n his guest speech at Yale University on September 27, 2018, Russian-American journalist Vladimir Pozner summarized the attitude of ordinary Russians toward economic sanctions. “For Russians… The tougher it is, the tougher they become. They are pretty weak when things are good.” This inverse relationship of Russian patriotism to economic well-being explains a lot about the mental dimension of the current conflict. Shortly after Russian forces invaded Ukraine, Western countries responded with new sanctions against Russian banks, industry and the financial sector – which also prompted an exodus of foreign companies. The aim of the sanctions is not just to punish Russia but, as France’s finance minister said, to “bring about the collapse of the Russian economy.” Yet the immediate impact of the sanctions went in the opposite direction – Vladimir Putin’s approval increased by 14 points (from 69 to 83%). While gas prices are at all-time highs and the U.S. risks an all-out war with Russia, the response of American citizens toward their leader is quite different. Joseph Biden’s approval rate plummeted to a record low of 40% (an 8% decrease since December 2021). This is not a coincidence, but a manifestation of two different mindsets of Russia and the collective West.
Russia: Military Trumps Economy
Every video game fan knows Sid Meier’s Civilization series. A player controls a civilization from antiquity till the modern age. From the earliest phase, a player realizes the vital necessity of the military – not only to fight barbarians but also to deter any invasion. The harder the game’s difficulty the more likely neighbors will seize any chance to prey on the player’s weakness unless appeased by lucrative trade or generous tribute.
Curiously enough, this game model explains how Russian authorities view international affairs. One might think that modern Russia’s overreliance on military might is a legacy of the Soviet doctrines. Indeed, the Soviet military spending was close to 20% of its national income, while its per capita GDP was the same as in Mexico. Yet the roots of such thinking go much deeper. From its birth, Russia bordered the Great Steppe populated by various nomadic tribes – Khazars, Pechenegs, Polovtsi, Tatars and Mongols. It was customary for the nomads to raid their settled neighbors. While military skirmishes in Western Europe usually ended in a redistribution of influence between feudal lords, in Russia losing a battle could mean losing everything. If a city could not hold its gates against a raid, it would be razed, its male population slaughtered, and its women and children enslaved. For Russians, there was never a choice between guns and butter.
The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of this ‘siege mindset.’ Russia became the only nuclear power among all former Soviet republics, retaining membership in the UN Security Council. Despite suffering extreme economic hardships in the ‘90s, Russian leadership refused to accept its inferior status and still viewed their country as a military superpower equal to the U.S. This mindset only grew during the rule of Vladimir Putin. In his famous Munich speech, Putin declared that Russian interests must be reckoned with. The ultimatum against NATO expansion and the invasion of Ukraine are direct consequences of that speech’s mindset.
This mindset informed Putin’s focus on modernizing the military and its doctrine, even at the expense of ignoring economic and social problems. Gerasimov’s doctrine (based on the thoughts of a KGB and former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov) was adopted, emphasizing a highly mobile military using aircraft, artillery, and high precision cruise missiles. The doctrine’s cornerstone is the principle of a multipolar world and the use of the military as part of a (hybrid) warfare doctrine.
“The worse – the better” is a common saying in Russia. Military force creates tension and secures or expands borders, potentially leading to economic gains. With the declaration of martial law, business and political elites must pledge allegiance and keep their assets in Russia or go into exile and lose everything. Consequently, the use of force to an extent secures future economic gains and development.
U.S. Economy Trumps Military
The U.S. has a vast military presence all over the globe ready to protect its national interests. Yet military calculus is not the primary factor in its security decision-making. The U.S. relies primarily on its economic and cultural might to subjugate adversaries. Americans are aware of their technological supremacy; they have secured control over computer chip production and energy independence. The world’s biggest high-tech companies are in the U.S., while Hollywood is not to be underestimated with its cultural and ideological influence on the audience of all ages.
