.
O

n 24 June 2023, the Wagner Group's attempted coup in Russia shocked the world. After serving the Kremlin for years as a tool of hybrid warfare, the private militia has turned against its master—Vladimir Putin and the Moscow establishment. The uprising's consequences will impact the Kremlin's foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), particularly in Syria and Libya. In these countries, the group has built a network of military and economic interests—such as the diamond and gold exploitation in the Central African Republic (CAR). 

Two days after the attempted coup, Russian Foreign Ministry officials phoned Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the CAR president, reassuring him that the Wagner mercenaries in its country would stay. Here, the group is involved in several activities, from providing security to the presidents to organizing pro-Putin propaganda campaigns. Some U.S. officials believe that many African countries will not trust those assurances after the mercenaries revolted against the Russian state, possibly resulting in the partial closing of their relations with the militia. For now, this scenario is only a possibility.

Michael Mulroy, a former senior Pentagon official, is sure Russia's activities outside its borders are deeply damaged. Speaking to The Arab Weekly, he said, "They [the Wagner Group] will be seen as too unstable and potentially a threat to the leadership in those countries. They almost started a coup in their own [country]."

The situation is even more complex in the MENA region because Wagner's activities intertwine with those of other regional powers. Since 2015, Russia has deployed them in almost every regional crisis, especially in Libya and Syria, two failed countries with limited state sovereignty. The Kremlin always took advantage of countries' weaknesses and turmoils, especially after the Arab Spring that resulted in civil wars and ethnic conflicts.  

Libyan Relations 

Wagner Group started its activities in Libya in late 2018 when they joined the side of local warlord Khalifa Haftar. According to some reports, they helped Haftar in its fight against Islamists in Eastern Libya and were involved in his offensive on Tripoli in 2019. Today, they still have a considerable role in personally protecting Haftar and maintaining control over Libya's eastern oil-rich area.

Speculations about Wagner's role in Libya intensified on 30 June after a mysterious drone strike hit one of the militia's bases. However, compared to five years ago, the Libyan National Army (LNA), headed by General Haftar, is more prone to discuss Wagner's withdrawal. The main reason is that, in recent months, there have been advancing talks between the LNA and some high-level US officials, such as Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

The LNA is concerned with two factors. First, it worries about possible mutinies in the territories under its authority. Second, it fears the Wagner Group could get to Libya with advanced weapons without its control. Ensuring a peaceful coexistence with them is a goal of both the LNA and the Kremlin, which needs to further strengthen its role in the area—at the expense of NATO.

Syrian Relations  

Lastly, there is the Syrian case. The Wagner Group has long supported President Bashar al-Assad, helping the regime forces to reconquer a large part of rebel-held areas during the civil war. Also, in 2018, they fought against the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in northern Syria in one of the cruelest fights, the battle of Khasham.

Right after the attempted coup, many Arabic media outlets reported that the official Russian army, together with local intelligence, flooded into the Wagner Group's offices in Syria and imprisoned some of its fighters and colonels. Sky News Arabia confirmed the arrests on 28 June, even if some sources close to the militia denied them.

The main actor involved in Wagner's withdrawal, either forced or spontaneous, is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Teheran has a lot of on-field interests that could expand if Russian-backed forces leave Syria. Even for this reason, Putin decided to strengthen a security partnership with Iran by signing a new agreement. The Kremlin thought that it would be a prudent investment to stabilize the situation abroad rather than pursuing solitary choices.

On the contrary, the Wagner Group's revolt comes at a decent time for al-Assad. Its regime has already secured large territorial portions that rebels had captured during the civil war. Mark Katz, a professor at George Mason University, told TNA, "Assad is fortunate in that Russian forces have already helped reduce the capabilities of his internal opponents and that external powers previously aiding them seem less interested in doing so now."

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Wagner’s Evolving Post-Coup Role in the Middle East and North Africa

Desert in Libya. Photo by Ahmed Almakhzanji on Unsplash.

