When it became independent, Ukraine had the greatest economic prospects of any Soviet Republic. Today it has natural resources most countries would dream of. From vast agricultural production to extraction industries, an educated workforce, warm water ports, an advanced defense industry, pipelines, and energy storage facilities, it boasts a prime location in Europe next to the EU consumer market and Russian sources of energy. Since 1991 Ukraine has been one of the most troubled countries in Europe. After suffering one political crisis after another, it has finally come to a national precipice. Ukraine is bankrupt, internally divided, and in the process of being partitioned by Russia. It is almost miraculous that Ukraine’s politicians were able to do so little with so much; a testament to corruption, incompetence, and weakness.
The EU’s Eastern Partnership agreement amounted to a choice for Ukraine between Russia and the West. It will be remembered as the end of the Ukrainian state as it existed from 1991 from 2014. It may not be how the EU intended it, but it is the consequence. There is little the West can do about Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia’s activities in Eastern and Southern Ukraine will steadily wrest control of those regions away from Kiev. Granting greater autonomy to those regions will buy the Ukrainian government some time, but time is more on Russia’s side. Vladimir Putin can wait until the West has suffered from exhaustion in Ukraine and turn back to its many other priorities. He can destabilize and fragment Ukraine faster than the West can stabilize it and build a genuine state out of it.
A practical solution to the current crisis would be born out of direct negotiations between Russia and Western leaders, except for one obstacle: there is little Russia wants that the West can deliver. Those who fought on the Maidan did not do so to have their interests traded away to Russia as part of a political compromise. The popular sentiment behind the new Ukrainian government is so hostile to Russia that it is doubtful any compromise would be worth the paper it is written on. Washington and Brussels could propose a joint partnership to Russia in stewarding Ukraine, one that gives Moscow a significant role in its development, secures its influence, and freezes Kiev’s international orientation into that of a buffer state. The West could promise to Russia that Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO, and that it will have a role in the country’s development. There is an outline for a pragmatic compromise.
However, we are past the point of pragmatic compromises. Moscow will not believe Western promises, or that any assurances will last beyond a single U.S. administration. It does so with good reason, since such a deal would be likely based on lies. The West cannot credibly abridge the hopes of Western Ukrainians, or secure Russia’s interests in such a polarized country. Western leaders care about many things, but Russian interests have never been among them. Meanwhile Russia’s only motivation in an agreement would be to buy time to change facts on the ground. It will seek to expand influence while increasing social and political fragmentation in Ukraine. At this stage, there is nothing the West can offer Vladimir Putin that he cannot take. By annexing Crimea he has already made certain that Ukraine will get into NATO only the day after Russia does.
Russia has vital interests in Ukraine, along with deep historical and cultural ties. The West does not. Thousands of jobs and entire industries in Ukraine depend on the Russian market. The EU’s Eastern Partnership proposal is indicative that Europeans saw Ukraine as “good to have”, if it could be acquired cheaply, not a “must have.” It offered little in terms of investment or aid, but required a great undertaking of modernization and reforms. Now the West has its prize: a broken country. Ukraine needs nothing less than a complete nation building project, requiring a level of financial and political commitment the West has never offered it before. It will also need a transformational leader. Western and Ukrainian leaders will have to fight Russia along the way and make hard choices. The first of these will be to give Ukraine billions so that it can in turn hand this money over to Moscow in order to pay off its gas and debt obligations.
Finally, Western and Ukrainian leaders will have to moderate the bloody calls for further confrontation with Russia. Russia cannot respond to economic sanctions in kind, but it can punish Ukrainians for every bit of pain Western leaders inflict. Ukraine can have a bright future, but it will never leave Russia’s borders. NATO may deploy forces forward and back, but Ukraine’s distance to Moscow remains the same. Those in the U.S. and NATO advocating for much tougher actions in response to Russian aggression should consider whether or not they want to fight Russia, or save Ukraine. The two could prove mutually exclusive in the long term. Ukraine has become Moscow's hostage. Western leaders should create costs for undesirable Russian behavior, but be cognizant that in the end a deal will have to be struck on Ukraine, or risk turning it into a ruined no man’s land between trenches.
Michael Kofman is Program Manager and Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's May/June 2014 print edition.
Photo: Nikola Bagarov (cc).
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Can You Confront Russia and Save Ukraine?
