The International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), selected the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command—Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) to lead the development of the ALP. CFSOCC-A, which had prior experience in establishing rural area security, employed a new three prong counterinsurgency methodology known as Village Stability Operations (VSO). To appreciate the contributions of ALP it is essential to recognize that it is a subset of the broader VSO methodology. “VSO embodies a broad effort to connect top down and bottom up stabilization efforts along three lines of operation: security, governance, and development. The site where teams embed in a village to conduct VSO, called a Village Stability Platform (VSP), becomes a bridgehead for GIRoA ministries and Coaltion and International Community organizations to deliver services to neglected communities.” VSO is a critical component of ISAF’s comprehensive civil-military, counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy with ALP as the primary security component of that strategy. VSO occurs in four-phases: shape, hold, build, and transition with a focus on identifying the root causes of stability vice the root causes of instability and building upon that foundation.
Broad-based misconceptions about the ALP have characterized the program as more militia than government sanctioned security mechanism. This is not the case. Each location that establishes ALP goes through a rigorous process. VSO fosters governance by helping the Afghans stand up representative shuras while providing development projects identified by local villagers. By establishing these shuras and gaining the trust of the locals, VSO empowers the villagers to decide if they want/need ALP. Once the Afghans make this decision, they vote on each ALP candidate before he can begin training. The Special Forces teams embedded at the VSO platform train and mentor the ALP; however they are legally under the control of the district’s chief of police, the leading MoI authority in a district. Empowering the ALP enables the population to protect itself vice focusing Coalition resources on protecting the population.
The original ALP program envisioned 30 districts with 10,000 members. Set to expire in 2-5 years, the program goes unfunded in 2015. The success of the program led the US Congress to authorize an expansion of ALP to 100 sites and 30,000 members. Despite this increase, the program is still set to expire in 2015. As of 1 November, 2011 there are 56 validated ALP sites and 9000 approved ALP members. Current growth projections indicate that the force is growing by approximately 200 police per month, and with transition planning ongoing, it is imperative to reconsider the future of the ALP.
Enduring Entity
By 2014, CFSOCC-A anticipates that ALP, supported by VSO, will be a major component of the ISAF/GIRoA “hold force” used to consolidate strategic gains. If the ALP continues its successful development, the program should be examined as a possible long-term solution for community based security in Afghanistan. There are several benefits to having ALP as an enduring force for both GIRoA and the USG.
First, ALP is considerably cheaper than funding the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA). Cost calculations indicate that ALP is roughly one fourth the cost of an ANP officer, and one sixth the cost of an ANA soldier. While ALP brings fewer capabilities, they can maintain the persistent presence in the rural areas of Afghanistan that are rarely patrolled by other security forces.
Second, the ALP’s lower cost means it can be more easily sustained in terms of USG funding than the other security forces. An expansion of ALP above the current objective force level could be offset by small decreases in force levels of the ANA/ANP, with significant return on investment. This expansion would allow the ALP to expand into even more critical districts that are significant to both insurgent actors and terrorists. Expanding the ALP into strategic regions and more districts of Afghanistan could ensure tribal and ethnic parity aligning the ALP program with demographic norms of Afghan population percentages.
Third, ALP is unique in that it allows for localized service within the MoI. This continues to be an attractive recruiting tool, as many young men in Afghanistan want to remain close to their villages, tribes, and families. Currently no other security elements allow individuals to work within their home district, and in many cases the member is stationed far from his home province. Allowing ALP to be the “local service” option for other security forces would expand the recruitment pool and give individuals, who would have otherwise quit Afghan security forces, an option to remain a GIRoA employee and serve in their home communities.
Fourth, because of the enabling aspect of the VSO program, educational and vocational benefits exist with the ALP. ALP services could be synched with literacy and vocational training requirements oriented at educating locals from each district center. This would reinforce GIRoA as a viable government to locals, and provide tangible benefits for villages, districts and provinces. Finally, enabling ALP members through these services incentivizes membership while providing skills that allow ALP members to expand their civilian lives.
While the ALP program has achieved amazing success in just 16 months, reaching its long-term potential will require constant re-enforcement. Implementation of ALP as an enduring force in Afghanistan would lead to greater government recognition by Afghans, increasing and solidifying the government’s legitimacy. Ultimately the ALP could be a critical element as coalition forces transition security to Afghanistan. Besides offering this tangible security benefit, the ALP would also offer less financial risk to the USG and international donors.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's January/February issue.
