.
It is easy to use the metaphor of a fragile Ukraine as a symbol of the post-Soviet struggle for political and economic self-determination, or emblematic of an alarming New Cold War rooted in the same old script that pits Putin’s Russia against the Western influences of the U.S., EU and NATO. It’s easy because those realities are undeniably true, but at the same time they fail to affirm Ukraine’s own agency, however conflicted it might be.
This narrative of a country torn “in between,” whose core interests are essentially derivative of Great Powers, has been the default setting throughout much of Ukraine’s history and defines the policies that continue to shape that history. What’s harder, but now imperative – particularly in light of Kiev’s move in favor of decentralized local self-rule – is for Ukrainians to speak with a new resolve to forge a multicultural identity, negotiate a difficult internal reconciliation and emerge as a unified nation within, but not subordinate to, its geopolitical context. To this extent, the October 25th local elections will be nothing short of a litmus test.
The challenges that an ailing Ukraine faces are formidable. The announcement from President Petro Poroshenko on constitutional changes that would increase regional autonomy – changes that were met with guarded approval from France and Germany for their potential to resolve civil conflict in the Donbass – resulted in a gruesome grenade attack in Kiev, killing three. The self-rule measures are bitterly opposed by many Ukrainians, as civilians and military personnel alike have suffered during the protracted fighting with secessionist rebels.
More recently, the Russia-Ukraine talks held in Paris on October 2, which according to Poroshenko established “a truce” between the new nations, effectively prolonged the Minsk ceasefire and secured a deal for elections and weapons pullback. But if on September 17 Bloomberg reported that the truce was being upheld with the Ukrainian army starting to withdraw weapons from the frontline in Donetsk, the same day UNIAN information agency revealed that two Ukrainian soldiers had been wounded due to open fire from the rebels, casting a shadow over new commitments to put an end to the 18-month war in the Donbas.
Indeed, as of August, more than 2.3 million Ukrainians have been displaced by the conflict, with an estimated 5 million directly affected. Despite a prior ceasefire, more than 1,200 homes in the town of Horlivka have been destroyed by military actions since the beginning of August according to United Nations reports. In addition to food, water and sanitation concerns, the UN is now reporting a polio outbreak in Eastern Ukraine – and this in a nation working hard to stave off default, battling with high rates of unemployment and inflation, while dealing with the unsettling influence of far-right groups like Svoboda and Right Sector.
Political division, within and without
The war has taken a heavy toll on both civilians and politicians. Just days after the Kiev attack, Ukraine’s National Security Council approved a new military policy that calls for Ukraine to join NATO and “officially establishes the Russian Federation as Ukraine's military opponent,” according to Poroshenko. But at the same time that the President upped the ante with Russia, just 24 percent of Ukrainians approved of his leadership and policies according to a recent poll. The same lack of trust has permeated the government run by Arseniy Yatseniuk of the People’s Front, a party that currently enjoys the support of 2.8% of Ukrainians.
It’s no surprise then that former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, now governor of Odessa, has mounted an all-out attack against Yatseniuk, blaming the Prime Minister for throttling reforms in what he called “sabotage by [a] central government” that services the interests of oligarchs. The fact that Saakashvili’s remarks were made on Poroshenko’s own Channel 5 and were dovetailed by a petition published on the website of the Presidency signed by almost 30,000 of his supporters recommending the former Georgian President to replace Yatseniuk as PM have caused much chatter in Kiev.
And that’s not the only name churned out by the rumor mill as a potential replacement for Yateseniuk. Surprisingly enough, Dmitry Firtash, the head of the Ukrainian Employer’s Federation is also allegedly considered for the Premiership. As a result of a court case he won in late April in Vienna, Firtash emerged as one of the most influential figures in Ukrainian politics. The Austrian judge dismissed the charges leveled against him by the FBI on grounds that they were “politically motivated” after hearing evidence from Firtash that he had played an instrumental role in securing the presidency for Poroshenko. While nominating such a divisive figure seems highly unlikely at this point, it’s becoming quite clear that the unity of the Ukrainian political class is fraying, as Yatseniuk’s party hemorrhages support.
Political infighting is also afflicting the separatist Donetsk region, where reports of power struggles and leadership changes, directed by Moscow, suggesting elections in the region are hardly around the corner. Additionally, President Francois Hollande has stated that the time to organize the elections (approximate three months) would mean that “we would go beyond the date that was set for the Minsk [process], that is to say, [beyond] 31 December”. Today, the question thus becomes, can Ukraine be reconciled within the coming months?
The project of Ukrainian reconciliation
The public opinion numbers on a reconciliation between the majority of Ukrainians aren’t encouraging. According to a 2015 poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, at 92.6 percent, believe the country is divided, and only 40 percent of them think that such a reconciliation is possible – and that’s only true if Russia withdraws from Ukraine’s affairs.
In Donbass, it’s just 17.5 percent who see reconciliation as possible, while 37.5 say they are “too different” to live in the same country. Anecdotally, both sides think in terms of hostile enemies when speaking of other Ukrainians – which makes the difficult task of healing all the more necessary for a Ukraine that seeks unity and self-determination in negotiating with both East and West.
