“Egypt had been seeking aircraft quickly, due to the threats that it faces,” said French President François Hollande to journalists in Brussels in early February 2015, after France concluded a 5.2 billion euro deal to sell fighter jets to Egypt. Shortly afterwards, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced that France would partially finance the sale with a 3.2 billion euro loan. According to military experts, however, the terrorist threats in Sinai cannot be dealt with using fighter jets. Instead, attack helicopters, which Egypt possesses hundreds, including American Apaches and French Gazelles, are better suited for attacks within the challenging topography of the Sinai.
So why would Egypt allocate billions of Euros from its already emaciated budget toward the purchase of unneeded military hardware from France when they arguably already have what it takes to combat Islamist militants in the Sinai? Observers may argue that the move is driven by the government’s frustration with the United States’ suspension of military aid to Egypt. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is not, however, that purblind. He is not in a position to abandon U.S. military support. Egypt’s turn to other U.S. allies, like France, to conduct its military business does however send a clear enough message to the United States that Egypt is willing and able to diversify its sources of Western support and dependence. President Putin’s recent visit to Cairo in February 2015 is such an example. During his visit he gifted a Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle to his Egyptian counterpart in a gesture of forthcoming military cooperation--a visit that symbolized both countries’ strategic partnership in various fields including helping Egypt build its nuclear reactors.
It would appear that Sisi is trying to recalibrate Egypt’s position as a key player in the Middle East. Beyond his regime’s notoriety for instigating a military coup, leading rights watchdogs such as Amnesty International and HRW portray Sisi as a symbol of violent oppression and autocracy. In the long term, his image undermines his status as a credible and stable leader on the international stage. In the short term, it complicates the Sisi Government’s efforts to secure vital arms delivery, military aid, and manufacturing licenses.
Following the ouster of Egypt’s former President, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, some governments considered it an unambiguous coup d’état, despite the fact that none of those governments officially called it a coup. This framing of the event spread with little contest in the wake of Morsi’s bloody crackdown on Sisi’s dissent. It also drove Western governments to either suspend or review their military and security programs with Egypt. On August 21, 2013 the Council of the European Union issued a statement in which it decided to suspend weapons export licenses to Egypt, stemming the flow of any equipment that might be used for internal repression. At the same time, the Council’s statement called for a reassessment of export licenses for equipment and a review of their security assistance with Egypt. U.S. President Barack Obama then declared in his speech on Egypt in August 2015 that he was cancelling his country’s joint military exercise with Egypt, directed his administration to review assistance to Egypt. This combination of blows to Egypt’s military arms delivery did not so much injure its capacity as its international credibility.
The deal between France and Egypt has been mutually beneficial for the two countries. Unable to attract buyers of the “modern” Rafael jets that it has been flying for twenty years, France longs to rid itself of its aging expensive fighter jets, while Egypt strives to land an equipment deal from an influential Western country. Egypt knocked specifically on France’s door for a reason. The deal means that Sisi’s Government not only receives a first-buyer discount on France’s jets, but also that Sisi has secured an advocate for lifting the EU arms suspension. To overcome the EU arms embargo, French defense minister told AFP that his government worked an analysis of risks and dangers on the reality of the situation in Egypt. He even called it “a contract of confidence” given the strategic ties between both countries. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, Sisi’s government attempt to recoup a significant portion of its international legitimacy through proving their ability to successfully negotiate and secure a new heavy arms deal from a major western country. Seeing that France is willing to agree on contracts that upgrade Egypt’s military arsenal (even if France considers the Rafael jets obsolete for its own purposes) may well induce other governments to resume military cooperation with Egypt.
While the Egypt-U.S. bilateral relationship is generally mending, especially after the release of the Apaches, Egypt still works to reinforce its position, breaks the U.S. arms monopoly, and more importantly reduces its decades-long dependence on U.S. equipment. In fact, resuming the American arms deals with Egypt isn’t only for the benefit of Egypt’s military, it is also for the benefit the American defense industry itself. According to the Institute for Southern Studies, the $1.3 billion in aid is primarily used to buy American-made gear, therefore any permanent cuts in the military assistance programs would lead to significant ramifications on the U.S. companies that provide equipment, trainings, and services to the Egyptian military through their contracts with the Defense Department.
Although, relationships between governments cannot be reduced to -only- arms and weapons, Sisi’s vision -perhaps because of his military background- seems to be paying special attention to the hard power aspect of Egypt’s new foreign policy especially with the increasing presence of the Islamic State in the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Sisi’s continuous remarks over Egypt’s prospected role in protecting the Arab national security as well as his ideas on an Egyptian-led pan Arab military force is an example that further explains his vision on the region. In short, Sisi is aiming at introducing himself as a sturdy regional player capable of handling difficult political maneuvers to secure his country’s national interests. By all means, the intricate network of interests between Egypt and Western governments, that goes far beyond security issues, will largely govern the new doctrine of Egypt’s new foreign policy.
Abdallah Hendawy is an Egyptian activist. For over 10 years, he has been working for several political entities in and outside Egypt focusing on the Middle East and North Africa region. Hendawy is currently pursuing a PhD in Political Sociology at George Mason University. He holds an MA in Conflict Transformation from the EPU in Austria.
