Last week, a coalition of 10 Islamic countries launched a military operation against Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen who are fighting to oust Yemen's Sunni president Abd Raboo Hadi. The coalition’s air strikes, which targeted military installations in the Capital city of Sanaa and other Shiite strongholds, were hailed by key governments including the U.S. and the UK, whereas harshly condemned by other governments such as Iran and Syria.
For some, the war in Yemen may seem like just another war in the Middle East, but this is not just any war. The air strikes barrage takes the rapidly worsening proxy conflict in the Middle East and North Africa to another level—that in which Arabs take it upon themselves to confront Iran militarily in its strongholds in Yemen. Houthis of Yemen are another ring in Iran’s chain of allies in the region that includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq, Bashar in Syria, and other militias in Libya. The common ground among all those factions is their close association with Iran. Some—like Hezbollah, Houthis, and Bashar—due to religious and ideological commonalities, while others—like Hamas—due to common Israeli antagonism. If we take away the pluses and minuses that cancel one another from the aforementioned conflicting parties we would be able to silhouette a plain figure of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation in the region; on one side, Iran has been—and still is—working vigorously to augment its clout in the Arabian peninsula counter to the will of the Sunni powers. On the other hand, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are in the defensive position trying to limit their loses.
The two new leaders of the Arab World—President al-Sisi of Egypt and King Salman of Saudi Arabia—just contoured untraditional features of the Pan Arab dynamism. First in Libya, when Egypt unilaterally bombed Islamist strongholds in the city of Derna in mid February and second when Arab joint forces initiated this military operation in Yemen. It is worth noting that this is the first time since the 1973 war that Arab countries initiate a large-scale military act on their own without authorization from the UN Security Council or without including a Western component in the joint force. Although it is evident Western governments were informed about the operation well in advance, it seems Arabs wanted to take on this encumbrance with aplomb. The participation of Pakistan in particular—the only non-Arab state—can only further strengthen the message being sent to Iran from the Sunni Muslim countries.
The long-established multifaceted patterns of the Sunni-Shiite conflict drove the Arabs berserk over Iran’s mounting influence and are, this time, decisive on halting their advance by setting Yemen as an example. This could be manifested by the unevenly use of force—more than 100 jet fighters as well as a number of Egyptian and Saudi warships—that are meant to show off Sunni deterrence capabilities and a political determination more than actually defeating the poorly trained Houthi rebels.
A few days ago, it would have been an option to question the probability of a civil war outbreak in Yemen but today—after the military onslaught—the civil war outbreak is inevitable. Whether the Arab onslaught in Yemen serves the Pan Arab nationalist interests or a just another erratic action, if steps of bombardment in Yemen aren't carefully calculated, away from transnational bigotry and narrow political propaganda, a region-wide humanitarian havoc will be inevitable. Arabs have repeatedly criticized the West for abandoning Iraq and Libya in the aftermath of the military intervention without having a long-term vision of post-war reconstruction, state building, or securing a smooth transition. But Arabs do not seem to be prepared in that sense either.
Now that we are already in civil war territory and it is highly doubtable that Arabs have any vision for Yemen post-war phase, Arabs in general and Yemen’s neighbors in particular (Saudis, along with other Gulf countries) should probably think of their ability to afford a humanitarian crisis. Arab Gulf countries are rich enough to buy tents and canned beans—but their political willingness to handle thousands of refugees and internally displaced people on their borders if the situation worsens in a country that ranks high in terms of gun ownership in the world is questionable.
If Arabs wanted to hurl a message to express their malcontent over Iran’s tamper in the region, then Arabs should be careful not to have the helpless Yemeni people pay the bill. The region and the people cannot afford the futility of another withering war.
