.
The European Union has been in a state of crisis-management since the economic and monetary crisis in 2008. While the focus on security threats on Europe’s southern and eastern borders, as well as terror threats, has crowded out the political space to discuss new defense policies or integration, it is essential that European leaders prioritize measures to make the Union safer as a whole. Still, the Union’s loss of one of its highly capable military members, the United Kingdom, further complicates efforts towards common defense policies. In order to fill the post-Brexit defense gap, the European Union needs to get serious about strengthening and deepening European defense cooperation in a wide array of areas. Ironically, Brexit has created a window of opportunity for such a change in dynamics and new defense initiatives that can transform European defense coordination.
The United Kingdom is one of the military superpowers on the European continent. Britain is a major contributor to NATO operations—it is one of the few EU member states that has maintained NATO’s 2 percent defense spending pledge—and European Union missions under the Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) framework. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom, which recognizes NATO as the primary military forum to ensure the security of its territory, has often hampered proposed far-reaching EU security and defense initiatives by arguing that EU defense cooperation would duplicate and undermine the effectiveness of NATO efforts. Ironically, it was the United Kingdom (along with France) that took the initiative in 1998 to establish a European security and defense policy (the predecessor to the CSDP), which included a European military force capable of autonomous action. Now, with the United Kingdom out of the equation, the European Union has more space to forge new initiatives on defense cooperation and integration.
While the United Kingdom has been a notorious opponent of deeper European defense cooperation, its role in CSDP missions remains important. It is a partner in 12 of the current 16 missions that the CSDP runs separately from NATO and is one of the five biggest contributing members in all missions. The United Kingdom is also ranked as the third biggest contributor to the European Defense Agency, an EU executive agency tasked with developing new European military capabilities. In the post-Brexit environment, the question arises as to whether another member state is able or willing to step in and provide the needed resources to successfully continue these missions.
Brexit does not completely close the door on continued UK contribution to EU missions. The United Kingdom could continue to fulfill its role through the CSDP framework—should it wish to do so—through a third country partnership. However, the Union will lose strategic UK capacities as a result of Brexit aside from crucial military capabilities. British staffers and officers bring military and strategic knowledge to mission headquarters, the EU diplomatic service, and the European External Action Service. EU members, therefore, need to get serious about what defense spending and investments will look like without the United Kingdom. It will be important to evaluate needed CSDP mission capabilities in the areas of information and strategic communications and intelligence sharing, amongst others.
There are signs that some member states, as well as the European Commission, view Brexit as an opportunity to further proposals on European defense cooperation in different areas. Indeed, European defense cooperation is the only effective way to combat shortfalls in European military capabilities, since no single European country can afford to maintain a full-spectrum of military capabilities on their own. With recent proposals from the Franco-German axis, the Visegrad group of Eastern European states, and Italy, as well as recent proposals by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, it seems the European Union is finally pushing toward creating the needed conditions to stimulate long overdue defense cooperation between member states. Looking at the current internal and external security environments of the European Union, it is indeed high time that member states take genuine action to address the widespread issues concerning defense cooperation, including funding gaps, joint procurement capability, and more efficient planning, command, and political decision making structures.
While it is true that the European Union will lose a significant and capable military partner as a result of Brexit, the United Kingdom will remain a close and active ally to many members through the NATO alliance. Still, Brexit sends a crucial reminder that EU member states and the Union as an institution need take concrete steps towards European defense cooperation and coordination. In March, the European Union is expected to present the long anticipated plan for a European Defense Union, which will set in stone measures for structured defense cooperation between member states as well as a new EU military headquarters. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, however, member states need to step up efforts in smart defense spending and more aggressively address the capability gap from which the Union has been suffering due to decades of underspending and underinvesting.
Karlijn Jans specializes in defense and security policies. She currently works as a strategic analyst at the The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Karlijn received an LL.M in European Law from Maastricht University and MA in European Studies from King’s College London. She has been a part-time modular student at the Netherlands Defence Academy and chairs the Netherlands Atlantic Youth Association. Karlijn is also a Europe Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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What Does Brexit Mean for European Defense?
