.
Just one week after diplomats in Lausanne, Switzerland packed their bags for the long flight home, believing they had scored a decisive victory at the end of marathon nuclear talks with Iran, disagreement emerged over the key takeaways of the resulting Joint Plan of Action. On Thursday, April 9th, Iran released a set of talking points almost perpendicular to a State Department fact sheet sent out a week previously. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei played up the discrepancy, calling for an immediate cessation of sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program while offering no concessions of his own. Just hours earlier, Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan rejected the notion that a consensus had been reached at Lausanne, repudiating claims that military site inspections were on the table.
Should the G5+1 wrangle Iran back to the bargaining table, concerns about nuclear breakout time ought to remain at the top of the agenda. But a more immediate consequence of the talks deserves consideration. How will lifting sanctions impact Iran’s political economy?
In an April 6th radio interview, American President Barack Obama explained that if Iran violated the terms of the agreement and forced Washington to implement fresh penalties, the damages could spill over into the global marketplace. Unfortunately for Obama and reformers in Tehran, a darker element of Iran’s social fabric could greatly benefit from the removal of sanctions, particularly if that process unfolds to Khamenei’s liking.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia tend to figure heavily in political analyses of Iran. Yet these groups, answerable directly to the Supreme Leader, did not appear to figure into Washington’s calculus during the talks. Pronouncements made by IRGC and Basij brass to state media are easily dismissed as bombastic threats and boasts.
In the realm of foreign policy, however, President Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, are in fact subordinate to Khamenei and his paramilitary hierarchy. Officially, Rouhani has the power to sign treaties with the consent of the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, and can appoint his own foreign minister to conduct negotiations. But that power is eclipsed by Khamenei’s ability to declare war, command the armed forces, and direct religious authority. When U.S. soldiers were under attack by Shiite militias in Iraq, American commanders reached out to Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, not the president or a cabinet official.
While Iran’s conservatives and reformists place their faith in Rouhani to provide economic relief, Iran’s foreign affairs and vast swaths of the marketplace remain firmly under the thumb of the Supreme Leader and his inner coterie, including the Quds Force, the IRGC and the Basij. The paramilitary enjoys tremendous influence abroad, and elites in the IRGC and Basij stand to benefit the most from renewed foreign trade.
Dr. Saeid Golkar, a senior fellow at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, details the entrenchment of paramilitaries in Iran’s economy in his upcoming book on the Basij. In 1989, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Khamenei spurred then-President Hashemi Rafsanjani to establish a quasi-governmental welfare foundation dedicated to the Basij to ensure loyalty among veterans of the devastating campaign.
Under Khamenei’s auspices, that foundation grew into a massive holding firm that acquired subsidiary corporations in industries ranging from agriculture and real estate to zinc mining and banking. During Mohammad Khatami’s reformist administration in the late 1990s, economic opportunities for the paramilitary class were rolled back, but following uprisings by university students in 1999, IRGC brass drafted a letter in which they warned Khatami to back down. His second term saw the return of paramilitary largesse.
Paramilitary economic outgrowth flourished under President Ahmadinejad, himself a Basiji. Much of Khamenei’s privatization program of 2007 resulted in paramilitary commanders becoming stakeholders in vital industries. As the Basij have become more fully integrated within the Revolutionary Guard, divisions of patronage have emerged: the IRGC are awarded high-profile construction and development projects, while small-scale contracts fall to the Basij.
Historically, paramilitary commanders have been given special privileges during periods of increased privatization and investment; there is good reason to believe cronyism would prevail were sanctions to suddenly evaporate. President Obama ought to carefully consider who stands to benefit from rapid sanction elimination and what he can do about it. With Majlis elections approaching early in 2016, the G5+1 should delay rescinding the sanctions that target paramilitary holdings and ensure that Khamenei and the paramilitary apparatus are serious about striking a deal.
