ndian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s second address to the U.S. Congress this week is reflective of the deepening bonds between the world’s oldest and largest democracies. American and Indian national interests call for closer convergence across economic, political, and security domains which are driven by mutual concerns over China and shared international interests and policies. Without India, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy reduces to a Pacific strategy, and without the U.S., India’s ability to act as a counterweight to China and the rest of the world are substantially diminished. Clear-eyed realism pulls the two nations in a closer embrace overcoming decades of ambivalence and mistrust.
Last month, Ashley Telis, an established India hand in Washington, D.C., called out “America’s Bad Bet on India” because he thinks that despite the U.S. largesse, India will refrain from joining in a military conflict between the U.S. and China in East Asia or the South China Sea. His essay prompted a lively and welcome discourse on the scope of the U.S.-India partnership just in time for PM Modi’s state visit. Distilling the U.S.-India convergence of interests to a hypothetical U.S.-China military conflict in the South China Sea is diversionary and represents a misread and misdirect of the tenor and trajectory of the U.S.-India strategic alliance. It also weighs history over the present and future of the relationship. Diplomacy, as with domestic policy, is subjected to litmus tests all too often, which are constraining and self-defeating.
India’s aversion, in its early years, to join coalitions led by great powers would not have predicted India’s active role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its engagement in sea, air and land war exercises with the U.S. and other QUAD partners. Disproportionate and rigid reliance on the past in projecting the future of the U.S.-India partnership suffers from analytic infirmities analogous to Robert Lucas’s theory of rational expectations. Two recent transformative drivers may influence the future direction of the U.S.-India partnership more than the past. One, an increasingly assured and confident India buoyed by robust economic growth and stable political leadership. Two, strong and unyielding convergence of national interests between the U.S. and India starting from their close collaboration in Afghanistan and extending to growing cooperation in rebutting Chinese dominance of Asia. Today, India’s global posture is associated and defined by its membership of QUAD and near constant presence at the G7 more than its participation in the informal economic grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS.) This fact is less to do with India’s historical aversion than its growing self-belief that it too is a great power able to enjoy strong reciprocal relations with the U.S. along the lines of Europe and Japan.
Staking America’s relationship with India to the latter’s military involvement in a future Taiwan conflict is confining and counterproductive. The U.S. and India enjoyed a close and constructive partnership in Afghanistan for over two decades without Indian troops fighting alongside that of NATO and coalition forces. Ironically, the U.S.’s sudden and shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan that left its allies—including India—high and dry, may offer more lessons on matters of trust and bets than speculations over India’s role in a future conflict involving Taiwan. Moreover, India is presently engaged in an active border dispute with China. It would be hyperbolic of India to predicate its “good bet” partnership with the U.S. on active American military engagement in a future India-China land war.
India’s reticence on future Taiwan conflict is in clear contrast to French President Macron’s loud ruminations on Europe staying out of a Taiwan conflict—while imploring steadfast U.S. support for Ukraine. European security in contrast to India’s is entirely dependent on U.S. assistance and engagement. In light of Europe’s geographical distance and its dependence on the Chinese market, it would be folly to reduce transatlantic relations to a Taiwan litmus test. Such a limitation imposes an even more acute restriction on the U.S.-India relationship.
In any case, given India’s military capacities, it is unsure whether its active military participation in a U.S.-China conflict around Taiwan would be determinative or even desired in Washington. India’s contribution in such an eventuality would likely be to impose its security blanket across the Indian Ocean and permutations of logistic and other support for allied forces across the land and waters of Southeast Asia. The latter may be analogous to India’s role in Afghanistan, which was complementary and desired in pursuance of American interests and goals. And for pundits who harken to the past, it is worth noting that over 4 million Indian soldiers fought from Somme to Singapore in the two world wars with the political support of the Indian National Congress with the backing of the none other than the non-violent “great soul” Gandhi.
Present geopolitics, after delusions of democratic triumph over history of civilizations, has reverted to an era of aligning national interests in a contested world—to an era of realpolitik. Thus, the U.S.-India partnership is best engaged through clear-eyed realism of their respective national interests. The world’s largest and soon to be the third largest economies are stronger together in an economic, military, and technological contest. India’s ability to offer a viable counterweight to China in its own continent without the U.S. active support is negligible. Conversely, India is the only nation on the Asian landmass with the size and capacity to be a viable or equal alternative to China in keeping the region free and open.
Thus, it is necessary for the U.S. and India to double down on their present alignment of national interests without holding them hostage to a hypothetical future. It’s in U.S.-Indian interests for India to become the dominant naval and military power across the Indian Ocean; for India to be an effective conduit between the G7 and the Global South on issues of economic and energy transitions, health, connectivity, security etc; and for their respective tech industries to aspire to interoperability and harmony. The U.S.-India partnership can overcome historic mistrust and settle into a stable and reinforcing relationship immune to inadvertent slights and conducive to candid conversations on the “home of democracy’s” deafening silence in conveying solidarity with a fledgling democracy—Ukraine—fighting for its life. As future predictions are difficult to speak to, the best bet for the U.S. and India is to focus on strengthening their alliance and moving toward a mutually beneficial path towards a free and open Indo-Pacific.
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Clear-Eyed Realism is Strengthening the U.S.-India Alliance
The Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi, part of India's Capitol Complex. Image by Shaurya Singh from Pixabay
June 30, 2023
Geopolitics is transitioning back toward realpolitik and aligning national interests in a contested world after assumptions of the final triumph of democracy proved premature. This clear-eyed view of the world as it exists is illustrated in strengthening U.S.-India ties, writes Dr. Kaush Arha.
