022 ruling, the Iraqi Supreme Court decided that Kurdistan had to hand over its oil field production to the Iraqi government.
In 2024, the Supreme Court declared the 11 seats reserved for religious and ethnic minorities in the Kurdistan Parliament unconstitutional, reducing the number of seats from 111 to 100. Many analysts and policymakers deemed this ruling inconsistent with Iraq's Constitution, which, according to Article 49, provides for minority representation in the government.
Barzani, the Kurdistan president, reiterated that his party, the KDP, will not participate in elections until the minority quota is restored. He said, "Depriving the minorities of their seats is a threat to the historical values of our nation." With Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission’s mandate expiring in July 2024, the Kurdistan elections, if postponed, will not likely be held until next year. For its part, the PUK said it would not accept further election delays and condemned "any unilateral attempts" to postpone them.
The PUK repeatedly denounced the KDP, claiming that it has intentionally cut the budget of PUK–controlled areas, particularly the province of Sulaymaniyah, where its headquarters is located. In addition, the PUK has accused the KDP of manipulating the minority quota to secure a majority in the Kurdistan Parliament. This is one of the reasons why the PUK welcomed the Iraqi Federal Court ruling on minority seats.
The consequences on Kurdistan's autonomy
The potential consequences at the micro–level—i.e., those involving the Kurdistan political landscape—are hard to predict. One likely scenario is the PUK demanding the dissolution of the Kurdistan Regional Government cabinet, which will lead to the establishment of a provisional government, anticipating future elections. Another scenario is a fracturing of Kurdistan between KDP– and PUK–controlled zones, since there is no guarantee that the elections will be held anytime soon.
Attempting to solve the electoral impasse, Barzani made a state visit to Tehran in early May 2024, meeting with both the Iranian prime minister and foreign minister. He asked Iran to pressure the PUK—a party with which it has very close political relations—to agree to postponing the elections. In exchange, Tehran asked him to curb Israeli and Iranian organizations hostile to the Iranian regime stationed in Kurdistan. They reached an agreement, and now Iran is allegedly reported to be backing KDP's request to postpone the elections.
At a macro level—i.e., the future of Kurdistan autonomy—this electoral impasse could severely threaten the Region as a political entity. The domestic electoral process is crucial in resolving controversies between the KDP and the PUK. The tacit agreement between these parties is based on them both supporting Kurdistan's historical heritage and institutions. If this agreement is broken, the Kurdistan government's legitimacy may collapse. And a weakened Kurdistan government would be set up for failure in its already troubled relationship with Baghdad.
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An electoral impasse threatens Kurdistan’s autonomy
Kurdish people waving their flag. Photo by Levi Meir Clancy from Unsplash.
May 23, 2024
In February 2024, the Iraqi Supreme Court declared the 11 reserved seats for minorities in the Kurdistan Parliament unconstitutional—sparking political turmoil, with Kurdistan's President Nechirvan Barzani postponing the June elections, and deepening KDP-PUK tensions, writes Elia Preto Martini.
I
n February 2024, the Iraqi Supreme Court ruled that the 11 seats reserved for religious and ethnic minorities in the Kurdistan Region Parliament are unconstitutional. In response, the Kurdistan president and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Nechirvan Barzani, decided to postpone the elections scheduled for June 2024. His decision was criticized by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the second–largest party in the Kurdistan region, resulting in increased tensions between KDP and PUK.
The Court's ruling flared latent tensions in Iraqi politics. Mainly since 2022, the Iraqi Supreme Court has issued rulings on legal and economic matters, slowly eroding the Kurdistan Region's autonomy. The current electoral impasse between KDP and other parties weakens the legitimacy of the Kurdistan government in this already troubled relations with Baghdad.
The clashes between KDP and KUP over elections
The Kurdistan Region is an autonomous region within the federal state of Iraq. It has its own Parliament and independence in managing its natural resources, particularly oil. In the last few years, tensions have increased between the Iraqi federal and regional governments due to attempts to erode Kurdistan's autonomy. In a contested 2022 ruling, the Iraqi Supreme Court decided that Kurdistan had to hand over its oil field production to the Iraqi government.
In 2024, the Supreme Court declared the 11 seats reserved for religious and ethnic minorities in the Kurdistan Parliament unconstitutional, reducing the number of seats from 111 to 100. Many analysts and policymakers deemed this ruling inconsistent with Iraq's Constitution, which, according to Article 49, provides for minority representation in the government.
Barzani, the Kurdistan president, reiterated that his party, the KDP, will not participate in elections until the minority quota is restored. He said, "Depriving the minorities of their seats is a threat to the historical values of our nation." With Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission’s mandate expiring in July 2024, the Kurdistan elections, if postponed, will not likely be held until next year. For its part, the PUK said it would not accept further election delays and condemned "any unilateral attempts" to postpone them.
The PUK repeatedly denounced the KDP, claiming that it has intentionally cut the budget of PUK–controlled areas, particularly the province of Sulaymaniyah, where its headquarters is located. In addition, the PUK has accused the KDP of manipulating the minority quota to secure a majority in the Kurdistan Parliament. This is one of the reasons why the PUK welcomed the Iraqi Federal Court ruling on minority seats.
The consequences on Kurdistan's autonomy
The potential consequences at the micro–level—i.e., those involving the Kurdistan political landscape—are hard to predict. One likely scenario is the PUK demanding the dissolution of the Kurdistan Regional Government cabinet, which will lead to the establishment of a provisional government, anticipating future elections. Another scenario is a fracturing of Kurdistan between KDP– and PUK–controlled zones, since there is no guarantee that the elections will be held anytime soon.
Attempting to solve the electoral impasse, Barzani made a state visit to Tehran in early May 2024, meeting with both the Iranian prime minister and foreign minister. He asked Iran to pressure the PUK—a party with which it has very close political relations—to agree to postponing the elections. In exchange, Tehran asked him to curb Israeli and Iranian organizations hostile to the Iranian regime stationed in Kurdistan. They reached an agreement, and now Iran is allegedly reported to be backing KDP's request to postpone the elections.
At a macro level—i.e., the future of Kurdistan autonomy—this electoral impasse could severely threaten the Region as a political entity. The domestic electoral process is crucial in resolving controversies between the KDP and the PUK. The tacit agreement between these parties is based on them both supporting Kurdistan's historical heritage and institutions. If this agreement is broken, the Kurdistan government's legitimacy may collapse. And a weakened Kurdistan government would be set up for failure in its already troubled relationship with Baghdad.
