After over a decade, the British Government in a major policy shift has decided to give up its boycott of the Gujarat Government headed by Narendra Modi. The UK High Commissioner shall be visiting Gujarat and interacting with Modi and senior officials of the state. In 2002 during his Chief Ministership, the state was witness to ghastly communal riots. As a consequence of which many western governments, including the UK, kept him at arms length for a while. In 2005, he was also rejected for a visa by the U.S. Government and has not been issued a visa ever since.
In the recent past however, many foreign governments have been cozying up to Modi, and he has received accolades from overseas. A report published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in September 2011 showered praise on the Gujarat Chief Minister for being an efficient administrator who has the ability to deliver. This report was followed by a write-up titled "India’s most admired and most feared politician" in March 2012 by William Antholis, Managing Director and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. While the write-up did draw attention to Modi’s ambiguities on issues pertaining to foreign policy, itwas laudatory when it came to his economic policies, efficient governance, and foresight.
Many believe that Britain is making attempts to build a rapport with a future Prime Ministerial candidate; however, the British High Commissioner’s Gujarat visit is not the first example of a foreign government wooing a state government. In May 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited West Bengal even before she visited New Delhi and met up with the Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee to discuss the possibility of U.S. investments in West Bengal. Last year, Clinton visited Tamil Nadu and met up with the Chief Minister Jayalalitha.
What explains this increasing engagement between foreign and local governments?
First, ever since the 1990s in the immediate aftermath of economic liberalization, local governments have been aggressive in pursuing economic diplomacy with both the U.S. and other countries. Some clear examples of this point being Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. In recent years, even other states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Bihar have been pro-active and wooed foreign governments. State governments such as Gujarat and Bihar have in fact started global summits where potential investors from other parts of the world are present.
The second reason for the ever increasing role of local governments in foreign policy is the trend of coalition politics, in which regional parties have an important role to play. These regional parties have been able to exercise a considerable influence over foreign policy, especially with regard to the neighborhood. In certain cases, they have even intervened on issues which in the past would be considered the exclusive domain of the central government.
This participation of regional governments in foreign policy is a global phenomenon and has been defined as ‘constituent diplomacy’ by American scholar John Kincaid, who attributes a mix of factors arising out of globalization, such as economic liberalization, diffusion of technology, and politics and local economic incentives.
Two prominent examples of assertive regional parties in India’s foreign policy include West Bengal Chief Minister and Trinamool Congress Supremo Mamata Banerjee (who until recently was an ally of the incumbent Congress-led UPA regime in Delhi but left due to differences on issues such as the introduction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in multi-brand retail) and the DMK of Tamil Nadu (which is still a constituent of the UPA).
Mamata’s pressure on the UPA Government resulted in India’s last minute decision to back out of the Teesta River sharing agreement which was to be signed with Bangladesh in September 2011, during Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangladesh.
Similarly, pressure from DMK leader Karunanidhi, an important ally of the UPA and the ruling AIADMK regime headed by Jayalalitha, have dictated India’s Sri Lanka policy. As a result of pressure from both these parties, New Delhi was compelled to vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in March this year. In the resolution, India sought credible investigations into substantial allegations of heinous crimes committed against the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, during the war against Tamil Tiger separatists in 2009. It should be mentioned that the DMK, a crucial ally of the UPA alliance, threatened to withdraw support in case New Delhi did not vote against.
Aggressive posturing on Sri Lanka did not end here. In July, both the DMK and ruling AIADMK, which hardly see eye to eye on any issue, expressed their displeasure at the presence of Sri Lankan army personnel in the Defence Staff College in Coonoor. A few days before this, Sri Lankan airmen under training in Tamil Nadu had to be shifted to Bangalore due to pressure from the Tamil Nadu government. In the third week of August, both Karunanidhi and Jayalalitha again expressed their displeasure with New Delhi, saying that it needed to take a tougher stance vis-à-vis Colombo on issues pertaining to the Tamil minority there and also the killing of fishermen by Tamil navy. The DMK leader in fact wrote a letter in which he put forward a range of demands such as moving a resolution in the UNHRC for giving greater political rights to the Sri Lankan Tamils. Karunanidhi also urged New Delhi to provide asylum to Sri Lankan Tamils in India. In September, a soccer team from Sri Lanka, which had come to play a friendly match in Chennai was forced to leave by the Chief Minister, and a stadium official was suspended for allowing the Sri Lankan team in.
It would be unfair to say that their concerns were totally false. Mamata did not want to go against public opinion since the earlier left dispensation in West Bengal, which was taken into confidence when the Ganges water treaty was signed between the two countries in 1996, still faces criticism from certain quarters. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s record on its treatment of Tamils is not acceptable, but the way in which they have compelled the UPA Government to take a stand is detrimental to India’s interests.
