roxy engagement is a challenging tool in deterring bad actors and international aggression, and yet the alternatives—direct confrontation or failing to respond to aggression—are even more dangerous. What remains unknown is whether or not Ukraine, and through it, the West, can deter ongoing Russian aggression without overplaying their hand and making things even worse.
The Ukraine crisis served as a critical pivot for Western grand strategy once Russia invaded on 24 February 2022. This war and the response by the West begs questions on whether or not the liberal order can sustain these kinds of reactive, proxy confrontations without inviting escalation with strategic competitors. History recalls that limited engagement by the West in foreign conflict often devolves into wider confrontation, when end states have not been established by policy. The post-colonial Vietnam front in the Cold War and the seminal proxy conflict between Communism and the free world on the Korea peninsula serve as evidence of this failure to define end states in proxy conflicts.
Historical lessons on limited engagement and proxy conflict show they can and often do produce a singular result: war, albeit to varying degrees of severity and cost. In the case of Korea and Vietnam, these limited initial interventions devolved into full-scale war. Whether the West can avoid the same result as it shapes policy in 2023 remains the unanswered question as the conflict in Ukraine remains far from over.
How Much Support is Enough?
Russia’s unbridled aggression, revanchist policies, and the crisis on NATO’s flank demanded decisive, constructive action, albeit after the fact. The West had to respond, if for no better rationale than inaction would embolden aggression in the future. Failure to deter Russian action through consequences following incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 are evidence of this reality.
The West’s response in Ukraine was swift and sweeping indeed. Economic pressure and financial isolation against Moscow were unparalleled in history. Billions of dollars in global aid were provided to equip and sustain Ukrainian defense forces. And NATO and the West writ large forged a deeper unity.
But the guardrails in the West—when it comes to containing the level of engagement—seem to be widening, and therein lies the potential for confrontation. Early in the conflict, President Biden stated unequivocally that weapons which could be used to target deep into Russian territory would not be sent to Ukraine. Then such weapons were sent to Ukraine in June. The initial aid packages to Ukraine between March and the summer included personal protective equipment, ammunition, and medical supplies, along with communications and sustainment equipment. More recently, NATO partners have announced they plan to send tanks, armored vehicles, and expanded munitions inventories to assist with repelling the Russian invaders who have been fighting on their back foot since before the winter.
It matters little in Russia’s strategic perspective if the West stops short of sending NATO forces into Ukraine to fight the Russian forces. What Russia sees is the whole of the West committing incredible resources to Ukraine to fight Russia on the West’s behalf. To set the conditions for this “special military operation,” Moscow employed clandestine and mercenary forces to destabilize the region ahead of invasion. Conversely, the West has employed Ukraine as its proxy to fight Russia.
What End State?
This continued expansion of security aid to Ukraine is simply explained: there are no clear objectives for an end state in the Ukraine conflict, and the West has invested much in this conflict without considering the implications of the blank checks it has signed. Lacking a roadmap—with clear, realistic, achievable goals and a means to get there—there is no incentive for Ukraine to think it needs to stop at reclaiming its borders.
NATO, the United States, Europe, the West writ large has not implemented a scope on this endeavor, and the aid increases apace. The West’s support is increasing despite the territorial gains made by Ukrainian defense forces, who are of course simply fighting to retake and secure their homeland. Yet those widening guardrails on Western aid may embolden Ukraine to expand the conflict beyond a reasonable scope.
For a collective international apparatus of states wanting to avoid conflict with Russia while defeating Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, the West has omitted constraint from the process. These questions must guide the policy-making process and Western strategy going forward: what is the end state desired, what are the necessary tools to get there, and how will it achieve this in 2023 without fomenting direct confrontation with an isolated, desperate Moscow?
Rhetoric matters a great deal here, especially in an age of competition—the new buzzword for potential conflict—where disinformation remains one of Russia’s strongest tools. And even though the West truly wishes to avoid confrontation with Russia, its competitors in Moscow have consistently twisted the public narrative to make themselves appear to be the victims of Western escalation. In foreign minister Sergei Lavrov’s own words: “When Western partners deny, foaming at the mouth, that they are not at war with Russia, they are lying. The volume of support rendered by the West shows that it has staked a great deal on its war against Russia.”
Necessary Evil
Russian public rhetoric can parlay words as well as any institution. But it knows that this is a war, and that it illegally invaded Ukraine without due provocation. Yet Moscow also sees the West’s whole-of-body engagement and sponsorship of Ukraine in this conflict as a near-direct engagement between the East and West. Just as bizarrely valid in this era of information shaping, Russia sees itself as the stable, reasonable actor that is trying to avoid escalated conflict with the West and end this “war” in Ukraine as soon as possible.
It is necessary for the West to support Ukraine’s efforts to defeat Russia, and see its own sovereignty assured. Kyiv cannot fight this war alone, and will depend on its benefactors in Washington, Brussels, and European capitals for the foreseeable future.
There is little debate on whether the liberal order should be involved in deterring authoritarian aggression. But it will be unlikely, if not impossible, to contain the scope of this conflict if the West continues to expand its support for Ukraine without consideration for the implications of boundless proxy intervention. This will remain true if the West fails to determine collectively, publicly, and clearly what the end state is for Ukraine. Failure to do so could result in a repeat of history, in which engagement inevitably expanded—and devolved—into confrontation.
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When Will the West’s Ukraine Aid Cross the Line for Russia?
Photo by Taine Noble via Unsplash.
