In December 2013, the Kurdish autonomous government in Erbil signed a series of energy agreements with Turkey, provoking anger in Baghdad. These agreements, potentially, allow the Kurds to export oil by bypassing the Iraqi government, thereby, making a significant step towards achieving political independence. One key question, however, is whether the Iraqi Kurds are well advised to invest in a Turkish government, which seems to be sinking deeper into a fully-fledged political crisis.
While the Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria celebrated nowruz, the celebrations of the Iraqi Kurds between March 11th and March 20th were mixed with anxiety. To punish the Kurds for their insubordination towards Baghdad, the Iraqi government, headed by President Nouri al-Maliki, has interrupted the flow of public money to the Kurdish autonomous government in Erbil, Hence, Kurdish political authorities were unable to pay the salaries of more than one million of the province’s five million employees on the local government payroll—including members of the Kurdish army, the Peshmerga.
Until recently, the Kurdish autonomous government was allocated approximately 17 percent of Iraq’s total national budget. This amounted to an estimated $722 million a month. Needless to say the Kurds are severely affected by Baghdad’s recent decision.
Massoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdish autonomous government, reacted harshly to Maliki’s budget cuts, calling them an “economic blockade” and a “declaration of war against the Kurdish people”. The Kurdish province is formally autonomous, but is also highly dependent on transfers from Baghdad, as they represent a large share of the province’s revenues. To give an idea of the relations between the Kurdish province and the rest of Iraq, people from central and southern Iraq can enter northern Iraq only if they have their passport stamped, and then they can remain in the territory only for a limited number of days. Afterwards they have to go to the local immigration office and renew their permission. In another sign of increased autonomy, northern Iraq plans to launch its own stock exchange market later this year.
Iraq’s oil is the focal point of contention between Erbil and Baghdad. But the conflict has grown so serious that the Obama administration—and apparently Iran and Turkey—has stepped in to mediate.
The difference of views originates from the controversial energy agreements the Kurds signed with neighboring Turkey in March 2013. These agreements allow Iraq’s Kurdish region to export up to two million barrels of oil a day, and also substantial quantities of natural gas, from northern Iraq fields to Turkey. A portion of this oil is to be exported from the Kurdish province to Turkey via a new pipeline, which will not be linked to the existing pipeline network controlled by Baghdad. This will allow the Kurdish province to sell oil unilaterally from northern Iraqi fields and operate as if it is actually an independent state.
Unsurprisingly, Baghdad has condemned these agreements as “illegal”. Iraq’s 2005 Constitution states that the country’s energy resources belong to all the Iraqi people. The Kurds also refer to the Constitution, insisting that the agreements with Turkey were done by the book, precisely because the Constitution states that 17 percent of Iraq’s total government revenues must accrue to the Kurdish province. The Kurds claim that they abided by this ratio in these energy agreements. Erbil will supposedly transfer the remaining 83 percent to Baghdad.
The Maliki government insists that the Kurds’ right to 17 percent of state revenues is subject to an obligation to sell oil through Iraq’s state-owned oil companies. Leading Iraqi—and some Turkish—energy experts have called the agreements with the Kurdish province invalid and claimed they are in violation of not only the Iraqi constitution but international law. According to the Iraqi Constitution, the Iraqi government is the only body that has the authority to sell Iraq’s energy resources.
There is no provision in the Constitution, which says that there is something called Kurdish oil or Kurdish gas. It mentions only “Iraqi oil” located in Iraq’s northern regions. Although these regions are inhabited by Kurds, the oil or gas belongs to “all the Iraqi people”.
“The equation is simple: you take 17 percent of the wealth, you hand over the oil you have,” Prime Minister al-Maliki told France 24 television on March 12th. However, the Kurds have turned a deaf ear to Baghdad’s warnings and sold a million barrels of oil to Turkey.
Meanwhile, under a decision of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s government, the oil already sent to Turkey through the pipeline is being stockpiled in the Mediterranean city of Ceyhan until Baghdad and Erbil agree on a model for re-exporting Iraqi oil. Recently, the Maliki government hired an international law firm to closely monitor all oil exports via Turkey and other states. However, according to local sources, in the last months of December 2012, Kurdish oil was regularly transported from northern Iraq to Turkey via tanker truck.
By entering into these energy agreements, Iraqi Kurds are betting that closer cooperation with Ankara will bring economic, and eventually political, independence a step closer. Turkey is involved in many other development projects in the Kurdish province, from airport construction to hotels, roads, and supermarkets.
The relationship between Erbil and Ankara has undergone a quite remarkable change. Not so many years ago, Turkey accused Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous government of allowing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish rebel movement operating in the south eastern part of Turkey, to use northern Iraq as a base for its attacks on the Turkish military stationed in the border regions. Although Erbil denied this, it appears that the extensive Turkish investments in the Iraqi Kurdish economy and infrastructure, and now this significant energy cooperation between the Kurdish autonomous province and the AKP government in Ankara, are being interpreted in Erbil as another firm step towards interdependence and, potentially, total sovereignty in the not-too-distant future.