Abdallah Hendawy is a political researcher. For over 10 years, he has been working for several governmental and non-governmental political entities focusing on the Middle East and North Africa region. Hendawy is currently pursuing a PhD in Political Sociology at George Mason University. He holds an MA in Conflict Transformation from the EPU in Austria.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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Yemenis Should Not Pay the Bill
March 30, 2015
Last week, a coalition of 10 Islamic countries launched a military operation against Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen who are fighting to oust Yemen's Sunni president Abd Raboo Hadi. The coalition’s air strikes, which targeted military installations in the Capital city of Sanaa and other Shiite strongholds, were hailed by key governments including the U.S. and the UK, whereas harshly condemned by other governments such as Iran and Syria.
For some, the war in Yemen may seem like just another war in the Middle East, but this is not just any war. The air strikes barrage takes the rapidly worsening proxy conflict in the Middle East and North Africa to another level—that in which Arabs take it upon themselves to confront Iran militarily in its strongholds in Yemen. Houthis of Yemen are another ring in Iran’s chain of allies in the region that includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq, Bashar in Syria, and other militias in Libya. The common ground among all those factions is their close association with Iran. Some—like Hezbollah, Houthis, and Bashar—due to religious and ideological commonalities, while others—like Hamas—due to common Israeli antagonism. If we take away the pluses and minuses that cancel one another from the aforementioned conflicting parties we would be able to silhouette a plain figure of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation in the region; on one side, Iran has been—and still is—working vigorously to augment its clout in the Arabian peninsula counter to the will of the Sunni powers. On the other hand, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are in the defensive position trying to limit their loses.
The two new leaders of the Arab World—President al-Sisi of Egypt and King Salman of Saudi Arabia—just contoured untraditional features of the Pan Arab dynamism. First in Libya, when Egypt unilaterally bombed Islamist strongholds in the city of Derna in mid February and second when Arab joint forces initiated this military operation in Yemen. It is worth noting that this is the first time since the 1973 war that Arab countries initiate a large-scale military act on their own without authorization from the UN Security Council or without including a Western component in the joint force. Although it is evident Western governments were informed about the operation well in advance, it seems Arabs wanted to take on this encumbrance with aplomb. The participation of Pakistan in particular—the only non-Arab state—can only further strengthen the message being sent to Iran from the Sunni Muslim countries.
The long-established multifaceted patterns of the Sunni-Shiite conflict drove the Arabs berserk over Iran’s mounting influence and are, this time, decisive on halting their advance by setting Yemen as an example. This could be manifested by the unevenly use of force—more than 100 jet fighters as well as a number of Egyptian and Saudi warships—that are meant to show off Sunni deterrence capabilities and a political determination more than actually defeating the poorly trained Houthi rebels.
A few days ago, it would have been an option to question the probability of a civil war outbreak in Yemen but today—after the military onslaught—the civil war outbreak is inevitable. Whether the Arab onslaught in Yemen serves the Pan Arab nationalist interests or a just another erratic action, if steps of bombardment in Yemen aren't carefully calculated, away from transnational bigotry and narrow political propaganda, a region-wide humanitarian havoc will be inevitable. Arabs have repeatedly criticized the West for abandoning Iraq and Libya in the aftermath of the military intervention without having a long-term vision of post-war reconstruction, state building, or securing a smooth transition. But Arabs do not seem to be prepared in that sense either.
Now that we are already in civil war territory and it is highly doubtable that Arabs have any vision for Yemen post-war phase, Arabs in general and Yemen’s neighbors in particular (Saudis, along with other Gulf countries) should probably think of their ability to afford a humanitarian crisis. Arab Gulf countries are rich enough to buy tents and canned beans—but their political willingness to handle thousands of refugees and internally displaced people on their borders if the situation worsens in a country that ranks high in terms of gun ownership in the world is questionable.
If Arabs wanted to hurl a message to express their malcontent over Iran’s tamper in the region, then Arabs should be careful not to have the helpless Yemeni people pay the bill. The region and the people cannot afford the futility of another withering war.
Abdallah Hendawy is a political researcher. For over 10 years, he has been working for several governmental and non-governmental political entities focusing on the Middle East and North Africa region. Hendawy is currently pursuing a PhD in Political Sociology at George Mason University. He holds an MA in Conflict Transformation from the EPU in Austria.
Photo courtesy of the author.
