he fallout from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was truly global, stretching from energy price shocks to worries over potential impacts on noodle stocks in Southeast Asia. Antarctica, a continent historically characterized by remarkable interstate cooperation in the midst of global conflicts, has not emerged unscathed.
Ongoing disagreements over whether Belarus and Canada should be afforded decision–making power in the Antarctic Treaty System, a decision that should in theory be based on the states’ respective scientific involvement but in practice is skewed by their opposing positions in the Ukraine conflict, show that global politics is an unavoidable part of Antarctic diplomacy.
Both states are currently non–consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty, allowing them observer status, but are hoping to join 29 other states in becoming consultative parties, able to contribute to discussions and vote on proposals. In theory this should happen once they have shown sufficient interest in the white continent by “conducting substantial research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition.”
This may seem like a clear parameter, but it is increasingly vulnerable to the intrusion of broader disputes. And as decisions in the Antarctic Treaty System require consensus among the consultative parties, any strongly–held objections can be difficult to overcome.
Since the Czech Republic became the last new Consultative Party in 2014, Venezuela has tried several times to join the club, rejected consistently in no small part due to South American concerns about its domestic politics. It seems now to have effectively given up, but Canada and Belarus are still trying, although so far equally unsuccessfully.
Canada’s Antarctic role entails significant Canadian contributions to research papers, supported by increasing state funding for Antarctic research. But as the country lacks a facility in Antarctica, it is forced to piggy–back off the operations of other states, and conducts most of its research remotely. The Royal Canadian Navy began its first ever deployment to the Southern Ocean on Jan. 10, 2025.
Belarus, in contrast, has an established presence in Antarctica through its own seasonal research station, and is currently conducting its 17th Antarctic Expedition. Its relationship with Russia has enabled similar access to Antarctic research as Canada.
So why have both countries’ attempts to become a consultative party been consistently rebuffed? The official reasons given cite questions over Canada’s lack of direct involvement in Antarctica, and the quality of the science Belarus has produced. But the underlying reason, making official justifications little more than excuses, is Ukraine.
Belarus’ application for consultative party status was rejected most recently at the 2024 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Kochi, India, by Ukraine and 17 other parties, according to Ukraine’s National Antarctic Scientific Center. Its head explained that this was because “Belarus continues to support Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and cooperates with scientific institutions of the occupied Crimea, in particular on Antarctic research.”
The quality or relevance of the research, how ‘substantial’ it is, is seemingly irrelevant to this decision, because Ukraine as a consultative party has an effective veto. So does Belarus’ main ally, Russia. Canada knows this, and hence was reluctant to even submit a request for consultative party status in 2023 knowing that Russia (and China) would likely reject it in retaliation for the decision on Belarus. Canada did submit its request last year, but was once again unsuccessful. Both countries’ applications are now seemingly inextricably linked, with neither side willing to budge.
As much as China in particular has requested that political conflicts taking place away from Antarctica be excluded from Antarctic diplomacy, which had historically functioned well even during the Cold War, the hot war between two Consultative Parties makes this difficult. The offices of Ukraine’s Antarctic Program in Kyiv were damaged in a missile attack in 2022, and several Ukrainian researchers in Antarctica returned home to serve on the frontlines. Those who remain have become a symbol of Ukraine’s global relevance.
Antarctic diplomacy sorely needs the resolution of conflicts involving its members. Efforts to protect the Emperor Penguin by declaring it a Specially Protected Species, or monitor and regulate krill fishing in the Southern Ocean, have ground to a halt in recent years as a result of a breakdown in diplomacy.
If these impasses cannot be resolved, the Antarctic Treaty System, which has been responsible for agreeing landmark environmental protections since the original treaty was signed in 1959, risks being rendered toothless by factors outside of its control. For the sake of Antarctica, the Consultative Parties need to find a way to separate protection of the continent from their own disputes, and judge applications on their own merits rather than allowing other political concerns to intrude. They may well be able to do this, but it will require a new level of diplomatic engagement and an increased emphasis on listening to scientific advice.
It seems nothing will now happen in terms of granting either Belarus or Canada Consultative Party status until the Russia–Ukraine war reaches a resolution. Whether the Antarctic Treaty System can adjust to a new level of involvement with 21st century conflict and retain its ability to introduce pioneering environmental protections remains to be seen.
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In Antarctica, Belarus and Canada reveal a diplomatic divide
January 27, 2025
Global disputes are interfering with Antarctic consensus like never before, writes Huw Paige.