The mounting internal criticism of Erdoğan's government, however, raises the question as to whether the Kurds have bet on the wrong horse. What began as widespread corruption allegations against senior members of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has evolved into a more troubling international criticism of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s attacks on both the judiciary system and the press—and more recently social networks like Twitter and YouTube.
Erdoğan describes his mission as a shadow struggle against a panoply of enemies ranging from internal lobby groups and terrorist organizations to foreign agents and parallel state structures under the thumb of the transnational religious and social movement Hizmet (“the Service”), which is led by U.S.-based Islamic scholar and preacher Imam Fethullah Gulen. In other words, Erdoğan and the AKP government are the kind of partners on which no one should pin all their hopes. Nevertheless, this is exactly what the Iraqi Kurds are doing.
The Kurdish political class nourishes distrust of Iraq’s leaders due to the way the former dictator of the country, Saddam Hussein, treated them. When Baghdad froze the funds allocated to the Kurdish region, Barzani compared the Maliki government with Saddam’s bloody regime, which also occasionally withheld funds to the Kurds in the north. Barzani warned that, “the Kurdish people did not make all these sacrifices in order to be subjected to oppression and despotic rule once again,” adding that the time had come to reconsider relations with Iraq.
Criticism of Iraq’s Kurdish oil exports comes not only from Maliki and his government. Militant groups attacked the oil pipelines just a few days after the first few tons of oil started flowing from the Kurdish province to Turkey. In particular, the Kurdish armed rebel group PKK has a clear interest in opposing the further strengthening of the alliance between Erbil and Ankara.
Spring is known to usually mark the start of the conflict season between Turkey and the PKK, a conflict which over the last 30 years has claimed more than 40,000 lives. The PKK declared a truce in March 2013, but has recently emphasized that it expects clear concessions from the Turkish government if the fragile peace is to be preserved.
However, Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish government made it clear that the days when PKK fighters could consider the Kurdish mountains of Iraq as a safe haven are gone. PKK Kurdish rebels should no longer expect support from their ethnic allies in northern Iraq.
While Erbil is becoming more and more dependent on Turkey, this apparently does not give rise to real concerns among Iraq’s Kurdish population. It is always dangerous to become dependent on just one country, as Kurds are doing with Turkey. But, as Barzani might argue, what other options are available? What other neighbors do the Iraqi Kurds have? Can they turn to Syria? This is impossible at the moment. To Iran? Again no—Iran will at all times invest in Baghdad, never in the Iraqi Kurds.
Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the American University of Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. His research, teaching and consulting interests include Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics, international political economy and globalization.
Photo: U.S. Geological Survey.
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Who Is Allowed to Sell Oil in Iraq?
July 16, 2014
In December 2013, the Kurdish autonomous government in Erbil signed a series of energy agreements with Turkey, provoking anger in Baghdad. These agreements, potentially, allow the Kurds to export oil by bypassing the Iraqi government, thereby, making a significant step towards achieving political independence. One key question, however, is whether the Iraqi Kurds are well advised to invest in a Turkish government, which seems to be sinking deeper into a fully-fledged political crisis.
While the Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria celebrated nowruz, the celebrations of the Iraqi Kurds between March 11th and March 20th were mixed with anxiety. To punish the Kurds for their insubordination towards Baghdad, the Iraqi government, headed by President Nouri al-Maliki, has interrupted the flow of public money to the Kurdish autonomous government in Erbil, Hence, Kurdish political authorities were unable to pay the salaries of more than one million of the province’s five million employees on the local government payroll—including members of the Kurdish army, the Peshmerga.
Until recently, the Kurdish autonomous government was allocated approximately 17 percent of Iraq’s total national budget. This amounted to an estimated $722 million a month. Needless to say the Kurds are severely affected by Baghdad’s recent decision.
Massoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdish autonomous government, reacted harshly to Maliki’s budget cuts, calling them an “economic blockade” and a “declaration of war against the Kurdish people”. The Kurdish province is formally autonomous, but is also highly dependent on transfers from Baghdad, as they represent a large share of the province’s revenues. To give an idea of the relations between the Kurdish province and the rest of Iraq, people from central and southern Iraq can enter northern Iraq only if they have their passport stamped, and then they can remain in the territory only for a limited number of days. Afterwards they have to go to the local immigration office and renew their permission. In another sign of increased autonomy, northern Iraq plans to launch its own stock exchange market later this year.
Iraq’s oil is the focal point of contention between Erbil and Baghdad. But the conflict has grown so serious that the Obama administration—and apparently Iran and Turkey—has stepped in to mediate.
The difference of views originates from the controversial energy agreements the Kurds signed with neighboring Turkey in March 2013. These agreements allow Iraq’s Kurdish region to export up to two million barrels of oil a day, and also substantial quantities of natural gas, from northern Iraq fields to Turkey. A portion of this oil is to be exported from the Kurdish province to Turkey via a new pipeline, which will not be linked to the existing pipeline network controlled by Baghdad. This will allow the Kurdish province to sell oil unilaterally from northern Iraqi fields and operate as if it is actually an independent state.