May 7, 2014
When it became independent, Ukraine had the greatest economic prospects of any Soviet Republic. Today it has natural resources most countries would dream of. From vast agricultural production to extraction industries, an educated workforce, warm water ports, an advanced defense industry, pipelines, and energy storage facilities, it boasts a prime location in Europe next to the EU consumer market and Russian sources of energy. Since 1991 Ukraine has been one of the most troubled countries in Europe. After suffering one political crisis after another, it has finally come to a national precipice. Ukraine is bankrupt, internally divided, and in the process of being partitioned by Russia. It is almost miraculous that Ukraine’s politicians were able to do so little with so much; a testament to corruption, incompetence, and weakness.
The EU’s Eastern Partnership agreement amounted to a choice for Ukraine between Russia and the West. It will be remembered as the end of the Ukrainian state as it existed from 1991 from 2014. It may not be how the EU intended it, but it is the consequence. There is little the West can do about Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia’s activities in Eastern and Southern Ukraine will steadily wrest control of those regions away from Kiev. Granting greater autonomy to those regions will buy the Ukrainian government some time, but time is more on Russia’s side. Vladimir Putin can wait until the West has suffered from exhaustion in Ukraine and turn back to its many other priorities. He can destabilize and fragment Ukraine faster than the West can stabilize it and build a genuine state out of it.
A practical solution to the current crisis would be born out of direct negotiations between Russia and Western leaders, except for one obstacle: there is little Russia wants that the West can deliver. Those who fought on the Maidan did not do so to have their interests traded away to Russia as part of a political compromise. The popular sentiment behind the new Ukrainian government is so hostile to Russia that it is doubtful any compromise would be worth the paper it is written on. Washington and Brussels could propose a joint partnership to Russia in stewarding Ukraine, one that gives Moscow a significant role in its development, secures its influence, and freezes Kiev’s international orientation into that of a buffer state. The West could promise to Russia that Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO, and that it will have a role in the country’s development. There is an outline for a pragmatic compromise.
However, we are past the point of pragmatic compromises. Moscow will not believe Western promises, or that any assurances will last beyond a single U.S. administration. It does so with good reason, since such a deal would be likely based on lies. The West cannot credibly abridge the hopes of Western Ukrainians, or secure Russia’s interests in such a polarized country. Western leaders care about many things, but Russian interests have never been among them. Meanwhile Russia’s only motivation in an agreement would be to buy time to change facts on the ground. It will seek to expand influence while increasing social and political fragmentation in Ukraine. At this stage, there is nothing the West can offer Vladimir Putin that he cannot take. By annexing Crimea he has already made certain that Ukraine will get into NATO only the day after Russia does.
Russia has vital interests in Ukraine, along with deep historical and cultural ties. The West does not. Thousands of jobs and entire industries in Ukraine depend on the Russian market. The EU’s Eastern Partnership proposal is indicative that Europeans saw Ukraine as “good to have”, if it could be acquired cheaply, not a “must have.” It offered little in terms of investment or aid, but required a great undertaking of modernization and reforms. Now the West has its prize: a broken country. Ukraine needs nothing less than a complete nation building project, requiring a level of financial and political commitment the West has never offered it before. It will also need a transformational leader. Western and Ukrainian leaders will have to fight Russia along the way and make hard choices. The first of these will be to give Ukraine billions so that it can in turn hand this money over to Moscow in order to pay off its gas and debt obligations.
Finally, Western and Ukrainian leaders will have to moderate the bloody calls for further confrontation with Russia. Russia cannot respond to economic sanctions in kind, but it can punish Ukrainians for every bit of pain Western leaders inflict. Ukraine can have a bright future, but it will never leave Russia’s borders. NATO may deploy forces forward and back, but Ukraine’s distance to Moscow remains the same. Those in the U.S. and NATO advocating for much tougher actions in response to Russian aggression should consider whether or not they want to fight Russia, or save Ukraine. The two could prove mutually exclusive in the long term. Ukraine has become Moscow's hostage. Western leaders should create costs for undesirable Russian behavior, but be cognizant that in the end a deal will have to be struck on Ukraine, or risk turning it into a ruined no man’s land between trenches.
Michael Kofman is Program Manager and Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's May/June 2014 print edition.
Photo: Nikola Bagarov (cc).
