re you a terrorist?” Many are incredulous at the question. Who would ever admit to it on an entry form? Why would a government even ask such an absurd question?
As silly as it may seem to be asked this question when entering a country, the rationale behind it is very wise: It is a jurisdictional “hook.” If you are entering the United States (or any other country), and you have committed an act of terrorism in another part of the world, the U.S. (or that other country) does not have jurisdiction over that extraterritorial offense. But if you lie about it by saying that you are not a terrorist and that you have never committed acts of terrorism, now you have committed an offense in the United States over which the government has jurisdiction. You’ve committed fraud, made a false statement to a government official and can now be held, tried, and convicted for that offense.
There are numerous examples of other ways such jurisdictional hooks can be employed for law enforcement and governance issues. In the maritime space, where vessels are always moving between countries, it is a particularly powerful approach. For example, if you have dumped oily water or even oil itself out on the high seas or even in the waters of another country, you cannot be tried for having done so by any state other than the flag state of the vessel or the coastal state where the dumping occurred. But much like asking visitors “are you a terrorist?,” the United States deems, as a matter of law, that if a foreign vessel enters the United States, it is automatically presenting the Log Books, Oil Record Books, Incinerator Records, and other documents to the United States Coast Guard. If those records have been falsified in any way to try to hide the dumping, it is, again, fraud and making false statements to an official of the United States. The harm may have happened elsewhere, but the vessel may end up paying for it in the U.S.
As global attention keeps turning to the “dark” or “shadow” fleet, many are wondering what can be done about these vessels that subvert the law in different ways. Automatic Identification System (AIS) trackers have been required on ships of a certain size for nearly twenty years now. Initiated as a safety measure, the requirement falls under the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, and requires vessels over 500 gross tons to have AIS transponders, as well as vessels over 300 gross tons that are engaged in international voyages. What that means is that we can now watch the movement of the world’s commercial shipping fleet, cruise ships, and industrial fishing vessels in near real time, for free, from any smart phone. In theory, anyway.
For years, “dark” activity has referred to when the ship’s master or crew turn off the AIS transponder and proceed to sail invisibly—at least as far as AIS tracking is concerned. Under international law, the AIS transponder is required to be turned on at all times except when the ship’s master turns it off for the safety of the vessel and records doing so in the Master’s Log. Good reasons for turning it off might be concerns around pirate attacks or, more recently, attacks by either the Houthis or the Iranians. The frequency of dark activity has increased considerably in recent years, and not just because there are more areas of the world where attacks are possible. Vessels of all sorts—from commercial ships to luxury yachts to fishing vessels—will turn off their AIS to avoid being monitored while doing things that are either of dubious legality or which are outright illegal. And increasingly, we have another problem: Rather than going dark, vessels are “spoofing” their location, indicating that they are operating visibly, but not where the AIS systems indicate that they are.
The shadow fleet of around 1,500 sanctioned vessels operating without AIS or using darkness to avoid detection is just one of the emerging problems. Indeed, the fishing sector may be even more problematic, as the plundering of the oceans by unmonitored fishing vessels poses an intergenerational food, economic, and ecological concern at least as substantial as that of the shadow fleet. So what can be done?
International law is only operationalized when it is domesticated into the national legal systems of relevant states. So while the SOLAS convention may require AIS to be turned on, many states have not yet included such a requirement in their domestic law or have failed to make an adequate penalty for it to make it worth enforcing as a deterrent measure. Beyond the extensive potential regulatory penalties on which coastal states around the world are missing out, they are also failing to recognize the power of AIS as a jurisdictional hook.
Boarding vessels that have either intentionally gone dark or spoofed their position in the coastal state’s waters becomes a lot more appealing if there is a near definite chance to collect a regulatory penalty. But the process of doing so may also open up to a more regularized search of vessels whose behavior deserves added scrutiny. This can increase the odds of interdictions for all sorts of other offenses like drugs, arms and human trafficking, environmental crimes, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and any number of more technical matters. In other words, it can be the sure–fire jurisdictional hook used to go after vessels that can end up yielding substantial amounts to the state in asset forfeiture and other penalties if given due scrutiny. Additionally, it can be the tool by which deterrence against illegal or irregular behaviors becomes meaningfully achieved.
Legal creativity is desperately needed to reduce the activities of fleets of vessels operating against the law in the maritime domain. Perhaps the simplest thing a state can do is to impose and enforce the AIS requirement of international law in its domestic law. Criminal and sanctioned actors will adjust in due course, but for now, it is a powerful opportunity to curtail illicit behavior that threatens the safety, security, stability, governance and prosperity of the world.
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A jurisdictional ‘hook’ to strengthen maritime governance
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May 11, 2026
Domesticating AIS rules gives coastal states a jurisdictional hook to curb dark fleets and maritime crime, writes Dr. Ian Ralby.