Photo: U.S. Army
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Building A Viable Local Security Force
February 10, 2012
The International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), selected the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command—Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) to lead the development of the ALP. CFSOCC-A, which had prior experience in establishing rural area security, employed a new three prong counterinsurgency methodology known as Village Stability Operations (VSO). To appreciate the contributions of ALP it is essential to recognize that it is a subset of the broader VSO methodology. “VSO embodies a broad effort to connect top down and bottom up stabilization efforts along three lines of operation: security, governance, and development. The site where teams embed in a village to conduct VSO, called a Village Stability Platform (VSP), becomes a bridgehead for GIRoA ministries and Coaltion and International Community organizations to deliver services to neglected communities.” VSO is a critical component of ISAF’s comprehensive civil-military, counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy with ALP as the primary security component of that strategy. VSO occurs in four-phases: shape, hold, build, and transition with a focus on identifying the root causes of stability vice the root causes of instability and building upon that foundation.
Broad-based misconceptions about the ALP have characterized the program as more militia than government sanctioned security mechanism. This is not the case. Each location that establishes ALP goes through a rigorous process. VSO fosters governance by helping the Afghans stand up representative shuras while providing development projects identified by local villagers. By establishing these shuras and gaining the trust of the locals, VSO empowers the villagers to decide if they want/need ALP. Once the Afghans make this decision, they vote on each ALP candidate before he can begin training. The Special Forces teams embedded at the VSO platform train and mentor the ALP; however they are legally under the control of the district’s chief of police, the leading MoI authority in a district. Empowering the ALP enables the population to protect itself vice focusing Coalition resources on protecting the population.
The original ALP program envisioned 30 districts with 10,000 members. Set to expire in 2-5 years, the program goes unfunded in 2015. The success of the program led the US Congress to authorize an expansion of ALP to 100 sites and 30,000 members. Despite this increase, the program is still set to expire in 2015. As of 1 November, 2011 there are 56 validated ALP sites and 9000 approved ALP members. Current growth projections indicate that the force is growing by approximately 200 police per month, and with transition planning ongoing, it is imperative to reconsider the future of the ALP.
Enduring Entity
By 2014, CFSOCC-A anticipates that ALP, supported by VSO, will be a major component of the ISAF/GIRoA “hold force” used to consolidate strategic gains. If the ALP continues its successful development, the program should be examined as a possible long-term solution for community based security in Afghanistan. There are several benefits to having ALP as an enduring force for both GIRoA and the USG.
First, ALP is considerably cheaper than funding the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA). Cost calculations indicate that ALP is roughly one fourth the cost of an ANP officer, and one sixth the cost of an ANA soldier. While ALP brings fewer capabilities, they can maintain the persistent presence in the rural areas of Afghanistan that are rarely patrolled by other security forces.
Second, the ALP’s lower cost means it can be more easily sustained in terms of USG funding than the other security forces. An expansion of ALP above the current objective force level could be offset by small decreases in force levels of the ANA/ANP, with significant return on investment. This expansion would allow the ALP to expand into even more critical districts that are significant to both insurgent actors and terrorists. Expanding the ALP into strategic regions and more districts of Afghanistan could ensure tribal and ethnic parity aligning the ALP program with demographic norms of Afghan population percentages.
Third, ALP is unique in that it allows for localized service within the MoI. This continues to be an attractive recruiting tool, as many young men in Afghanistan want to remain close to their villages, tribes, and families. Currently no other security elements allow individuals to work within their home district, and in many cases the member is stationed far from his home province. Allowing ALP to be the “local service” option for other security forces would expand the recruitment pool and give individuals, who would have otherwise quit Afghan security forces, an option to remain a GIRoA employee and serve in their home communities.
Fourth, because of the enabling aspect of the VSO program, educational and vocational benefits exist with the ALP. ALP services could be synched with literacy and vocational training requirements oriented at educating locals from each district center. This would reinforce GIRoA as a viable government to locals, and provide tangible benefits for villages, districts and provinces. Finally, enabling ALP members through these services incentivizes membership while providing skills that allow ALP members to expand their civilian lives.
While the ALP program has achieved amazing success in just 16 months, reaching its long-term potential will require constant re-enforcement. Implementation of ALP as an enduring force in Afghanistan would lead to greater government recognition by Afghans, increasing and solidifying the government’s legitimacy. Ultimately the ALP could be a critical element as coalition forces transition security to Afghanistan. Besides offering this tangible security benefit, the ALP would also offer less financial risk to the USG and international donors.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's January/February issue.
Photo: U.S. Army