For a Ukraine devastated by competing brands of nationalism, and increasingly wary of both the violence of extremists and the vitriol in political discourse, increasing local autonomy may be the only way to start the reconciliation process and protect the country’s hard-won commitments to democracy. If seen through, it also may be what, finally, keeps Ukraine from falling apart.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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Unexpected Political Shifts in Ukraine
October 23, 2015
It is easy to use the metaphor of a fragile Ukraine as a symbol of the post-Soviet struggle for political and economic self-determination, or emblematic of an alarming New Cold War rooted in the same old script that pits Putin’s Russia against the Western influences of the U.S., EU and NATO. It’s easy because those realities are undeniably true, but at the same time they fail to affirm Ukraine’s own agency, however conflicted it might be.
This narrative of a country torn “in between,” whose core interests are essentially derivative of Great Powers, has been the default setting throughout much of Ukraine’s history and defines the policies that continue to shape that history. What’s harder, but now imperative – particularly in light of Kiev’s move in favor of decentralized local self-rule – is for Ukrainians to speak with a new resolve to forge a multicultural identity, negotiate a difficult internal reconciliation and emerge as a unified nation within, but not subordinate to, its geopolitical context. To this extent, the October 25th local elections will be nothing short of a litmus test.
The challenges that an ailing Ukraine faces are formidable. The announcement from President Petro Poroshenko on constitutional changes that would increase regional autonomy – changes that were met with guarded approval from France and Germany for their potential to resolve civil conflict in the Donbass – resulted in a gruesome grenade attack in Kiev, killing three. The self-rule measures are bitterly opposed by many Ukrainians, as civilians and military personnel alike have suffered during the protracted fighting with secessionist rebels.
More recently, the Russia-Ukraine talks held in Paris on October 2, which according to Poroshenko established “a truce” between the new nations, effectively prolonged the Minsk ceasefire and secured a deal for elections and weapons pullback. But if on September 17 Bloomberg reported that the truce was being upheld with the Ukrainian army starting to withdraw weapons from the frontline in Donetsk, the same day UNIAN information agency revealed that two Ukrainian soldiers had been wounded due to open fire from the rebels, casting a shadow over new commitments to put an end to the 18-month war in the Donbas.
Indeed, as of August, more than 2.3 million Ukrainians have been displaced by the conflict, with an estimated 5 million directly affected. Despite a prior ceasefire, more than 1,200 homes in the town of Horlivka have been destroyed by military actions since the beginning of August according to United Nations reports. In addition to food, water and sanitation concerns, the UN is now reporting a polio outbreak in Eastern Ukraine – and this in a nation working hard to stave off default, battling with high rates of unemployment and inflation, while dealing with the unsettling influence of far-right groups like Svoboda and Right Sector.
Political division, within and without
The war has taken a heavy toll on both civilians and politicians. Just days after the Kiev attack, Ukraine’s National Security Council approved a new military policy that calls for Ukraine to join NATO and “officially establishes the Russian Federation as Ukraine's military opponent,” according to Poroshenko. But at the same time that the President upped the ante with Russia, just 24 percent of Ukrainians approved of his leadership and policies according to a recent poll. The same lack of trust has permeated the government run by Arseniy Yatseniuk of the People’s Front, a party that currently enjoys the support of 2.8% of Ukrainians.
It’s no surprise then that former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, now governor of Odessa, has mounted an all-out attack against Yatseniuk, blaming the Prime Minister for throttling reforms in what he called “sabotage by [a] central government” that services the interests of oligarchs. The fact that Saakashvili’s remarks were made on Poroshenko’s own Channel 5 and were dovetailed by a petition published on the website of the Presidency signed by almost 30,000 of his supporters recommending the former Georgian President to replace Yatseniuk as PM have caused much chatter in Kiev.
And that’s not the only name churned out by the rumor mill as a potential replacement for Yateseniuk. Surprisingly enough, Dmitry Firtash, the head of the Ukrainian Employer’s Federation is also allegedly considered for the Premiership. As a result of a court case he won in late April in Vienna, Firtash emerged as one of the most influential figures in Ukrainian politics. The Austrian judge dismissed the charges leveled against him by the FBI on grounds that they were “politically motivated” after hearing evidence from Firtash that he had played an instrumental role in securing the presidency for Poroshenko. While nominating such a divisive figure seems highly unlikely at this point, it’s becoming quite clear that the unity of the Ukrainian political class is fraying, as Yatseniuk’s party hemorrhages support.
Political infighting is also afflicting the separatist Donetsk region, where reports of power struggles and leadership changes, directed by Moscow, suggesting elections in the region are hardly around the corner. Additionally, President Francois Hollande has stated that the time to organize the elections (approximate three months) would mean that “we would go beyond the date that was set for the Minsk [process], that is to say, [beyond] 31 December”. Today, the question thus becomes, can Ukraine be reconciled within the coming months?
The project of Ukrainian reconciliation
The public opinion numbers on a reconciliation between the majority of Ukrainians aren’t encouraging. According to a 2015 poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, at 92.6 percent, believe the country is divided, and only 40 percent of them think that such a reconciliation is possible – and that’s only true if Russia withdraws from Ukraine’s affairs.
In Donbass, it’s just 17.5 percent who see reconciliation as possible, while 37.5 say they are “too different” to live in the same country. Anecdotally, both sides think in terms of hostile enemies when speaking of other Ukrainians – which makes the difficult task of healing all the more necessary for a Ukraine that seeks unity and self-determination in negotiating with both East and West.
For a Ukraine devastated by competing brands of nationalism, and increasingly wary of both the violence of extremists and the vitriol in political discourse, increasing local autonomy may be the only way to start the reconciliation process and protect the country’s hard-won commitments to democracy. If seen through, it also may be what, finally, keeps Ukraine from falling apart.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