T
he fallout from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was truly global, stretching from energy price shocks to worries over potential impacts on noodle stocks in Southeast Asia. Antarctica, a continent historically characterized by remarkable interstate cooperation in the midst of global conflicts, has not emerged unscathed.
Ongoing disagreements over whether Belarus and Canada should be afforded decision–making power in the Antarctic Treaty System, a decision that should in theory be based on the states’ respective scientific involvement but in practice is skewed by their opposing positions in the Ukraine conflict, show that global politics is an unavoidable part of Antarctic diplomacy.
Both states are currently non–consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty, allowing them observer status, but are hoping to join 29 other states in becoming consultative parties, able to contribute to discussions and vote on proposals. In theory this should happen once they have shown sufficient interest in the white continent by “conducting substantial research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition.”
This may seem like a clear parameter, but it is increasingly vulnerable to the intrusion of broader disputes. And as decisions in the Antarctic Treaty System require consensus among the consultative parties, any strongly–held objections can be difficult to overcome.
Since the Czech Republic became the last new Consultative Party in 2014, Venezuela has tried several times to join the club, rejected consistently in no small part due to South American concerns about its domestic politics. It seems now to have effectively given up, but Canada and Belarus are still trying, although so far equally unsuccessfully.
Canada’s Antarctic role entails significant Canadian contributions to research papers, supported by increasing state funding for Antarctic research. But as the country lacks a facility in Antarctica, it is forced to piggy–back off the operations of other states, and conducts most of its research remotely. The Royal Canadian Navy began its first ever deployment to the Southern Ocean on Jan. 10, 2025.
Belarus, in contrast, has an established presence in Antarctica through its own seasonal research station, and is currently conducting its 17th Antarctic Expedition. Its relationship with Russia has enabled similar access to Antarctic research as Canada.
So why have both countries’ attempts to become a consultative party been consistently rebuffed? The official reasons given cite questions over Canada’s lack of direct involvement in Antarctica, and the quality of the science Belarus has produced. But the underlying reason, making official justifications little more than excuses, is Ukraine.
Belarus’ application for consultative party status was rejected most recently at the 2024 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Kochi, India, by Ukraine and 17 other parties, according to Ukraine’s National Antarctic Scientific Center. Its head explained that this was because “Belarus continues to support Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and cooperates with scientific institutions of the occupied Crimea, in particular on Antarctic research.”
The quality or relevance of the research, how ‘substantial’ it is, is seemingly irrelevant to this decision, because Ukraine as a consultative party has an effective veto. So does Belarus’ main ally, Russia. Canada knows this, and hence was reluctant to even submit a request for consultative party status in 2023 knowing that Russia (and China) would likely reject it in retaliation for the decision on Belarus. Canada did submit its request last year, but was once again unsuccessful. Both countries’ applications are now seemingly inextricably linked, with neither side willing to budge.
As much as China in particular has requested that political conflicts taking place away from Antarctica be excluded from Antarctic diplomacy, which had historically functioned well even during the Cold War, the hot war between two Consultative Parties makes this difficult. The offices of Ukraine’s Antarctic Program in Kyiv were damaged in a missile attack in 2022, and several Ukrainian researchers in Antarctica returned home to serve on the frontlines. Those who remain have become a symbol of Ukraine’s global relevance.
Antarctic diplomacy sorely needs the resolution of conflicts involving its members. Efforts to protect the Emperor Penguin by declaring it a Specially Protected Species, or monitor and regulate krill fishing in the Southern Ocean, have ground to a halt in recent years as a result of a breakdown in diplomacy.
If these impasses cannot be resolved, the Antarctic Treaty System, which has been responsible for agreeing landmark environmental protections since the original treaty was signed in 1959, risks being rendered toothless by factors outside of its control. For the sake of Antarctica, the Consultative Parties need to find a way to separate protection of the continent from their own disputes, and judge applications on their own merits rather than allowing other political concerns to intrude. They may well be able to do this, but it will require a new level of diplomatic engagement and an increased emphasis on listening to scientific advice.
It seems nothing will now happen in terms of granting either Belarus or Canada Consultative Party status until the Russia–Ukraine war reaches a resolution. Whether the Antarctic Treaty System can adjust to a new level of involvement with 21st century conflict and retain its ability to introduce pioneering environmental protections remains to be seen.