March 1, 2023
The West's support of Ukraine makes sense from a strategic, political, and humanitarian point of view, but it remains a delicate balancing act. Limited, proxy engagement historically have often led to war, and the West must be mindful of this, writes Ethan Brown.
P
roxy engagement is a challenging tool in deterring bad actors and international aggression, and yet the alternatives—direct confrontation or failing to respond to aggression—are even more dangerous. What remains unknown is whether or not Ukraine, and through it, the West, can deter ongoing Russian aggression without overplaying their hand and making things even worse.
The Ukraine crisis served as a critical pivot for Western grand strategy once Russia invaded on 24 February 2022. This war and the response by the West begs questions on whether or not the liberal order can sustain these kinds of reactive, proxy confrontations without inviting escalation with strategic competitors. History recalls that limited engagement by the West in foreign conflict often devolves into wider confrontation, when end states have not been established by policy. The post-colonial Vietnam front in the Cold War and the seminal proxy conflict between Communism and the free world on the Korea peninsula serve as evidence of this failure to define end states in proxy conflicts.
Historical lessons on limited engagement and proxy conflict show they can and often do produce a singular result: war, albeit to varying degrees of severity and cost. In the case of Korea and Vietnam, these limited initial interventions devolved into full-scale war. Whether the West can avoid the same result as it shapes policy in 2023 remains the unanswered question as the conflict in Ukraine remains far from over.
How Much Support is Enough?
Russia’s unbridled aggression, revanchist policies, and the crisis on NATO’s flank demanded decisive, constructive action, albeit after the fact. The West had to respond, if for no better rationale than inaction would embolden aggression in the future. Failure to deter Russian action through consequences following incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 are evidence of this reality.
The West’s response in Ukraine was swift and sweeping indeed. Economic pressure and financial isolation against Moscow were unparalleled in history. Billions of dollars in global aid were provided to equip and sustain Ukrainian defense forces. And NATO and the West writ large forged a deeper unity.
But the guardrails in the West—when it comes to containing the level of engagement—seem to be widening, and therein lies the potential for confrontation. Early in the conflict, President Biden stated unequivocally that weapons which could be used to target deep into Russian territory would not be sent to Ukraine. Then such weapons were sent to Ukraine in June. The initial aid packages to Ukraine between March and the summer included personal protective equipment, ammunition, and medical supplies, along with communications and sustainment equipment. More recently, NATO partners have announced they plan to send tanks, armored vehicles, and expanded munitions inventories to assist with repelling the Russian invaders who have been fighting on their back foot since before the winter.
It matters little in Russia’s strategic perspective if the West stops short of sending NATO forces into Ukraine to fight the Russian forces. What Russia sees is the whole of the West committing incredible resources to Ukraine to fight Russia on the West’s behalf. To set the conditions for this “special military operation,” Moscow employed clandestine and mercenary forces to destabilize the region ahead of invasion. Conversely, the West has employed Ukraine as its proxy to fight Russia.
What End State?
This continued expansion of security aid to Ukraine is simply explained: there are no clear objectives for an end state in the Ukraine conflict, and the West has invested much in this conflict without considering the implications of the blank checks it has signed. Lacking a roadmap—with clear, realistic, achievable goals and a means to get there—there is no incentive for Ukraine to think it needs to stop at reclaiming its borders.
NATO, the United States, Europe, the West writ large has not implemented a scope on this endeavor, and the aid increases apace. The West’s support is increasing despite the territorial gains made by Ukrainian defense forces, who are of course simply fighting to retake and secure their homeland. Yet those widening guardrails on Western aid may embolden Ukraine to expand the conflict beyond a reasonable scope.
For a collective international apparatus of states wanting to avoid conflict with Russia while defeating Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, the West has omitted constraint from the process. These questions must guide the policy-making process and Western strategy going forward: what is the end state desired, what are the necessary tools to get there, and how will it achieve this in 2023 without fomenting direct confrontation with an isolated, desperate Moscow?
Rhetoric matters a great deal here, especially in an age of competition—the new buzzword for potential conflict—where disinformation remains one of Russia’s strongest tools. And even though the West truly wishes to avoid confrontation with Russia, its competitors in Moscow have consistently twisted the public narrative to make themselves appear to be the victims of Western escalation. In foreign minister Sergei Lavrov’s own words: “When Western partners deny, foaming at the mouth, that they are not at war with Russia, they are lying. The volume of support rendered by the West shows that it has staked a great deal on its war against Russia.”
Necessary Evil
Russian public rhetoric can parlay words as well as any institution. But it knows that this is a war, and that it illegally invaded Ukraine without due provocation. Yet Moscow also sees the West’s whole-of-body engagement and sponsorship of Ukraine in this conflict as a near-direct engagement between the East and West. Just as bizarrely valid in this era of information shaping, Russia sees itself as the stable, reasonable actor that is trying to avoid escalated conflict with the West and end this “war” in Ukraine as soon as possible.
It is necessary for the West to support Ukraine’s efforts to defeat Russia, and see its own sovereignty assured. Kyiv cannot fight this war alone, and will depend on its benefactors in Washington, Brussels, and European capitals for the foreseeable future.
There is little debate on whether the liberal order should be involved in deterring authoritarian aggression. But it will be unlikely, if not impossible, to contain the scope of this conflict if the West continues to expand its support for Ukraine without consideration for the implications of boundless proxy intervention. This will remain true if the West fails to determine collectively, publicly, and clearly what the end state is for Ukraine. Failure to do so could result in a repeat of history, in which engagement inevitably expanded—and devolved—into confrontation.
