NATO’s scheduled withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014 has some people worried the country will sink back into the political and economic disorder that blighted the country after the Soviets withdrew in 1989. Others, more hopeful, feel the nation can survive the pullout and gradually become stronger and self-sufficient. Either scenario, it seems, could play out with equal likelihood, but several factors could tip the balance in one direction or the other.
The United States and its allies are financially burdened by the high cost of this war. They are now seeking to end it responsibly. The chief beneficiary of NATO’s withdrawal, of course, will be the Taliban.
The opening of the Taliban’s office in Qatar in June was a bold undertaking by all parties concerned. President Karzai’s support for the office demonstrated to the people of Afghanistan and to the international community that his decade-long efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and establish a lasting peace may be starting to bear fruit.
The office in Qatar was intended to give the Taliban political legitimacy once more, which they emphasized by flying the white flag they used during their five-year rule before the U.S-led invasion in 2001. Karzai objected to the flag, and it was soon brought down, prompting the Taliban to temporarily close the office in protest.
It remains to be seen how this issue will be resolved and what the office, if reopened, will do for peace negotiations. While some people are understandably reluctant to see the Taliban back in the political process, the office seemed to be a step in the right direction, toward a more peaceful, stronger and independent Afghanistan. As Ambassador Dobbins put it: “You don’t negotiate with your friends; you negotiate with your enemies."
"Peace talks don’t take place after a war,” he added, “they take place during the war.”
Karzai last month suspended the final round of talks with the United States on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which was supposed to take place during the week when the Taliban opened their office. On several occasions he has successfully used the BSA talks as leverage to promote his own agenda, such as to get American special forces out of Wardak Province or to hand over Bagram Prison to Afghan authorities.
The BSA negotiations have dragged on too long, which is disconcerting. When Karzai and Obama signed the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement in May 2012, they agreed to conclude the BSA within a year. Now, more than a year later, there is no indication the agreement will be settled anytime soon.
The general mentality in Afghanistan is that the Americans will never leave the country. They will leave, however, as they left Iraq, but any political miscalculation by either of the two parties during these negotiations could have devastating effects on the long-term security of Afghanistan after 2014. It is therefore crucial for Karzai to reach a deal quickly and sign the BSA.
The Afghan economy has been slowing at an alarming rate over the past year. Speculation about what will happen after the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops by the end of 2014 is scaring off critical foreign investment. Anwar ul Haq Ahadi, the minister of commerce and industry, recently warned that unemployment, poverty, low investment rates, and declining property values will present significant challenges in the years to come. It is important to note that Afghanistan’s economic growth over the past decade has not been organic. It has been fueled mostly by large amounts of foreign aid pouring into the country. As a result, the economy is, and remains, heavily dependent on outside aid. According to a World Bank report, a decrease in foreign assistance post-2014 is likely to plunge the country into recession.
With post-2014 Afghanistan looking so gloomy, it is essential for the Afghan government to reconcile with the Taliban by offering some sort of power-sharing deal. There can be no peace without their involvement, and settling the BSA now is a key to the peace process. An agreement will allow the Afghan government to meaningfully engage the Taliban at the negotiating table. Karzai may not like some of the provisions of the agreement, but overall it is a good deal for Afghanistan.
Signing the BSA will bring a greater sense of economic confidence and help to boost foreign investment. A lack of foreign investment will only leave the country’s manufacturing sector weak and unemployment high, further contributing to socio-political instability.
No one wants a return to the post-Soviet withdrawal era. The right decisions now can help to put the country on a new trajectory. What happens before 2014 will have momentous and historic consequences for Afghanistan. It will make or break the country’s future.
Abid Amiri is an Afghan citizen currently working toward an M.A. in International Development at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. His work on unemployment in Afghanistan has been published by the Global Journal. His research on Muslim-Americans’ representation in the media and “Road Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Afghanistan” have been published in the Islam and Muslim Societies Journal, as well as in the International Affairs Review.