If a military intervention is still necessary for achieving political goals, the U.S. prefers indirect participation. It is often – as is the case in Ukraine – cheaper and safer to supply arms. If ‘boots on the ground’ are still needed, the U.S. typically requires its allies to participate and share expenses. And if the U.S. realizes its presence is an excessive financial and political burden, it withdraws military forces – as in Afghanistan.
America’s military dominance would not be possible without its solid economic foundation developed after WWI and WWII with the Bretton Woods system, the end of the gold standard, petro-dollar, and swift actions of the FRS chairman Paul Volcker. Despite America’s economic clout, the U.S.-China trade war proved that a competitor with a big enough share of the world economy can force the U.S. to make a deal. Why do you have to make any deal with a country like Russia? Who would negotiate with 3% of the world economy? No economic strength – no real power.
A Matter of Trust
The West’s sanctions regime is making each Russian suffer, while also reviving feelings of humiliation they felt after the Cold War. Russian elites have similar feelings and treat the U.S. as an adversary that wants to preserve a unipolar world order. The harder the U.S. pushes, the stronger that sentiment will grow in the minds of Russians.
American elites do not treat Russia seriously because of its modest share of global GDP. This ‘statistical weakness’ emboldens them to push harder, punishing Russians for their government’s decision. The U.S. also bet on the younger generation which got used to Western living standards, but the younger generation doesn’t have any organized political opposition to organize behind.
The situation is a stalemate. Each side is committed to their decision and will not back off. Two different strategic mindsets widen the rift between the elites, affecting people’s attitudes in both countries. Furthermore, the longer policymakers ignore this rift, the greater tension it will create.
Relations during the Cold War thawed when both sides realized that the Doomsday Clock was ‘three minutes to midnight.’ Yet a true strengthening of relations occurred only when General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan established personal trust. Right now, it feels like no personal trust is possible. Instead, we are likely to face a long period of mutual suspicion, accusations, and doubling down with potentially disastrous consequences.
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Differences in Russian and Western Mindsets Complicate Ukraine Conflict
Protester showing solidarity with Ukraine in front of the building of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Prague. Photo by Jakub Ivanov via Unsplash.
April 7, 2022
The mindsets—and the foundations of power—differ drastically between Russia and the West (and especially the U.S.). This dissonance explains Western reliance on sanctions against Russia—and why they will have limited success, write Roman Kusaiko and Alexey Ilin.
I
n his guest speech at Yale University on September 27, 2018, Russian-American journalist Vladimir Pozner summarized the attitude of ordinary Russians toward economic sanctions. “For Russians… The tougher it is, the tougher they become. They are pretty weak when things are good.” This inverse relationship of Russian patriotism to economic well-being explains a lot about the mental dimension of the current conflict. Shortly after Russian forces invaded Ukraine, Western countries responded with new sanctions against Russian banks, industry and the financial sector – which also prompted an exodus of foreign companies. The aim of the sanctions is not just to punish Russia but, as France’s finance minister said, to “bring about the collapse of the Russian economy.” Yet the immediate impact of the sanctions went in the opposite direction – Vladimir Putin’s approval increased by 14 points (from 69 to 83%). While gas prices are at all-time highs and the U.S. risks an all-out war with Russia, the response of American citizens toward their leader is quite different. Joseph Biden’s approval rate plummeted to a record low of 40% (an 8% decrease since December 2021). This is not a coincidence, but a manifestation of two different mindsets of Russia and the collective West.
Russia: Military Trumps Economy
Every video game fan knows Sid Meier’s Civilization series. A player controls a civilization from antiquity till the modern age. From the earliest phase, a player realizes the vital necessity of the military – not only to fight barbarians but also to deter any invasion. The harder the game’s difficulty the more likely neighbors will seize any chance to prey on the player’s weakness unless appeased by lucrative trade or generous tribute.