I
ndian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s second address to the U.S. Congress this week is reflective of the deepening bonds between the world’s oldest and largest democracies. American and Indian national interests call for closer convergence across economic, political, and security domains which are driven by mutual concerns over China and shared international interests and policies. Without India, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy reduces to a Pacific strategy, and without the U.S., India’s ability to act as a counterweight to China and the rest of the world are substantially diminished. Clear-eyed realism pulls the two nations in a closer embrace overcoming decades of ambivalence and mistrust.
Last month, Ashley Telis, an established India hand in Washington, D.C., called out “America’s Bad Bet on India” because he thinks that despite the U.S. largesse, India will refrain from joining in a military conflict between the U.S. and China in East Asia or the South China Sea. His essay prompted a lively and welcome discourse on the scope of the U.S.-India partnership just in time for PM Modi’s state visit. Distilling the U.S.-India convergence of interests to a hypothetical U.S.-China military conflict in the South China Sea is diversionary and represents a misread and misdirect of the tenor and trajectory of the U.S.-India strategic alliance. It also weighs history over the present and future of the relationship. Diplomacy, as with domestic policy, is subjected to litmus tests all too often, which are constraining and self-defeating.
India’s aversion, in its early years, to join coalitions led by great powers would not have predicted India’s active role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its engagement in sea, air and land war exercises with the U.S. and other QUAD partners. Disproportionate and rigid reliance on the past in projecting the future of the U.S.-India partnership suffers from analytic infirmities analogous to Robert Lucas’s theory of rational expectations. Two recent transformative drivers may influence the future direction of the U.S.-India partnership more than the past. One, an increasingly assured and confident India buoyed by robust economic growth and stable political leadership. Two, strong and unyielding convergence of national interests between the U.S. and India starting from their close collaboration in Afghanistan and extending to growing cooperation in rebutting Chinese dominance of Asia. Today, India’s global posture is associated and defined by its membership of QUAD and near constant presence at the G7 more than its participation in the informal economic grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS.) This fact is less to do with India’s historical aversion than its growing self-belief that it too is a great power able to enjoy strong reciprocal relations with the U.S. along the lines of Europe and Japan.
Staking America’s relationship with India to the latter’s military involvement in a future Taiwan conflict is confining and counterproductive. The U.S. and India enjoyed a close and constructive partnership in Afghanistan for over two decades without Indian troops fighting alongside that of NATO and coalition forces. Ironically, the U.S.’s sudden and shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan that left its allies—including India—high and dry, may offer more lessons on matters of trust and bets than speculations over India’s role in a future conflict involving Taiwan. Moreover, India is presently engaged in an active border dispute with China. It would be hyperbolic of India to predicate its “good bet” partnership with the U.S. on active American military engagement in a future India-China land war.
India’s reticence on future Taiwan conflict is in clear contrast to French President Macron’s loud ruminations on Europe staying out of a Taiwan conflict—while imploring steadfast U.S. support for Ukraine. European security in contrast to India’s is entirely dependent on U.S. assistance and engagement. In light of Europe’s geographical distance and its dependence on the Chinese market, it would be folly to reduce transatlantic relations to a Taiwan litmus test. Such a limitation imposes an even more acute restriction on the U.S.-India relationship.
In any case, given India’s military capacities, it is unsure whether its active military participation in a U.S.-China conflict around Taiwan would be determinative or even desired in Washington. India’s contribution in such an eventuality would likely be to impose its security blanket across the Indian Ocean and permutations of logistic and other support for allied forces across the land and waters of Southeast Asia. The latter may be analogous to India’s role in Afghanistan, which was complementary and desired in pursuance of American interests and goals. And for pundits who harken to the past, it is worth noting that over 4 million Indian soldiers fought from Somme to Singapore in the two world wars with the political support of the Indian National Congress with the backing of the none other than the non-violent “great soul” Gandhi.
Present geopolitics, after delusions of democratic triumph over history of civilizations, has reverted to an era of aligning national interests in a contested world—to an era of realpolitik. Thus, the U.S.-India partnership is best engaged through clear-eyed realism of their respective national interests. The world’s largest and soon to be the third largest economies are stronger together in an economic, military, and technological contest. India’s ability to offer a viable counterweight to China in its own continent without the U.S. active support is negligible. Conversely, India is the only nation on the Asian landmass with the size and capacity to be a viable or equal alternative to China in keeping the region free and open.
Thus, it is necessary for the U.S. and India to double down on their present alignment of national interests without holding them hostage to a hypothetical future. It’s in U.S.-Indian interests for India to become the dominant naval and military power across the Indian Ocean; for India to be an effective conduit between the G7 and the Global South on issues of economic and energy transitions, health, connectivity, security etc; and for their respective tech industries to aspire to interoperability and harmony. The U.S.-India partnership can overcome historic mistrust and settle into a stable and reinforcing relationship immune to inadvertent slights and conducive to candid conversations on the “home of democracy’s” deafening silence in conveying solidarity with a fledgling democracy—Ukraine—fighting for its life. As future predictions are difficult to speak to, the best bet for the U.S. and India is to focus on strengthening their alliance and moving toward a mutually beneficial path towards a free and open Indo-Pacific.
