n 19 May 2024, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir–Abdollahian died in a plane crash. Since the country’s constitution sets a time limit of electing a new President 50 days after the President's death, the next election will be held on 28 June. Despite the regime's control over the electoral procedures, six candidates, including the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, have been allowed to participate.
The U.S. sanctions continue to have a significant impact on Iran, and the recent tensions with Israel have exposed major security concerns for the Islamic Republic. Whoever is elected as the new President will have limited economic flexibility in the short–term and will need to ensure domestic stability for a potential transition into the post–Ayatollah Ali Khamenei era. Khamenei holds extensive political power as the religious Supreme Leader of Iran, but at 85 years old, preparations for appointing a successor are necessary.
The elections background
The Iranian people will elect their new President on 28 June 2024. The election comes at a time of domestic issues such as tensions with the U.S. and Israel, a severe economic crisis, and a widespread crackdown on dissent by the regime. In Iranian domestic politics, there are two main factions: The principlists, who cater to the conservative or right–wing voters, and the reformists, who promote Islamic liberalism and appeal to the center and center–left electorate. Both sides compete in the Presidential election, which is considered competitive, but not entirely free. While people can effectively choose between different candidates, there are several external, preemptive constraints from the religious establishment and the judicial system that render the race unfair.
This is illustrated by the fact that, out of 80 Presidential candidates, only six have passed the vetting process of the Guardian Council, a body composed of jurists and clerics overseen by Khamenei. None of the women who applied to run were allowed to stand for election, and the same was true for former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—demonstrating the heavy influence of the religious establishment on the political system.
The main candidates
There are three leading candidates in the race. The first one is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the conservative Speaker of the Parliament and former Mayor of Tehran. During a speech on 3 June, Khamenei praised some of Ghalibaf's qualities, hinting at his support for him. Ghalibaf has close ties with the country's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a powerful military organization tasked to defend the Islamic Republic; which is why many refer to him as the "IRGC candidate."
The second conservative candidate is the hardliner Saeed Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator. Like Ghalibaf, he has strong ties with both the IRGC and Khamenei, having run the latter's office for several years. He has been accused of proposing unrealistic projects to rejuvenate the economy, such as attracting hundreds of billions of dollars of private investments in the oil sector. Iran is a well–known hostile environment for foreign investments and is not even ranked among the top 25 emerging economies worldwide on the FDI Confidence Index. Regarding foreign policy, he has stated that Iran does not need to restore relations with the U.S. and the West.
Masoud Pezeshkian is the sole candidate from the reformist side. He holds different positions from his opponents on human rights, the economy, and the nuclear deal. For instance, he has called for further investigation into the death of Mahsa Amini, a girl who allegedly died at the hands of the regime two years ago for not wearing the hijab properly. Additionally, he has advocated for the release of Green Movement leaders who have been under house arrest since the 2009–2010 anti–regime protests, and he has backed the revival of the Iran Nuclear Deal.
What to expect after the election
The conservative camp is divided into five candidates, with two of them considered truly competitive. This could create opportunities for the reformists. However, the released surveys have provided contradictory results mainly due to aforementioned, external political influences. According to Iran's Culture, Art, and Communications Research Center, Jalili is leading the race with 36.7%, followed by Ghalibaf at 30.4% and Pezeshkian at 28.3%. Another survey conducted by an Iranian university presents different results: Qalibaf is leading with 34.9%, followed by Pezeshkian at 26.3%, and Jalili at 17.4%.
At 41%, the 2021 elections in Iran had the lowest voter turnout ever recorded for a presidential election since 1979. Some journalists have suggested that the regime allowed Pezeshkian to participate in attracting reformist voters to the polls, which would enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the Iranian political system. Estimates indicate that voter turnout this year is expected to range between 51% and 56%.
However, given the country's dire economic situation and the extensive influence of the clerics over the political system, not much change can be expected in the short term, either in the case of a reformist or principlist victory. The regime's priority now is to guarantee a smooth transition in the post–Khamenei era.
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Anticipating the 2024 Iranian presidential election
Photo by Majid Bashiri on Unsplash.