Photo courtesy of the author.
a global affairs media network
A Deal beyond Fighter Jets: The Egyptian French Juxtaposition
March 25, 2015
“Egypt had been seeking aircraft quickly, due to the threats that it faces,” said French President François Hollande to journalists in Brussels in early February 2015, after France concluded a 5.2 billion euro deal to sell fighter jets to Egypt. Shortly afterwards, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced that France would partially finance the sale with a 3.2 billion euro loan. According to military experts, however, the terrorist threats in Sinai cannot be dealt with using fighter jets. Instead, attack helicopters, which Egypt possesses hundreds, including American Apaches and French Gazelles, are better suited for attacks within the challenging topography of the Sinai.
So why would Egypt allocate billions of Euros from its already emaciated budget toward the purchase of unneeded military hardware from France when they arguably already have what it takes to combat Islamist militants in the Sinai? Observers may argue that the move is driven by the government’s frustration with the United States’ suspension of military aid to Egypt. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is not, however, that purblind. He is not in a position to abandon U.S. military support. Egypt’s turn to other U.S. allies, like France, to conduct its military business does however send a clear enough message to the United States that Egypt is willing and able to diversify its sources of Western support and dependence. President Putin’s recent visit to Cairo in February 2015 is such an example. During his visit he gifted a Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle to his Egyptian counterpart in a gesture of forthcoming military cooperation--a visit that symbolized both countries’ strategic partnership in various fields including helping Egypt build its nuclear reactors.
It would appear that Sisi is trying to recalibrate Egypt’s position as a key player in the Middle East. Beyond his regime’s notoriety for instigating a military coup, leading rights watchdogs such as Amnesty International and HRW portray Sisi as a symbol of violent oppression and autocracy. In the long term, his image undermines his status as a credible and stable leader on the international stage. In the short term, it complicates the Sisi Government’s efforts to secure vital arms delivery, military aid, and manufacturing licenses.
Following the ouster of Egypt’s former President, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, some governments considered it an unambiguous coup d’état, despite the fact that none of those governments officially called it a coup. This framing of the event spread with little contest in the wake of Morsi’s bloody crackdown on Sisi’s dissent. It also drove Western governments to either suspend or review their military and security programs with Egypt. On August 21, 2013 the Council of the European Union issued a statement in which it decided to suspend weapons export licenses to Egypt, stemming the flow of any equipment that might be used for internal repression. At the same time, the Council’s statement called for a reassessment of export licenses for equipment and a review of their security assistance with Egypt. U.S. President Barack Obama then declared in his speech on Egypt in August 2015 that he was cancelling his country’s joint military exercise with Egypt, directed his administration to review assistance to Egypt. This combination of blows to Egypt’s military arms delivery did not so much injure its capacity as its international credibility.
The deal between France and Egypt has been mutually beneficial for the two countries. Unable to attract buyers of the “modern” Rafael jets that it has been flying for twenty years, France longs to rid itself of its aging expensive fighter jets, while Egypt strives to land an equipment deal from an influential Western country. Egypt knocked specifically on France’s door for a reason. The deal means that Sisi’s Government not only receives a first-buyer discount on France’s jets, but also that Sisi has secured an advocate for lifting the EU arms suspension. To overcome the EU arms embargo, French defense minister told AFP that his government worked an analysis of risks and dangers on the reality of the situation in Egypt. He even called it “a contract of confidence” given the strategic ties between both countries. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, Sisi’s government attempt to recoup a significant portion of its international legitimacy through proving their ability to successfully negotiate and secure a new heavy arms deal from a major western country. Seeing that France is willing to agree on contracts that upgrade Egypt’s military arsenal (even if France considers the Rafael jets obsolete for its own purposes) may well induce other governments to resume military cooperation with Egypt.
While the Egypt-U.S. bilateral relationship is generally mending, especially after the release of the Apaches, Egypt still works to reinforce its position, breaks the U.S. arms monopoly, and more importantly reduces its decades-long dependence on U.S. equipment. In fact, resuming the American arms deals with Egypt isn’t only for the benefit of Egypt’s military, it is also for the benefit the American defense industry itself. According to the Institute for Southern Studies, the $1.3 billion in aid is primarily used to buy American-made gear, therefore any permanent cuts in the military assistance programs would lead to significant ramifications on the U.S. companies that provide equipment, trainings, and services to the Egyptian military through their contracts with the Defense Department.
Although, relationships between governments cannot be reduced to -only- arms and weapons, Sisi’s vision -perhaps because of his military background- seems to be paying special attention to the hard power aspect of Egypt’s new foreign policy especially with the increasing presence of the Islamic State in the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Sisi’s continuous remarks over Egypt’s prospected role in protecting the Arab national security as well as his ideas on an Egyptian-led pan Arab military force is an example that further explains his vision on the region. In short, Sisi is aiming at introducing himself as a sturdy regional player capable of handling difficult political maneuvers to secure his country’s national interests. By all means, the intricate network of interests between Egypt and Western governments, that goes far beyond security issues, will largely govern the new doctrine of Egypt’s new foreign policy.
Abdallah Hendawy is an Egyptian activist. For over 10 years, he has been working for several political entities in and outside Egypt focusing on the Middle East and North Africa region. Hendawy is currently pursuing a PhD in Political Sociology at George Mason University. He holds an MA in Conflict Transformation from the EPU in Austria.
Photo courtesy of the author.
