The newly elected European Parliament will help set the political tone in Europe for the next five years. The new MEPs will have a major impact on the next College of Commissioners and will also have a say on critical issues, from a free-trade deal with the United States, to the energy supply across the continent, as well as on questions of institutional reform and the governance of the single European currency.
There are many excellent summaries of seats won and lost, but perhaps more intriguing is the difficulty in saying who really “won” the European Elections held across 28 Member States between 22nd and 25th May. Proclaiming the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) as the winner because they have the most MEPs in the new Parliament masks the fact that they lost some 62 seats compared to 2009, whilst the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the Liberals & Democrats (ALDE) both lost only around 10 MEPs each. Certainly Marine Le Pen (Front National, France) and Nigel Farage (UK Independence Party, UK) both feel like winners, coming first nationally with 26 percent and 27 percent of the vote respectively. Nonetheless, whilst these and other Eurosceptic or “fringe” gains (Austria 27 percent, Denmark 26.6 percent, Hungry 14.68 percent, and Greece 26.6 percent) are the most immediately significant and striking result of this election, they are not an actual victory in terms of parliamentary arithmetic.
Perhaps one way to call victory relates to the new President of the European Commission, successor to José Manuel Barosso. One innovation of the 2014 elections was the nomination by major political parties of a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ or ‘top candidate’ for the President’s role. The party that gets their nominee into that slot could claim real victory, as it will be a hugely powerful position. The European Parliament's Conference of Presidents has said the EPP’s Spitzenkandidat, Jean-Claude Juncker (a former prime minister of Luxembourg), has a clear mandate to start negotiations for the role. Given the lack of clear majority in the European Parliament, however, Juncker may not have enough support; the German MEP Martin Schulz, the PES Spitzenkandidat (who served as President of the European Parliament from 2012), is actively working to form a coalition behind his own candidacy.
This said, the sole prerogative to appoint the President actually sits with the European Council, which is merely obliged to “consider” the results of Parliamentary elections rather than acquiesce to any given Spitzenkandidat. The Member State governments that make up the Council are ambivalent, at best, regarding Parliament’s claims to appointing the new head of the Commission. They may well put forward their own candidate, and the only real influence MEPs will have then is to approve or reject the nominee, and subsequently do the same with the College of Commissioners.
Dominating the legislative process might be another way to identify a winner but that, too, is not cut and dried. In the (entirely predictable) absence of a political group with an absolute majority, the ability to engineer partnerships and coalitions will be crucial. A “grand coalition” between EPP and PES might see the light of day, although the Socialists have stated that they are willing to cooperate only if the EPP signs up to certain policy priorities. Instead, the two largest parties might feel more comfortable with traditional allies. The PES can probably count on the Greens and the far-left, giving them a group of around 285 MEPs. Meanwhile, the EPP may be able to co-opt the European Conservatives & Reformers (ECR) to create a block of around 260 MEPs (this is by no means a certainty, however, as some ECR MEPs are pressing to align with UKIP). The consequence of these moves might be to make ALDE the Parliament’s powerbrokers: their 60+ MEPs would put any of the two coalitions in front, although still neither would have an absolute majority. Despite the rise of the ‘fringe’, therefore, really all of the major parties can make some kind of claim to “victory”.
The final possible analysis of who came out on top is to look at the Member States themselves. This election will radically change the balance of power within the major political groups. The clearest illustration of this is that France’s largest delegation of MEPs now comes from the far-right, weakening that Member State’s influence in mainstream political groups, notably in the EPP where France will be dwarfed by the German delegation (and where the UK will absent since its Conservative MEPs sit in the ECR). Indeed Germany should be very well-placed in most of the big party groups, as not only does this Member State have the most MEPs but its mainstream parties were not as badly mauled by the electorate as elsewhere.
The coming months and years will doubtless give us a clearer picture of who really won this election, if anyone. It may be easier to point out who lost or did not even feel part of the game. “Many are called but few are chosen” has resonance not only for the would-be MEPs that failed to be elected between 22nd and 25th May; it also reflects on some 228 million EU voters who did not make it to polling booths across the country. The 43.11 percent turnout was in fact slightly up on the percentage who voted in 2009, marking the first time the popular vote did not decline since elections began in 1979. However, that said, 2009’s turnout was only slightly lower at 43.00 percent. It seems clear that these elections simply did not rouse that much interest amongst Europeans, which is as clear an ”absence of true victory” as we might wish to find.
The 2014 European elections clearly have changed some things, nonetheless. We will certainly see Brussels politics entering a phase of coalition and disruption, retrenchment and reform. This will almost certainly lead to a concentration of effective Parliamentary power with the mainstream political groups and may lead to more “moderate” European policy-making in the face of pressure from the “fringe”. At the same time, however, Member State governments will be wrestling with domestic political agendas that have been changed by the surge of Euroscepticism. How this will affect the attitude of the European Council and the Commission will be as important as the Parliament’s own response to the 2014 European Elections.
In a series of articles, Diplomatic Courier and APCO Worldwide are partnering to cover the 2014 European Union elections. Find more information about this series here, and read all the articles in this series here. Follow @EPElections for daily news and updates from APCO’s team in Brussels.
Theo Moore is senior director in APCO Worldwide’s Brussels office.
Photo: European Union 2014 - European Parliament (cc).
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Victory in Europe?