July 14, 2023

The Wagner Group operates in more theaters than just Ukraine, especially in Africa and the Middle East. The Wagner Group's short-lived coup attempt in late June will likely have impacts on how the mercenary group is used in other countries, and on Russia's foreign policy, writes Elia Preto Martini.

O

n 24 June 2023, the Wagner Group's attempted coup in Russia shocked the world. After serving the Kremlin for years as a tool of hybrid warfare, the private militia has turned against its master—Vladimir Putin and the Moscow establishment. The uprising's consequences will impact the Kremlin's foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), particularly in Syria and Libya. In these countries, the group has built a network of military and economic interests—such as the diamond and gold exploitation in the Central African Republic (CAR). 

Two days after the attempted coup, Russian Foreign Ministry officials phoned Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the CAR president, reassuring him that the Wagner mercenaries in its country would stay. Here, the group is involved in several activities, from providing security to the presidents to organizing pro-Putin propaganda campaigns. Some U.S. officials believe that many African countries will not trust those assurances after the mercenaries revolted against the Russian state, possibly resulting in the partial closing of their relations with the militia. For now, this scenario is only a possibility.

Michael Mulroy, a former senior Pentagon official, is sure Russia's activities outside its borders are deeply damaged. Speaking to The Arab Weekly, he said, "They [the Wagner Group] will be seen as too unstable and potentially a threat to the leadership in those countries. They almost started a coup in their own [country]."

The situation is even more complex in the MENA region because Wagner's activities intertwine with those of other regional powers. Since 2015, Russia has deployed them in almost every regional crisis, especially in Libya and Syria, two failed countries with limited state sovereignty. The Kremlin always took advantage of countries' weaknesses and turmoils, especially after the Arab Spring that resulted in civil wars and ethnic conflicts.  

Libyan Relations 

Wagner Group started its activities in Libya in late 2018 when they joined the side of local warlord Khalifa Haftar. According to some reports, they helped Haftar in its fight against Islamists in Eastern Libya and were involved in his offensive on Tripoli in 2019. Today, they still have a considerable role in personally protecting Haftar and maintaining control over Libya's eastern oil-rich area.

Speculations about Wagner's role in Libya intensified on 30 June after a mysterious drone strike hit one of the militia's bases. However, compared to five years ago, the Libyan National Army (LNA), headed by General Haftar, is more prone to discuss Wagner's withdrawal. The main reason is that, in recent months, there have been advancing talks between the LNA and some high-level US officials, such as Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

The LNA is concerned with two factors. First, it worries about possible mutinies in the territories under its authority. Second, it fears the Wagner Group could get to Libya with advanced weapons without its control. Ensuring a peaceful coexistence with them is a goal of both the LNA and the Kremlin, which needs to further strengthen its role in the area—at the expense of NATO.

Syrian Relations  

Lastly, there is the Syrian case. The Wagner Group has long supported President Bashar al-Assad, helping the regime forces to reconquer a large part of rebel-held areas during the civil war. Also, in 2018, they fought against the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in northern Syria in one of the cruelest fights, the battle of Khasham.

Right after the attempted coup, many Arabic media outlets reported that the official Russian army, together with local intelligence, flooded into the Wagner Group's offices in Syria and imprisoned some of its fighters and colonels. Sky News Arabia confirmed the arrests on 28 June, even if some sources close to the militia denied them.

The main actor involved in Wagner's withdrawal, either forced or spontaneous, is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Teheran has a lot of on-field interests that could expand if Russian-backed forces leave Syria. Even for this reason, Putin decided to strengthen a security partnership with Iran by signing a new agreement. The Kremlin thought that it would be a prudent investment to stabilize the situation abroad rather than pursuing solitary choices.

On the contrary, the Wagner Group's revolt comes at a decent time for al-Assad. Its regime has already secured large territorial portions that rebels had captured during the civil war. Mark Katz, a professor at George Mason University, told TNA, "Assad is fortunate in that Russian forces have already helped reduce the capabilities of his internal opponents and that external powers previously aiding them seem less interested in doing so now."

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.