Apart from coalition partners pressurizing New Delhi in the realm of foreign policy, certain state governments which are not allied to the central government have also been batting for a better relationship with the neighbours, and have ironically backed the central government. Two examples are those of Punjab (which neighbors Pakistan), Tripura (which borders Bangladesh), and Manipur and Arunachal (which border Myanmar).
In Punjab, such is the desire for peace with Pakistan due to shared culture and the economic benefits of a potentially cordial relationship, that the ruling Shiromani Akali Dal has been more than supportive of New Delhi’s peace initiative towards Islamabad. Both the Congress and the ruling Akali Dal have been pressurizing Delhi to open up more trade routes, increase the number of commodities through the Attari-Wagah land route, and ease vise restrictions. Punjab’s role in the Indo-Pak relationship is also especially interesting considering that Punjab was always a problem, not a bridge, with Pakistan.
The increasingly pro-active role of states in foreign policy raises some interesting questions. First, state intervention in foreign policy is not always obstructionist, and examples of Tripura and Punjab clearly reiterate this point. Second, many times allies are more troublesome in the foreign policy realm than those who are not part of the coalition, as is evident from the examples discussed. Third, some leaders are very aggressive when it comes to wooing countries outside the immediate neighborhood but fail to do so within it. A good example of this point is Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi who he has visited countries such as Japan and China to attract foreign investment to his state, but has not extended an olive branch to neighboring Sind in Pakistan. This is in spite of the two regions having old trade linkages and also the fact that one of the biggest beneficiaries of trade with Pakistan would be Gujarat. Interestingly, Modi has spoken about cooperation with Sind in the realm of energy, apart from encouraging investment from across the border in his state, but this has been downplayed by him individually and the Indian media. Trade delegations from Pakistan have also been visiting his state; the Karachi Chamber of Commerce has in fact invited him to visit Pakistan but so far he has been non-committal.
In conclusion, it is impossible to generalize about the overall influence of state participation on foreign policy as regional dynamics and political consideration vary from region to region in a diverse country such as India. But with election results likely to be fragmented, and certain states of India being committed to increasing levels of economic diplomacy, the outside world would do well to realize that regional influence on India’s foreign policy is not just a temporary phenomenon but a long-term dynamic.
Tridivesh Singh Maini is a New Delhi-based columnist and independent foreign policy analyst.
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Constituent Diplomacy' in India's Foreign Policy
October 27, 2012
After over a decade, the British Government in a major policy shift has decided to give up its boycott of the Gujarat Government headed by Narendra Modi. The UK High Commissioner shall be visiting Gujarat and interacting with Modi and senior officials of the state. In 2002 during his Chief Ministership, the state was witness to ghastly communal riots. As a consequence of which many western governments, including the UK, kept him at arms length for a while. In 2005, he was also rejected for a visa by the U.S. Government and has not been issued a visa ever since.
In the recent past however, many foreign governments have been cozying up to Modi, and he has received accolades from overseas. A report published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in September 2011 showered praise on the Gujarat Chief Minister for being an efficient administrator who has the ability to deliver. This report was followed by a write-up titled "India’s most admired and most feared politician" in March 2012 by William Antholis, Managing Director and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. While the write-up did draw attention to Modi’s ambiguities on issues pertaining to foreign policy, itwas laudatory when it came to his economic policies, efficient governance, and foresight.
Many believe that Britain is making attempts to build a rapport with a future Prime Ministerial candidate; however, the British High Commissioner’s Gujarat visit is not the first example of a foreign government wooing a state government. In May 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited West Bengal even before she visited New Delhi and met up with the Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee to discuss the possibility of U.S. investments in West Bengal. Last year, Clinton visited Tamil Nadu and met up with the Chief Minister Jayalalitha.
What explains this increasing engagement between foreign and local governments?
First, ever since the 1990s in the immediate aftermath of economic liberalization, local governments have been aggressive in pursuing economic diplomacy with both the U.S. and other countries. Some clear examples of this point being Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. In recent years, even other states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Bihar have been pro-active and wooed foreign governments. State governments such as Gujarat and Bihar have in fact started global summits where potential investors from other parts of the world are present.
The second reason for the ever increasing role of local governments in foreign policy is the trend of coalition politics, in which regional parties have an important role to play. These regional parties have been able to exercise a considerable influence over foreign policy, especially with regard to the neighborhood. In certain cases, they have even intervened on issues which in the past would be considered the exclusive domain of the central government.
This participation of regional governments in foreign policy is a global phenomenon and has been defined as ‘constituent diplomacy’ by American scholar John Kincaid, who attributes a mix of factors arising out of globalization, such as economic liberalization, diffusion of technology, and politics and local economic incentives.