May 27, 2014
The newly elected European Parliament will help set the political tone in Europe for the next five years. The new MEPs will have a major impact on the next College of Commissioners and will also have a say on critical issues, from a free-trade deal with the United States, to the energy supply across the continent, as well as on questions of institutional reform and the governance of the single European currency.
There are many excellent summaries of seats won and lost, but perhaps more intriguing is the difficulty in saying who really “won” the European Elections held across 28 Member States between 22nd and 25th May. Proclaiming the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) as the winner because they have the most MEPs in the new Parliament masks the fact that they lost some 62 seats compared to 2009, whilst the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the Liberals & Democrats (ALDE) both lost only around 10 MEPs each. Certainly Marine Le Pen (Front National, France) and Nigel Farage (UK Independence Party, UK) both feel like winners, coming first nationally with 26 percent and 27 percent of the vote respectively. Nonetheless, whilst these and other Eurosceptic or “fringe” gains (Austria 27 percent, Denmark 26.6 percent, Hungry 14.68 percent, and Greece 26.6 percent) are the most immediately significant and striking result of this election, they are not an actual victory in terms of parliamentary arithmetic.
Perhaps one way to call victory relates to the new President of the European Commission, successor to José Manuel Barosso. One innovation of the 2014 elections was the nomination by major political parties of a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ or ‘top candidate’ for the President’s role. The party that gets their nominee into that slot could claim real victory, as it will be a hugely powerful position. The European Parliament's Conference of Presidents has said the EPP’s Spitzenkandidat, Jean-Claude Juncker (a former prime minister of Luxembourg), has a clear mandate to start negotiations for the role. Given the lack of clear majority in the European Parliament, however, Juncker may not have enough support; the German MEP Martin Schulz, the PES Spitzenkandidat (who served as President of the European Parliament from 2012), is actively working to form a coalition behind his own candidacy.
This said, the sole prerogative to appoint the President actually sits with the European Council, which is merely obliged to “consider” the results of Parliamentary elections rather than acquiesce to any given Spitzenkandidat. The Member State governments that make up the Council are ambivalent, at best, regarding Parliament’s claims to appointing the new head of the Commission. They may well put forward their own candidate, and the only real influence MEPs will have then is to approve or reject the nominee, and subsequently do the same with the College of Commissioners.
Dominating the legislative process might be another way to identify a winner but that, too, is not cut and dried. In the (entirely predictable) absence of a political group with an absolute majority, the ability to engineer partnerships and coalitions will be crucial. A “grand coalition” between EPP and PES might see the light of day, although the Socialists have stated that they are willing to cooperate only if the EPP signs up to certain policy priorities. Instead, the two largest parties might feel more comfortable with traditional allies. The PES can probably count on the Greens and the far-left, giving them a group of around 285 MEPs. Meanwhile, the EPP may be able to co-opt the European Conservatives & Reformers (ECR) to create a block of around 260 MEPs (this is by no means a certainty, however, as some ECR MEPs are pressing to align with UKIP). The consequence of these moves might be to make ALDE the Parliament’s powerbrokers: their 60+ MEPs would put any of the two coalitions in front, although still neither would have an absolute majority. Despite the rise of the ‘fringe’, therefore, really all of the major parties can make some kind of claim to “victory”.
The final possible analysis of who came out on top is to look at the Member States themselves. This election will radically change the balance of power within the major political groups. The clearest illustration of this is that France’s largest delegation of MEPs now comes from the far-right, weakening that Member State’s influence in mainstream political groups, notably in the EPP where France will be dwarfed by the German delegation (and where the UK will absent since its Conservative MEPs sit in the ECR). Indeed Germany should be very well-placed in most of the big party groups, as not only does this Member State have the most MEPs but its mainstream parties were not as badly mauled by the electorate as elsewhere.
The coming months and years will doubtless give us a clearer picture of who really won this election, if anyone. It may be easier to point out who lost or did not even feel part of the game. “Many are called but few are chosen” has resonance not only for the would-be MEPs that failed to be elected between 22nd and 25th May; it also reflects on some 228 million EU voters who did not make it to polling booths across the country. The 43.11 percent turnout was in fact slightly up on the percentage who voted in 2009, marking the first time the popular vote did not decline since elections began in 1979. However, that said, 2009’s turnout was only slightly lower at 43.00 percent. It seems clear that these elections simply did not rouse that much interest amongst Europeans, which is as clear an ”absence of true victory” as we might wish to find.
The 2014 European elections clearly have changed some things, nonetheless. We will certainly see Brussels politics entering a phase of coalition and disruption, retrenchment and reform. This will almost certainly lead to a concentration of effective Parliamentary power with the mainstream political groups and may lead to more “moderate” European policy-making in the face of pressure from the “fringe”. At the same time, however, Member State governments will be wrestling with domestic political agendas that have been changed by the surge of Euroscepticism. How this will affect the attitude of the European Council and the Commission will be as important as the Parliament’s own response to the 2014 European Elections.
In a series of articles, Diplomatic Courier and APCO Worldwide are partnering to cover the 2014 European Union elections. Find more information about this series here, and read all the articles in this series here. Follow @EPElections for daily news and updates from APCO’s team in Brussels.
Theo Moore is senior director in APCO Worldwide’s Brussels office.
Photo: European Union 2014 - European Parliament (cc).