Unsurprisingly, Baghdad has condemned these agreements as “illegal”. Iraq’s 2005 Constitution states that the country’s energy resources belong to all the Iraqi people. The Kurds also refer to the Constitution, insisting that the agreements with Turkey were done by the book, precisely because the Constitution states that 17 percent of Iraq’s total government revenues must accrue to the Kurdish province. The Kurds claim that they abided by this ratio in these energy agreements. Erbil will supposedly transfer the remaining 83 percent to Baghdad.
The Maliki government insists that the Kurds’ right to 17 percent of state revenues is subject to an obligation to sell oil through Iraq’s state-owned oil companies. Leading Iraqi—and some Turkish—energy experts have called the agreements with the Kurdish province invalid and claimed they are in violation of not only the Iraqi constitution but international law. According to the Iraqi Constitution, the Iraqi government is the only body that has the authority to sell Iraq’s energy resources.
There is no provision in the Constitution, which says that there is something called Kurdish oil or Kurdish gas. It mentions only “Iraqi oil” located in Iraq’s northern regions. Although these regions are inhabited by Kurds, the oil or gas belongs to “all the Iraqi people”.
“The equation is simple: you take 17 percent of the wealth, you hand over the oil you have,” Prime Minister al-Maliki told France 24 television on March 12th. However, the Kurds have turned a deaf ear to Baghdad’s warnings and sold a million barrels of oil to Turkey.
Meanwhile, under a decision of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s government, the oil already sent to Turkey through the pipeline is being stockpiled in the Mediterranean city of Ceyhan until Baghdad and Erbil agree on a model for re-exporting Iraqi oil. Recently, the Maliki government hired an international law firm to closely monitor all oil exports via Turkey and other states. However, according to local sources, in the last months of December 2012, Kurdish oil was regularly transported from northern Iraq to Turkey via tanker truck.
By entering into these energy agreements, Iraqi Kurds are betting that closer cooperation with Ankara will bring economic, and eventually political, independence a step closer. Turkey is involved in many other development projects in the Kurdish province, from airport construction to hotels, roads, and supermarkets.
The relationship between Erbil and Ankara has undergone a quite remarkable change. Not so many years ago, Turkey accused Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous government of allowing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish rebel movement operating in the south eastern part of Turkey, to use northern Iraq as a base for its attacks on the Turkish military stationed in the border regions. Although Erbil denied this, it appears that the extensive Turkish investments in the Iraqi Kurdish economy and infrastructure, and now this significant energy cooperation between the Kurdish autonomous province and the AKP government in Ankara, are being interpreted in Erbil as another firm step towards interdependence and, potentially, total sovereignty in the not-too-distant future.
The mounting internal criticism of Erdoğan's government, however, raises the question as to whether the Kurds have bet on the wrong horse. What began as widespread corruption allegations against senior members of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has evolved into a more troubling international criticism of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s attacks on both the judiciary system and the press—and more recently social networks like Twitter and YouTube.
Erdoğan describes his mission as a shadow struggle against a panoply of enemies ranging from internal lobby groups and terrorist organizations to foreign agents and parallel state structures under the thumb of the transnational religious and social movement Hizmet (“the Service”), which is led by U.S.-based Islamic scholar and preacher Imam Fethullah Gulen. In other words, Erdoğan and the AKP government are the kind of partners on which no one should pin all their hopes. Nevertheless, this is exactly what the Iraqi Kurds are doing.
The Kurdish political class nourishes distrust of Iraq’s leaders due to the way the former dictator of the country, Saddam Hussein, treated them. When Baghdad froze the funds allocated to the Kurdish region, Barzani compared the Maliki government with Saddam’s bloody regime, which also occasionally withheld funds to the Kurds in the north. Barzani warned that, “the Kurdish people did not make all these sacrifices in order to be subjected to oppression and despotic rule once again,” adding that the time had come to reconsider relations with Iraq.
Criticism of Iraq’s Kurdish oil exports comes not only from Maliki and his government. Militant groups attacked the oil pipelines just a few days after the first few tons of oil started flowing from the Kurdish province to Turkey. In particular, the Kurdish armed rebel group PKK has a clear interest in opposing the further strengthening of the alliance between Erbil and Ankara.
Spring is known to usually mark the start of the conflict season between Turkey and the PKK, a conflict which over the last 30 years has claimed more than 40,000 lives. The PKK declared a truce in March 2013, but has recently emphasized that it expects clear concessions from the Turkish government if the fragile peace is to be preserved.
However, Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish government made it clear that the days when PKK fighters could consider the Kurdish mountains of Iraq as a safe haven are gone. PKK Kurdish rebels should no longer expect support from their ethnic allies in northern Iraq.
While Erbil is becoming more and more dependent on Turkey, this apparently does not give rise to real concerns among Iraq’s Kurdish population. It is always dangerous to become dependent on just one country, as Kurds are doing with Turkey. But, as Barzani might argue, what other options are available? What other neighbors do the Iraqi Kurds have? Can they turn to Syria? This is impossible at the moment. To Iran? Again no—Iran will at all times invest in Baghdad, never in the Iraqi Kurds.
Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the American University of Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. His research, teaching and consulting interests include Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics, international political economy and globalization.
Photo: U.S. Geological Survey.