A
re you a terrorist?” Many are incredulous at the question. Who would ever admit to it on an entry form? Why would a government even ask such an absurd question?
As silly as it may seem to be asked this question when entering a country, the rationale behind it is very wise: It is a jurisdictional “hook.” If you are entering the United States (or any other country), and you have committed an act of terrorism in another part of the world, the U.S. (or that other country) does not have jurisdiction over that extraterritorial offense. But if you lie about it by saying that you are not a terrorist and that you have never committed acts of terrorism, now you have committed an offense in the United States over which the government has jurisdiction. You’ve committed fraud, made a false statement to a government official and can now be held, tried, and convicted for that offense.
There are numerous examples of other ways such jurisdictional hooks can be employed for law enforcement and governance issues. In the maritime space, where vessels are always moving between countries, it is a particularly powerful approach. For example, if you have dumped oily water or even oil itself out on the high seas or even in the waters of another country, you cannot be tried for having done so by any state other than the flag state of the vessel or the coastal state where the dumping occurred. But much like asking visitors “are you a terrorist?,” the United States deems, as a matter of law, that if a foreign vessel enters the United States, it is automatically presenting the Log Books, Oil Record Books, Incinerator Records, and other documents to the United States Coast Guard. If those records have been falsified in any way to try to hide the dumping, it is, again, fraud and making false statements to an official of the United States. The harm may have happened elsewhere, but the vessel may end up paying for it in the U.S.
As global attention keeps turning to the “dark” or “shadow” fleet, many are wondering what can be done about these vessels that subvert the law in different ways. Automatic Identification System (AIS) trackers have been required on ships of a certain size for nearly twenty years now. Initiated as a safety measure, the requirement falls under the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, and requires vessels over 500 gross tons to have AIS transponders, as well as vessels over 300 gross tons that are engaged in international voyages. What that means is that we can now watch the movement of the world’s commercial shipping fleet, cruise ships, and industrial fishing vessels in near real time, for free, from any smart phone. In theory, anyway.
For years, “dark” activity has referred to when the ship’s master or crew turn off the AIS transponder and proceed to sail invisibly—at least as far as AIS tracking is concerned. Under international law, the AIS transponder is required to be turned on at all times except when the ship’s master turns it off for the safety of the vessel and records doing so in the Master’s Log. Good reasons for turning it off might be concerns around pirate attacks or, more recently, attacks by either the Houthis or the Iranians. The frequency of dark activity has increased considerably in recent years, and not just because there are more areas of the world where attacks are possible. Vessels of all sorts—from commercial ships to luxury yachts to fishing vessels—will turn off their AIS to avoid being monitored while doing things that are either of dubious legality or which are outright illegal. And increasingly, we have another problem: Rather than going dark, vessels are “spoofing” their location, indicating that they are operating visibly, but not where the AIS systems indicate that they are.
The shadow fleet of around 1,500 sanctioned vessels operating without AIS or using darkness to avoid detection is just one of the emerging problems. Indeed, the fishing sector may be even more problematic, as the plundering of the oceans by unmonitored fishing vessels poses an intergenerational food, economic, and ecological concern at least as substantial as that of the shadow fleet. So what can be done?
International law is only operationalized when it is domesticated into the national legal systems of relevant states. So while the SOLAS convention may require AIS to be turned on, many states have not yet included such a requirement in their domestic law or have failed to make an adequate penalty for it to make it worth enforcing as a deterrent measure. Beyond the extensive potential regulatory penalties on which coastal states around the world are missing out, they are also failing to recognize the power of AIS as a jurisdictional hook.
Boarding vessels that have either intentionally gone dark or spoofed their position in the coastal state’s waters becomes a lot more appealing if there is a near definite chance to collect a regulatory penalty. But the process of doing so may also open up to a more regularized search of vessels whose behavior deserves added scrutiny. This can increase the odds of interdictions for all sorts of other offenses like drugs, arms and human trafficking, environmental crimes, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and any number of more technical matters. In other words, it can be the sure–fire jurisdictional hook used to go after vessels that can end up yielding substantial amounts to the state in asset forfeiture and other penalties if given due scrutiny. Additionally, it can be the tool by which deterrence against illegal or irregular behaviors becomes meaningfully achieved.
Legal creativity is desperately needed to reduce the activities of fleets of vessels operating against the law in the maritime domain. Perhaps the simplest thing a state can do is to impose and enforce the AIS requirement of international law in its domestic law. Criminal and sanctioned actors will adjust in due course, but for now, it is a powerful opportunity to curtail illicit behavior that threatens the safety, security, stability, governance and prosperity of the world.