Two prominent examples of assertive regional parties in India’s foreign policy include West Bengal Chief Minister and Trinamool Congress Supremo Mamata Banerjee (who until recently was an ally of the incumbent Congress-led UPA regime in Delhi but left due to differences on issues such as the introduction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in multi-brand retail) and the DMK of Tamil Nadu (which is still a constituent of the UPA).
Mamata’s pressure on the UPA Government resulted in India’s last minute decision to back out of the Teesta River sharing agreement which was to be signed with Bangladesh in September 2011, during Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangladesh.
Similarly, pressure from DMK leader Karunanidhi, an important ally of the UPA and the ruling AIADMK regime headed by Jayalalitha, have dictated India’s Sri Lanka policy. As a result of pressure from both these parties, New Delhi was compelled to vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in March this year. In the resolution, India sought credible investigations into substantial allegations of heinous crimes committed against the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, during the war against Tamil Tiger separatists in 2009. It should be mentioned that the DMK, a crucial ally of the UPA alliance, threatened to withdraw support in case New Delhi did not vote against.
Aggressive posturing on Sri Lanka did not end here. In July, both the DMK and ruling AIADMK, which hardly see eye to eye on any issue, expressed their displeasure at the presence of Sri Lankan army personnel in the Defence Staff College in Coonoor. A few days before this, Sri Lankan airmen under training in Tamil Nadu had to be shifted to Bangalore due to pressure from the Tamil Nadu government. In the third week of August, both Karunanidhi and Jayalalitha again expressed their displeasure with New Delhi, saying that it needed to take a tougher stance vis-à-vis Colombo on issues pertaining to the Tamil minority there and also the killing of fishermen by Tamil navy. The DMK leader in fact wrote a letter in which he put forward a range of demands such as moving a resolution in the UNHRC for giving greater political rights to the Sri Lankan Tamils. Karunanidhi also urged New Delhi to provide asylum to Sri Lankan Tamils in India. In September, a soccer team from Sri Lanka, which had come to play a friendly match in Chennai was forced to leave by the Chief Minister, and a stadium official was suspended for allowing the Sri Lankan team in.
It would be unfair to say that their concerns were totally false. Mamata did not want to go against public opinion since the earlier left dispensation in West Bengal, which was taken into confidence when the Ganges water treaty was signed between the two countries in 1996, still faces criticism from certain quarters. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s record on its treatment of Tamils is not acceptable, but the way in which they have compelled the UPA Government to take a stand is detrimental to India’s interests.
Apart from coalition partners pressurizing New Delhi in the realm of foreign policy, certain state governments which are not allied to the central government have also been batting for a better relationship with the neighbours, and have ironically backed the central government. Two examples are those of Punjab (which neighbors Pakistan), Tripura (which borders Bangladesh), and Manipur and Arunachal (which border Myanmar).
In Punjab, such is the desire for peace with Pakistan due to shared culture and the economic benefits of a potentially cordial relationship, that the ruling Shiromani Akali Dal has been more than supportive of New Delhi’s peace initiative towards Islamabad. Both the Congress and the ruling Akali Dal have been pressurizing Delhi to open up more trade routes, increase the number of commodities through the Attari-Wagah land route, and ease vise restrictions. Punjab’s role in the Indo-Pak relationship is also especially interesting considering that Punjab was always a problem, not a bridge, with Pakistan.
The increasingly pro-active role of states in foreign policy raises some interesting questions. First, state intervention in foreign policy is not always obstructionist, and examples of Tripura and Punjab clearly reiterate this point. Second, many times allies are more troublesome in the foreign policy realm than those who are not part of the coalition, as is evident from the examples discussed. Third, some leaders are very aggressive when it comes to wooing countries outside the immediate neighborhood but fail to do so within it. A good example of this point is Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi who he has visited countries such as Japan and China to attract foreign investment to his state, but has not extended an olive branch to neighboring Sind in Pakistan. This is in spite of the two regions having old trade linkages and also the fact that one of the biggest beneficiaries of trade with Pakistan would be Gujarat. Interestingly, Modi has spoken about cooperation with Sind in the realm of energy, apart from encouraging investment from across the border in his state, but this has been downplayed by him individually and the Indian media. Trade delegations from Pakistan have also been visiting his state; the Karachi Chamber of Commerce has in fact invited him to visit Pakistan but so far he has been non-committal.
In conclusion, it is impossible to generalize about the overall influence of state participation on foreign policy as regional dynamics and political consideration vary from region to region in a diverse country such as India. But with election results likely to be fragmented, and certain states of India being committed to increasing levels of economic diplomacy, the outside world would do well to realize that regional influence on India’s foreign policy is not just a temporary phenomenon but a long-term dynamic.
Tridivesh Singh Maini is a New Delhi-based columnist and independent foreign policy analyst.
