Since Egypt first proposed a Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMD-FZ) in 1990, very little progress has been achieved towards this goal. Nevertheless, the idea remains highly endorsed internationally, having EU support for a high-level conference originally scheduled to be held in Helsinki sometime during 2012.
More crucially, all Arab countries have shown support for the idea. Warning against the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the Ambassador of Bahrain to the United Kingdom remarked that as the region is one of regimes rather than nations, institutional constraints on the usage of WMDs are weaker: “If we adopt nuclear technology across our region, it will become a region of mushroom clouds”.
Last fall, even Iran showed support for the idea and expressed their willingness to attend the conference. Yet the conference was postponed indefinitely, as Israel did not show any inclination to attend it. Officially Israel’s decision to not participate was attributed to fears of the conference turning into a high-profile opportunity for its neighbours to criticize its policies. However, the underlying reason is that nuclear deterrence (or ‘ambiguity’ in Israeli jargon) is central to Israel’s long-term security strategy.
Israel is More Vulnerable Than it Appears
While a series of resounding military victories in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars–coupled with strong military support from the United States–has given Israel something of an air of invincibility in the region, this is nothing the Israeli leadership takes for granted–nor should they.
Their U.S.-guaranteed superiority in military technology over their neighbours is highly valuable, but it is unlikely that it is substantial enough to make up for their inferiority in numbers. Against its immediate neighbours, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are outnumbered 5:1 in active soldiers, reserves, and paramilitaries. If the Gulf Cooperation Council and Maghreb countries were included in an estimate of a particularly apocalyptic scenario, the IDF would be outnumbered 12:1.
This discrepancy is mitigated by Israel’s proportionally larger pool of reservists, which on the other hand makes Israel economically more vulnerable to mobilisation, as this would draw more than 10 percent of the country’s working age population into the army. Israel is unlikely to survive a sustained campaign without significant external support.
Of course, no mainstream analyst expects a large-scale invasion of Israel anytime soon, and few think it likely in the medium-term. But when the Israeli state formulates its national security strategy, it necessarily looks decades ahead. In this broader timeframe, few things are certain. For Israel, nuclear deterrence is an important addition to their well-equipped but outnumbered armed forces.
Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence
For nuclear deterrence to work, a state needs three things. First, it needs to have nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them. Second, it needs the political will to use them. Third, it needs its potential aggressors to perceive that they possess items one and two.
So does Israel have nuclear weapons or other WMDs? No outsider really knows, though the 57 photographs and detailed testimony provided by former nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu strongly suggests so. However, whether they do or not is secondary since we do know that they want their neighbours and the world to think they do have nuclear weapons. Their policy of 'nuclear opacity' is essentially an attempt to enjoy the deterrent effect of nukes without suffering from their moral problems and political stigma.
Taking the WMD-FZ seriously would mean at some point to either disclose their lack of WMDs, or decommission them (if they indeed exist). Each of these scenarios would result in Israel losing its strategic nuclear deterrent.
Israel’s Geo-Strategic Advantage
Judging by its actions, public statements from right-wing parties, and occasional candid remarks from key officials, Israel has little or no interest in a two-state solution.
Of their actions, the most destabilizing and obstructive are continued illegal settlements on the West Bank. These make a future peace deal increasingly difficult, as they create a situation where thousands of settlers would need to be uprooted in order to establish a territory for a viable Palestinian state.
That the public would vote a far-right party like “the Jewish Home” to become the fourth largest party in the Knesset suggests that this is unlikely to change on its own. That party's leader Naftali Bennet often voices his determination to prevent a Palestinian state and sees Palestinians relegated into small, “self-governing” enclaves after an Israeli annexation.
Senior advisers are also devising their strategies for avoiding a Palestinian state. For instance, Ariel Sharon’s top adviser Dov Weissglass explained that the Gaza disengagement plan sought to place the peace process in “formaldehyde”, whereby it looks alive, but is actually dead.
Instead, Israel will likely continue to keep Gaza under quarantine while chipping away at the territory of the nominally Palestinian Authority controlled West Bank until it is completely administered from Jerusalem. As Israel already occupies all this land (and indeed has done so for more than 45 years) there is little that can stop them.
As Israel does not have any territorial ambitions that are beyond the West Bank, which their army currently occupies, whether their neighbours are able to deter them from any offensive operations is of secondary concern. Thus the prospect of a nuclear armed Egypt or Saudi Arabia is insufficient motivation for Israel to support the WMD-FZ process.
At least as far as deterrence theory is concerned, Israel would be safer in a region of nuclear armed regimes, than in a region of numerically superior armies. In the former scenario, the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction would ensure an uneasy peace.
Regional Security–The Way Forward
For broader regional security, the WMD-FZ is an unrealistic idea that will falter on the fact that the only regional nuclear power sees their WMDs as integral for their long-term national security.
Regarding non-proliferation, efforts should instead be focused on reassuring other regimes that obtaining or developing nuclear weapons is not the best way for them to ensure national security. While a WMD-FZ is impossible, further proliferation in the region is avoidable, and should be tightly controlled.
But the key to long-term regional security can be summed up in four words: resuscitate the peace process. Before a regional WMD-FZ can be successfully implemented, the security problems that make up the need for WMDs need to be solved.
Edvin Arnby-Machata is a thinker and writer on conflict issues and international affairs. He is currently West Africa Editor at Global South Development Magazine and manages the Royal Institute of Public Administration’s (RIPA International) company blog. He has studied at Uppsala University, Istanbul Bilgi University, and the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London.
Photo: U.S. Department of State.