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Why Karzai Must Settle Peace with the Taliban before 2014
July 23, 2013
NATO’s scheduled withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014 has some people worried the country will sink back into the political and economic disorder that blighted the country after the Soviets withdrew in 1989. Others, more hopeful, feel the nation can survive the pullout and gradually become stronger and self-sufficient. Either scenario, it seems, could play out with equal likelihood, but several factors could tip the balance in one direction or the other.
The United States and its allies are financially burdened by the high cost of this war. They are now seeking to end it responsibly. The chief beneficiary of NATO’s withdrawal, of course, will be the Taliban.
The opening of the Taliban’s office in Qatar in June was a bold undertaking by all parties concerned. President Karzai’s support for the office demonstrated to the people of Afghanistan and to the international community that his decade-long efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and establish a lasting peace may be starting to bear fruit.
The office in Qatar was intended to give the Taliban political legitimacy once more, which they emphasized by flying the white flag they used during their five-year rule before the U.S-led invasion in 2001. Karzai objected to the flag, and it was soon brought down, prompting the Taliban to temporarily close the office in protest.
It remains to be seen how this issue will be resolved and what the office, if reopened, will do for peace negotiations. While some people are understandably reluctant to see the Taliban back in the political process, the office seemed to be a step in the right direction, toward a more peaceful, stronger and independent Afghanistan. As Ambassador Dobbins put it: “You don’t negotiate with your friends; you negotiate with your enemies."
"Peace talks don’t take place after a war,” he added, “they take place during the war.”
Karzai last month suspended the final round of talks with the United States on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which was supposed to take place during the week when the Taliban opened their office. On several occasions he has successfully used the BSA talks as leverage to promote his own agenda, such as to get American special forces out of Wardak Province or to hand over Bagram Prison to Afghan authorities.
The BSA negotiations have dragged on too long, which is disconcerting. When Karzai and Obama signed the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement in May 2012, they agreed to conclude the BSA within a year. Now, more than a year later, there is no indication the agreement will be settled anytime soon.
The general mentality in Afghanistan is that the Americans will never leave the country. They will leave, however, as they left Iraq, but any political miscalculation by either of the two parties during these negotiations could have devastating effects on the long-term security of Afghanistan after 2014. It is therefore crucial for Karzai to reach a deal quickly and sign the BSA.
The Afghan economy has been slowing at an alarming rate over the past year. Speculation about what will happen after the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops by the end of 2014 is scaring off critical foreign investment. Anwar ul Haq Ahadi, the minister of commerce and industry, recently warned that unemployment, poverty, low investment rates, and declining property values will present significant challenges in the years to come. It is important to note that Afghanistan’s economic growth over the past decade has not been organic. It has been fueled mostly by large amounts of foreign aid pouring into the country. As a result, the economy is, and remains, heavily dependent on outside aid. According to a World Bank report, a decrease in foreign assistance post-2014 is likely to plunge the country into recession.
With post-2014 Afghanistan looking so gloomy, it is essential for the Afghan government to reconcile with the Taliban by offering some sort of power-sharing deal. There can be no peace without their involvement, and settling the BSA now is a key to the peace process. An agreement will allow the Afghan government to meaningfully engage the Taliban at the negotiating table. Karzai may not like some of the provisions of the agreement, but overall it is a good deal for Afghanistan.
Signing the BSA will bring a greater sense of economic confidence and help to boost foreign investment. A lack of foreign investment will only leave the country’s manufacturing sector weak and unemployment high, further contributing to socio-political instability.
No one wants a return to the post-Soviet withdrawal era. The right decisions now can help to put the country on a new trajectory. What happens before 2014 will have momentous and historic consequences for Afghanistan. It will make or break the country’s future.
Abid Amiri is an Afghan citizen currently working toward an M.A. in International Development at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. His work on unemployment in Afghanistan has been published by the Global Journal. His research on Muslim-Americans’ representation in the media and “Road Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Afghanistan” have been published in the Islam and Muslim Societies Journal, as well as in the International Affairs Review.
