n late February of this year, the Turkish authorities arrested six people on charges of espionage of Uyghur leaders and organizations on behalf of Chinese intelligence. Turkish authorities did not confirm the nationalities of these people, but a Radio Free Asia investigation reported they were of Uyghurs ethnicity. This is the latest incident in the complex Beijing–Ankara relationship over the issue of the Uyghurs, a Turkic–speaking people originating from interior Asia and persecuted by Chinese authorities. Since his rise to power, Turkish President Erdoğan has tried to balance the country's need for economic cooperation with China with a robust stance against the Uyghur persecution. The ambiguous strategy that resulted has generated discontent in Turkish civil society and has failed to build lasting relations with Beijing.
Erdoğan’s advocacy of the Uyghurs impact on Turkey–China relations
The Uyghur issue has been one of the critical factors in influencing China–Turkey ties over the last few decades. According to several investigations, Beijing has persecuted them in the Xinjiang region by limiting their religious freedom, detaining them in fortified camps, and coercing them into forced labor. Since the 1950s, Turkey has been a favorite destination for Uyghurs fleeing persecution in China, and around 50,000 people from this ethnic group live in Turkey today—forming the largest Uyghur diaspora outside China.
Turkish President Erdoğan was a strong Uyghur advocate at the beginning of his political career. In 2009, he defined China's policy against this ethnic group as "genocide." At that time, Erdoğan presented himself as a moderate Islamist while his country was starting the accession process to the EU. To the West, his commitment to the Uyghur issue seemed to be a concrete step in defending human rights within and outside his country.
Six years later, Turkey joined China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Ankara experienced a significant increase in trade and investment from Beijing. China's "non–interference" in domestic affairs facilitated bilateral ties since Turkey was going through a period of democratic regression, especially after the 2016 attempted coup against the Turkish government that Erdoğan exploited. Also in 2015, anti–China protests spread in Istanbul, generating a minor diplomatic incident between the two countries—with China's Foreign Ministry forced to warn its citizens to pay attention to possible attacks when visiting Turkey. Erdoğan publicly commented that "unnamed forces" were trying to endanger Turkey–China ties by spreading inaccurate and exaggerated information regarding the Uyghur's life in Xinjiang—later visiting Beijing and reiterating that those hidden forces would not affect China–Turkey bilateral relations. The ambiguity and vagueness with which he handled this crisis was one of the first signs of the Turkish President's inability to manage the Uyghur issue.
In 2021, two opposition politicians, Meral Aksener from the IVI Party and the Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas from the CHP, criticized China's Uyghur treatment, endangering bilateral ties again. China reacted by summoning its Ambassador, and Erdoğan tried to repair ties months later by calling Chinese President Xi Jinping—stating that while Uyghur Muslims deserve to live as equal citizens of China, he respects China's sovereignty. This statement did not please either the Uyghur community, who found it unsatisfactory; or Beijing, who perceived it as a criticism of Uyghurs' human rights situation in Xinjiang.
China’s response to Erdoğan and ongoing domestic pressure
The crisis that broke out in early February regarding the spies was only the latest event that has put the Turkish President in a difficult position. The rift between China and Turkey has increased, with Beijing becoming critical of the Turkish policy over the Kurds as a response. Erdoğan will be increasingly required to defend himself from the allegation of persecuting the Kurdish minority, especially if he does not soften his pro–Uyghur rhetoric.
Concerning diplomacy, Erdoğan welcomed China's rise as a global superpower because he aimed to shift Turkey's foreign policy towards the East. He has also taken advantage of a multipolar world in which the U.S., China, and Russia each have their sphere of influence to move his country closer to one superpower or another, depending on the circumstances.
Thus, Istanbul needs increased economic cooperation with Beijing since its degree of economic integration remains below that of Turkey with the European Union or the United States. In 2023, China was not even listed among the ten countries with the largest investments in Turkey, surpassed by smaller countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Switzerland.
Mounting domestic pressure on the Uyghur issue in Turkey counterbalances these economic and strategic needs. The 2024 Economist's Intelligence Unit’s “Democracy Index” categorized Turkey as a hybrid regime, meaning space for public demonstrations—even if limited—exists and influences Erdoğan's decisions. Popular sentiment in defense of the Uyghurs cannot be ignored, and the President is struggling to meet the civil society demands on this issue. All the diplomatic incidents over the last decade have highlighted Erdoğan's inability to manage ties with China effectively, creating a crack in his power system and undermining ties with Beijing.
a global affairs media network
The diplomatic ramifications of Erdoğan's Uyghur dilemma
The Beştepe Millet Camii, in Ankara, Turkey. Photo by inlovew photography on Unsplash.