About the authors: Greg Lewin is a Master of Public Policy student at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. Evan Burt is pursuing his Dual Masters of Global Policy Studies and Masters of Middle Eastern Studies at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas - Austin.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
a global affairs media network
Washington Neglects Paramilitaries in Nuclear Talks with Iran
Destination Iran
May 1, 2015
Just one week after diplomats in Lausanne, Switzerland packed their bags for the long flight home, believing they had scored a decisive victory at the end of marathon nuclear talks with Iran, disagreement emerged over the key takeaways of the resulting Joint Plan of Action. On Thursday, April 9th, Iran released a set of talking points almost perpendicular to a State Department fact sheet sent out a week previously. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei played up the discrepancy, calling for an immediate cessation of sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program while offering no concessions of his own. Just hours earlier, Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan rejected the notion that a consensus had been reached at Lausanne, repudiating claims that military site inspections were on the table.
Should the G5+1 wrangle Iran back to the bargaining table, concerns about nuclear breakout time ought to remain at the top of the agenda. But a more immediate consequence of the talks deserves consideration. How will lifting sanctions impact Iran’s political economy?
In an April 6th radio interview, American President Barack Obama explained that if Iran violated the terms of the agreement and forced Washington to implement fresh penalties, the damages could spill over into the global marketplace. Unfortunately for Obama and reformers in Tehran, a darker element of Iran’s social fabric could greatly benefit from the removal of sanctions, particularly if that process unfolds to Khamenei’s liking.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia tend to figure heavily in political analyses of Iran. Yet these groups, answerable directly to the Supreme Leader, did not appear to figure into Washington’s calculus during the talks. Pronouncements made by IRGC and Basij brass to state media are easily dismissed as bombastic threats and boasts.
In the realm of foreign policy, however, President Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, are in fact subordinate to Khamenei and his paramilitary hierarchy. Officially, Rouhani has the power to sign treaties with the consent of the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, and can appoint his own foreign minister to conduct negotiations. But that power is eclipsed by Khamenei’s ability to declare war, command the armed forces, and direct religious authority. When U.S. soldiers were under attack by Shiite militias in Iraq, American commanders reached out to Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, not the president or a cabinet official.
While Iran’s conservatives and reformists place their faith in Rouhani to provide economic relief, Iran’s foreign affairs and vast swaths of the marketplace remain firmly under the thumb of the Supreme Leader and his inner coterie, including the Quds Force, the IRGC and the Basij. The paramilitary enjoys tremendous influence abroad, and elites in the IRGC and Basij stand to benefit the most from renewed foreign trade.
Dr. Saeid Golkar, a senior fellow at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, details the entrenchment of paramilitaries in Iran’s economy in his upcoming book on the Basij. In 1989, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Khamenei spurred then-President Hashemi Rafsanjani to establish a quasi-governmental welfare foundation dedicated to the Basij to ensure loyalty among veterans of the devastating campaign.
Under Khamenei’s auspices, that foundation grew into a massive holding firm that acquired subsidiary corporations in industries ranging from agriculture and real estate to zinc mining and banking. During Mohammad Khatami’s reformist administration in the late 1990s, economic opportunities for the paramilitary class were rolled back, but following uprisings by university students in 1999, IRGC brass drafted a letter in which they warned Khatami to back down. His second term saw the return of paramilitary largesse.
Paramilitary economic outgrowth flourished under President Ahmadinejad, himself a Basiji. Much of Khamenei’s privatization program of 2007 resulted in paramilitary commanders becoming stakeholders in vital industries. As the Basij have become more fully integrated within the Revolutionary Guard, divisions of patronage have emerged: the IRGC are awarded high-profile construction and development projects, while small-scale contracts fall to the Basij.
Historically, paramilitary commanders have been given special privileges during periods of increased privatization and investment; there is good reason to believe cronyism would prevail were sanctions to suddenly evaporate. President Obama ought to carefully consider who stands to benefit from rapid sanction elimination and what he can do about it. With Majlis elections approaching early in 2016, the G5+1 should delay rescinding the sanctions that target paramilitary holdings and ensure that Khamenei and the paramilitary apparatus are serious about striking a deal.
About the authors: Greg Lewin is a Master of Public Policy student at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. Evan Burt is pursuing his Dual Masters of Global Policy Studies and Masters of Middle Eastern Studies at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas - Austin.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