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Why Israel Prefers Nuclear Proliferation Over Disarmament
April 20, 2013
Since Egypt first proposed a Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMD-FZ) in 1990, very little progress has been achieved towards this goal. Nevertheless, the idea remains highly endorsed internationally, having EU support for a high-level conference originally scheduled to be held in Helsinki sometime during 2012.
More crucially, all Arab countries have shown support for the idea. Warning against the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the Ambassador of Bahrain to the United Kingdom remarked that as the region is one of regimes rather than nations, institutional constraints on the usage of WMDs are weaker: “If we adopt nuclear technology across our region, it will become a region of mushroom clouds”.
Last fall, even Iran showed support for the idea and expressed their willingness to attend the conference. Yet the conference was postponed indefinitely, as Israel did not show any inclination to attend it. Officially Israel’s decision to not participate was attributed to fears of the conference turning into a high-profile opportunity for its neighbours to criticize its policies. However, the underlying reason is that nuclear deterrence (or ‘ambiguity’ in Israeli jargon) is central to Israel’s long-term security strategy.
Israel is More Vulnerable Than it Appears
While a series of resounding military victories in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars–coupled with strong military support from the United States–has given Israel something of an air of invincibility in the region, this is nothing the Israeli leadership takes for granted–nor should they.
Their U.S.-guaranteed superiority in military technology over their neighbours is highly valuable, but it is unlikely that it is substantial enough to make up for their inferiority in numbers. Against its immediate neighbours, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are outnumbered 5:1 in active soldiers, reserves, and paramilitaries. If the Gulf Cooperation Council and Maghreb countries were included in an estimate of a particularly apocalyptic scenario, the IDF would be outnumbered 12:1.
This discrepancy is mitigated by Israel’s proportionally larger pool of reservists, which on the other hand makes Israel economically more vulnerable to mobilisation, as this would draw more than 10 percent of the country’s working age population into the army. Israel is unlikely to survive a sustained campaign without significant external support.
Of course, no mainstream analyst expects a large-scale invasion of Israel anytime soon, and few think it likely in the medium-term. But when the Israeli state formulates its national security strategy, it necessarily looks decades ahead. In this broader timeframe, few things are certain. For Israel, nuclear deterrence is an important addition to their well-equipped but outnumbered armed forces.
Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence
For nuclear deterrence to work, a state needs three things. First, it needs to have nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them. Second, it needs the political will to use them. Third, it needs its potential aggressors to perceive that they possess items one and two.
So does Israel have nuclear weapons or other WMDs? No outsider really knows, though the 57 photographs and detailed testimony provided by former nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu strongly suggests so. However, whether they do or not is secondary since we do know that they want their neighbours and the world to think they do have nuclear weapons. Their policy of 'nuclear opacity' is essentially an attempt to enjoy the deterrent effect of nukes without suffering from their moral problems and political stigma.
Taking the WMD-FZ seriously would mean at some point to either disclose their lack of WMDs, or decommission them (if they indeed exist). Each of these scenarios would result in Israel losing its strategic nuclear deterrent.
Israel’s Geo-Strategic Advantage
Judging by its actions, public statements from right-wing parties, and occasional candid remarks from key officials, Israel has little or no interest in a two-state solution.
Of their actions, the most destabilizing and obstructive are continued illegal settlements on the West Bank. These make a future peace deal increasingly difficult, as they create a situation where thousands of settlers would need to be uprooted in order to establish a territory for a viable Palestinian state.
That the public would vote a far-right party like “the Jewish Home” to become the fourth largest party in the Knesset suggests that this is unlikely to change on its own. That party's leader Naftali Bennet often voices his determination to prevent a Palestinian state and sees Palestinians relegated into small, “self-governing” enclaves after an Israeli annexation.
Senior advisers are also devising their strategies for avoiding a Palestinian state. For instance, Ariel Sharon’s top adviser Dov Weissglass explained that the Gaza disengagement plan sought to place the peace process in “formaldehyde”, whereby it looks alive, but is actually dead.
Instead, Israel will likely continue to keep Gaza under quarantine while chipping away at the territory of the nominally Palestinian Authority controlled West Bank until it is completely administered from Jerusalem. As Israel already occupies all this land (and indeed has done so for more than 45 years) there is little that can stop them.
As Israel does not have any territorial ambitions that are beyond the West Bank, which their army currently occupies, whether their neighbours are able to deter them from any offensive operations is of secondary concern. Thus the prospect of a nuclear armed Egypt or Saudi Arabia is insufficient motivation for Israel to support the WMD-FZ process.
At least as far as deterrence theory is concerned, Israel would be safer in a region of nuclear armed regimes, than in a region of numerically superior armies. In the former scenario, the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction would ensure an uneasy peace.
Regional Security–The Way Forward
For broader regional security, the WMD-FZ is an unrealistic idea that will falter on the fact that the only regional nuclear power sees their WMDs as integral for their long-term national security.
Regarding non-proliferation, efforts should instead be focused on reassuring other regimes that obtaining or developing nuclear weapons is not the best way for them to ensure national security. While a WMD-FZ is impossible, further proliferation in the region is avoidable, and should be tightly controlled.
But the key to long-term regional security can be summed up in four words: resuscitate the peace process. Before a regional WMD-FZ can be successfully implemented, the security problems that make up the need for WMDs need to be solved.
Edvin Arnby-Machata is a thinker and writer on conflict issues and international affairs. He is currently West Africa Editor at Global South Development Magazine and manages the Royal Institute of Public Administration’s (RIPA International) company blog. He has studied at Uppsala University, Istanbul Bilgi University, and the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London.
Photo: U.S. Department of State.