May 10, 2024
Turkey has sought to maintain good relations with China alongside a robust stance against the Uyghur persecution. It’s a difficult to maintain balance, particularly as China brings additional pressure to bear, writes Elia Preto Martini.
I
n late February of this year, the Turkish authorities arrested six people on charges of espionage of Uyghur leaders and organizations on behalf of Chinese intelligence. Turkish authorities did not confirm the nationalities of these people, but a Radio Free Asia investigation reported they were of Uyghurs ethnicity. This is the latest incident in the complex Beijing–Ankara relationship over the issue of the Uyghurs, a Turkic–speaking people originating from interior Asia and persecuted by Chinese authorities. Since his rise to power, Turkish President Erdoğan has tried to balance the country's need for economic cooperation with China with a robust stance against the Uyghur persecution. The ambiguous strategy that resulted has generated discontent in Turkish civil society and has failed to build lasting relations with Beijing.
Erdoğan’s advocacy of the Uyghurs impact on Turkey–China relations
The Uyghur issue has been one of the critical factors in influencing China–Turkey ties over the last few decades. According to several investigations, Beijing has persecuted them in the Xinjiang region by limiting their religious freedom, detaining them in fortified camps, and coercing them into forced labor. Since the 1950s, Turkey has been a favorite destination for Uyghurs fleeing persecution in China, and around 50,000 people from this ethnic group live in Turkey today—forming the largest Uyghur diaspora outside China.
Turkish President Erdoğan was a strong Uyghur advocate at the beginning of his political career. In 2009, he defined China's policy against this ethnic group as "genocide." At that time, Erdoğan presented himself as a moderate Islamist while his country was starting the accession process to the EU. To the West, his commitment to the Uyghur issue seemed to be a concrete step in defending human rights within and outside his country.
Six years later, Turkey joined China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Ankara experienced a significant increase in trade and investment from Beijing. China's "non–interference" in domestic affairs facilitated bilateral ties since Turkey was going through a period of democratic regression, especially after the 2016 attempted coup against the Turkish government that Erdoğan exploited. Also in 2015, anti–China protests spread in Istanbul, generating a minor diplomatic incident between the two countries—with China's Foreign Ministry forced to warn its citizens to pay attention to possible attacks when visiting Turkey. Erdoğan publicly commented that "unnamed forces" were trying to endanger Turkey–China ties by spreading inaccurate and exaggerated information regarding the Uyghur's life in Xinjiang—later visiting Beijing and reiterating that those hidden forces would not affect China–Turkey bilateral relations. The ambiguity and vagueness with which he handled this crisis was one of the first signs of the Turkish President's inability to manage the Uyghur issue.
In 2021, two opposition politicians, Meral Aksener from the IVI Party and the Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas from the CHP, criticized China's Uyghur treatment, endangering bilateral ties again. China reacted by summoning its Ambassador, and Erdoğan tried to repair ties months later by calling Chinese President Xi Jinping—stating that while Uyghur Muslims deserve to live as equal citizens of China, he respects China's sovereignty. This statement did not please either the Uyghur community, who found it unsatisfactory; or Beijing, who perceived it as a criticism of Uyghurs' human rights situation in Xinjiang.
China’s response to Erdoğan and ongoing domestic pressure
The crisis that broke out in early February regarding the spies was only the latest event that has put the Turkish President in a difficult position. The rift between China and Turkey has increased, with Beijing becoming critical of the Turkish policy over the Kurds as a response. Erdoğan will be increasingly required to defend himself from the allegation of persecuting the Kurdish minority, especially if he does not soften his pro–Uyghur rhetoric.
Concerning diplomacy, Erdoğan welcomed China's rise as a global superpower because he aimed to shift Turkey's foreign policy towards the East. He has also taken advantage of a multipolar world in which the U.S., China, and Russia each have their sphere of influence to move his country closer to one superpower or another, depending on the circumstances.
Thus, Istanbul needs increased economic cooperation with Beijing since its degree of economic integration remains below that of Turkey with the European Union or the United States. In 2023, China was not even listed among the ten countries with the largest investments in Turkey, surpassed by smaller countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Switzerland.
Mounting domestic pressure on the Uyghur issue in Turkey counterbalances these economic and strategic needs. The 2024 Economist's Intelligence Unit’s “Democracy Index” categorized Turkey as a hybrid regime, meaning space for public demonstrations—even if limited—exists and influences Erdoğan's decisions. Popular sentiment in defense of the Uyghurs cannot be ignored, and the President is struggling to meet the civil society demands on this issue. All the diplomatic incidents over the last decade have highlighted Erdoğan's inability to manage ties with China effectively, creating a crack in his power system and undermining ties with Beijing.