June 27, 2024
Given Iran's dire economic situation and the extensive influence of the clerics over its political system, not much change should be expected in the short term, writes Elia Preto Martini.
O
n 19 May 2024, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir–Abdollahian died in a plane crash. Since the country’s constitution sets a time limit of electing a new President 50 days after the President's death, the next election will be held on 28 June. Despite the regime's control over the electoral procedures, six candidates, including the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, have been allowed to participate.
The U.S. sanctions continue to have a significant impact on Iran, and the recent tensions with Israel have exposed major security concerns for the Islamic Republic. Whoever is elected as the new President will have limited economic flexibility in the short–term and will need to ensure domestic stability for a potential transition into the post–Ayatollah Ali Khamenei era. Khamenei holds extensive political power as the religious Supreme Leader of Iran, but at 85 years old, preparations for appointing a successor are necessary.
The elections background
The Iranian people will elect their new President on 28 June 2024. The election comes at a time of domestic issues such as tensions with the U.S. and Israel, a severe economic crisis, and a widespread crackdown on dissent by the regime. In Iranian domestic politics, there are two main factions: The principlists, who cater to the conservative or right–wing voters, and the reformists, who promote Islamic liberalism and appeal to the center and center–left electorate. Both sides compete in the Presidential election, which is considered competitive, but not entirely free. While people can effectively choose between different candidates, there are several external, preemptive constraints from the religious establishment and the judicial system that render the race unfair.
This is illustrated by the fact that, out of 80 Presidential candidates, only six have passed the vetting process of the Guardian Council, a body composed of jurists and clerics overseen by Khamenei. None of the women who applied to run were allowed to stand for election, and the same was true for former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—demonstrating the heavy influence of the religious establishment on the political system.
The main candidates
There are three leading candidates in the race. The first one is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the conservative Speaker of the Parliament and former Mayor of Tehran. During a speech on 3 June, Khamenei praised some of Ghalibaf's qualities, hinting at his support for him. Ghalibaf has close ties with the country's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a powerful military organization tasked to defend the Islamic Republic; which is why many refer to him as the "IRGC candidate."
The second conservative candidate is the hardliner Saeed Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator. Like Ghalibaf, he has strong ties with both the IRGC and Khamenei, having run the latter's office for several years. He has been accused of proposing unrealistic projects to rejuvenate the economy, such as attracting hundreds of billions of dollars of private investments in the oil sector. Iran is a well–known hostile environment for foreign investments and is not even ranked among the top 25 emerging economies worldwide on the FDI Confidence Index. Regarding foreign policy, he has stated that Iran does not need to restore relations with the U.S. and the West.
Masoud Pezeshkian is the sole candidate from the reformist side. He holds different positions from his opponents on human rights, the economy, and the nuclear deal. For instance, he has called for further investigation into the death of Mahsa Amini, a girl who allegedly died at the hands of the regime two years ago for not wearing the hijab properly. Additionally, he has advocated for the release of Green Movement leaders who have been under house arrest since the 2009–2010 anti–regime protests, and he has backed the revival of the Iran Nuclear Deal.
What to expect after the election
The conservative camp is divided into five candidates, with two of them considered truly competitive. This could create opportunities for the reformists. However, the released surveys have provided contradictory results mainly due to aforementioned, external political influences. According to Iran's Culture, Art, and Communications Research Center, Jalili is leading the race with 36.7%, followed by Ghalibaf at 30.4% and Pezeshkian at 28.3%. Another survey conducted by an Iranian university presents different results: Qalibaf is leading with 34.9%, followed by Pezeshkian at 26.3%, and Jalili at 17.4%.
At 41%, the 2021 elections in Iran had the lowest voter turnout ever recorded for a presidential election since 1979. Some journalists have suggested that the regime allowed Pezeshkian to participate in attracting reformist voters to the polls, which would enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the Iranian political system. Estimates indicate that voter turnout this year is expected to range between 51% and 56%.
However, given the country's dire economic situation and the extensive influence of the clerics over the political system, not much change can be expected in the short term, either in the case of a reformist or principlist victory. The regime's priority now is to guarantee a smooth transition in the post–Khamenei era.
