fghanistan in August 2021 was fundamentally different to the Afghanistan of 2001, and the protests that took place across the country as the Taliban replaced the flag of the republic with their own is characteristic of that change. Afghanistan has experienced great social progress over the past two decades and these protests are proof of that. However, the country has also seen the growth of bad governance, corruption, aid dependency, and terrorism. That being said, in hindsight the achievements far outweigh the failures, and the events following August 15 are a stark reminder of how much there is to lose.
Afghanistan’s Progress and Setbacks Since 2001
In the years following the international intervention of 2001, progress toward equality was rapid. A new Constitution was adopted in 2004 enshrining women's rights and in 2009 Afghanistan adopted the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law. Economic growth had been volatile but rapid, with construction and agriculture the key contributors to the country’s economic expansion. Women became more actively involved in economic activity, making up approximately 16% of the total national work force. A new report by UNESCO shows that education enrollment increased ten-fold in the last 20 years, with almost no primary schools for girls prior to 2001, by 2018 there was 2.5 million. Furthermore, according to the World Health Organization, there were a total of 3,135 health facilities, ensuring access to almost 87% of the population within a two-hour distance.
Afghanistan’s security forces, despite heavy casualties, were also being restructured, giving way to a new generation of defense and law enforcement that in time could have led the way to a modernization of the security sector. Women made up 1.4% of the security sector and took up positions in the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces previously not available to them in the country’s history. Though this figure was far below the target of 10% set by the Afghan government and its international partners to achieve by 2020, the space to advocate for the effective implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution on 1325 National Action Plan (NAP), which Afghanistan adopted in 2015, did exist.
Much had been achieved, but much remained still to be done in all three domains of peace, security, and development. In 2016, an internal survey conducted by the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS) showed that Afghanistan’s youth identified corruption, unemployment, poor economy, followed by weak governance as the main factors pushing them to leave Afghanistan. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when these challenges became so prominent despite efforts by the international aid community, but the period following the security transition process (2011-2014) and transition to the Ghani government is a likely culprit. Over the ensuing years, the number of regional and international terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan proliferated, the Taliban made significant gains, and both fatalities and displacement among women and children rose sharply.
Starting in 2018, Afghanistan began experiencing a politically dynamic period marked by the start of U.S.-Taliban negotiations and talks between the Republic’s Negotiating Team and the Taliban Negotiating Team from September to December 2020. The unprecedented ceasefire agreed to by the Afghan government and Taliban in June 2018 demonstrated the possibility of peace in Afghanistan. However, the parties involved and their stakeholders repeatedly excluded key groups, including women and civil society actors from the peace table. Thus while the ceasefire and ensuing negotiations demonstrated the possibility of peace, the failings of the negotiations also illustrated how easily actors involved could sideline the need for local ownership while reinforcing a culture of impunity in the pursuit of achieving that peace.
How A Lack Of Inclusivity Doomed The Peace Talks
Since the Peace and Reconciliation process first started in 2010, civil society organizations and women’s groups expressed concern over a lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government, regional stakeholders, and international stakeholders in the promotion and inclusion of women in major phases of the process. These groups argued that the peace process was top-down and elite centric, but those concerns were largely ignored. Additionally, very little consensus building actually took place across the country. The exception to this was the Peace Jirga held by the government in April 2019, bringing together 3200 community leaders, tribal and religious elders, women, and youth who agreed that durable peace was only achievable through a political process rather than military action. However, such one-off events did not satisfy calls for an inclusive process that required continuous national consultations to reach a consensus among all groups on the definition for peace, framework for talks, and redlines for negotiations. In summary, the international community and its Afghan counterparts focused on technical and operational aspects of the peace process, while sidelining the needs and aspirations of Afghan society, particularly women.
In some ways, Afghanistan made progress toward more inclusive involvement of women in peace and security. It signed off on the 1325 agenda, had gender units in all ministries, committed to women making up 30% of its civil service, and was working on an anti-harassment policy in the police force. Furthermore, women were included on the peace negotiation team, and the government passed the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law. But ultimately Afghanistan’s prevailing patriarchal socio-cultural attitudes toward women meant the treatment of women’s rights was superficial and any advances remained vulnerable to external shocks. Thus, as far as women in peace and security was concerned, there existed only a hollow infrastructure.
Despite these barriers, Afghan women actively involved themselves politically and socially. We witnessed the remarkable mobilization of women and women-based organizations who came together in ways never seen before. Their advocacy cut across ethnic, religious and sectorial lines with the goal of preventing a regression on the gains made towards women’s Constitutional rights, civil liberties, and democracy. They have held nation-wide consultations, talked with current and former Taliban members, organized roundtables, wrote op-eds, staged sit-in inside of peace tents in the restive province of Helmand, provided policy recommendations, and carried out peaceful protests in Kabul and around the world. Afghan women called upon the international community to stand behind their struggle for inclusion and sustainable peace. “No Peace Without Women; My Red Line; and Women Will Not Go Back,” are only some of the messages that spread across social media to express that any process in which women are left behind, is one that is not only unacceptable, but is also doomed to fail.