Curiously enough, this game model explains how Russian authorities view international affairs. One might think that modern Russia’s overreliance on military might is a legacy of the Soviet doctrines. Indeed, the Soviet military spending was close to 20% of its national income, while its per capita GDP was the same as in Mexico. Yet the roots of such thinking go much deeper. From its birth, Russia bordered the Great Steppe populated by various nomadic tribes – Khazars, Pechenegs, Polovtsi, Tatars and Mongols. It was customary for the nomads to raid their settled neighbors. While military skirmishes in Western Europe usually ended in a redistribution of influence between feudal lords, in Russia losing a battle could mean losing everything. If a city could not hold its gates against a raid, it would be razed, its male population slaughtered, and its women and children enslaved. For Russians, there was never a choice between guns and butter.
The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of this ‘siege mindset.’ Russia became the only nuclear power among all former Soviet republics, retaining membership in the UN Security Council. Despite suffering extreme economic hardships in the ‘90s, Russian leadership refused to accept its inferior status and still viewed their country as a military superpower equal to the U.S. This mindset only grew during the rule of Vladimir Putin. In his famous Munich speech, Putin declared that Russian interests must be reckoned with. The ultimatum against NATO expansion and the invasion of Ukraine are direct consequences of that speech’s mindset.
This mindset informed Putin’s focus on modernizing the military and its doctrine, even at the expense of ignoring economic and social problems. Gerasimov’s doctrine (based on the thoughts of a KGB and former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov) was adopted, emphasizing a highly mobile military using aircraft, artillery, and high precision cruise missiles. The doctrine’s cornerstone is the principle of a multipolar world and the use of the military as part of a (hybrid) warfare doctrine.
“The worse – the better” is a common saying in Russia. Military force creates tension and secures or expands borders, potentially leading to economic gains. With the declaration of martial law, business and political elites must pledge allegiance and keep their assets in Russia or go into exile and lose everything. Consequently, the use of force to an extent secures future economic gains and development.
U.S. Economy Trumps Military
The U.S. has a vast military presence all over the globe ready to protect its national interests. Yet military calculus is not the primary factor in its security decision-making. The U.S. relies primarily on its economic and cultural might to subjugate adversaries. Americans are aware of their technological supremacy; they have secured control over computer chip production and energy independence. The world’s biggest high-tech companies are in the U.S., while Hollywood is not to be underestimated with its cultural and ideological influence on the audience of all ages.
If a military intervention is still necessary for achieving political goals, the U.S. prefers indirect participation. It is often – as is the case in Ukraine – cheaper and safer to supply arms. If ‘boots on the ground’ are still needed, the U.S. typically requires its allies to participate and share expenses. And if the U.S. realizes its presence is an excessive financial and political burden, it withdraws military forces – as in Afghanistan.
America’s military dominance would not be possible without its solid economic foundation developed after WWI and WWII with the Bretton Woods system, the end of the gold standard, petro-dollar, and swift actions of the FRS chairman Paul Volcker. Despite America’s economic clout, the U.S.-China trade war proved that a competitor with a big enough share of the world economy can force the U.S. to make a deal. Why do you have to make any deal with a country like Russia? Who would negotiate with 3% of the world economy? No economic strength – no real power.
A Matter of Trust
The West’s sanctions regime is making each Russian suffer, while also reviving feelings of humiliation they felt after the Cold War. Russian elites have similar feelings and treat the U.S. as an adversary that wants to preserve a unipolar world order. The harder the U.S. pushes, the stronger that sentiment will grow in the minds of Russians.
American elites do not treat Russia seriously because of its modest share of global GDP. This ‘statistical weakness’ emboldens them to push harder, punishing Russians for their government’s decision. The U.S. also bet on the younger generation which got used to Western living standards, but the younger generation doesn’t have any organized political opposition to organize behind.
The situation is a stalemate. Each side is committed to their decision and will not back off. Two different strategic mindsets widen the rift between the elites, affecting people’s attitudes in both countries. Furthermore, the longer policymakers ignore this rift, the greater tension it will create.
Relations during the Cold War thawed when both sides realized that the Doomsday Clock was ‘three minutes to midnight.’ Yet a true strengthening of relations occurred only when General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan established personal trust. Right now, it feels like no personal trust is possible. Instead, we are likely to face a long period of mutual suspicion, accusations, and doubling down with potentially disastrous consequences.