EU flag waving in front of European Parliament building. Brussels Belgium
December 8, 2016
The European Union has been in a state of crisis-management since the economic and monetary crisis in 2008. While the focus on security threats on Europe’s southern and eastern borders, as well as terror threats, has crowded out the political space to discuss new defense policies or integration, it is essential that European leaders prioritize measures to make the Union safer as a whole. Still, the Union’s loss of one of its highly capable military members, the United Kingdom, further complicates efforts towards common defense policies. In order to fill the post-Brexit defense gap, the European Union needs to get serious about strengthening and deepening European defense cooperation in a wide array of areas. Ironically, Brexit has created a window of opportunity for such a change in dynamics and new defense initiatives that can transform European defense coordination.
The United Kingdom is one of the military superpowers on the European continent. Britain is a major contributor to NATO operations—it is one of the few EU member states that has maintained NATO’s 2 percent defense spending pledge—and European Union missions under the Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) framework. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom, which recognizes NATO as the primary military forum to ensure the security of its territory, has often hampered proposed far-reaching EU security and defense initiatives by arguing that EU defense cooperation would duplicate and undermine the effectiveness of NATO efforts. Ironically, it was the United Kingdom (along with France) that took the initiative in 1998 to establish a European security and defense policy (the predecessor to the CSDP), which included a European military force capable of autonomous action. Now, with the United Kingdom out of the equation, the European Union has more space to forge new initiatives on defense cooperation and integration.
While the United Kingdom has been a notorious opponent of deeper European defense cooperation, its role in CSDP missions remains important. It is a partner in 12 of the current 16 missions that the CSDP runs separately from NATO and is one of the five biggest contributing members in all missions. The United Kingdom is also ranked as the third biggest contributor to the European Defense Agency, an EU executive agency tasked with developing new European military capabilities. In the post-Brexit environment, the question arises as to whether another member state is able or willing to step in and provide the needed resources to successfully continue these missions.
Brexit does not completely close the door on continued UK contribution to EU missions. The United Kingdom could continue to fulfill its role through the CSDP framework—should it wish to do so—through a third country partnership. However, the Union will lose strategic UK capacities as a result of Brexit aside from crucial military capabilities. British staffers and officers bring military and strategic knowledge to mission headquarters, the EU diplomatic service, and the European External Action Service. EU members, therefore, need to get serious about what defense spending and investments will look like without the United Kingdom. It will be important to evaluate needed CSDP mission capabilities in the areas of information and strategic communications and intelligence sharing, amongst others.
There are signs that some member states, as well as the European Commission, view Brexit as an opportunity to further proposals on European defense cooperation in different areas. Indeed, European defense cooperation is the only effective way to combat shortfalls in European military capabilities, since no single European country can afford to maintain a full-spectrum of military capabilities on their own. With recent proposals from the Franco-German axis, the Visegrad group of Eastern European states, and Italy, as well as recent proposals by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, it seems the European Union is finally pushing toward creating the needed conditions to stimulate long overdue defense cooperation between member states. Looking at the current internal and external security environments of the European Union, it is indeed high time that member states take genuine action to address the widespread issues concerning defense cooperation, including funding gaps, joint procurement capability, and more efficient planning, command, and political decision making structures.
While it is true that the European Union will lose a significant and capable military partner as a result of Brexit, the United Kingdom will remain a close and active ally to many members through the NATO alliance. Still, Brexit sends a crucial reminder that EU member states and the Union as an institution need take concrete steps towards European defense cooperation and coordination. In March, the European Union is expected to present the long anticipated plan for a European Defense Union, which will set in stone measures for structured defense cooperation between member states as well as a new EU military headquarters. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, however, member states need to step up efforts in smart defense spending and more aggressively address the capability gap from which the Union has been suffering due to decades of underspending and underinvesting.
Karlijn Jans specializes in defense and security policies. She currently works as a strategic analyst at the The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Karlijn received an LL.M in European Law from Maastricht University and MA in European Studies from King’s College London. She has been a part-time modular student at the Netherlands Defence Academy and chairs the Netherlands Atlantic Youth Association. Karlijn is also a Europe Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