As direct talks between the Taliban and the United States progressed, critics’ concerns went beyond the exclusion of women from the peace process, focusing more broadly on how the peace talks should be reconfigured to ensure inclusivity and sustainability. The talks were progressing on a narrow agenda over the withdrawal of foreign forces and assurances by the Taliban that they would not allow Afghanistan to be used as a sanctuary for groups working against U.S. interests.
This narrow focus not only set the ground for a hasty withdrawal that would jeopardize the future of hard-won gains, it also excluded any meaningful participation from women’s groups, activists, civil society actors, or even the Afghan government itself. This exclusion further exacerbated fears about the loss of rights and freedoms Afghanistan’s young democracy had afforded its citizens. Women’s groups and civil society organizations also questioned whether U.S.-Taliban talks would eventually lead to the start of Intra-Afghan Dialogue – and whether that forum would be one in which actors ensure unity of approach based on a national consensus and inclusivity. The fact remained that the only process that could gain legitimacy and be sustainable would be one which reflected the aspirations of Afghans.
Even at this late date, Afghans were calling for the international community to deepen its engagement in support of grass-roots consensus building amongst all sectors of Afghan society on key concerns related to the peace process. Remedies were still available to avoid the crisis we witnessed in August, and Afghan stakeholders made their voices heard about these remedies. The ongoing peace process could have been strengthened if the international community introduced a strong third-party mediator and observer group to monitor the implementation of any political settlement reached with the Taliban. The timetable for the withdrawal of Western troops could have been made contingent on all parties involved in talks upholding and protecting the country’s democratic gains international donors could have made clear strategy statements tying post-peace agreement aid to alignment with Afghanistan’s development priorities to help generate greater revenue, continue delivering services, and create long-term employment.
Afghanistan’s international partners repeatedly expressed their intention to continue to stand behind the people of Afghanistan to ensure an orderly withdrawal, a comprehensive peace agreement, and an Afghanistan that could continue to progress. In the end, however, Afghans felt abandoned both by the Afghan government and its international partners.
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Afghanistan Fought to Improve, but for What?
Afghanistan. Photo via Pixabay.
November 11, 2021
Despite significant hurdles, Afghanistan made hard-fought gains in governance, human rights, development, and gender equality over the past two decades. Today it's hard to see what it was all for, writes DROPS Executive Director Mariam Safi.
A
fghanistan in August 2021 was fundamentally different to the Afghanistan of 2001, and the protests that took place across the country as the Taliban replaced the flag of the republic with their own is characteristic of that change. Afghanistan has experienced great social progress over the past two decades and these protests are proof of that. However, the country has also seen the growth of bad governance, corruption, aid dependency, and terrorism. That being said, in hindsight the achievements far outweigh the failures, and the events following August 15 are a stark reminder of how much there is to lose.
Afghanistan’s Progress and Setbacks Since 2001
In the years following the international intervention of 2001, progress toward equality was rapid. A new Constitution was adopted in 2004 enshrining women's rights and in 2009 Afghanistan adopted the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law. Economic growth had been volatile but rapid, with construction and agriculture the key contributors to the country’s economic expansion. Women became more actively involved in economic activity, making up approximately 16% of the total national work force. A new report by UNESCO shows that education enrollment increased ten-fold in the last 20 years, with almost no primary schools for girls prior to 2001, by 2018 there was 2.5 million. Furthermore, according to the World Health Organization, there were a total of 3,135 health facilities, ensuring access to almost 87% of the population within a two-hour distance.
Afghanistan’s security forces, despite heavy casualties, were also being restructured, giving way to a new generation of defense and law enforcement that in time could have led the way to a modernization of the security sector. Women made up 1.4% of the security sector and took up positions in the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces previously not available to them in the country’s history. Though this figure was far below the target of 10% set by the Afghan government and its international partners to achieve by 2020, the space to advocate for the effective implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution on 1325 National Action Plan (NAP), which Afghanistan adopted in 2015, did exist.
Much had been achieved, but much remained still to be done in all three domains of peace, security, and development. In 2016, an internal survey conducted by the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS) showed that Afghanistan’s youth identified corruption, unemployment, poor economy, followed by weak governance as the main factors pushing them to leave Afghanistan. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when these challenges became so prominent despite efforts by the international aid community, but the period following the security transition process (2011-2014) and transition to the Ghani government is a likely culprit. Over the ensuing years, the number of regional and international terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan proliferated, the Taliban made significant gains, and both fatalities and displacement among women and children rose sharply.
Starting in 2018, Afghanistan began experiencing a politically dynamic period marked by the start of U.S.-Taliban negotiations and talks between the Republic’s Negotiating Team and the Taliban Negotiating Team from September to December 2020. The unprecedented ceasefire agreed to by the Afghan government and Taliban in June 2018 demonstrated the possibility of peace in Afghanistan. However, the parties involved and their stakeholders repeatedly excluded key groups, including women and civil society actors from the peace table. Thus while the ceasefire and ensuing negotiations demonstrated the possibility of peace, the failings of the negotiations also illustrated how easily actors involved could sideline the need for local ownership while reinforcing a culture of impunity in the pursuit of achieving that peace.
How A Lack Of Inclusivity Doomed The Peace Talks
Since the Peace and Reconciliation process first started in 2010, civil society organizations and women’s groups expressed concern over a lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government, regional stakeholders, and international stakeholders in the promotion and inclusion of women in major phases of the process. These groups argued that the peace process was top-down and elite centric, but those concerns were largely ignored. Additionally, very little consensus building actually took place across the country. The exception to this was the Peace Jirga held by the government in April 2019, bringing together 3200 community leaders, tribal and religious elders, women, and youth who agreed that durable peace was only achievable through a political process rather than military action. However, such one-off events did not satisfy calls for an inclusive process that required continuous national consultations to reach a consensus among all groups on the definition for peace, framework for talks, and redlines for negotiations. In summary, the international community and its Afghan counterparts focused on technical and operational aspects of the peace process, while sidelining the needs and aspirations of Afghan society, particularly women.
In some ways, Afghanistan made progress toward more inclusive involvement of women in peace and security. It signed off on the 1325 agenda, had gender units in all ministries, committed to women making up 30% of its civil service, and was working on an anti-harassment policy in the police force. Furthermore, women were included on the peace negotiation team, and the government passed the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law. But ultimately Afghanistan’s prevailing patriarchal socio-cultural attitudes toward women meant the treatment of women’s rights was superficial and any advances remained vulnerable to external shocks. Thus, as far as women in peace and security was concerned, there existed only a hollow infrastructure.
Despite these barriers, Afghan women actively involved themselves politically and socially. We witnessed the remarkable mobilization of women and women-based organizations who came together in ways never seen before. Their advocacy cut across ethnic, religious and sectorial lines with the goal of preventing a regression on the gains made towards women’s Constitutional rights, civil liberties, and democracy. They have held nation-wide consultations, talked with current and former Taliban members, organized roundtables, wrote op-eds, staged sit-in inside of peace tents in the restive province of Helmand, provided policy recommendations, and carried out peaceful protests in Kabul and around the world. Afghan women called upon the international community to stand behind their struggle for inclusion and sustainable peace. “No Peace Without Women; My Red Line; and Women Will Not Go Back,” are only some of the messages that spread across social media to express that any process in which women are left behind, is one that is not only unacceptable, but is also doomed to fail.
As direct talks between the Taliban and the United States progressed, critics’ concerns went beyond the exclusion of women from the peace process, focusing more broadly on how the peace talks should be reconfigured to ensure inclusivity and sustainability. The talks were progressing on a narrow agenda over the withdrawal of foreign forces and assurances by the Taliban that they would not allow Afghanistan to be used as a sanctuary for groups working against U.S. interests.
This narrow focus not only set the ground for a hasty withdrawal that would jeopardize the future of hard-won gains, it also excluded any meaningful participation from women’s groups, activists, civil society actors, or even the Afghan government itself. This exclusion further exacerbated fears about the loss of rights and freedoms Afghanistan’s young democracy had afforded its citizens. Women’s groups and civil society organizations also questioned whether U.S.-Taliban talks would eventually lead to the start of Intra-Afghan Dialogue – and whether that forum would be one in which actors ensure unity of approach based on a national consensus and inclusivity. The fact remained that the only process that could gain legitimacy and be sustainable would be one which reflected the aspirations of Afghans.
Even at this late date, Afghans were calling for the international community to deepen its engagement in support of grass-roots consensus building amongst all sectors of Afghan society on key concerns related to the peace process. Remedies were still available to avoid the crisis we witnessed in August, and Afghan stakeholders made their voices heard about these remedies. The ongoing peace process could have been strengthened if the international community introduced a strong third-party mediator and observer group to monitor the implementation of any political settlement reached with the Taliban. The timetable for the withdrawal of Western troops could have been made contingent on all parties involved in talks upholding and protecting the country’s democratic gains international donors could have made clear strategy statements tying post-peace agreement aid to alignment with Afghanistan’s development priorities to help generate greater revenue, continue delivering services, and create long-term employment.
Afghanistan’s international partners repeatedly expressed their intention to continue to stand behind the people of Afghanistan to ensure an orderly withdrawal, a comprehensive peace agreement, and an Afghanistan that could continue to progress. In the end, however, Afghans felt abandoned both by the Afghan government and its international partners.
